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Sacrifice in Modernity: Community, Ritual, Identity
Joachim Duyndam, Anne-Marie Korte and Marcel Poorthuis
Sacrifice, Opfer, Yajna – the various terms for sacrifice that can be found across 
different religious traditions show the many aspects that are perceived as 
constituting its core business, such as making holy, gift-giving, exchange, or 
the loss of something valuable. Since the mid 19th century, scholars studying 
written or performed sacrificial acts have tried to capture its essence with 
concepts such as bribery (Edward Burnett Tylor), a gift to the gods (Marcel 
Mauss), an act of consensual violence (René Girard), or a matter of cooking 
(Charles Malamoud). The act of offering sacrifices is undoubtedly one of the 
most universal religious phenomena. From time immemorial, offering a sac-
rifice has been considered the proper way to approach the godhead. Whether 
the goods to be offered were products from the harvest, the firstlings of the 
flock, flowers, or flour, the believers expressed their gratitude, begged for 
divine favours or tried to appease the godhead or the community.1 The trans-
formations – or re-embodiments – of sacrifice that have taken place in many 
religions have included prayer, almsgiving, fasting, continence, and even mar-
tyrdom. These acts not only imply an effort to offer something of value, but 
often also a form of self-surrender, a surrender to the divine. However, these 
sacrificial religious practices, as such, seem to have lost most of their relevance 
and resonance in the context of modern western societies. Secularization and 
the decline of institutional religion have rendered them obsolete, dissolving the 
specific contexts and discourses that made these practices self-evident and 
meaningful.
But is this indeed the case? In this volume, consisting of a collection of stud-
ies into contemporary forms and manifestations of sacrifice, or sacrifice-like 
activities, it is argued that religious phenomena such as sacrifice, even when 
they have lost their significance as a strictly religious ritual, have persisted in 
manifold manifestations. Philosophers and sociologists of religion have argued 
that the classical secularization thesis, which states that religion declines when 
science makes progress, is no longer tenable for large parts of the modern 
world. They view, on the one hand, secularization as an intrinsic outcome 
1   Catherine Bell, Ritual: Perspectives and Dimensions (New York: Oxford University Press 1997), 
112: “Some form of sacrifice can be found in almost all societies.”
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of, especially, Christianity,2 and point, on the other, to a nascent post-secular 
condition of western societies.3 Without reaching any definitive conclusions 
about these tendencies, the studies that follow explore the centrality of rituals 
of sacrifice in a variety of areas, such as politics, daily and communal life, 
ethics, art, and popular culture. Indeed, the subtitle of this book has been aptly 
chosen: among the cases that will be covered are the Harry Potter book series, 
the movies of the Twilight Saga, and present day self-sacrificing caregiving. 
Without a doubt, many of these examples draw upon centuries old sacrificial 
patterns and images and can only be understood in combination with a thor-
ough knowledge of sacrifice in all its ramifications.
Although the phenomenon of sacrifice is a central characteristic of most 
religious traditions, at first glance it seems difficult to fathom it in the context 
of modernity. Why is it that sacrifice takes on the appearance of an opaque, 
old-fashioned religious phenomenon, pervaded with strangeness, while at 
the same time it appears to excite a great topical fascination? In recent years, 
scholars in cultural anthropology, theology, religious studies, and philosophy 
have put sacrifice on the agenda again, pointing out the complex and emotion-
ally charged relations between sacrifice and violence, self-sacrifice and auton-
omy, and religious martyrdom and terrorism. In research and debates, they 
have attempted to get to the heart of the current fascination with sacrifice.4 
2   Especially in France, this thesis has found its protagonists, such as Jean-Luc Nancy, Luc Ferry, 
Giorgio Agamben, and Gianni Vattimo. In a way, the Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor 
belongs to the same trend.
3   José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1994); Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007); 
Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on Post-Secular Society”, New Perspectives Quarterly 25, no. 4 (2008): 
17–29.
4   See Jonneke Bekkenkamp and Yvonne Sherwood, eds, Sanctified Aggression: Legacies of 
Biblical and Post-Biblical Vocabularies of Violence (London: T & T Clark International, 2003); 
Dennis King Keenan, The Question of Sacrifice (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2006); Jan N. Bremmer, The Strange World of Human Sacrifice (Leuven: Peeters, 2007); 
Paul Kahn, Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror and Sovereignty (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University 
of Michigan Press, 2008); Kathryn McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence: A Comparative 
Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2008); Cleo McNelly Kearns, 
The Virgin Mary, Monotheism, and Sacrifice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); 
William T. Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2009); Sarah Coakley, Sacrifice Regained: Reconsidering the Rationality of Christian Belief 
(inaugural lecture as Norris-Hulse Professor of Divinity at the University of Cambridge, 
October 13, 2009); Stanley Hauerwas, “Sacrificing the Sacrifices of War,” in Religion and Politics 
of Peace and Conflict (eds Linda Hogan and Dylan Lee Lehrke; Princeton: Princeton Theo-
logical Monograph, 2009), 83–104; Ingolf U. Dalferth, “Self-sacrifice: from the Act of Violence 
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This fascination seems to coincide with an increasing dissemination of the 
term ‘sacrifice’ outside the strictly religious domain, it being applied to various 
phenomena within the public and private spheres that relate sacrifice to, on 
the one hand, self-destruction and merciless terror, and, on the other hand, to 
devotion, submission, and self-effacement for the benefit of other people. The 
violent aspect of sacrifice seems often to be over-emphasized, perhaps due to 
the highly influential theories of the French philosopher René Girard, on the 
one hand, and the (over)representation of instances of ‘terrorist’ martyrdom in 
the media, on the other. However, a sacrifice can also express gratitude, praise, 
community spirit, and commitment to the poor, and for many of the faithful 
the primary meaning of a sacrificial act is best captured in these rather benign 
dimensions.
The approach to sacrifice guiding this volume is not confined to the dynam-
ics of violence and victimization that often dominates contemporary interests 
and theories of sacrifice in public debates and academic discussions. We locate 
our starting point in three central and interlocking aspects of sacrificial perfor-
mance: sacrifice as a community focused act, sacrifice as a ritually performed 
act, and sacrifice as an act that is constitutive of (individual or collective) 
identity. These three angles each point to conjunctures of religiously acknowl-
edged and contemporarily (re)discovered aspects of sacrifice. Combined, 
these three angles render it possible to address the actual multifacetedness 
of the phenomenon of sacrifice, and to identify and evaluate its contemporary 
fascination. These three dimensions make up the three main sections of this 
book, and in this introduction we clarify the choices and procedures that have 
engendered its content.
1 Sacrifice: Changes and Challenges
Sacrifice in Modernity: Community, Ritual, Identity addresses the above intro-
duced conglomerate of questions about the (re)appearance and  (re)inter-
pretation of sacrifice in contemporary societies. It represents the outcome of 
an interdisciplinary and interreligious academic research project examining 
the current fascination with sacrifice, both in the light of its classic religious 
to the Passion of Love,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68, no. 1–3 (2010), 77–94; 
Douglas Hedley, Sacrifice Imagined: Violence, Atonement, and the Sacred (New York, London: 
Continuum, 2011); John Dunnill, Sacrifice and the Body: Biblical Anthropology and Christian 
Self-Understanding (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013); A. Houtman, M. Poorthuis, J. Schwartz, and 
Y. Turner eds, The Actuality of Sacrifice, Past and Present (Leiden: Brill, 2015).
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origins and meanings, and through the study of present-day appropriations of 
sacrifice and their interpretations. Bringing together these two fields of study 
in an ongoing academic discussion has been one of the project’s explicit aims. 
This joint research project has been organized through a thematic research 
group (2009–2012) supported by the Netherlands School of Advanced Studies 
in Theology and Religion (NOSTER). Scholars from various backgrounds 
and disciplines (religious studies, theology, philosophy, cultural and literary 
studies) have joined the project, with participants coming from the Netherlands 
and Flanders.5
A central tenet informing the explorations in this volume is the acknowledg-
ment that religious developments have steadily changed the idea and practices 
of sacrifice, while the extraordinary power and the impact of sacrifice have, 
in turn, made specific contributions to the development of religious practice 
and reflection. For instance, not only classical antiquity but also Judaism and 
Christianity have experienced a decisive turn towards “the discovery of the 
inner self” during the first centuries of our era.6 In the history of sacrificial 
practices, we simultaneously notice a transition from the literal sacrificing of 
animals, crops, and libations to more abstract and spiritualized sacrifices in the 
form of religious study, prayer, charity, and ascetic practices.7 Furthermore, 
the discovery of the inner self has produced new views on corporality and 
guilt while also changing the function and meaning of ritual as such, and these 
changes have transformed and ‘reinvented’ sacrifice. Buddhism, too, shows a 
spiritual reinterpretation of sacrifice as practiced in Hinduism.8 Still, the Vedic 
sacrifice is seen as the oldest sacrificial practice in human history, and to this 
day sacrifice constitutes the heart of Hindu religion.9
5   See also www.noster.org.
6   Jan Assmann and Guy Stroumsa, eds, Transforming the Inner Self in Ancient Religions (Leiden: 
Brill, 1999).
7   Guy Stroumsa, La fin du sacrifice: Mutations religieuses de l’antiquité tardive (Paris: Odile 
Jacob, 2005).
8   James Egge, Sacrifice and Purification: The Meanings of Religious Giving in Theravada 
Buddhism (PhD diss., The University of Chicago, 1998); Reiko Ohnuma, Head, Eyes, Flesh, and 
Blood: Giving Away the Body in Indian Buddhist Literature (New York, Chichester: Columbia 
University Press, 2007).
9   Frits Staal, ed., Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 
1983); David M. Knipe, Hinduism: Experiments in the Sacred (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); 
Selvanayagam Israel, The dynamics of Hindu traditions: The Teape Lectures on Sacrifice, Gita, 
and Dialogue (Bangalore: Asian Trading Corporation, 1996); Kathryn McClymond, “Death 
Be Not Proud: Reevaluating the Role of Killing in Sacrifice,” International Journal of Hindu 
Studies 6, no. 3 (2002): 221–242; Timothy Lubin, “Veda on Parade: Revivalist Ritual as Civic 
Spectacle,” Journal of the American Academy of Religion 69, no. 2 (2001): 377–408.
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Sacrifice, as conceptualized and practiced in various religious traditions, 
has not only experienced major changes, it has also constantly propelled oppo-
sition, legitimization, debate, and reflection. Therefore, sacrifice has been at 
the heart of religious practice as well as of formative religious narratives, imag-
ery and disputes. Famous stories from the Torah, the Qurʾan, and the Bible – 
such as Genesis 22, “Abraham’s sacrifice”, and the passion of Christ – mirror 
sacrificial practices and comment on them simultaneously.10 Theological dis-
cussions from the history of religion display the ongoing urge to restate the 
meaning of sacrifice, evoked by the engraved place it occupies in scripture and 
liturgy. From time to time new debates emerge which call for reinterpretation 
of ideas of sacrifice in old and venerated texts. For example, in patristic texts 
on the biblical figure of Samson we can find a fierce battle over the question 
of whether Samson, by destroying the temple, his enemies, and himself in 
one final gesture, was a martyr or someone who merely committed suicide – 
and even whether what he did was an act of religious terrorism. Other issues 
have retained their relevance to this day, such as whether Christ’s death on the 
cross should be seen as a unique and single sacrifice or whether – as its conse-
quence – a sacrificial attitude is expected and required from a believer as well. 
This issue continues to divide Roman Catholics and Protestants. Is sacrifice 
ultimately an achievement and a means to influence the deity, or does it imply 
submission to the source of life?11
Still, it is our conviction that the relevance of sacrifice for understanding 
modernity’s inner tensions, in particular regarding the establishment of com-
munity, the practice of rituals and the formation of (individual and collective) 
identity, goes much further than only these isolated issues. This is why we have 
brought together various present-day approaches to sacrifice: philosophical 
perspectives (from the work of, among others, Giorgio Agamben, René Girard, 
10   See e.g. Jacob Milgrom, The Binding of Isaac: The Akedah, a Primary Symbol in Jewish 
Thought and Art (Berkeley, CA: Bibal Press, 1988); Aharon Agus, The Binding of Isaac 
and Messiah: Law, Martyrdom and Deliverance in Early Rabbinic Religiosity (Albany, 
New York: State University of New York Press, 1988); Carol Delaney, Abraham on Trial: 
The Social Legacy of Biblical Myth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Daniel 
Boyarin, Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of Christianity and Judaism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999); Jerome I. Gellman, Abraham! Abraham! Kierkegaard 
and the Hasidim on the Binding of Isaac (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003); Ed Noort and Eibert 
Tigchelaar, eds, The Sacrifice of Isaac: The Aqedah (Genesis 22) and its Interpretations 
(Leiden: Brill, 2002); Edward Kessler, Bound by the Bible: Jews, Christians and the Sacrifice 
of Isaac (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Lippman Bodoff, The Binding 
of Isaac, Religious Murders & Kabbalah: Seeds of Jewish Extremism and Alienation? 
(Jerusalem, New York: Devora Publishing Company, 2005).
11   Ivan Strenski, Theology and the First Theory of Sacrifice (Leiden: Brill, 2003).
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Julia Kristeva, Emmanuel Levinas, Jean-Luc Nancy, and Slavoj Žižek); multi-
disciplinary debates on autonomy and heteronomy; gender-related  questions 
(as put forth by, among others, Carol Delaney, Nancy Jay, Julia Kristeva, 
Wendy Doniger, Grace Jantzen, Sarah Coakley); ethnological studies; political 
issues (terrorism, fundamentalism); and theological disputes. Together, these 
approaches constitute an exciting challenge for interdisciplinary and socially 
relevant academic research, which has been the aim of this project from 
the outset.
We have recognized that the term sacrifice refers to a profusion of views and 
practices, ranging from the actual sacrificing and killing of animals, people, or 
oneself on behalf of a higher good (a deity, an ideal) to the substitutive and 
symbolic sacrificing of crops and gifts. Although it is probably impossible to 
locate one essential characteristic that is shared by all views on sacrifice or 
common to all sacrificial practices, there are networks of similarities, such 
as the ritualistic character of some sacrificial practices, the symbolic mean-
ings of others, the way in which the loss implied in sacrifice is legitimized and 
assessed, or the gift-like character (in either a generous or an economic sense) 
of sacrifice.
In Beyond Sacred Violence: A Comparative Study of Violence (2008), Kathryn 
McClymond, a comparative scholar of religion, distinguishes six contempo-
rary approaches to sacrifice: as a dramatized myth; as an exchange or trade; 
as something people eat (a meal or cuisine); as a ritual without a function, 
goal, or (symbolic) meaning (structuralism); as a gender-related issue; and as 
violence.12 During the first phase of the project that has led to this book, 
Kathryn McClymond was invited to elaborate on her approach and to eluci-
date its value for interdisciplinary and comparative research of religion(s). 
We are very grateful for her generous and stimulating contributions to the 
initial debates and presentations of this research project, and we are delighted 
that she has written the epilogue, in which she discusses the contributions 
to this volume in light of the comparative study of sacrifice. She rejects the 
facile association of sacrifice with violence. A community’s enjoyment of rit-
ual can also convey an identity of sharing and celebration. Vegetarian sacrifice, 
flowers, and frankincense, wine libations, prayer and charity – there are many 
ways to celebrate life without resorting to violence. The threefold division of 
approaches in this volume, indeed, allows for a much broader exploration 
of sacrifice, in which the non-violent elements of sacrifice receive as much 
attention as the violent aspects.
12   McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence, 1–24.
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2 Three Exemplary Narratives
In order to trace the present-day challenge of sacrifice in its many manifes-
tations, this research project has taken its departure in three exemplary nar-
ratives about sacrifice, each stemming from a different religious tradition. In 
the first stages of the research collaboration, these narratives were presented 
to all the participants. After the formation of three groups, studying sacrifice 
from the angle of community, ritual, and identity respectively, the narratives 
were distributed and taken up in the separate groups’ deliberations. Hence, 
each section opens with a presentation and analysis of one of these key nar-
ratives, describing a religious sacrifice in a traditional setting: an African com-
munity ritual, a Hindu fire ritual, and the Islamic feast that commemorates 
Ibrahim’s readiness to sacrifice his son. The discussion of the key narratives 
offers detailed insight into the act of sacrifice as way of establishing commu-
nity, executing ritual, and marking one’s identity. By focusing on the sacrifice 
as performed or written and exploring their particular context and details, the 
concerned authors have created a hermeneutical space for discussing the par-
ticular complexity of these sacrifices and confronting their often hybrid and 
enigmatic character. For instance, rather than a simple bargain of do ut des 
(I give in order that you give), the sacrifice may denote an acute awareness of 
life as a gift to be enjoyed, and to be shared by those who need it, and conse-
crated to the divinity who is considered the real owner of it. Hence, sacrifice 
may denote charity as well as violence, responsibility for the other as well as 
victimizing the other.
In each section of the book the introduction of the key narrative is followed 
by the contributions of an interdisciplinary cluster of authors. They were 
invited to respond to the key narrative and to connect it to a concrete case, 
narrative, or practice of sacrifice from either their own or a different religious 
tradition (depending on their own choice). In a series of meetings (both gen-
eral and per cluster) the authors have discussed the individual contributions. 
Their topics and approaches will be introduced here by section.
3 Section I: Sacrifice and Community
The first section highlights the communal character of sacrifice. The home 
sacrifice of the Kapsiki, living in Nigeria and Cameroon, is meticulously ana-
lysed by the cultural anthropologist Walter van Beek, showing how family 
ties are renewed and re-established during the celebration of the sacrificial 
meal. Simultaneously, the implicit exclusion of some family members and 
Duyndam, Korte and Poorthuis�0
 acquaintances makes clear that communal sacrifices have a complex mech-
anism of inclusion and exclusion. The remarkable privileged position of the 
blacksmith only stresses this mechanism further.
Exploring similar and other community establishing dynamics and effects 
of sacrificial acts, the next contributions in this first section take their inspira-
tion from the refined anthropological research into the Kapsiki home sacri-
fice. Philosopher of religion Theo de Wit, debating the ideal of offering one’s 
life for a political community in historical and philosophical perspective, 
demonstrates how soldiers who have died in war are often viewed as martyrs 
who have sacrificed their lives for their country, thereby strictly demarcating 
one’s own community from that of the other/the enemy. The question arises 
whether every state needs an enemy in order to create internal coherence and 
a sense of community.
The highly enigmatic movie The sacrifice, by the famous Russian filmmaker 
Andrei Tarkovsky, suggests that performing a sacrifice might have implications 
for the global community. An impending nuclear disaster can be averted if the 
main character is willing to sacrifice his possessions. Even his son’s life is jeop-
ardized in the end. As such, the protagonist seems to be in a similar plight 
as the patriarch Abraham. Frederiek Depoortere, a theologian from Leuven 
University, draws parallels to philosophical reflections by Nietzsche and Žižek. 
Whether the obligation to sacrifice is either a phantasmagoric delusion or a 
genuine obligation towards the godhead remains ambiguous.
The German poet Friedrich Hölderlin offers another artistic expression of 
sacrifice, in which the poet seems to allude to himself as the glorified hero – 
or the victim – which brings up the relationship between the individual 
and the community. Humanistic scholar Rebecca Prevoo and philosophical 
anthropologist Joachim Duyndam analyse the different versions of the tragedy 
of the Greek philosopher Empedocles, who threw himself in the Mount Etna 
volcano. His self-destruction could be explained as a reaction to the people’s 
contempt, in which case Empedocles took it upon himself to assume the role 
of a scapegoat. Even then, the sacrifice and the community maintain an intrin-
sic relationship.
The expression “sacrifice of the self” may point to violence and a denial of 
autonomy, but the researcher of humanistic studies Saskia van Goelst Meijer 
points out that freedom fighters, like Gandhi and Martin Luther King, use 
precisely this expression to describe what they see as a prerequisite for non-
violence. However, what they point to is a very different understanding of 
(self-)sacrifice, one that actually leads to autonomy and empowerment. In any 
case, an easy dismissal of the concept of “sacrifice of the self” as no longer 
being acceptable to modern people is apparently not a viable option. Noting 
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the non-violent connotation of sacrifice, her views align with those of Kathryn 
McClymond, who we have already mentioned.
4 Section II: Sacrifice and Ritual
The second section, on sacrifice and ritual, opens with a narrative from Vedic 
Hinduism. Myths about the origin of sacrifices are strongly intertwined with 
rituals, which revives the old debate about the priority of myth over rite, or 
vice-versa. Again, there is a shifting away from the facile association of sacri-
fice with violence. At first sight, these highly intricate and age-old rituals seem 
to escape logic as well as explanation. Indologist Albertina Nugteren empha-
sizes their refined creative connotations: creation itself is re-enacted in these 
rituals. As such, the ritual of sacrifice transgresses the thin demarcation line 
between the rational and the irrational, between the functional and the sacred, 
the linear and the cyclic, as well as between human and animal existence.
Early Christianity had its own perspective on sacrifice. The rituals of sacri-
fice were transformed into the Eucharist rather than abolished, the historian 
of Christian theology Gerard Rouwhorst argues. Although the bloody sacri-
fices were considered a pagan remnant or a Jewish practice that should not 
be continued, the sacrificial terminology and the reminiscences of the Temple 
remained in force. Even the practice of bringing food to be distributed to the 
poor to the Church, thereby transforming sacrifice into charity, can be docu-
mented in early Christianity and has remained relevant to this day.
The unexpected relevance of sacrifice to the position of religion in modern 
society came up with the debate in the Netherlands about the ritual slaugh-
ter of animals in Judaism and Islam. Voices to stop this practice altogether 
received unexpected support. Historian Bart Wallet demonstrates how this 
debate comes up time and again, sometimes initiated by extreme right-wing 
parties, at other times by environmental activists – not to mention the medical 
profession. The supposedly cruel sacrificial ritual fuels the image of religion as 
an outdated phenomenon within Western society.
In the work of the Japanese Catholic novelist Shūsaku Endō, the theme of 
the relationship between humans and animals plays a considerable role as 
well. Theologian Sigrid Coenradie, exploring the theme of sacrificial substitu-
tion in Endō’s fictional works, describes a ritual process of Stellvertretung, the 
substitution of the human life by an animal, not unlike the story of Abraham 
and the ram. Coenradie’s comparative reading of sacrificial substitution in 
Endō’s narratives brings to light several interesting differences with regard to 
Abraham’s ritual focus and its moral consequences: in Gen. 22, the relationship 
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between Abraham and God seems to take priority over the human relationships 
of Abraham and his wife Sarah, his son Isaac, and his friend Eliezer, whereas 
the relationship of the main character in Endō’s stories to the unknown giver 
of the animal substitute seems to improve the relationship to his family.
Young girls can tell you all about it: the extremely popular vampire stories 
of the Twilight Saga, encompassing four bulky volumes and several films. 
Theologian and ethicist Grietje Dresen shows the highly erotic nature of the 
central notion of ritually shedding blood in the saga, paradoxically combined 
with a culture of sexual abstinence. Although the young – mostly female – 
readers recognize the fictional character of the saga, its strongly ‘romanticized’ 
vampire stories offer them the possibility to confront and appropriate the 
highly ambivalent ritual meanings of female blood that in many cultures con-
stitute the greatest taboo.
The so-called apocryphal story of the biblical heroine Judith has fascinated 
painters and libretto writers alike. The height of her heroic action is undoubt-
edly the display of the head of Holofernes, who was decapitated by this beau-
tiful woman while lying on his bed. The story ends, however, with Judith and 
the Israelites bringing the spoils to the Temple in Jerusalem to be dedicated to 
God. Biblical studies scholar Anne-Mareike Wetter discovered numerous ritu-
als and sacrificial acts in the biblical text. She draws a picture of Judith not as 
the violent femme fatale, which may be a modern projection of male fantasies, 
but as the embodiment of religious female creativity, via trajectories different 
from the traditional male ritual performance.
5 Section III: Sacrifice and Identity
Central to the third section, on sacrifice and identity, is the famous story, com-
mon to the three monotheistic religions, of the patriarch Abraham being asked 
by God to sacrifice his beloved son. Abraham/Ibrahim proves his identity as 
a firm believer and thus becomes the paragon of faith. Islamic theologian 
Abdelilah Ljamai acquaints us with this story as told in the Qurʾan. The wealth 
of commentaries makes clear that for Islam, when it comes to the question of 
the identity of the son, Ishmael is not the only option, as is often thought. The 
story remains a prime example of the act of sacrifice because of the three 
crucial elements of the enhancement of the identity of Abraham/Ibrahim by 
showing his faith, the conscious consent of the victim (the beloved son), and 
the replacement of the human victim with an animal. The redemption of the 
human victim by an animal sacrifice is celebrated as a major religious holiday 
in Islam.
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A phenomenological description of sacrifice in human relations makes 
clear that victimizing the other or victimizing oneself in order to influence 
the other can easily happen within families. As such, the redemptive value of 
sacrifice should be sought for in a therapeutic context, theologian and ethicist 
Mariéle Wulf argues. The free act of sacrificing oneself for the other should be 
distinguished from being branded as the scapegoat.
Gertrud von le Fort’s Die letzte am Schafott (1931, translated as The Song at 
the Scaffold) contains a severe criticism of imposing sacrifice upon someone 
else, theologian Marcel Poorthuis argues. The story pictures Carmelite sis-
ters resisting the confiscation of their convent during the French revolution 
and the condemnation to death of sixteen sisters. The highest and most self-
assured authority among the Carmelite nuns flees from the scaffold, whereas 
the young Sister Blanche, full of fear from her childhood onwards, joins her 
fellow nuns out of free will on their way to martyrdom. By recognizing one’s 
fear of death and by embracing life in all its beauty, can sacrifice have the 
meaning of enhancing one’s identity, Gertrud von Le Fort seems to profess.
Historian Marjet Derks tells the history of a spiritual Catholic movement of 
young women, the Grail movement. Initially, in the 1920s, sacrifice was consid-
ered the essence of this spiritual community. The founder, a charismatic priest, 
even advocated sacrificial and ascetic exercises especially for these women, 
because of their supposedly greater ability to bear pain. After the 1960s, how-
ever, the sacrificial language gave way to self-affirmation and autonomy. At 
times the initial predilection for sacrifice has even become flatly denied.
It is no coincidence that the ethics of care comes across the issue of self-
sacrifice so often. The easy solution, to replace self-sacrifice by autonomy and 
self-determination, does not satisfy ethicist Inge van Nistelrooij. She explores 
the ambiguous dimensions of caring for the other, both in its possibilities and 
its limitations. The tragic element in the awareness that more can always be 
done should not be ignored, but sustained.
Perhaps the most famous of the literary protagonists featured in this book is 
Harry Potter. Theologian Sigrid Coenradie sees striking similarities between his 
story and the biblical story of Abraham and his son, as well as between Harry’s 
and Jesus’ suffering and death. There is an element of vocation in Harry’s life, 
coupled with the fact that he never kills but, instead, is prepared to give his life 
out of love. Just like the son in the Qurʾanic story, Harry acts out of free will.
The story of Abraham being commanded to sacrifice his son constitutes a 
formidable challenge to modernity because of its seemingly heteronomous 
character. Although the story has a happy ending and militates against human 
sacrifice, the story does not fail to shock a modern predilection for autonomy. 
The many Jewish commentaries on the story of Abraham and Isaac introduce 
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an altogether new figure, Satan, by which the story receives a multilayered 
tapestry of ethical deliberations. Abraham’s readiness to sacrifice his son is 
traditionally considered to be proof of his identity as a believer in God. The 
post-Biblical re-readings strongly challenge this picture. Satan’s arguments 
seem to coincide with those brought forward by modern thought. Let us face it: 
he is the one who tempts Abraham not to kill his son. Theologian Elliot Lyons 
describes how in a strong dialectics of good and evil the Jewish Midrash por-
trays Abraham as almost the embodiment of evil and as being out of his wits, 
whereas Satan appears as the wise adviser. Even the offering of a lamb belongs 
to the latter’s recommendations, but apparently Abraham has to endure the 
test until the very end before this solution becomes relevant. It is clear that 
this way of re-interpreting the biblical story avoids a monolithic message of 
sacrifice, allowing all sorts of objections and new perspectives instead.
Ethics, responsibility, scapegoating, the individual and the community between 
autonomy and heteronomy, compassion, grace, creativity in the postmodern 
ritual, the relationship between humans and animals, which has become a 
highly relevant issue in modernity – these are only some of the themes that 
have proved relevant while pondering over the ongoing fascination with sac-
rifice. It is the axiom of this volume that substantive insight into modernity’s 
fascinations and paradoxes regarding community, ritual, and identity could be 
gained from a sacrificial perspective, or, at least, a perspective informed by the 
sacrificial practices, vicissitudes, and reflections of religious communities and 
traditions.
Part 1
 Sacrifice and Community
∵
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The Kapsiki Home Sacrifice
Walter E. A. van Beek
1 Introduction: The Setting
The Kapsiki/Higi are one of the numerous groups living in the area south 
of the Chad Basin, along the western edge of the Mandara Mountains strad-
dling the border between Cameroon and Nigeria. In Cameroon they live on a 
plateau at 1,000 meters surrounded by mountain ridges rising to 1,300 meters. 
The plateau is dotted with spectacular volcanic outcroppings. On the western 
side in Nigeria, the Higi, as the group is called there, cultivate the mountain 
ridges and the plains to the west extending farther into Nigeria. Before the pax 
colonialis, this mountain habitat offered good protection against slave raiding, 
while still allowing for subsistence cultivation. After colonial rule was estab-
lished, people gradually moved down from hilltops, spreading out over the 
plateau or into the lower river valleys.
The Kapsiki/Higi number about 200,000, the largest part living in Nigeria.1 
Situated in an old volcanic area, the plateau and hillsides are quite fertile and 
are cultivated on a permanent basis by crop rotation and few inputs. In fact, 
the mountains are well suited to labor intensive horticultural production using 
relatively simple technology and mixed husbandry, and that is how the Kapsiki 
make their living. Kapsiki villages are autonomous, within the formal political 
structures of present-day Cameroon and Nigeria. Each village has a traditional 
chief with a predominantly ritual function, and consists of several wards, each 
with a ward chief, mainly for administrative duties. The crucial social unit is 
the individual compound, rhè, housing a nuclear or extended family, usually 
polygynous. A classic mountainside, Kapsiki compound is a veritable fortress 
with its man-high stone wall, a reminder of the bad old days when walls formed 
a last defense against marauders. And, as we shall see in the sacrifice, the wall 
is still important.2
1   The 2003 Cameroonian census gives 96,000 Kapsiki; Nigerian figures are less reliable, but 
the Higi tend to be twice as many as the Cameroonian Kapsiki. I keep the conservative esti-
mate of 200,000, accounting for some over-reporting by censuses. See Walter E. A. van Beek, 
“Introduction,” in Contes Kapsiki du Cameroun (ed. Walter E. A. van Beek and H. Tourneux; 
Paris, Karthala, 2013), pp. 7–23.
2   Oxford University Press is thanked for its kind permission to use and rework material from 
Walter E. A. van Beek, The Dancing Dead. Ritual and Religion among the Kapsiki/Higi of North 
Cameroon and Northeastern Nigeria (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter 5.
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The man-high stone wall is a center of ritual attention. Its height shields the 
inhabitants from view or, as the Kapsiki say, it hides their poverty. At the narrow 
entrance, the wall is higher and bears many traces of former sacrifices and 
libations. The wall effectively separates the inside from the outside, the fam-
ily from the rest of the society, and kin from non-kin – distinctions resonat-
ing in the sacrifice. Outside the wall is situated the forecourt (derha), a lower 
structure serving as the social space of the rhè. The house as a whole is ori-
ented more or less north-south, as neither the setting nor the rising sun are 
allowed to shine directly through the opening of the wall; this would be con-
sidered unhealthy.
In the dry season, most family activities and all public functions take place 
in the entrance court, the derha. People freely enter the forecourt, but no 
stranger advances through the wall at the back of the derha without very good 
reason. Just behind the opening in the wall is the entrance hut proper, the 
dabala, a round hut with two openings, where the family cooks and eats in 
the wet season. The inside of the compound is divided into a male and a female 
side. The male side houses sleeping huts for the master of the house and his 
sons, and the female side has huts for each of the women. If the wives want to 
Foto � A Kapsiki compound from the outside.
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have their own kitchen, they have double huts, a kitchen plus a sleeping hut, 
but in many families the wives share a kitchen and have just sleeping huts. 
Each woman has her own washing spot between her sleeping hut and the wall, 
with a small outlet at the base of the wall, an important ritual spot, as women 
bury the umbilical cords and placentas of their children here. For a man it is a 
dangerous place that he will not readily enter, fearing for his virility.
The layout of a typical compound is as follows:
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2 The Sacrifice
Tlimu Vandu has consulted the crab diviner and received clear instructions 
about holding a melè rhè, a sacrifice in his compound, in honor of his father, 
Vandu Zra Tè, who had died two years before. The sacrifice is also held at the 
request of a close friend of his father’s.3 In the evening before the sacrifice, he 
buys some red beer, tè, to fill his sacrificial jar. In the early morning, at half past 
five, he takes a red rooster which he has bought at the market for this purpose, 
as instructed by the diviner. His neighbors are not aware of what is happening, 
and because visitors are not welcome, Tlimu closes the compound entrance 
with a large stick: Now it is taboo to enter the compound as a stranger. Only 
a smith may be invited to perform the sacrifice, but that is more usual when 
slaughtering a goat than a chicken.
Without any ritual preparation, Tlimu takes his large sacrificial jar, called 
melè, from under the granary, plucks the rooster’s neck (the jar has to taste the 
first blood), cuts it and lets the blood drip on the jar. He gently touches the jar 
with the dying rooster, saying:
My shala, here you have something to eat.4 Father, here is your friend, he 
has not forgotten you. I have not seen you for a long time and people 
have arrived after your burial to honor you with the tè shingli, in order for 
the people to be healthy, healthy after your demise.
He throws the rooster on the ground, and watches how it dies. If the dying ani-
mal flaps its wings, shala5 (god) has accepted the sacrifice: “Thank you, shala, 
3   That, in fact, is me. I asked for this sacrifice for two reasons. Vandu Zratè was a close friend 
and I could not attend his funeral, which happened while I was in The Netherlands. Also, 
attending a sacrifice that is not one’s own is difficult in Kapsiki religion, and I liked to partici-
pate in this one – a typical example – and participatory dilemma – of a close friendship that 
is instrumental as well.
4   Shala ta da, nde wusu kezeme ashè gè. In order not to confuse readers, I use a simplified 
orthography for the Kapsiki language, officially called Psekyè, in which implosive consonants 
are not marked.
5   The notion of shala is complex. Though increasingly used to indicate some kind of monothe-
istic being, it in fact is a personal god: Every Kapsiki has his or her own shala, but at a certain 
level they shade over into each other. See Van Beek, The Dancing Dead, chapter 6, as well as 
Walter E. A. van Beek, “Why things go wrong. Agency and evil among the Kapsiki of North 
Cameroon,” in Agency and Changing World Views in Africa (eds Dieter Neubert and Christine 
Scherer; Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2014), 73–98.
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thank you shala”.6 If not, he would be disappointed but would not repeat the 
sacrifice. Then Tlimu walks round the inside of the wall, counter clockwise, 
slapping the bloodied neck of the rooster against the wall, as a part of the ritual 
called kayisù yindlu (sprinkle the wall). He ends his round in the dabala, where 
some of his children sit around a small fire. With a glowing ember he singes 
the feathers of the rooster and holds it for a moment over his children’s heads. 
With two of his sons taking the rooster’s legs, Tlimu cuts off the legs and throws 
them into the compound – “for his father” – to be eaten later. The oldest son 
takes over one of his father’s duties, puts some of the intestines, especially the 
liver, on the melè and starts roasting the chicken. The whole procedure appears 
a routine, ‘work’ as Tlimu calls it, and the children know what to do. It is done 
quickly, and at 6.30 am the family is in the dabala, waiting for the rooster and 
some mush, cooked by one of Tlimu’s daughters. His whole family cannot be 
present as its size is spectacular (four wives and 37 children, with numerous 
grandchildren)7 but the youngest are there. When the animal is roasted, Tlimu 
takes his melè again from under the granary, picks up a piece of the rooster’s 
liver, some mush, and with his right hand smears the mix on the melè. He then 
takes a mouthful of beer from the jar and sprinkles his breast, for the mpisu 
hwu, spitting on the chest, a rite aimed at the “bad thoughts in the heart”, espe-
cially bad thoughts about other people.
Shala, give me health.8 Take the evil out of my belly, make me healthy, 
I say. I have to hear the words from outside. Whoever is jealous, I trample 
under my feet. Our children, who have stayed behind, we should not be 
jealous. Whatever illness we have should disappear like the wind. May 
the illness pass because you want it.9 [Words from the ‘outside’ means 
that any news, bad news, comes from another home.]
6   Hana shala, hana shala.
7   Tlimu is a highly successful husband and father, as discussed at length in Walter E. A. van 
Beek, “Dynamic of Kapsiki/Higi marriage exchanges,” in Les échanges et la communication 
dans le bassin du lac Tchad (eds Sergio Baldi and Geraud Magrin; Naples: Studi Africanistici, 
Serie Ciado-Sudanese 6, 2014), 105–131.
8   Yita, ndeke da lèngelèle pe ‘ya. Pelu tengwela jive ’ya kafa rhena. Mpelè ya ngkede wundu nya 
kedema ntsu ta da mbe hwu seda.
9   Meaning that shala has to want the illness to disappear and thus has to be convinced by the 
speaker.
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Then one by one the children come along, and Tlimu smears liver on their 
chest: “Here, eat”. One crying toddler gets some meat in advance, the others 
simply wait.
Tlimu gives each of his wives, who are watching him from their hut, some 
mush which they put on her own melè, a small jar inside their hut. They have been 
discussing among them whether the whole family had to be called in, as far as 
feasible, or whether just the present kids were sufficient for the sacrifice. After 
some debate they decided that it was not a melè keshi, a lineage sacrifice, which 
the mention of their father-in-law might suggest, but indeed a melè rhè, house 
sacrifice. So just the ones present would do. Tlimu pours beer from the melè 
 Liver on the chest of the kids.
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in an plain white calabash (it should be a traditional oblong calabash, but he 
has none) and then one of the high points of the sacrifice follows batle melè, 
inundate the jar:
This is for you, Vandu, because your friendship has to be fresh, everybody 
has to be fresh after your death. Shala, let the wind take whatever is evil. 
Please have them return safely to their villages, for them to visit us again.
 Tlimu sacrificing on his melè.
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In the meantime a neighboring smith woman has come into the house – which 
is her right – as her presence enhances the status of the ritual. She loudly ulu-
lates and praises Tlimu for his work in keeping the house in order. Later her 
husband joins Tlimu in drinking from the melè; he has assisted Tlimu in build-
ing a hut, and now brings some rice from his daughter’s wedding for everyone 
to taste.10 A young son of Tlimu drinks first and the family gathers to drink the 
beer, the men around the melè, and the women in front of their own huts with 
the smith woman. When the beer in the melè is almost finished, Tlimu calls the 
men to witness the mekele melè (lifting the jar); they all watch Tlimu tilt 
the jar upside down to empty it, the end of the sacrifice proper, and the oldest 
of the men, his father’s friend drinks first of this last calabash. Finally, Tlimu 
puts the meat and mush in his personal vase and all finish the beer and eat, 
clapping their hands to thank shala.
10   Smiths form a special category of people in Kapsiki society. The men forge, divine, bury, 
make music or medicate, while their women make pottery and are specialized in treating 
children’s illnesses. Smiths, rerhè in Psekyè, are so by birth, marry among themselves, thus 
forming an endogamous echelon with a lower social status than the melu, the common 
Kapsiki. Smiths of both genders are welcome at melu sacrifices, due to their position as 
intermediaries between this existence and the “other world”. Cp. more general, Mircea 
Eliade, Schmiede und Alchemisten, (Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag 1956).
 Tlimu hands out the sacrifice to some of his children at the end of the sacrifice.
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Now that the first part of the sacrifice is over, the beam shutting the entrance 
is removed so neighbors are welcome once more. In the evening, the rooster is 
cooked as part of the evening meal. Then Tlimu takes some of the liver from 
the cooking pot with sorghum mush and puts the mix on the jar, which is back 
at its resting place under the granary: “Here, father, some food for you. Give me 
health, take the illness away”.11 The family then eats the mush and the rest of 
the rooster.
3 The Sacrificial Jar
The central object in the sacrifice is the melè, the sacrificial jar, a piece of 
pottery shaped like a standard beer jar but for a few symbols: It has a ring 
of small clay cones around the neck and a symbolic indication of the male 
or the female sex. Closed with a cow’s horn, its usual resting place is under a 
granary. The women keep theirs inside their own huts. Both parents can be 
represented in such a jar, and an individual can also have a special melè as 
circumstances dictate. One special type is the gumeze, a jar with a threefold 
neck with one opening. A man has this kind of melè made if he has killed 
someone in battle or if he has killed a special kind of bird. Killing this particu-
lar bird brings bad luck, like the death of a child, unless he has such a gumeze. 
If he killed someone in war, two jars are made, one large, one small. The small 
one receives the name of the victim and is buried in a field, while the larger one 
is used for sacrifices. The small one is dangerous and is not actually used; in his 
final spoken will, the owner of a gumeze has to tell his son where he has hidden 
the small jar. He is to break it when his father dies.
Another kind is called after the sun, veci, and looks just like a normal jar, 
so without any symbols. It is an exacting jar to own. Anyone who rises very 
early may see the sun at the horizon in the shape of a ram, ascending into 
heaven at sunrise. Viewing such a ram implies that it will rain in the morn-
ing, and the ram signifies the transition from moon to sun. In such a case it is 
wise to perform divination to ascertain who has to make the jar, who can drink 
from it and who cannot, and whether it has to be hidden. Such a veci demands 
many sacrifices, which can be a source of pride, if one is able to perform all 
those sacrifices.
A sacrificial jar is made at the death of a parent. Before that time a man has 
another type of melè, usually a flint stone the size of a fist, whereas a woman 
has just a small jar. A boy gets his flint from his father, a girl from her mother; 
11   Nde nganga wusu kezeme, yita. Ndeke da lèngèlènge, kelemte zererhwe nya kiku.
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during initiation a boy gets his first proper melè, while a girl uses a small jar 
as mèle presented during their first wedding12 and given by her groom. Smith 
women fabricate the melè, like all pottery. So after the death of his father a 
son orders one. When the mèle is ready, the blacksmith woman takes a fist-
ful of sorghum flour, mixes it with water and pours the mix on the jar with 
the words: “Let everyone be healthy”, which is also called batle melè, in fact a 
sacrifice in itself. Later the son gives her a huge bowl of millet flour; if he forgets 
it, she will harass him at his home, telling him that she is “so very hungry”. She 
also has to be invited at the first use of the jar, after the funeral rites, when it is 
inaugurated as a real melè, that is, as the representation of the parent. During 
the sacrifice, the melè is addressed as ‘father’ or ‘mother’. The jars serve only the 
direct descendants, as a personal melè is destroyed during one’s funeral rites. 
Therefore the melè can never represent a grandfather.
A melè proper, with the cones plus the genital decoration like Tlimu’s, is only 
for one son, the oldest firstborn son of one of the deceased’s wives, if possible 
his first bride. Other brothers, like the firstborn sons of other wives, have a veci 
made, and so have the younger brothers, just a smaller jar. This veci has no 
danger element. When they sacrifice on it, they do not call on their ‘father’ but 
on shala, god, as the connection with their father is through the proper melè 
only. If there is no son, the oldest daughter will take the melè.13
4 Varieties of Sacrifice
There are several types of home sacrifices. The one just described is, in prin-
ciple, just for the family, often generated by a problem and indicated by divina-
tion. More extensive home sacrifices, as we shall see, involve sacrificing a goat. 
But sometimes a quicker procedure is used, with a simple mix of sorghum flour 
with water. Most of the mixture is put on the entrance in the wall, the mè pelu.
12   Kapsiki marriage is unstable, and most women have more grooms, consecutively, the 
main theme of Walter E. A. van Beek, The Kapsiki of the Mandara Mountains (Prospect 
Heights: Waveland Press, 1987). The first marriage of a girl is a large ritual event, her even-
tual secondary marriages are much less ritualized.
13   When people convert to Christianity or Islam, these jars are the first things they leave 
behind, being the icons of the traditional religion; this holds not just for the Kapsiki, 
but also for other mountain cultures, such as the Mafa, their northern neighbors. See 
José van Santen, They leave their jars behind: the conversion of Mafa women to Islam 
(Leiden: VENA, 1993).
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Other types of sacrifices are classified depending on the social echelons 
of the village: A lineage sacrifice, a ward sacrifice, and the most important 
one, the village sacrifice.14 Any sacrifice consists of four essential elements: 
Slaughtering the animal, pouring upon the jar, spraying the belly, and putting 
food on the jar.
Though divination15 does give directions for the sacrifice, the variation rests 
in the detail: Who is allowed to be present, the color of the sacrificial animal, 
whether a blacksmith performs the ritual and any special words to be said. The 
format can be found in sacrifices at any social level. One common element 
in all sacrifices is chasing away “bad things” or “bad thoughts”, which are not 
defined in any greater detail but are ubiquitous. Evil has to leave, has to go to 
someone else; it has to be elsewhere, not here. Some evil is inevitable, so some-
one who should suffer, is possibly someone else.
The home sacrifice has also a larger variant, reaching beyond the confines 
of the compound. When the reason for the sacrifice is more important, that is, 
when social problems indicate a sacrifice, a goat has to be slaughtered. Yet the 
main difference is not the animal but beer. When a goat is sacrificed, the man 
has to brew the ritual beer of the Kapsiki,16 which provides the time frame for 
the major rituals in Kapsiki. The recipe for brewing beer is similar all over the 
world. One soaks sorghum grains in water for a day, and lets them sprout and 
dry. Sprouts in Kapsiki should not remain exposed to the air too long, because 
otherwise “the beer is for one’s one burial”.17 The brewing process includes a 
long cooking period, a day and a night, and then the beer is taken from the 
large cooking pot into beer jars, including the melè. For ritual beer, the brewer 
does not add yeast but he simply waits three days for the beer to ferment on 
its own. After the second day, the beer starts to ferment and is called sarerhè 
14   A special sacrifice in these Mandara Mountains involves the largest of all sacrificial 
animals, a bull hand-fed in the stable. This complicated sacrifice bears some quite dis-
tinct characteristics. See for the North of the Manadara area, Charlotte von Graffenried, 
Das Jahr des Stieres: Ein Opferritual der Zulgo und Gemjek in Nordkamerun (Studia 
Ethnographica Friburgensia 2, Freiburg: Freiburg Universitäts Verlag, 1984). For the 
Kapsiki variant, see Van Beek, Dancing Dead, chapter 5.
15   Usually with a crab. See Walter E. A. van Beek, The Smith in Kapsiki/Higi Culture, North 
Cameroon and Northeastern Nigeria (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2015), 
in press.
16   Walter E. A. van Beek, “Kapsiki Beer Dynamics,” in Ressources vivrières et choix alimen-
taires dans le bassin du lac Chad (eds Eric Garine, Olivier Langlois and Claude Raimond; 
Paris: IRD, 2006), 477–500.
17   The crux of the brewing process, viz. sprouting the sorghum, in effect is the very reason 
these people are called Kapsiki: psekè means to sprout.
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(the smith drinks), and then it will be used for sacrifice.18 The sacrifice follows 
the same general liturgy as the sacrifice of a chicken, but spitting on the belly 
and putting ground millet on the melè is only done if the diviner has specifi-
cally indicated the need to do so.
The man and his son keep the goat’s neck above the jar, and the father stabs 
it to let the first blood fall on the melè. Everybody listens to the man praying 
“Shala, let us all be healthy, here is something to eat”. The man cuts the throat 
of the animal, the blood is collected in a pot, and all who live in the compound 
put some of it on their own melè. With the goat dead, beer is poured in a special 
oblong calabash and the owner pours on his melè, asking for health, children 
and good feelings in the house and the ward. His son gives all people of the 
family some beer for their personal melè, and the man pours blood and beer 
on the entrance of the wall, putting some blood and beer every few meters on 
the inside of the wall. Finally, he pours blood and beer in the hollow stone 
at the lower end of the forecourt. He is the first then to drink, and his wives 
and children follow him, spraying beer on their bellies and putting the food 
stuff on their belly as well, as we saw in the sacrifice of a chicken. The goat is 
skinned, butchered and cooked, and life in the compound resumes it normal 
daily rhythm. In the evening, the rest of the meat is cooked as part of the sauce. 
The owner then takes the broiled liver from the pot and, with both hands, puts 
a few morsels and some excrement on the melè, with similar word. His family 
does the same.
One may invite a sister’s son as a special guest. While a nephew performs 
the actual slaughter on normal occasions, he does not do so for sacrifice, but 
his presence will add to the well-being at the sacrifice. The link between moth-
er’s brother and sister’s son in Kapsiki is close and affectionate and this task 
is deemed fitting. After a non-ritual slaughter the boy will get a substantial 
amount of meat, the neck, liver, first stomach (omasum) and a piece of a hind 
leg. All this precious meat he will bring home proudly, to eat with his family.
The main difference between a chicken and a goat sacrifice can be seen 
early the next morning. In case of a goat, close kinsmen and invited neighbors 
assemble for the last phase of the ritual, drinking from the tè melè. The beer 
now has its optimal level of fermentation. In such a ritual drinking spree, the 
owner carefully distributes a number of beer jars, one for the old men around 
the fire place, one for some other guests, while the melè itself remains in the 
18   The Kapsiki also know a white beer variant that is brewed exclusively by women for 
immediate consumption or for the market. Recently, the women have taken up brewing 
the red tè for the market, developing a quicker process enhancing the taste.
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house for the immediate kin. Then he explains the reason for the sacrifice in 
often extremely vague, even elliptical language:
I was at somebody’s who dreamt that I had to do a sacrifice, a few nights 
ago. I have put some grains in the water and on the melè. I have some-
thing left and invited a few people to drink together with me.
He indicates no specific problems, just the fact that he ‘dreamt’, that is, con-
sulted the diviner and has prepared beer. But the neighbors probably know 
the reasons anyway, as such a sacrifice is aimed at “usual problems” like illness 
or infertility, though it also might be held at more regular intervals to keep the 
house healthy.
The owner himself drinks first, while his family drinks from the melè 
inside the house. The old men applaud the owner and the oldest or the village 
chief offers flattering comments. He should do that also in the favored Kapsiki 
speech style, in which a lot is said with as little clarity as possible. Hyperbole, 
hidden references to happenings in the past, and parts of stories are mixed into 
a discourse which is real “inside speak”. “Some grains in the water” is quite an 
understatement because between 80 and 120 liters of beer is standard, and this 
ritual drinking takes all morning.
A house owner may invite a blacksmith, either at his own wish or because 
divination has told him to. In that case the smith sits at the side, softly clap-
ping his hands; if the sacrifice is done in the evening, the smith may perform 
the sacrifice, but it will be something small, like a chicken. For some serious 
issues, a sacrifice will take place outside home, for example at a spot associated 
with shala (god) in the bush; in that case a blacksmith has to do it, as it would 
simply be too dangerous to do it oneself. For such a sacrifice the color of the 
goat is clearly indicated, usually black, and the animal is left in the bush; some-
times its feet are broken and then it is left behind. In a few cases the blacksmith 
may take some of the immolated beast back home, depending on the divina-
tion. Reasons for such intense sacrifices are, for example, a child’s death or 
prolonged infertility.
The general mood during a sacrifice is usually quite relaxed. The ritual 
does not call for a reverential attitude or for special outfits; Kapsiki ritual is 
often quite homely, part of everyday life, without specific formulas or atti-
tudes. Only in rituals for the whole village, such as the village sacrifice, is the 
whole day marked off as a day-out-of-time, as a liminal day and then nobody 
should cultivate. The transition from daily time to ritual or liminal time is usu-
ally not marked, and is gradual and smooth; yet there is a recognizable core to 
the ritual, a symbolic focus, which defines the high point of the proceedings. 
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In sacrifice, this is the killing of the chicken, although the prayers and blessings 
during a sacrifice are straightforward and in normal language.
5 Discussion
Sacrifice has received much theoretical attention since the start of religious 
studies and anthropology. Not only is sacrifice the core rite in Kapsiki religion, 
this is the case in many religions throughout the world, and with good reason. 
Sacrifices come ‘naturally’ in religions; in the past they have been character-
ized as bribe (E. B. Tylor), as gifts to the gods (M. Mauss), as acts of consen-
sual violence (R. Girard) and throughout as communion with the sacred. But 
if anything characterizes the Kapsiki sacrifice it is the notion of a meal, a fam-
ily meal; the classic scholar of religion Robertson Smith would recognize this 
immediately. It is in many respects a standard family meal, but for the presence 
of the unseen, of a family member who is dead – the father – or of a special 
guest who is invisible, in this case shala. In the terminology of the new cogni-
tive theory of religion,19 such a sacrifice is a cognitively optimal ritual, a ritual 
that comes quickly to mind, is easily remembered and has a liturgy that does 
not require a good memory, as it is just a normal meal with an invisible guest.
The core notion here is “minimal counterintuitive”, a term coined by Pascal 
Boyer for supernatural concepts. Supernatural beings are conform our inbred 
expectations of human beings but with one single but significant change: 
A ghost is a person, but without a material body; a witch is a normal embodied 
person with a spirit that detaches itself and can do harm; a god is a being like 
a person with some special power of omnipresence.20 The power of these con-
cepts is that they fit in well with our existent cognitive framework, but through 
their one minor-but-crucial difference stick to the memory. They are quick to 
learn, easy to transmit and hard to forget. I think that this productive concept 
can well be used for rituals too. Concepts that are minimally counterintuitive 
are called cognitively optimal, and hence rituals that are minimally counterin-
tuitive I will call optimal rituals.21
Such a meal becomes an optimal ritual because of one minimally coun-
terintuitive aspect, the invisible guests. They are human, addressed yes, fed 
19   Harvey Whitehouse, Modes of religiosity. A Cognitive Theory of Religious Transmission 
(Oxford: Altamira Press, 2004).
20   Pascal Boyer, Religion explained: The Human Instincts that fashion Gods, Spirits and 
Ancestors (London: Vintage Books, 2002).
21   Whitehouse, Modes, chapter 4.
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definitely, personally known without a doubt, but nobody sees them and they 
digest nothing. As one eats every day in almost the same way, the exegesis 
remains close to home: Eating with the ‘other’. The model for the optimal ritual 
is a daily event, ordinary, normal and not easy to forget. In a similar vein, in 
one of the few gestures that are out of the ordinary in the home sacrifice, the 
children get their first food on their belly instead of inside them. When Tlimu 
put the stripes of mush on his children’s belly, the act in itself was cognitively 
optimal. Feeding the belly is normal, feeding the belly on the outside is mini-
mally counterintuitive, an optimal ritual act.22
The minimal counterintuitive aspects are in the unseen presences and 
in the act as slight but crucial departures of the normal meal, but are also rep-
resented materially, in the melè itself. The jar represents the conceptual beings 
plus the different way of eating. So the counterintuitive aspect is not only 
thought and done, but also embodied, a special object stored at a special place, 
to be used and addressed only at this occasion. Although some melè are recog-
nizable as special pots, many in fact have no distinctive features. A jar is a melè 
thanks to its history: It was fabricated as a melè, has functioned as such in the 
rites of farewell for the father, and simply is considered special.23 That unseen 
presence has a clear material focus in the sacrificial jar, the melè, but also in 
the wall of the house, which renders the unseen less invisible after all.24 Thus 
there are not only minimally counterintuitive concepts and rituals, but also 
22   This closeness to everyday experience also enhances the self-referential function of rit-
ual, in the words of Rappaport, implying a self-contained act in which the actors have a 
definite position, but where the basic and overly clear message is that people are inside 
a ritual. Roy A. Rappaport, Ritual and Religion in the making of Humanity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999).
23   Pots are usually used for shrines in this region: Judy Sterner and Nicholas David, “Pots, 
stones and potsherds: Shrines in the Mandara Mountains (North Cameroon and 
Northeastern Nigeria),” in Shrines in Africa; History, Politics and Society (ed. Allan C. 
Dawson; Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2009), 1–40. The notion that pots are people, 
as argued for the Bulahay and Mafa to the North of the Kapsiki, does not hold for the 
Kapsiki, at least not nearly so strong: Nicholas David, Judy Sterner & Kondji Gavua, “Why 
Pots are Decorated,” Current Anthropology 29, 3 (1988): 265–289. Compare the Mofu situ-
ation, Jeanne-Françoise Vincent, “Le prince et le sacrifice: pouvoir, religion et magie dans 
les montagnes du Nord-Cameroun,” Journal de la Société des Africanistes 2 (1987): 89–121, 
as well with other West African types of shrines, Walter E. A. van Beek, “Shrines and sacred 
places in two traditional West African religions,” in Sacred Spaces and Contested Identities 
(eds Paul Post, Philip Nel and Walter van Beek; Trenton: Africa World Press), 65–82.
24   For a treatise on the cognitive weight of the various senses in Kapsiki, see Walter E. A. van 
Beek, “Eyes on top. Culture and the Weight of the Senses,” in Invisible Africa; Sprache und 
Geschichte in Afrika 21 (ed. Anne Storch; Köln: Koppe, 2010), 245–270.
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objects. This sacrificial complex is, as an optimal ritual, what I would call with 
Whitehouse an “attractor point”: A series of minor changes in the daily routine 
and entourage, constituting a rite in which people can feel at home, can do 
almost as they are wont to do and yet feel connected with the other world.
This cognitively optimal characteristic is highlighted by, for instance, the 
absence of formulaic speech. People tell shala or their father directly what 
they want, and this entails just the basics of life: Food, health, fertility and rea-
sonable relations. And please no evil, not here in this compound at least. The 
unseen presence is addressed in terms of reciprocity:
We give you food, so give us health, or even the reverse, if you do not give 
us ours, then you can forget about any claims upon us. If you let us suffer, 
you will suffer as well.
And what could be more cognitively optimal than reciprocity? Both the visible 
and the unseen are joined at the hip, interdependent in one fragile universe. 
For the rest, nothing special there, and thus sacrifice is in a way “nothing spe-
cial”, it is just doing what comes naturally.
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Pro Patria Mori: Sacrificing Life in Service of  
the Political Community
Theo W. A. de Wit
1 Introduction
At Christmas, 1915, five months after the German invasion and occupation of 
neutral Belgium, Cardinal Mercier, the primate of Belgium, published a pas-
toral letter entitled Patriotism and Endurance. In this letter, Mercier passion-
ately argued that the Belgians were justified in regarding their patriotism as 
‘consecrated’ and consequently, the German violation of Belgian national 
sovereignty as a “sacrilegious profanation”. The letter specifically sought to 
respond to a pastoral-theological question, put to Mercier by members of his 
flock, namely whether or not it is justified to view soldiers falling for a just 
cause (“which ours clearly is”) as martyrs. Mercier’s immediate response was 
‘no’, not in the theological sense of the word, for after all, unlike soldiers, the 
Christian martyr does not resist his executioners. At the same time however, 
Mercier had little doubt that any soldier who, in avenging violated justice, laid 
down his life in honor of his fatherland, would be assured of eternal salvation:
The soldier who dies to save his brothers, to protect the hearths and the 
altars of his country, fulfils the highest form of love. (. . .) We are justi-
fied for hoping for them the immortal crown which encircles the fore-
heads of the elects. For such is the virtue of an act of perfect love that, of 
itself alone, it wipes out a whole life of sin. Of a sinner instantly it makes 
a saint.1
A few months later his French counterpart, cardinal Billot, responded with 
severe disapproval:
To say that the mere fact of dying consciously for the just cause of 
the Fatherland “suffices to assure salvation” means to substitute the 
1   See for the full text of the pastoral letter in English http://www.zum.de/psm/1wk/ww1/ 
mercier.php3.
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Fatherland for God (. . .), to forget what God is, what is sin, what is divine 
forgiveness.2
To Billot, positing any political-theological link between God and fatherland, 
between the forgiving of sins and the imperatives of patriotic duty, was theo-
logically indefensible and should therefore be resisted.
In 1951 the medievalist Ernst Kantorowicz, who was a great authority on 
medieval political theology, revisited this remarkable and fundamental differ-
ence of opinion within the Roman Catholic Church at that dramatic moment in 
modern European history, in an article entitled Pro Patria Mori. Kantorowicz’s 
historic-systematic reflections in this article point to the conclusion that, dur-
ing the first half of the twentieth century, the notion of sacrificing one’s life in 
service of the fatherland had fallen into discredit. This conclusion, which I will 
reformulate as a statement of problem, will be my point of departure (II).
Not long after the First World War however, Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) – 
a controversial, seminal, German jurist and political thinker – would reestab-
lish the notion of laying down one’s life in service of the state as central to 
our political existence, and to the state’s sovereignty, in his polemical treatise 
The Concept of the Political 3 which was aimed against post-war, liberal Weimar 
Republic Germany’s putting in perspective of state and politics. Schmitt’s 
invocation of Thomas Hobbes in support of his argument however, fails to 
square with the fact that specifically Hobbes may be regarded as one of the 
first modern political theorist to attack the notion of the primacy of commu-
nity over individual (III).
Current political-philosophical and political-theological discussions regard-
ing the continued meaningfulness of pro patria mori may be viewed in the con-
tinuum of the initial debate between Mercier/Schmitt on the one hand, and 
Billot on the other. Recently, the American philosopher of law Paul W. Kahn 
2   E. H. Kantorowicz, “Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Political Thought,” in Selected Studies 
(eds Michael Cherniavsky and Ralph E. Giesey; New York: Augustin, 1965), 308–324 (309). 
See also E. H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology 
(Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957), V.3, “Pro patria mori,” 232–273.
3   Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (Chicago, London: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1996). Translation of Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff des Politischen. 
Text von 1932 mit einem Vorwort und drei Corollarien (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963). The 
first version of the text appeared in 1927 as an article in Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik 58, 1 (1927), 1–33. See also Carl Schmitt, Political Theology. Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty, trans. George Schwab (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
The common translation of Politische Theologie; vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität 
(Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1921).
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chose to emphatically side with Schmitt. His compatriot, the theologian and 
ethical theorist Stanley Hauerwas, in following Billot (and theologians such as 
Karl Barth4), however appears to harbor grave reserves, specifically regarding 
the corollary to the willingness to die for one’s country, namely the willingness 
to kill for it (IV).
2 An Ancient Value, Dissolving Like Smoke
To Kantorowicz, the cardinals’ difference of opinion is cause for launching 
an historical investigation into the whole notion of pro patria mori. For, as he 
phrases his consideration:
If two eminent princes of the Church disagree so profoundly on a funda-
mental matter of life and death, and of life after death, we may be sure 
that the reasons for such a basic disagreement are to be sought in a dis-
tant past and that the whole problem has a long history.5
In an exquisitely documented contribution, he then shows that death in ser-
vice of the community – for patria read here ‘city’ (polis), and all the city stood 
for – was first and foremost a cherished ideal of Greek and Roman classical 
antiquity. In subsequent feudal times, mainly as a result of the growing influ-
ence of Christianity, this notion of laying down one’s life for the good of the 
city however gradually lost its emotional and (semi-)religious significance. For, 
as we may already read in St Augustine, Christians not so much fight and fall 
for the sake of earthly fame, but rather – as martyrs – for that of the invisible 
patria aeterna, the heavenly Jerusalem.
Only in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries would the temporal notion of 
patria (now framed in terms of national territory or kingdom) regain its emo-
tional appeal, and thus, by manner of speaking, return from heaven to earth. 
A precedent for the contrasting positions of Mercier’s politico-theological affir-
mation and Billot’s theological reservations, may be found in a much earlier 
debate, namely that of whether participation in a Crusade would contribute 
4   The Wikipedia article on Hauerwas (accessed January 1, 2015) explicitly mentions Karl 
Barth as an influence. With regard to Barth’s position on the First Word War, see Dieter 
Schellong, “Jenseits von politischer Theologie und unpolitischer Theologie. Zum Ansatz 
der Dialektischen Theologie,” in Der Fürst dieser Welt. Carl Schmitt und die Folgen (ed. Jacob 
Taubes; München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag/Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1983), 292–316.
5   E. H. Kantorowicz, “Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Thought,” 308 and 309.
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to the crusader’s salvation or not. While the Council of Clermont (1095) clearly 
established that the crusader would be absolved of any unfulfilled churchly 
penances (for instance prescribed fasting, giving alms, prayers), but not of 
all sins (remissio peccatorum), in political and churchly practice this distinc-
tion was generally ignored. As a result, common understanding held that any 
crusader who fell in defense of the Holy Land would automatically become 
a martyr, gaining direct access to paradise.
By the early fifteenth century, at the height of this development towards a 
sacralization and a greater appreciation of the emotive value of the notion of 
country (France, Francia Deo sacra, constitutes the paradigm in this regard), 
some authors were even starting to draw close parallels between the martyr’s 
death (or that of the crusader), and the act of sacrificing one’s life in defense 
of the corpus mysticum of the fatherland – both namely acts rooted in love 
(caritas).
Kantorowicz concludes that the positions of both Mercier and Billot, each 
in their own way, find vindication in tradition: While Mercier’s pastoral patrio-
tism follows a well-established tradition of ecclesiastical and political think-
ing, Billot has theological dogma on his side when he admonishes against the 
‘substitution’ of fatherland for God. Of most relevance to us however, is a con-
cluding remark Kantorowicz permits himself at the end of his investigation. 
This remark is not only indicative of the modesty of this great medievalist, but 
also betrays a certain dismay when he lets slip that:
It may be left to the reader to figure out all the distortions which the 
central idea of the corpus mysticum has suffered by its transference to 
national, party, and racial doctrines in more distant and in most recent 
times.6
Kantorowicz here refers to the examples of the “Tombs of the Martyrs” which 
the National Socialists erected in Munich in 1932, and to the gigantic banner, 
proclaiming Chi muore per Italia non muore,7 draped over the façade of the 
Milan cathedral as backdrop to the 1937 Christmas memorial service for Fascist 
Italy’s fallen combatants in the Spanish Civil War.
To Kantorowicz, these ‘distortions’, together with a growing “disenchant-
ment of the world”, signal that “the ancient ethical values, miserably abused 
and exploited in every quarter, are about to dissolve like smoke”. Given 
the “cold efficiency” witnessed during and since the Second World War on the 
6   Kantorowicz, “Pro patria mori in medieval Thought,” 324.
7   “Whoever die for Italy do not die.”
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one hand, and the contemporary individual’s fear of falling into the trap of 
religio-ideological ‘illusions’ on the other, it would seem the days of the tra-
ditional religious and ideological ‘superstructure’ are numbered. As a result, 
Kantorowicz suspects that:
Human lives (are) no longer (being) sacrificed but ‘liquidated’. We are 
about to demand a soldier’s death without any reconciling emotional 
equivalent for the lost life. If the soldier’s death in action – not to men-
tion the citizen’s death in bomb-struck cities – is deprived of any idea 
encompassing humanitas, be it God or king or patria, it will be deprived 
also of the ennobling idea of self-sacrifice. It becomes a cold-blooded 
slaughter or, what is worse, assumes the value and significance of a politi-
cal traffic accident on a bank holiday.8
If I were to – for my own purposes in this essay – somewhat reformulate and 
actualize Kantorowicz’s concluding remark from 1951, I would describe the 
new constellation he points towards, as follows. By instrumentalizing tradi-
tional, ancient values (such as that of pro patria mori), the great totalitarian 
movements of the twentieth century – the century of the “slave revolt of tech-
nology” in Walter Benjamin’s apt description9 – suddenly restored the political 
relevance of certain theological, eschatological reservations which have been 
present within Christianity for a long time. Specifically, reservations pertaining 
to any strong affinity towards, or ‘cohesion’ with, political-military power. The 
catastrophic devastation of two world wars have taught Europeans the bitter 
lessons that nation is best not tied to religion, that churches should refrain 
from lending their weight to the exaltation – the “praising to heaven” – of dying 
in war.
But the simultaneous loss of what Kantorowicz indicates as an “idea encom-
passing humanitas” also points towards a nascent void. Especially during the 
past two decades, Western politics, both within Europe and abroad, once 
more seem to hover between a bleak and defensive liberalism (Kantorowicz’s 
“anti-ideological individual”) with rational management and a purely formal 
notion of citizenship on the one hand, and on the other, the longing for a 
(greater) sense of community, and the reemergence of nationalistic politics. 
The German journalist Richard Herzinger’s book Die Tyrannei des Gemeinsinns 
8   Kantorowicz, “Pro Patria Mori in Medieval Thought,” 324.
9   W. Benjamin, “Theorien des deutschen Faschismus,” in Schriften III (Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp, 1972), 238: Jeder kommende Krieg ist zugleich ein Sklavenaufstand der Technik.
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(1997) provides a good example of the first tendency.10 In this book, Herzinger 
bids farewell to the Gemeinsinn (community spirit) and its “sacrificial logic”, 
instead making a strong plea for the “egoistical society”. The second tendency 
may be observed in the reemergence of what many see as that kind of pop-
ulist, nationalist sacrificial politics which Erich Voegelin in 1939 had termed 
“political religion” – that is, of the sacralization of collective identities such as 
state, nation and race.11 As we shall see below, these contradictory trends were 
already apparent to Carl Schmitt’s writings in the 1930s.
3 Carl Schmitt: Killing and Dying for “One’s Own”
At first glance, Schmitt provides a Hegelian12 ‘statist’ defense of the notion of 
sacrificing one’s life for the political community – this already during the early 
1920s in Weimar Germany, and most explicitly in his renowned The Concept 
of the Political (1927; 1932). In the central fifth paragraph of this treatise on 
the political (Das Politische), entitled “decision concerning war and enemy”, 
one reads for instance:
The state as the decisive political entity possesses an enormous 
power: The possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing 
of the lives of men. The ius belli contains such a disposition. It implies 
a double possibility: The right to demand from its own members the 
readiness to die (Todesbereitschaft) and unhesitatingly to kill enemies 
10   Richard Herzinger, Die Tyrannei des Gemeinsinns. Ein Bekenntnis zur egoistischen 
Gesellschaft (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1997), especially “Lob des Egoismus” (80–91) and 
“Verlocherungen der Transzendenz oder Opfer und Interesse” (183–211). Particularly 
the German ‘Opferkult’ (193) gets Herzinger hot under the collar: Gefeiert werden in 
Deutschland die Märtyrer, die Aushalter auf verlorener Posten, die immer an ihrem Platz 
stehen und nicht anders können. Die Linke verehrt die Messiasgestalten der Ausgebeutenen 
und Entrechteten, die sich schlachten liessen. Here Thomas Münzer, Rosa Luxemburg 
and Che Quevara are the heroes. Die Rechte verehrt dagegen den Frontsoldaten, der, von 
Führung und Heimat verlassen, tapfer seine Pflicht tat bis zum bitteren Ende, von Verdun bis 
Stalingrad. In brief: “Opfern für die Zukunft, ausharren für die Ewigkeit” (86–87).
11   E. Voegelin, Die Politischen Religionen (Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer Verlag, 1939). See 
also John Gray’s actualization thereof, Black Mass. Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of 
Utopia (London: Penguin, 2007).
12   For Hegel’s justification of sacrifice in service of the nation, see Peter Jonkers, “Justifying 
Sacrifice,” Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 50 (2008): 
313–329.
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(Tötungsbereitschaft). (. . .) By virtue of this power over the physical life 
of men, the political community transcends all other associations or 
societies.13
The state particularly also ‘transcends’ the “individualistic principles of a lib-
eral economic order”. In an essentially individualist liberal society however, 
the individual himself decides which causes are personally worth dying for – 
that is, as “a thoroughly private matter, decided upon freely”.14 According to 
this principle, “sacrificing one’s own life” (sein Leben opfern), in the traditional 
sense of pro patria mori, cannot be justified on any grounds:
War, the readiness of combatants to die, the physical killing of human 
beings who belong on the side of the enemy – all this has no normative 
meaning, but an existential meaning only, particularly in a real combat 
situation with a real enemy. There exist no rational purpose, no norm no 
matter how true, no program no matter how exemplary, no social ideal 
no matter how beautiful, no legitimacy nor legality which could justify 
men in killing each other for this reason.15
Schmitt also identifies what is actually at stake in this extreme ‘existential’ situ-
ation, when the sacrifice of the individual’s life is demanded. What is being 
defended, is the own, “one’s own form of existence” (Die eigene Art Existenz).16
But why does Schmitt, writing in the context of the young Weimar democ-
racy, place such emphasis on precisely this unique position of the state – the 
sacrifice of the lives of its citizens and their willingness to kill? Because 
the state’s sovereignty and ‘transcendence’ have ceased to be self-evident, 
and – in Schmitt’s own diagnosis – may even be under radical threat. This is 
already evident from the very first, somewhat cryptic sentence of his treatise: 
“The concept of the state presupposes the concept of the political”.17 With this 
13   Schmitt, Concept, 46 and 47.
14   Schmitt, Concept, 48.
15   Schmitt, Concept, 48–49.
16   Schmitt, Concept, 27.
17   Schmitt, Concept, 19. Also the sentence from the Political Theology which brought Schmitt 
enduring fame and notoriety (5 and 35: “Sovereign is he who decides on the Exception”) 
contains this message – after all, the sovereign does not necessarily, per se, have to be the 
state. According to Wolfgang Palaver, the first sentence of The Concept of the Political – 
in its reference to the Polis – already indicates the ‘Greek’ and ‘mythical’ (not biblical) 
roots of Schmitt’s concept of the political, as Schmitt himself recognizes in a letter to 
Christian Meier from 29 mai 1968. See Palaver, Die mythischen Quellen des Politischen. 
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Schmitt directly distances himself from traditional German political theory, in 
which politics are identified with state, politisch coincides with staatlich.18
Schmitt takes his point of departure in establishing that the state, as a result 
of the emergence of a new type of political subject, is in the process of losing 
its monopoly on politics. To Schmitt, the fundamental political-philosophical 
question with regard to the proper or specific of the political (Das Politische) 
therefore needs to be raised anew. Schmitt’s response is by way of a conceptual 
definition, expressed in the form of a criterion: “The specific political distinc-
tion to which political actions and motives can be reduced, is that between 
friend and enemy”.19 Ultimately, albeit to varying degrees, all relations which 
may rightly be termed ‘politics’ refer to “the ever present possibility of com-
bat”, in extreme instances, of civil war, or, once political unity (for instance the 
state) had been established, the possibility of an external, foreign enemy. To 
varying degrees: Properly viewed, the political constitutes no own domain or 
territory (‘politics’, as we are in the habit of saying) of its own; it denotes “the 
utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dis-
sociation”, and may be fed from a number of sources or domains.20 Religious, 
economic or ethnic differences within a society may become politicized to 
the point of a confrontation ad mortem. To Schmitt, concepts such as friend, 
enemy and struggle all ultimately refer to the actual possibility of the “physical 
act of killing”.
3.1 Reflection on the Independence of the Political from the State
Two aspects of Schmitt’s thinking this far deserve closer attention within the 
context of my own investigation into the fate and legitimacy of the notion of 
pro patria mori.
Firstly, only once the political ceases to indicate an independent domain, 
once it comes to indicate the “intensity of a union or separation”, can one truly 
speak of the emancipation of the political from the state. And because we know 
that for Schmitt the highest intensity is achieved in the willingness to kill or be 
Carl Schmitts Freund-Feind-Theorie (Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln: Kohlhammer, 1998), 35; and 
Wolfgang Palaver, “A Girardian Reading of Schmitt’s ‘Political Theology,” Telos. A Quarterly 
Journal of Critical Thought, 93 (1992): 43–68. The rest of my analysis will confirm his thesis.
18   In this regard, see Christoph Schönberger, “Der Begriff des Staates in Begriff des 
Politischen,” in Carl Schmitt. Der Begriff des Politischen. Ein kooperativer Kommentar 
(ed. Reinhard Mehring; Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2003), 21–45.
19   Schmitt, Concept, 26.
20   Schmitt, Concept, 26.
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killed, this emancipation potentially also holds a detachment of mortal sacri-
fice from the sphere of the national state.
What Schmitt observed in his own time, was that other political subjects 
were now vying with the state in demanding the ultimate sacrifice: Warring 
civil parties, partisans, guerillas, revolutionary classes and religions, terror-
ist groupings, etc.21 In this regard, Schmitt’s theorizing anticipated our own 
world, where sacrificial willingness has long since become detached from state. 
Schmitt himself, however has a clear nostalgia for the ‘transcendental’ 
state which protects society “from above”, and in exchange demands obedience 
from its citizens, and, in war, the supreme sacrifice. Schmitt therefore views 
these new political subjects as, in the first instance, competitors of the state, as 
proto-states. Into the 1930s he would keep hoping for a new, strong state, one 
able to harness and transcend social discord and conflict potential – thus his 
notorious backing of Hitler and the Nazi regime. At this point, the theory of 
René Girard on the ‘scapegoat-mechanism’ can be applied on Schmitt’s theory 
of the Political, as – among others – Wolfgang Palaver did: “The civil War, the 
enmity within the State, is superseded by the transposition of enmity to an 
enemy outside”.22
Nevertheless, already in the late 1920s, Schmitt clearly saw and described 
the political reality of new, non-state, political subjects, equally demanding 
from their members a willingness to be killed, or to kill – potentially also of 
non-combatants. And with this, a new type of war and a new image of sacri-
fice appears on the horizon. ‘Symmetrical’ warfare, between sovereign states 
of equal rank in which regular combatants lay down their lives, becomes 
supplanted by the ‘asymmetrical’ warfare of partisans, guerillas and terrorist 
groups, internally demanding total engagement; externally, the willingness to 
sacrifice the lives of innocent civilians in pursuit of a grand ideal.23
Attentive readers of Schmitt, such as Leo Strauss, Helmut Kuhn and 
Heinrich Meier – the first two already when the second version of Schmitt’s 
treatise appeared in 1932 – have noted that the roots of Schmitt’s emphatic 
21   See also Carl Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen, Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des 
Politischen (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1963).
22   Wolffgang Palaver, Die Mythischen Quellen des Politischen, 36. See also Paul Dumouchel, 
Le sacrifice inutile. Essai sur la violence politique, Paris: Flammarion, 2011, especially 
118–124 about Schmitt, and 134–138 about Girard: ‘Cette structuration de l’espace de 
solidarité/hostilité vise à protéger le groupe contre la violence’ (134).
23   With regard to this development away from symmetrical towards asymmetrical warfare, 
see: H. Münkler, “Symmetrische und asymmetrische Kriege,” in Merkur 58. Jg. Heft 8, 
(2004), 649–659; H. Münkler, Die neuen Kriege (Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2002), 
especially Ch 5, „Der internationale Terrorismus,“ 175–207.
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defense of Das Politische, as a realm of diverse human associations laying claim 
to the ultimate sacrifice, are essentially moral, even theological or mythical in 
nature.24 Schmitt does not believe in a post-political world in which political 
struggle and the existential significance of sacrificial willingness have become 
supplanted by straightforward economic competition, eternal discussion, 
an unquenchable quest for entertainment and wanton consumerism – in 
other words, the liberal Utopia, “The End of History” which Fukuyama opti-
mistically hailed following the downfall of communism.25 The political and 
its ‘intensity’ – and with that, (self)sacrifice – are however unavoidable, says 
Schmitt. On this point, he indeed pays resemblance to many of today’s anti-
liberal – both religious or conservative as well as revolutionary – movements, 
shunning neither the sacrifice of self or (innocent) others in the name of 
a fictional patria or Heimat, projected onto the past or future.
3.2 The Demise of Self-Sacrifice: Thomas Hobbes’ ‘Individualistic’ 
Liberalism
We have now arrived at the second aspect of interest to my investigation. As we 
saw, to Schmitt the risk of death constitutes the very reason for the existence of 
politics, its raison d’être. It is the existential risk – never completely predictable, 
never to be decided by a previously determined norm – which distinguishes 
the political community from all other human associations and affiliations: 
Only a political community or grouping can ask of its citizens, casu quo adher-
ents, to kill or to be killed on its behalf.
It is therefore somewhat odd that Schmitt – in this treatise, but also in some 
of his other works – would make frequent appeal to the work of the seventeenth 
24   Heinrich Meier, Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss und „Der Begriff des Politischen,“ Zu einer Dialog 
unter Abwesenden, (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1988); Theo W. A. de Wit, De onontkoombaarheid 
van de politiek. De soevereine vijand in de politieke filosofie van Carl Schmitt (Nijmegen: 
Pomppers, 1992). Wolfgang Palaver argued – convincingly, I think – against Heinrich 
Meier that Schmitts defense of the Political has ‘mythical’ (Greek, Roman and ‘heiden-
christliche’), not theological-eschatological roots. Papaver, ‘Die mythischen Quellen’, 
4: “Die mythische bzw. religiös-rituellen Quellen des Begriffs des Politischen,” 35–50.
25   Leo Strauss, “Notes on Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political (1932),” in Heinrich 
Meier, Carl Schmitt, 97–125; Helmuth Kuhn, “Besprechung zu: Carl Schmitt, Der Begriff 
des Politischen,” Kant-Studien 38 (1933): 190–196. With regard to Fukuyama’s utopia of the 
‘end of history’, Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the last Man, (New York: Free 
Press, 1992), and for my commentary, Theo W. A. de Wit, “De lompenverzamelaar en het 
libretto van de geschiedenis,” Armada 45 (2006): 27–42.
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century thinker Thomas Hobbes.26 Certainly, also to Hobbes the possibility of 
death constituted the fundamental raison d’être of politics – and no longer, 
as was the case for a whole classical tradition stretching back to Aristotle, the 
pursuit of the good life. On closer inspection however, precisely here also lies 
an important distinction between our two thinkers. To Hobbes, the violent 
death of the individual in the “state of nature” (in Hobbes’ construct of state, 
a fictitious status in which each person is law unto itself) is the very epitome of 
evil. It is the fear of death which drives mortal human beings towards a “civil 
state” and towards the state – a supreme, sovereign entity which establishes 
the rule of law, and is capable of offering effective protection. Guaranteeing the 
self-preservation of the individual therefore also constitutes the primary func-
tion of the state. Therefore, to Hobbes, the duty of obedience only holds as 
good as the guarantee of protection.
Seen in terms of Hobbes’ construct of state, where individual  self-preservation 
is at the very heart of the political covenant, Schmitt’s political defense of 
the individual’s willingness to kill or be killed on behalf of the collective 
existence is therefore plainly an anomaly. After all, as Hobbes puts it:
Obligation of Subjects to the Sovereign, is understood to last as long, and 
no longer, than the power lasteth, by which he is able to protect them. For 
the right men have by nature to protect themselves, when none else can 
protect them, can by no Covenant be relinquished.27
Some have noted that with this statement, Hobbes’ entire construct of state 
degenerates into an “absurdity”. For, when it comes to the crunch, when 
the sovereign really needs the utmost support of its subjects (that is, when the 
state itself is in danger) “they are admitted to be free to withdraw their support 
if in their judgment he is no longer clearly able to protect them”.28
At this point we need to revisit one of the key building blocks of Hobbes’ 
construct of state. Hobbes starts out by fixing the citizen’s most important 
motives for choosing for the state – in other words, for a peaceful existence – 
26   See also Der Begriff des Politischen, and especially the reference to Hobbes (121–123) – 
unjustly lacking from the English translation version. See also Carl Schmitt, Der Leviathan 
in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes. Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols 
(Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, 1938).
27   Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the matter, forme & power of a commonwealth ecclesiastical 
and civil (ed. Macpherson; London: Pelican Books, 1968), 272.
28   C. B. Macpherson, ‘Introduction’ in Hobbes, Leviathan, 62.
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in a series of moral prescriptions, or laws of nature.29 Together, these consti-
tute the conscience of the common, average (obviously still Christian) citizen. 
By transforming these moral prescriptions into positive laws, the state ensures 
the conditions necessary for their observance – something which was impos-
sible in the “state of nature”. In this scheme however, military service, courage 
and dare (“the Contempt of Wounds, and violent Death”)30 have no obvious 
place. Hobbes therefore also explicitly denies the status of courage as a virtue.31
Therefore, in Hobbes’ theory of state, military virtues and the love of one’s 
country unto death, suddenly become problematic – a firm departure from 
tradition, which, in Kantorowicz’s reconstruction, stretches back to Greco-
Roman times. On the contrary, says Hobbes, it is precisely the state’s duty to 
ensure the moral innocence of its subjects, to prevent them from becoming 
“guilty of warre”32 – as would otherwise likely have been the case in a state of 
nature. Herewith the modern separation of politics and morality: Simply put, 
the norms of civilian life do not apply to the state and its raison d’etat, such 
being intimately related to matters of aggression and enmity. The citizen is 
protected and simultaneously screened off from evil by the state: Ideally, 
the conduct of war is not the business of the common citizen. Ideally, for the 
weakness of the Hobbesian state becomes apparent as soon as the state has to 
appeal to its citizens in times of peril, in other words, when the protector itself 
becomes in need of protection.
In agreement with Leo Strauss, this difference between Hobbes and Schmitt 
may be encapsulated as follows: While Hobbes, living in an illiberal world, may 
be regarded as the founder of liberalism and its attendant ideal of peaceful 
civilization, human rights and a humanity underway towards a single, united 
“partnership in consumption and production”, Schmitt, living in a liberal 
world, sees his task in undertaking a critique of liberalism by pointing out the 
overlooked lasting ‘intensity’ of the political.33
29   Hobbes, Leviathan, Chapter 14 and 15.
30   Hobbes, Leviathan, 717. See Th. W. A. de Wit & Marin Terpstra, “Afschrikking en zelfopof-
fering. Thomas Hobbes en het nucleaire tijdperk,” Krisis 29, 1987, 27–46.
31   Leo Strauss reminds us of this in his discussion of Schmitt’s treatise on the political, 
“Notes,” 91.
32   That is at the core of the famous chapter 13 of the Leviathan, concerning the “Natural 
Condition of Mankind,” Leviathan, 183–188.
33   Strauss, Notes, 92–93.
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4 The Current Divide: The Sniper and the Terrorist
Could the Hobbesian ideal of a peaceful life without (self)sacrifice – which 
Hobbes himself ultimately failed to convincingly conceptualize34 – nevertheless 
still be realized? In the modern history of the right to self-preservation, the 
factual response to this question has been to re-conceptualize warfare as 
the ever-diminishing physical deployment of citizens – war which has there-
fore become more disembodied, abstract, technical and devastating. A good 
account of the Rationalization of Slaughter in modern times is given by 
the British historian Daniel Pick in his book War Machine.35 The threat of 
nuclear holocaust embodies the ultimate consequence of this develop-
ment. Nuclear weapons, in common with all other weapons which raise the 
threat of catastrophic war to unimaginable proportions, are the paradoxical 
outcome of a culture which elevates self-preservation to an absolute norm, 
while at the same time refusing to renounce the protection of state or world 
order against external threats. The impotent, pyrrhic, threat of the sacrificial 
pyre (Holocaust) is therefore in fact the corollary of our cultural repugnance 
towards any resolution of conflict by violent means, and especially towards 
the notion of self-sacrifice – something which countless people today would 
no doubt view as nothing short of insanity. By the way, Hobbes also brilliantly 
anticipated this development when voicing his deep skepticism of Christian 
ambitions of martyrdom and of those who come into conflict with the civil 
authorities as a result of their homespun evangelical doctrines.36
During the Cold War, this doctrine of deterrence would present the world 
with a huge dilemma: Absolute peace between the two superpowers, or global 
annihilation. In our own time, the dilemma has become whether or not it 
would be equitable to effectively freeze existing global political-military power 
relations in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons (in for 
instance Iran).
34   At the end of Leviathan, in the “Review and Conclusion,” Hobbes suddenly comes up 
with a new ‘last’ natural law, namely: “That every man is bound by Nature, as much as 
in him lieth, to protect in Warre, the Authority, by which he is himself protected in time 
of Peace.” (Leviathan, 718–719). With regard to this inconsistency, see De Wit & Terpstra, 
“Afschrikking en zelfopoffering,” 27–35.
35   Daniel Pick, War Machine. The rationalisation of slaughter in the Modern Age (New Haven 
& London: Yale University Press, 1993).
36   See especially Ch. 42 of his Leviathan, ‘Of Power Ecclesiastical’, 521–609.
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But it is particularly the following divide which nowadays determines 
the status and deployment of the notion of ultimate sacrifice in politics. The 
liberal, secular and democratically governed part of the world, hardly lon-
ger able to justify the notion of community-spirited self-sacrifice to itself, is 
increasingly confronted by that part of humanity which regards peaceful civil-
ian existence without a hereafter simply a material and spiritual impossibility: 
Irredeemable warmongers, mercenaries and irregular terror groups of all ilk; 
but also poor and oppressed masses, receptive to the religious compensations 
to poverty and defeat offered by their leaders.
These two worlds have become embroiled in a number of political-military 
conflicts; none ever boding well, for all are morally utterly questionable. The 
moral weakness of a ‘Hobbesian’, post-heroic (especially European) world, 
essentially stripped of the notion of ultimate sacrifice, lies in the way she seeks 
to conduct her wars (nowadays often termed punitive strikes, peacekeeping 
missions and pacifications): That is, killing, while shunning the risk of  getting 
killed. The American political philosopher Michael Walzer thus refers to 
Albert Camus (“You can’t kill unless you are prepared to die”) in his criticism 
of US intervention in Kosovo during the late 1990s. By mainly relying on supe-
rior air power and guided missile strikes, US strategy essentially entailed the 
massive deployment of firepower against Serb forces – with inevitable, signifi-
cant Serbian “collateral damage” – while keeping the risk of its own losses to a 
bare minimum.37 The soldier has now essentially become a sniper – executing 
the enemy from a distance. The same is true for the introduction of drones by 
states in their “war on terror”: Sacrificing lives in the name of ‘our’ security is 
getting identical to ‘liquidation’ (as Kantorowicz suspected)
The moral poverty of the second world, one until recently symbolized by 
Osama bin Laden, lies in using poor and humiliated groups and masses for its 
paradise’s insatiable appetite for martyred lives; while its ‘victories’ purely reside 
in a perverse quest to take as many opponent lives as possible. Punishment 
and revenge better describe their practices than the older European con-
cepts of war,38 For example, ‘revenge’ was the explicit motive of the terrorists 
who liquidated a great part of the editorial staff of the French journal Charlie 
Hebdo in January, 1915.
In a spiritual universe based on the pursuit of the earthly happiness of the 
greatest number of individuals – as Europe had largely become – it is  becoming 
37   Michael Walzer, Arguing about War (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 
2004), 101.
38   See Marcel Hénaff, “Terror und Rache. Politische Gewalt, Gegenseitigkeit, Gerechtigkeit – 
zehn Jahre danach,” Lettre international 94, 2011, 11–15.
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increasingly difficult to ascribe any continued meaning to the notion of mor-
tal self-sacrifice. “These guys have chosen for it”, would be a typical (but not 
uniquely) Dutch response to such casualties as may be suffered in, for instance, 
Afghanistan – a response indicative that, to many, the notion of supra- 
individual duty has become alien, incomprehensible even. After all, is not the 
state – or political community – merely an administrative device in service of 
its citizens? Now who would want to lay down their lives for the inland revenue 
service anyway? The classical pro patria mori is reframed and reduced to a job-
risk, and falling in Afghanistan now becomes an occupational hazard rather 
than a matter of mortal self-sacrifice. And this is precisely what Kantorowicz 
had in mind when talking of soldiers dying in action “without any reconciling 
emotional equivalent”.
Not infrequently, their opponents in the War on Terror invoke the exact mir-
ror image of this scenario. Here the martyr’s death is elevated to the pinnacle 
of human endeavor, and becomes the ultimate manifestation of the political 
or religious community and its triumphing sovereignty. Thus these two worlds 
hold one another in a curious and often deadly embrace. At the same time, we 
have all become inhabitants of a perverse moral universe: Suicidal dying in 
order to inflict punishment (religiously sanctioned violence), or killing from a 
safe distance (the war of calculating citizens).
4.1 Paul Kahn: Sovereignty and Sacrifice
In conclusion, let us turn to two contemporary American voices which are 
clearly recognizable as a continuation of the debate between Mercier/Schmitt 
and Billot, bearing in mind that Hobbes’ plea for peace appears to indicate 
greater affinity with the eschatological reservations of modern theology than 
Schmitt’s sacrificial concept of sovereignty. In Political Theology, a recent study 
whose very title bears homage to Carl Schmitt, Paul Kahn, author of a number 
of works on jurisprudence, demonstrates that, in the United States, the con-
cept of state sovereignty continues to remain premised on the notion of patri-
otic self-sacrifice. Kahn presents a phenomenology of the political which seeks 
to identify and describe “the presence of the sacred, wherever it appears”.39 
He presents his study as an actualizing interpretation of Schmitt’s Politische 
Theologie (1921), but under the banner of the discipline of ‘political theology’ he 
39   Paul Kahn, Political Theology. Four new Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 25 and 121. Kahn’s title only adds the word ‘new’ 
to Schmitt’s original, Politische Theologie. Vier Kapitel zur Lehre von der Souveränität. 
(see note 9). From the same author, see also Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror and Sovereignty 
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2008).
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also provides a fairly original description (without any normative  intentions) 
of specifically the American social imaginary of the political, in which he also 
regularly distances himself from Schmitt’s ideological anti-liberalism.
According to the central thesis of his book, a political community is not 
simply a contractually assented rational entity, governed by the rule of law. 
The modern American state, forged in revolution, is a unity of identity and 
law, exception and norm, faith and reason, love and justice, sovereignty 
and constitution – in short, of reason and an existential will rooted in the revo-
lutionary past. What the political imagery of such a community looks like – 
and not the part played by religious faith – is what is of relevance to a phenom-
enological and genealogical investigation into the “political theology” of such 
a political entity. In this regard, Kahn convincingly shows that, in terms of the 
United States’ political self-conception, (national) sovereignty continues to 
play a key role. Only in light of this notion of sovereignty can one make sense of 
American’s (in)famous ‘exceptionalism’ – the reluctance to join international 
human rights conventions and transnational courts – and other manifestations 
of national self-assurance such as the Pledge of Allegiance, the iconography of 
the flag, and the memorialization of citizen sacrifice.40 The fact that the US 
president is always trailed by an officer with the nuclear strike codes on hand 
is further testimony to the fact that Schmitt’s famous definition of sovereignty, 
as he who “decides on the state of exception (Ausnamezustand)” is no mere 
dead letter in the United States of today. These are all matters largely neglected 
by dominant liberal theory (Kahn regularly refers to John Rawls in this regard).
We may term Kahn’s central thesis Schmittian, for also Schmitt believes that 
a world which still holds potential enemies cannot be completely governed 
by law alone, and that the state ought to keep a firm grip on the free exer-
cise of ‘exceptional’ decisions – precisely in defense of the own way of life and 
the rule of law, including the possibility of demanding mortal self-sacrifice. 
Kahn also sees a political-theological continuity with the medieval doctrine of 
“the two bodies of the king” (one mortal, the other immortal), and the 
‘transfer’ of this sovereignty to the revolutionary concept of national sover-
eignty.41 Just like the king’s coronation endowed him with sacred status, the 
revolution forged the (American) nation into a trans-generational, ‘eternal’ 
subject. The revolution had enduringly recast (American) history as the prog-
ress towards national sovereignty, while the revolution’s ‘truths’ remain at 
40   Kahn, Political Theology, 8–17 and 2.
41   Concerning this doctrine, see Kantorowicz’s famous book (note 1).
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the heart of its citizens’ allegiance – to the point of being willing to make the 
supreme sacrifice.
4.2 Hauerwas: The Sacrifice of the Unwillingness to Kill
As remarked, Kahn has no normative intentions, even though he clearly has 
a corrective of liberal political theorizing in mind – which, in his view, is as 
inclined as European politics to disregard the existential dimension (i.e. of will) 
from politics, then only to be surprised by its sudden reappearances. Rightly so, 
for as I have already mentioned, also Europe is experiencing the reemergence 
of nationalist impulses, and of emotionally charged issues around collective 
identity.
It would seem that his compatriot, the well-known theologian and ethical 
theorist Stanley Hauerwas, author of a number of studies on the ethics of war, 
not so much wants to challenge Kahn’s phenomenology, as insist on a norma-
tive and theological evaluation of the American social imaginary of the politi-
cal. Thus, Hauerwas calls in question the Christian-theological legitimacy of 
Kahns political theology, as did – as we saw – Wolfgang Palaver in the case 
of Schmitt. In 2009, Hauerwas published an essay on the sacrificial aspect of 
war.42 His empirical thesis, essentially not entirely dissimilar from Kahn’s, has 
two aspects. War – with also Hauerwas in the first instance thinking of his own 
political community’s numerous wars – not only demands the supreme sacri-
fice of soldier’s lives, war by nature is a “sacrificial system”. War has a unique 
“moral power”, that “war creates its own justification”.43
War gives purpose and meaning to the lives of many, across generations. 
It also enables the transformation of common history into a coherent patri-
otic narrative in which the sides of good and bad, ‘us’ and ‘them’, are clearly 
defined. War also teaches us many valuable moral lessons: That meaning is 
more important than happiness, that self-interest is less important than noble-
minded sacrificial willingness, that hardiness and chivalry are important vir-
tues, and in general, that there are more important issues than our trivial daily 
concerns. And, while not often admitted, war even has a certain aesthetic 
dimension to it. As many first-hand accounts testify, the spectacle of war can be 
42   Stanley Hauerwas, “Sacrificing the Sacrifices of War,” in Religion and Politics of Peace 
and Conflict (eds Linda Hogan and Dylan Lee Lehrke; Princeton: Princeton Theological 
Monograph, 2009), 83–104. Also note that the article is also included in Hauerwas’ most 
recent book, War and the American Difference: Theological Reflections on violence and 
National Identity (Michigan: Baker Academic, 2011).
43   Hauerwas, “Sacrificing,” 86 and 93.
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a  captivating affair, powerfully blending destruction with an aesthetic pleasure 
“beyond good and evil”. And many a soldier has experienced that ecstatically 
intense degree of camaraderie, where combat essentially becomes a matter 
of killing or dying for one’s comrades, one’s ‘buddies’. And in conclusion, says 
Hauerwas, war manages to “to close the gap between piety – which required 
self-abnegation and self-sacrifice – and violence”, by for instance establishing 
the death of Christ and those of the fallen within the same continuum.44 As we 
have seen, this was what Cardinal Billot had protested against in 1915.
Apart from conveying a well-defined ethos and political-religious narra-
tive, war is self-justifying in another way. The state sending its troops to war 
is forced to provide some kind of meaning to the deaths of its fallen. For this 
reason, politicians would hardly if ever concede that a particular war mission 
had been a mistake or a failure, and rather tend to portray defeats as victories. 
To concede to error would after all mean to betray those lives sacrificed. Thus 
war has become self-justifying, almost impossible to criticize. For historical 
truth needs to be adapted to the unchangeable facts of dying and the death 
of the enemy.
The second part of Hauerwas’ thesis concerns the killing of the enemy. 
For in war, of soldiers is required not only “the willingness to be killed”, but 
also “as its dark side, the sacrifice of our unwillingness to kill”. In evidence, he 
quotes a number of empirical studies which indicate that killing not only 
leaves most soldiers with deep emotional wounds, but that it also “creates a 
world of silence, isolating those who have killed”.45 Therefore, we may say that 
“no sacrifice is more dramatic than the sacrifice of those sent to war, that is, the 
sacrifice of their unwillingness to kill”, and that possibly even greater cruelty 
lurks in the expectation that those who have killed in action, would simply slip 
back into the ‘normality’ of civilian life when returned home.46
In terms of delineating his own position with regard to the above empiri-
cal thesis, the theologian Hauerwas stands closest to Cardinal Billot’s escha-
tological reserve. As members of the body of the Civitas Dei (Hauerwas 
explicitly refers to St Augustine), the Christian cannot identify himself with 
an (American) patriotism which – as we have seen in Kahn – turns the nation 
into a ‘religion’, worthy of killing and dying for. After all, “in the cross of Christ, 
the Father has forever ended our attempts to sacrifice to God in terms set by 
44   Hauerwas, “Sacrificing,” 89. Hauerwas here leans on Allen Frantzen’s Bloody Good: 
Chivalry, Sacrifice, and the Great War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
45   Hauerwas, “Sacrificing,” 94 and 95. (Italics are mine).
46   Hauerwas, “Sacrificing,” 100.
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the city of man”. Translated into secular political philosophical terms, this 
means “that the World no longer needs to make sacrifices for tribe or state, 
or even humanity”.47 Hauerwas here recalls the statement which brought him 
to theological fame, namely that “the first task of the church is not to make 
the world more just, but to make the world the world”.48 Thus, no sacraliza-
tion of war and its sacrificial practices, and skepticism towards all unions pre-
cipitated by the specter of war – in other words, a political-theological task of 
demythologizing.
Hauerwas’ affinity to Hobbes as an ethical theorist and to the Hobbesian 
appeal to the laws of nature and the basic dictates of reason is only at first 
glance. According to Hauerwas, there is “no more basic natural law than the 
prohibition against killing”.49 Also to Hobbes “to seek peace, and follow it” 
constitutes the first and fundamental law of nature.50 But Hauerwas finds 
the consequence of the Hobbesian world described above (that is, the liberal 
striving for security while shunning the risk of self-sacrifice), difficult to accept, 
as may been seen in the following quote:
“I think, that Christians must insist that what is true is not what a society 
thinks is worth killing for, but rather that for which they think is worth 
dying.” To Hauerwas, we were “created to be at peace with one another 
and God (. . .) created to be in communion with one another”.51
Faced with the choice of having to kill or be killed, his answer would be 
rather martyr than murderer, a conviction rooted as much in Christianity as 
in Socratic tradition. Hobbes however no longer believes in the inherent telos 
of communion, thus immediately qualifying his newly formulated first law of 
nature with “and when he cannot contain it (i.e. peace), that he may seek, and 
use, all helps, and advantages of Warre”.52 Within the rhetoric of Leviathan, this 
qualification sought to make acceptable the sovereign’s monopoly on violence, 
for only then could moral prescriptions become practice, and the Christian 
really can follow his conscience. As mentioned, here starts the Hobbesian sep-
aration of morals and politics – a historic development which has ended up in 
47   Hauerwas, “Sacrificing,” 102.
48   Hauerwas, “Sacrificing,” 101.
49   Hauerwas, “Sacrificing,” 103.
50   Hobbes, Leviathan, 190.
51   Hauerwas, “Sacrificing,” 102–103.
52   Hobbes, Leviathan, 190.
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a strategy of “killing without risk”, and which, to a theologian such is Hauerwas, 
is completely unacceptable.
5 Conclusion
So what conclusion can we draw with regard to the fate of the notion of pro 
patria mori, with regard to its legitimacy? Kantorowicz’s diagnosis of the abuse 
of this ancient value in modern times has not managed to completely discredit 
it, as is evident from the work of influential authors like Schmitt and Kahn. 
The actuality of the notion of self-sacrifice is perhaps most apparent in the 
Arab world, where many are prepared to give their lives for a new future and 
true national sovereignty, rooted in the people. These revolutions illustrate an 
old insight, namely that peace by itself can never be the highest objective, for 
peace is not always just, and in some cases nothing but a cynical euphemism 
for decades of repression.
In my view, modern theology has rightly distanced itself from the ‘nation-
alist’ notion of sacrifice. The core message at the heart of the eschatological 
reserve is the following: We ourselves cannot determine whether ‘our’ wars are 
just in the eyes of God or not. Therefore, not infrequently nations have to wait 
a long time before knowing for sure whether a revolution had been a ‘felici-
tous’ one or not – also here there is no divine sanction. The Hobbesian legacy 
of making absolute self-preservation has led to nuclear stalemate, and for 
some, to a pacifistic criminalization of war – the latter not necessarily pursued 
by peaceful means. The hunt is now open on the last remaining warmongers 
(currently of course termed ‘terrorists’) in a war on war. And here I think we 
need to support Albert Camus: It is better to run the risk of an honorable and 
chivalrous death, than to claim the moral high ground without being prepared 
to risk one’s life for it. Schmitt also thinks back nostalgically to the chivalry of 
the duel between sovereigns – ‘classic’ warfare – but at the same time diag-
noses the rise of asymmetrical forms of struggle and terror, where chivalry is 
far away. Confronted with the threat of civil war in Weimar Germany he gave 
way to the temptation, to forge national homogeneity through an external 
enemy and trough scapegoating. Wolfgang Palaver rightly let Schmitt’s atti-
tude correct by F. M. Dostoyevsky, who in The Brothers Karamazov defends the 
position that:
The rejection of sacrifice and the devotion to universal divine love depend 
on each other. Only if human beings are ready to give up their lives for 
each other, only if they accept that they are responsible for the whole 
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world and all the sins of human beings, is it possible to avoid scapegoat-
ing others.53
Thus, the Christian attitude rejects sacrifice and accepts self-sacrifice as a pos-
sible consequence of love. Following Jesus’ saying about the grain of corn in 
John, 12:24, which was the motto of his novel.
53   Palaver, ‘Schmitt’s Critique of Liberalism,” 70.
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Self-Sacrifice and the Other(s): Reflections on 
Andrei Tarkovksy’s The Sacrifice
Frederiek Depoortere
1 Introduction
In 1986, the year of his death from cancer at the age of 54, the expatriate 
Russian filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky published his last film, titled The Sacrifice. 
It presents the character of Alexander, a former actor who has now become 
an essayist and lecturer. The film takes place on his fiftieth birthday, a day 
celebrated with his family and a few friends in his mansion in a remote corner 
of the Swedish countryside. This party is interrupted when the television news 
announces that a nuclear war has broken out. In his desperation Alexander 
turns to God, in whom he had not believed until then. He promises God to 
sacrifice all he possesses and to remain mute for the rest of his life, if only God 
will save his family and friends from the imminent nuclear holocaust. When 
he wakes up the next morning, everything has gone back to normal, as if noth-
ing had happened the previous day. Alexander then fulfils his part of the deal: 
He burns down his house, and is taken in an ambulance to be locked up in a 
psychiatric hospital, unable to explain his deed because of his vow of silence.1
2 A Multi-Layered Plot
Tarkovsky’s last film has confronted its viewers and interpreters with many 
puzzles and unresolved questions. As pointed out by the Australian cinema-
tographer Gino Moliterno, many critics, even those who think favorably of 
Tarkovsky, have claimed that the film is “flawed” and “strongly undermined 
by considerable narrative and thematic confusion”.2 Part of this confusion is 
1   Andrei Tarkovsky, Collected Screenplays, trans. William Powell and Natasha Synessios 
(London: Faber and Faber, 1999), 505–560; Andrei Tarkovsky, The Sacrifice [film]; with Erland 
Josephson, Susan Fleetwood, Allan Edwall. For further details on the film, see http://www 
.imdb.com/title/tt0091670/. In what follows, I refer to the 142 minutes version of the film as 
distributed by Moskwood Media, Haarlem, The Netherlands.
2   Gino Moliterno, “Zarathustra’s Gift in Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice,” Screening the Past: An 
International, Refereed, Electronic Journal of Screen History 12 (2001), http://www.latrobe.edu 
.au/screeningthepast/firstrelease/fr0301/gmfr12a.htm.
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caused by the fact that in the film we actually get two crises at the same time. 
There is – just as in the narrative of the African sacrifice3 – a close connection 
between sacrifice and the fate of the community. As outlined by Mark Le Fanu 
in his discussion of the film, next to the political crisis on a planetary scale (the 
imminent nuclear holocaust), there is also a personal crisis: A marriage crisis 
between Alexander and his wife Adelaida, who is suggested to have an affair 
with their friend Victor. The significance of this affair for his sacrifice is never 
completely fleshed out.4 On top of this, things become even more complex 
when Alexander, after he has made his vow to God, is visited in the middle 
of the night by Otto, the postman and a friend who was also present at his 
birthday party. Otto urges him to go to the house of his servant Maria and 
to sleep with her. She is a witch of the best kind, Otto knows, and spending 
the night with her will return things to normal. Alexander first objects, but 
eventually yields and goes off to Maria’s. This narrative complication is a 
remainder of the first drafts of the manuscript of the film, which was originally 
titled The Witch and would tell the story of a man who is cured of a fatal disease 
after sleeping with a witch.5 The imminent nuclear holocaust and the pact with 
God were only added at a later stage. The relation between Alexander’s pact 
with God and Otto’s promise of redemption through Maria remains unclear, 
however. Or, as Peter Green puts it: “Is this [promise] an immediate answer 
to [Alexander’s] prayers, the response to his vow, or is it an alternative to 
sacrifice?”.6 In the end it is, as Le Fanu notes, unclear what returned things 
to normal: The deal with God, the night spent with Maria, or neither: Maybe 
the superpowers returned to their senses and the nuclear war was stopped 
anyway, independently of any act of Alexander.7
3 Three Philosophical Issues
Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice also raises several questions of a philosophical 
nature. A first question concerns the characterization of the sacrificial ges-
ture in The Sacrifice. During an interview in March 1986, Tarkovsky stated that 
3   See the contribution of W. E. A. van Beek in this volume.
4   Mark Le Fanu, The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky (repr., London: British Film Institute, 
1990), 125.
5   Andrey Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time: Reflections on the Cinema, trans. Kitty Hunter-Blair 
(Austin, University of Texas Press 1989), 219–220.
6   Peter Green, “Apocalypse and Sacrifice,” Sight and Sound 56, 2 (1987), 111–118 (118).
7   Le Fanu, The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky, 126–127.
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The Sacrifice is a film on self-sacrifice.8 He made similar claims in Sculpting 
in Time, the book in which the filmmaker discussed his work.9 Yet, is it 
correct to designate Alexander’s sacrificial gesture as a self-sacrifice? Alexander 
indeed offers a number of things that matter a lot to him (such as his house 
and the contact with his young son, nicknamed “Little Man”), but he does not 
seem to be offering himself.
Another problem raised by Tarkovsky’s depiction of Alexander’s sacrificial 
gesture is the way the latter’s family is involved in it. Several critics have formu-
lated their unease in this regard. Moliterno, for instance, has put this as follows: 
“How can burning the home of his loved ones, the ones for whom he makes 
the pact with God, be an appropriate self-sacrifice for Alexander?”10 In this 
regard, Moliterno quotes Philip Strick, who in a 1987 review of The Sacrifice 
wondered why Alexander would deprive his family of their possessions (by 
burning down their house) in his attempt to offer atonement.11 A similar obser-
vation has been made by Le Fanu, who asks whether “sacrifice [can] be sacri-
fice if it implicates innocent people”.12 The example of Alexander suggests that 
others are always involved in any act of sacrifice and raises the question of the 
role played by sacrifice in the relationship of an individual with these others.
A further question that is raised by The Sacrifice, as pointed out by Le Fanu, 
is to what extent we should take Alexander as an exemplar.13 Is a sacrificial ges-
ture like Alexander’s advisable, and is it desirable? Should we all try to do 
like him? There are reasons to accept that Tarkovsky intended the hero of his 
last film to function as a moral exemplar. In the aforementioned interview 
from 1986, he explained that as far as he is concerned, self-sacrifice is what 
makes a human being truly human and distinguishes him or her from the 
animals. Somebody who does not possess the desire for self-sacrifice, in 
Tarkovsky’s view, has “ceased to be a man” and “begins to revert to the animal 
condition and becomes a strange machine, an object to be experimented with 
by society and the state”.14 But was Tarkovsky correct in defending the moral 
desirability of self-sacrifice?
8    Annie Epelboin, “Andrei Tarkovsky on The Sacrifice,” interview, see http://people.ucalgary 
.ca/~tstronds/nostalghia.com/TheTopics/On_Sacrifice.html.
9    Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, 218.
10   Moliterno, “Zarathustra’s Gift.”
11   See Philip Strick, “Offret (The Sacrifice),” Monthly Film Bulletin 636 (January 1987), 7–8 (7).
12   Le Fanu, The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky, 125.
13   Le Fanu, The Cinema of Andrei Tarkovsky, 124.
14   Epelboin, “Andrei Tarkovsky on The Sacrifice.”
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In what follows, I will take up the three philosophical issues that arise from 
The Sacrifice (the character of self-sacrifice, the role played by self-sacrifice 
in the relationship with one’s others, and the desirability of self-sacrifice), seek-
ing to clarify the philosophy of sacrifice that is present in Tarkovsky’s final film.
4 Is the Sacrifice of “The Sacrifice” a Self-Sacrifice?
Let us begin with the question whether Alexander’s sacrificial gesture can 
rightly be considered a self-sacrifice. To answer this question, we of course 
need to know what a self-sacrifice, or sacrifice of the self, is. This immediately 
raises two further questions: What is sacrifice? And what is “the self” that is 
sacrificed in an act of self-sacrifice? The Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dic­
tionary distinguishes between two meanings of the verb “to sacrifice”. The 
dictionary’s first meaning of to sacrifice is “to give up something that is valuable 
to you, in order to help another person”,15 the second is “to kill an animal or a 
person and offer them to a god or gods”.16 These definitions clearly show that 
sacrifice, be it secular or religious, involves someone else: Be it the god(s) to 
whom the sacrifice is addressed or the person or people for whose benefit one 
sacrifices. This suggests that in a sacrificial gesture four elements can be dis-
tinguished: The sacrificing subject (A), the sacrificed object (B), the addressee 
of the sacrifice (C), and the reason for the sacrifice (D). We might design the 
formal structure of a sacrifice as: “A sacrificing B to C for the sake of D”.17
This leads us back to the concept of self-sacrifice. The main problem with 
it is the meaning of ‘self ’ in the word ‘self-sacrifice’. An evident way to under-
stand the ‘self ’ in ‘self-sacrifice’ is as pointing to self-sacrifice as reflexive sac-
rifice, a sacrifice in which the subject sacrificing (A) and the object sacrificed 
(B) are identical (B = A). This is the way Claudia Welz understands self- 
sacrifice. In her view, self-sacrifice has the following formal structure: “A sacri-
ficing A to C for the sake of D”.18 Regarding the required identity of the subject 
sacrificing and the object sacrificed, Welz writes the following:
15   http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/sacrifice_1. The addition of ‘that is 
valuable to you’ is important: the term sacrifice is only used appropriately when it refers 
to a giving-up which is costly and painful.
16   http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/sacrifice_2.
17   I have adopted this formal structure of sacrifice from Claudia Welz, “Love as Gift and Self-
Sacrifice,” Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 50, 3–4 
(2008), 238–66 (at 246).
18   Welz, “Love as Gift and Self-Sacrifice,” 246.
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If the sacrificed self is not exactly the same as the sacrificing self, the 
self-sacrifice is incomplete. It is only a feature of the self or an aspect of 
its self-image that might be sacrificed. The self sacrificing itself survives 
the sacrifice of itself, ready for repeated self-sacrifices.19
Thus, according to Welz, a sacrifice can only be considered a self-sacrifice 
in cases where somebody dies for somebody else, when the sacrificing self 
does not survive the sacrifice.20 If we adopt this view, Alexander’s sacrifice 
as it is depicted in Tarkovsky’s film is clearly not a self-sacrifice: He does not 
give his life. If we put Alexander’s sacrificial gesture in a formula, we get the 
following: Alexander (A) sacrificing his house and the contact with his son 
(B) to God (C) for the well-being of his family and friends (D). The sacrific-
ing subject (Alexander) and the object sacrificed (his house and the contact 
with his son) are clearly not identical, in contrast to what one would expect if 
one follows Welz in defining self-sacrifice as a sacrifice in which B = A. Does 
this show that Tarkovsky was wrong in designating the sacrifice in his last film 
as a self-sacrifice? Or does Alexander’s example suggest that we can under-
stand self-sacrifice in another way?
4.1 Moliterno’s Nietzschean Interpretation
To help us answer these questions, I now turn to Gino Moliterno’s interpre-
tation of Tarkovsky’s film. Moliterno proposes a Nietzschean reading of 
Alexander’s gesture to burn down his house. This interpretation is accounted 
for by a reference to Nietzsche during a conversation between Alexander and 
his friend Otto in the first scene of The Sacrifice. Otto reprimands Alexander for 
always being gloomy and depressed. He suspects that Alexander is like most 
people, who are waiting their entire life for “something real and important” to 
happen, but who meanwhile forget to live life here and now. Otto admits that 
he is no different in this regard: He, too, is waiting, but he adds that he is often 
haunted by that notorious hunchbacked dwarf from Nietzsche, “the one that 
sent Zarathustra into a fainting fit”.21 This is a reference to the second section 
of the third part of Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra. In this section, which 
is titled “On the Vision and the Riddle”, Zarathustra tells about his encounter 
with “the spirit of gravity”, his “devil and arch-enemy”, who is sitting on his 
19   Ibidem.
20   Welz, “Love as Gift and Self-Sacrifice,” 246–47.
21   Tarkovsky, Collected Screenplays, 518–19; Tarkovsky, The Sacrifice [film], 09:25–11:15 
(i.e. a fragment starting at 9 minutes and 25 seconds and ending at 11 minutes and 
15 seconds in the film).
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shoulders and is pushing him down, while he wants to go upwards. This devil 
is subsequently depicted as “half dwarf, half mole, lame, paralyzing, dripping 
lead into my ear, lead-drop thoughts in my brain”.22 This hunchbacked dwarf is 
thus a symbol for everything that sickens the human spirit and pulls it down. 
Or, as Moliterno puts it:
[T]he dwarf is a personification of nihilism, [which is the] failure to value 
the present moment in its eternal ‘nowness’, thus manifesting a dissatis-
faction with, and ultimately a hatred of, the world, life and oneself. For 
Nietzsche, nihilism is an existential ailment or nausea, a sickness typified 
by a yearning for a different, better world or condition but a yearning 
which, in its ‘otherworldliness’, inevitably deprecates and de-values this 
earth and this life.23
Given this characterization of nihilism, Moliterno concludes that Alexander 
clearly passes the test as a nihilist. This can be derived from the second scene 
of the film, immediately following the conversation between Alexander and 
Otto. In this scene, we get a long monologue by Alexander in which he com-
plains about the deplorable state of humankind. Since sin is everything that is 
not necessary, he views human civilization as mostly, if not completely, sinful.24 
However, he is aware of the fact that he is no better than the rest. Towards 
the end of the scene, Alexander gets annoyed with his own idle chatter and 
expresses a desire for action, something of which he is not capable himself.25 
Alexander is clearly infected by the spirit of gravity, which depresses and para-
lyzes him. His desire for another, better world makes him melancholy, gloomy, 
and weary. He wallows in self-pity and pessimism. He is a prototypical nihilist.
This leads Moliterno to his Nietzschean interpretation of Alexander’s sac-
rifice, which should, in his view, be understood as “a joyful act of affirmative 
self-transfiguration”.26 In this respect, it is highly significant that Alexander’s 
22   Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: A Book for All and None, eds Adrian Del Caro 
and Robert B. Pippin, trans. Adrian Del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 124.
23   Moliterno, “Zarathustra’s Gift.” In this regard, Moliterno refers to Bernd Magnus, 
Nietzsche’s Existential Imperative: Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), 42 and 144–145, where nihilism is inter-
preted as being caused by “systematic dualism,” that is, a “contempt for the earth and the 
earthly,” the yearning for “a different, a better world or condition.”
24   Tarkovsky, Collected Screenplays, 523; The Sacrifice [film], 19:38.
25   Tarkovsky, The Sacrifice [film], 20:23–20:51.
26   Moliterno, “Zarathustra’s Gift.”
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sacrificial gesture consists in burning down his house. The house is not only, 
as pointed out by Moliterno, “a fairly transparent symbol of the self”,27 it also 
stands for one’s past. At home, the past can live on. It is a place where memories 
are kept alive, where souvenirs and other objects constantly serve as reminders 
of past events and people one once knew. As such, one’s house can become a 
place in which one can hide from the real life out there. This is precisely the 
role the house plays in The Sacrifice. It is no coincidence that it is situated in 
a remote corner of the Swedish countryside, since its owner is a man who has 
given up his busy life as an actor in London, has turned his back on the world 
and is now leading a secluded life of nostalgia and world-weariness. By burn-
ing down his own house, Alexander is breaking free from the burden of the 
past, from his “domiciled worldweariness”, from everything which pulls him 
downwards, “anchoring [him] to the past and fatally undermining the joy of 
the present through a yearning for another time, another place, another state”.28
If there is a self which is sacrificed in Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice, it is 
Alexander’s nihilist and world-weary self. This suggests that we should write 
the formalization of Alexander’s sacrificial gesture as follows: Alexander 
(A) sacrificing his nihilist self (A’) through sacrificing his house (B) to God 
(C) for the well-being of his family and friends (D).
4.2 Was Alexander’s Deed a Self-Sacrifice?
Moliterno’s characterization of Alexander as a prototypical nihilist is convinc-
ing. But does his Nietzschean reading of Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice not confirm 
Welz’s reluctance to talk about self-sacrifice? In The Sacrifice, is it not “only a 
feature of the self or an aspect of its self-image that [is] sacrificed” (in other 
words, its nihilism and world-weariness), while “the sacrificing self itself 
survives the sacrifice of itself?”.29 Does The Sacrifice not show, confirmed by 
Moliterno’s interpretation, that, except in the case that someone is actually 
giving up his or her life for the other (which Alexander is clearly not doing), 
“the sacrificing self [A] is irreducible to the sacrificed self [A’]” and “unable 
to get rid of itself?”.30 And should we therefore not reserve the term ‘self- 
sacrifice’ for the rare and exceptional cases in which someone gives up their 
life for the other?31
27   Moliterno, “Zarathustra’s Gift.”
28   Moliterno, “Zarathustra’s Gift.”
29   Welz, “Love as Gift and Self-Sacrifice,” 246.
30   Welz, “Love as Gift and Self-Sacrifice,” 246.
31   Welz, “Love as Gift and Self-Sacrifice,” 248.
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In my view, The Sacrifice offers a negative answer to these questions. This 
can be substantiated by Tarkovsky’s own understanding of the gesture of 
Alexander’s sacrificial gesture. In Sculpting in Time, the director explained 
that “Alexander (. . .) burns all the bridges behind him, leaving not a single 
path by which to return”32 and “breaks irrevocably with the world and with 
its laws”, losing in this way his family and placing “himself outside all accepted 
norms”.33 Put differently, Alexander cuts himself loose from the social fabric 
and becomes an outcast. And in this way he dies, not a biological death, but 
a “symbolic death”, the death that consists in being separated from the sym-
bolic order of language and community.34 That this kind of symbolic death 
is at stake in The Sacrifice is confirmed by the fact that Alexander’s sacrifice 
precisely consists in giving up speech and the contact with his family (and his 
son in particular). What Alexander gives up is his symbolic self, his place in the 
symbolic order, his identity.
Thus, we can enlarge Welz’s understanding of self-sacrifice and view 
Alexander’s sacrificial gesture to be a self-sacrifice: We can speak of a self- 
sacrifice, not only when someone gives up their life for the sake of someone else 
but also when someone forsakes their symbolic self for something or some-
one. This leads us back to the second philosophical question that is raised by 
The Sacrifice, the question of the role played by sacrifice in the relationship 
of the sacrificing subject with the others.
5 The Role of Alexander’s Sacrificial Gesture in the Relation to  
his Others
Although Moliterno’s characterization of Alexander as a prototypical nihilist 
is convincing and has allowed us to interpret the sacrifice in The Sacrifice as a 
self-sacrifice, his interpretation of Alexander’s sacrificial gesture is not with-
out problems. Moliterno ignores the obvious religious context of that sacrifice, 
the fact that Alexander burns down his house as the outcome of a pact with 
God, and he also leaves aside the issue that this pact with God is made to save 
Alexander’s beloved others (family, friends). For this reason, I will continue by 
taking a closer look at the role Alexander’s sacrifice plays in the  relationship 
32   Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, 224.
33   Tarkovsky, Sculpting in Time, 227.
34   The distinction between “biological death” and “symbolic death” is adopted from the 
work of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, in whose work it is a recurrent theme. 
See, for instance, Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), 135.
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with his others and with God. In doing so, I make use of a section from an 
article of the Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek, in which he distinguishes 
four ways sacrifice can play a role in a subject’s relationship with the others 
and with God.35 I will discuss these four roles of sacrifice and examine to what 
extent each of them can be found in The Sacrifice.
5.1 Do ut des
As noted by Žižek, the most elementary role sacrifice can play in the relation-
ship with the other is that it serves to provoke a positive answer from that 
other: I give to the other something which is important to me, in order to get 
something back which is even more important to me (do ut des).36 If we for-
malize this, we get the following: A sacrificing B to C for the sake of D, where 
D = getting B’ from C, while B’ is more important than B. Alexander’s sacri-
fice can be interpreted as such a simple do ut des: To the other, in casu God, 
he offers things that are very dear to him – his house, the contact with his 
son – to obtain something even more important: The well-being of his family 
and friends.
In The Sacrifice, however, there seem to be deeper grounds than just, as 
Žižek puts it, “some profitable exchange”.37 This is corroborated by the fact 
that Alexander, who is entering into a pact with God, had admitted earlier, in 
the first scene of the film, to having no relationship with God at all.38 Let us 
therefore take a look at what ultimately motivates Alexander’s turn to God in 
the dark hour in which he and his beloved ones find themselves. If we turn to 
Alexander’s prayer, we see that it culminates in his imploring to be released 
from the “deadly, sickening, animal fear” that he experiences in the face of the 
imminent nuclear holocaust.39 This fear is not merely the fear of death but of 
a far more terrifying fate. A nuclear war will not only result in Alexander’s own 
death but in the death of most, if not all, human beings. Life on earth will be 
wiped out. Or, as Alexander puts it in his prayer:
35   Slavoj Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” in Sexuation (ed. Renata Salecl; Durham, NC: 
Duke University Press, 2000), 216–259 (243–247). See also Slavoj Žižek, On Belief (Thinking 
in Action; London: Routledge, 2001), 69–74.
36   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 243; Žižek, On Belief, 69.
37   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 243; Žižek, On Belief, 69.
38   Tarkovsky, Collected Screenplays, 517–518; The Sacrifice [film], 08:45–09:00.
39   Tarkovsky, The Sacrifice [film], 01:13:06–01:13:07. See also Tarkovsky, Collected Screenplays, 
544: “sickening, deathly fear”.
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[T]his war is the last, and terrible, and will leave neither victor nor van-
quished; no towns, no villages, neither grass nor trees nor water in springs 
nor birds in the heavens.40
The death at stake here is not an individual’s death, which has its place in the 
natural and symbolic order that consists in a succession of generations, but 
the complete destruction of that order, the total interruption of the succession 
of the generations. Or, to phrase it differently, the threat of a nuclear holocaust 
opens an abyss of nothingness, of the utter and complete meaninglessness and 
insignificance of everything that mattered for Alexander until now.
5.2 A Way to Restore Meaning
This leads us back to Žižek and the second role of sacrifice distinguished by 
him. According to Žižek, sacrifice can, beyond the profitable exchange of the 
do ut des, also serve as a way to restore meaning in the face of utter meaning-
lessness. Or, to put it in Žižek’s own terms: Sacrifice is a way to convince our-
selves that there is an Other (with capital O) out there, the big Other who is 
pulling the strings and guarantees the good outcome of history. This means 
that we have the same formula, A sacrificing B to C for the sake of D, but with 
D = convincing A of C’s existence. In this regard, Žižek speaks in an earlier book 
about “the trick of the sacrifice”:
Sacrifice is a guarantee that the Other exists: That there is an Other 
who can be appeased by means of the sacrifice (. . .). [B]y the very act of 
sacrifice, we (presup)pose the existence of its addressee that guarantees the 
consistency and meaningfulness of our experience – so, even if the act 
fails in its proclaimed goal, this very failure can be read from within the 
logic of sacrifice as our failure to appease the Other.41
Even in the case that an act of sacrifice fails in its proclaimed goal, it still 
enables us to save the consistency and meaningfulness of our experience. Or, 
as Žižek explains:
Even if the Other does not grant my wish, I can at least be assured that 
there is another who – maybe – next time will respond differently: The 
40   Tarkovsky, Collected Screenplays, 543; The Sacrifice [film], 01:11:57–01:12:22.
41   Slavoj Žižek, Enjoy Your Symptom! Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (New York: 
Routledge, 1992), 64.
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world out there, inclusive of all catastrophes that may befall me, is not 
a meaningless piece of blind machinery, but a partner in a possible dia-
logue, so that even a catastrophic outcome is to be read as a meaningful 
response; we do not live in a kingdom of blind chance.42
It is clear that Alexander’s sacrificial gesture can be interpreted as a way to 
assure the existence of the big Other. By approaching the universe as a dia-
logue partner, he is turning the course of events into a meaningful answer of 
the big Other: Even if the big Other would not respond as he would wish, he 
can still believe in the meaningfulness of what happens – for it is the result, 
not of some blind process, but of an agent that acts intentionally. Even if God, 
who occupies the place of the big Other for Alexander, would decide not to 
respond positively to Alexander’s offer, his gesture would still enable him 
to save the meaningfulness of the world: The nuclear holocaust is no longer the 
outcome of blind and arbitrary processes, but wanted by God.
5.3 Sacrifice for the Other
However, it would be one-sided to say that Alexander is only interested in sav-
ing himself from the meaninglessness of the world. Before he promises God 
to give up everything he has, he prays for others, not only for his son, his wife 
and friends but also for humankind in general.43 This shows that Alexander’s 
offer to God aims at saving others. This leads us to what Žižek has written on 
sacrifice for the other, the third type of sacrifice that he distinguishes. This third 
type of sacrifice can be formulated as follows: A sacrificing B for the sake of D, 
with D = saving the other. As can be derived from this formula, this kind of sac-
rifice does not (necessarily) have an addressee. Žižek finds an eminent exam-
ple of such a sacrifice for the other in the Hollywood classic Beau Geste (1939).44 
In this film, the eldest of three brothers, Michael Geste, steals his family’s prize 
possession: An immensely expensive piece of jewellery. In doing so, he turns 
himself into an outcast, an ungrateful scoundrel. However, he did it to save his 
family, in particular his beloved aunt, from the shame of discovering that their 
prized jewel is actually a worthless replica. Or to express it once more within 
the formula: Michael (A) sacrificing his reputation (B) to save the reputation of 
his beloved family-others in the gaze of the big Other of society (D).45
42   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 243–44; Žižek, On Belief, 69.
43   See Tarkovsky, Collected Screenplays, 543; The Sacrifice [film], 01:10:40–01:11:57.
44   See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0031088/ for further details.
45   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 244; Žižek, On Belief, 70–71.
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If we compare the sacrifices of Michael from Beau Geste and Alexander from 
The Sacrifice, we find that in both cases somebody is becoming an outcast to 
save his family: Michael becomes a thief, Alexander a lunatic. In reference to 
the distinction between biological and symbolic death that was introduced 
above, we can say that both Michael and Alexander undergo a symbolic death. 
Michael is sacrificing his own reputation in order to conceal the truth for the 
big Other of society and to save his beloved family-others from shame and dis-
grace; Alexander engages in a bargain with the big Other, God, and promises to 
sacrifice his symbolic self because he wants to save his beloved others from an 
imminent nuclear holocaust.
5.4 Sacrifice to Dupe the Other
The example of Michael from Beau Geste shows that sacrifice can also serve to 
dupe the Other. In Beau Geste, Michael’s sacrifice aims at letting the big Other, 
society, believe that his family possesses an expensive necklace, while in real-
ity it possesses only a worthless replica. However, sacrifice can also be a means 
to make the Other believe that one does not yet possess some valuable and 
beloved object (A sacrificing B for the sake of D with D = duping the Other). 
This is the fourth role of sacrifice in the relationship to the Other that is distin-
guished by Žižek. To give an example of this, Žižek refers to a course of events 
returning in many Cold War spy films, such as Enigma from 1981:46 a secret 
agent is sent out on a mission which the agent’s superiors intended to fail from 
the very start. The poor fellow had to be captured so that the Russians would 
believe that the CIA was still searching for what they actually already pos-
sessed (for instance, as in Enigma, some special computer chip enabling the 
CIA to decode the messages sent from the KGB headquarters to its outposts). 
Or, as Žižek explains:
The strategy here is to stage a search operation in order to convince the 
Other (the enemy) that one does not already possess what one is looking 
for – in short, one feigns a lack, a want, in order to conceal from the Other 
that one already possesses the agalma, the Other’s innermost secret.47
More in general, the example of Enigma shows that sacrifice offers the subject 
a way to enjoy what is forbidden by the Law of the big Other. Žižek puts this 
as follows:
46   See http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0083891/ for further details.
47   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 244–45. See also Žižek, On Belief, 71–72.
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Insofar as the Other of the symbolic Law prohibits jouissance [enjoy-
ment], the only way for the subject to enjoy is to feign that he lacks the 
object that provides jouissance, that is, to conceal its possession from 
the Other’s gaze by staging the spectacle of the desperate search for it.48
In this way, Žižek adds, the subject is able to escape from the pressure of the 
superego. The superego is, as noted by Dylan Evans, “the Other insofar as 
the Other commands the subject to enjoy”. It is the dark underside of the Law 
and is nothing but the imperative to enjoy,49 that is, the implicit injunction 
to do precisely what is explicitly forbidden by the Law. This results in a guilt- 
ridden subject, torn between what is explicitly stated by the Law and the implicit 
command in the explicit prohibition to do the forbidden thing. Therefore, 
a sacrifice that aims at convincing the big Other that one does not yet possess 
the object of enjoyment is the ideal way to escape from this deadlock.50
This function of sacrifice, which can offer an individual a way to deal with 
the guilt that is caused by the enjoyment he experiences, can also be found 
in Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice. This is suggested by the prima facie strange reac-
tion of Alexander when he hears the news that a nuclear war has broken 
out: “I’ve waited for this all my life . . . all my life was spent in expectation of 
this”.51 This reaction is understandable in light of Alexander’s long monologue 
at the beginning of the movie in which he, as we have seen above, expressed 
his desire for some action. Now, at last, something truly interruptive occurs 
and Alexander’s deepest desire – what he was longing for at the outset of the 
film: Being freed, to put it in Moliterno’s Nietzschean idiom, from the spirit of 
gravity that infects him – is about to be realized. Yet, this imminent realization 
of his desire (and the enjoyment that comes with it) conflicts with his sym-
bolic existence as a father, a husband and a friend, and with the obligations 
connected to these roles. Therefore, that enjoyment is also a source of guilt, 
since, ultimately, Alexander enjoys the prospect of the death of his son, wife 
and friends as well as the total destruction of humankind. Alexander is trapped 
between the loyalties that are connected to his existence in the symbolic 
order and the enjoyment that comes with the prospect of an imminent end 
of the world. In this way, Alexander’s sacrificial gesture can be understood as 
48   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 246. See also Žižek, On Belief, 72.
49   Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (repr., London: 
Routledge, 1997), 201.
50   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 247; Žižek, On Belief, 74.
51   Tarkovsky, Collected Screenplays, 538; The Sacrifice [film], 00:54:10–00:54:21.
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a compensation for the enjoyment he experiences: Through his self-sacrifice 
he can do something for his beloved others, paying off the guilt caused by 
enjoying the prospect of their destruction.
6 Third Philosophical Issue: Is Self-Sacrifice Desirable?
In the preceding pages, we have discussed Gino Moliterno’s Nietzschean 
reading of Tarkovsky’s The Sacrifice (with an eye to showing that Alexander’s 
sacrificial gesture can be considered a self-sacrifice) as well as Slavoj Žižek’s view 
on the role sacrifice can play in the relation of an individual with others 
and the big Other. At the end of this chapter, I want to examine what light 
Moliterno and Žižek shed on the third philosophical question that is raised by 
The Sacrifice: To what extent should we take Alexander as an exemplar? Is a 
sacrificial gesture like Alexander’s advisable? Is it desirable? Should we all try 
to do like him?
In answering the question of the desirability of a sacrificial gesture like 
Alexander’s, Moliterno and Žižek point in opposing directions. Moliterno’s 
Nietzschean interpretation of The Sacrifice allows for a positive evaluation of 
Alexander’s sacrificial gesture. As we have seen, Moliterno praises the sacrifice 
as “a joyful act of affirmative self-transfiguration” that enables Alexander to 
break free from the spirit of gravity, the burden of the past and his cultivation 
of world-weariness. Through a separation from language and community (or 
symbolic death), he receives an unprecedented freedom vis-à-vis the symbolic 
order. However, it is not clear how this symbolic death can be understood as 
‘joyful’ and ‘affirmative’, and as an act of ‘self-transfiguration’ instead of self-
destruction (the destruction of the symbolic self), implied by our description 
of Alexander’s sacrificial gesture in terms of symbolic death (a term I adopted 
from Žižek).
Moreover, as I have mentioned above, Moliterno ignores the obvious fact 
that Alexander’s sacrifice was the outcome of a pact he made with God in 
order to save his family, friends and humankind at large from an imminent 
nuclear holocaust. And if we consider Alexander’s sacrificial gesture in light 
of Žižek’s discussion of the role sacrifice can play in the relationship between 
individuals with their others and with the big Other, that sacrifice appears in 
a completely different light. At least, this is the conclusion Žižek himself has 
drawn. Although he does not apply the four functions of sacrifice to the film, 
his discussion of these functions in the aforementioned article is framed by 
a twofold rejection of Alexander’s sacrificial gesture. The section from which 
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I have been quoting is titled “The Fake of the Sacrifice” and the question Žižek 
intends to answer here is what is wrong about the Tarkovskian sacrifice.52 
After discussing the four roles, Žižek concludes that the problem posed in The 
Sacrifice is false and misleading.53
6.1 A Disavowal of the True State of Affairs
But what, then, is wrong about it? What exactly is false in it? Looking back 
at Žižek’s four functions, we find that – once we move beyond profitable 
exchange – sacrifice in one way or another serves the aim of disavowing the true 
state of affairs. It is a means to conceal the truth: Either the truth that the big 
Other does not exist and therefore there is no ultimate guarantee of the mean-
ingfulness of the universe, the truth that the beloved other is actually lacking 
and impotent, or the truth about my own lack. And this is, in Žižek’s view, what 
is wrong with a sacrifice like Alexander’s: It is, in the end, about sustaining 
illusions – the illusion of the other whose lack can be filled by what I have to 
offer, the illusion of the other that would be able to fill my lack, and the illusion 
of a big Other who guarantees the good outcome of the course of history.
According to Žižek, the fundamental problem with The Sacrifice is that its 
protagonist offers himself “as the instrument to deliver the big Other”. The 
Sacrifice suggests that it is:
[O]nly by accomplishing an act which is totally senseless and ‘irratio-
nal’ that the subject can save the deeper global meaning of the universe 
as such.54
Or, to put it differently, what makes Alexander’s sacrificial gesture false is 
that his:
[R]enunciation is functionalized in the service of the big Other, as the 
redemptive act destined to restore spiritual meaning to life.55
And this is why, according to Žižek, we should not follow Alexander’s example, 
but resist the fatal attraction of sacrifice and accept that the big Other does 
52   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 243.
53   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 247.
54   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 247.
55   Žižek, “The Thing from Inner Space,” 247.
 69Self-Sacrifice and the Other(s)
not exist, while the lack of the other as well as our own lack are constitutive 
for what we are.
6.2 Tarkovsky’s Riddle – A Dual Interpretation Mode?
Given the different evaluations of Alexander’s sacrificial gesture offered by 
Moliterno and Žižek, what to conclude about the desirability of a self-sacrifice 
like Alexander’s? What may account for the difference between Moliterno 
and Žižek is what they make of the fact that Alexander’s act of sacrificing his 
symbolic self and disconnecting from the symbolic order does not disrupt 
or transform the established order. Whether this is considered problematic 
depends on one’s perspective. From the perspective of someone who sacri-
fices their symbolic self, such a sacrifice may indeed be experienced as some-
thing positive because it enables, as we have seen, an unprecedented freedom 
from the burdens and constraints of existence in the symbolic order. This is 
the view defended by Moliterno. Yet, from the perspective of societal change, 
which is shared by Žižek, a self-sacrifice like Alexander’s – which consists in 
a withdrawal from the symbolic order that does not affect that order as such – 
can only be highly troubling. After all, it rather confirms than challenges the 
current status quo and therefore sustains the powers that be.
This of course raises the question which perspective is defended by Tarkovsky 
himself in his last film. If we can take Alexander to express Tarkovsky’s per-
sonal view when he laments civilization as sinful (see above), there is a 
good reason to think that Tarkovsky would agree with the interpretation of 
Alexander’s sacrifice in terms of symbolic death – which is confirmed by what 
the filmmaker wrote about Alexander’s gesture in his book Sculpting in Time 
(see above). Yet, what distinguishes Tarkovsky from both Moliterno and Žižek 
is that he clearly understands Alexander’s symbolic death in religious terms. In 
the aforementioned interview from 1986, Tarkovsky even spoke about the sac-
rifice of The Sacrifice in terms of redemption and spiritual rebirth: The movie 
is about “restor[ing] one’s independence vis-à-vis the material things of life 
and consequently reaffirm[ing] one’s spiritual essence” and “[Alexander] is a 
man who has understood that, to redeem himself, it has become indispens-
able to efface himself”.56 Thus, according to Tarkovsky, Alexander is realizing 
his higher destiny through his sacrificial gesture. Žižek’s atheism, in contrast, 
does not allow for this possibility. For him, there is no such higher destiny 
of humankind and any withdrawal from the world that does not disrupt the 
56   Epelboin, “Andrei Tarkovsky on The Sacrifice.”
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 present order of things is false and misleading insofar as it contributes to the 
perpetuation of that order.
Ultimately, it is the presence or absence of God which decides about 
Alexander’s sacrifice as desirable or false. If there is no God, any attempt to 
reach a higher destiny beyond this world is mistaken and Žižek is right to reject 
Alexander’s sacrifice. But this very issue the film leaves unsolved. There are no 
clear signs in the film that there is indeed a God – although Tarkovsky believed 
there is. Therefore, Alexander’s sacrifice remains ambiguous: In the end, it is 
not possible to decide whether he is a saint or a lunatic.
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“Das Opferthier, das nicht vergebens fällt”:  
The Meaning of Sacrifice in Friedrich Hölderlin’s 
Der Tod des Empedokles
Rebecca Prevoo and Joachim Duyndam
1 Introduction
To deepen our understanding of the phenomenon of sacrifice today and its 
relation to the community at large, it may be helpful to explore its meaning 
in historical periods that mark the turning points of modernity. The German 
intellectual discourse at the end of the eighteenth century, in which the issues 
of community and national identity were fundamentally debated and rede-
fined, presents itself as a particularly fruitful ground for such an investigation. 
In the search for answers to the triple crisis of this period – in which social, 
political, and philosophical problems are entangled1 – all leading thinkers 
assign a crucial task to the poet.
This article analyzes the work of such a Dichter,2 Friedrich Hölderlin (1770–
1843), whose voice like no other echoes the turbulence of the time. However, 
we will not concentrate on his famous and important poems but shift attention 
to his dramaturgy. In the years preceding the turn of the century, Hölderlin is 
absorbed in a project to create a modern tragedy based on an ancient topic: the 
mythical death of the Greek philosopher Empedocles. In this work, the themes 
of sacrifice, community and identity are deeply and intriguingly connected. 
We will trace three different meanings of sacrifice as they can be identified in 
the subsequent versions of the text.
Hölderlin never completed his attempt to create a Greek tragedy for mod-
ern times; only three unfinished fragments remain. We seek to show how this 
failure marks a defining turn in Hölderlin’s thought, and how new and original 
insights into the problem of modern identity are initiated that will profoundly 
affect the meaning of sacrifice.
1   Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Jean-Luc Nancy and Anne Marie Lang, L’Absolu littéraire: théorie 
de la littérature du romantisme allemand (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1978), 13–14.
2   Poet. As we see it, the word may be used in a wider sense of an inspired, sensitive and 
eloquent person.
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2 Longing for a Meaningful Death
In 1799, Hölderlin writes a poem in which the themes of sacrificial death and 
community are explicitly connected. The ode Der Tod fürs Vaterland evokes 
a battle scene in which youthful heroes descend a hill to fight the intruding 
enemy. Although this enemy – described as Würger (stranglers) and Ehrelose 
(those without honor) – is physically stronger, they lack the spiritual weapons 
of the young heroes: their soul, the justice of their cause and their songs for the 
fatherland. In the third stanza, the wish to join their ranks is exclaimed, culmi-
nating in a motto expressing the longing for a meaningful death:
O nimmt mich, nimmt mich mit in die Reihen auf,
Damit ich einst nicht sterbe gemeinen Tods!
Umsonst zu sterben, lieb’ ich nicht, doch
Lieb’ ich, zu fallen am Opferhügel3
Already in the next stanza, the wish to die for the native country (“Für’s 
Vaterland, zu bluten des Herzens Blut/ Für’s Vaterland”)4 – is completed and the 
fallen youth descends into a realm which is closest to the images of the under-
world in ancient Greece.5 Here, arriving as a ‘humble foreigner’, the hero is wel-
comed by the “Helden und Dichter aus alter Zeit” (heroes and poets of ancient 
times) who treat him as a brother. The final stanza completes the legitimiza-
tion of the hero’s sacrifice and of sacrificial death in general:6
3   Friedrich Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, ed. Michael Knaupp, 3 vols., vol. 1 
(München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1992), 225. “O enlist me, enlist me in the ranks/ So I won’t 
die some paltry death!/ I don’t want to die in vain,/ I’d rather fall on the field, a sacrifice.” 
Translation from: Friedrich Hölderlin, Odes and Elegies (ed. Nick Hoff, Wesleyan Poetry 
Series; Middletown CT: Wesleyan University Press, 2008), 55.
4   “For the fatherland, to bleed my heart’s/ Blood for the fatherland.” See Hölderlin, Odes and 
Elegies, 55.
5   See Götz Schmitt, “ ‘Der Tod fürs Vaterland’. Hölderlins Ode und die Zeitgeschichte.” 
Hölderlin Jahrbuch 35 (2006/2007), 360. “Griechisch sind die Vorstellungen vom Zustand der 
Gefallenen. Sie werden nicht in ein himmlisches Walhalla aufgenommen (. . .) sie kommen 
hinunter.” (Greek are the conceptions of the condition of the fallen soldiers. They are not 
received in a heavenly Walhalla (. . .) they descend.)
6   Unsurprisingly, this poem, which ends with a justification of casualties in the name of the 
fatherland, has been appropriated and abused to sanction, glorify and promote war and 
nationalist violence. A blatant example of such an abuse can be found in the Nazi propa-
ganda movie Stukas, where the third and sixth stanza of the poem are recited to justify the 
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Und Siegesboten kommen herab: Die Schlacht
Ist unser! Lebe droben, o Vaterland,
Und zähle nicht die Todten! dir ist,
Liebes! nicht Einer zu viel gefallen.7
The meaning of sacrifice in Hölderlin’s ode is inextricably linked to images and 
ideas of death as a violent killing, a sanctified death which fulfills the desire to 
essentially belong to a community that shares a spiritual identity.
According to the American scholar Kathryn McClymond, prevailing theo-
ries of sacrifice in religious studies are too often restricted to sacrifice as sacred 
violence.8 To counter the dominant paradigm of sacrifice, which overempha-
sizes the importance of violent killing, McClymond introduces a multi lateral, 
polythetic approach. She distinguishes seven activities during sacrificial 
events, in which killing represents only a single – and not necessarily the most 
important – stage.9 In her work, McClymond examines Hebrew and Vedic 
texts and practices, but her general insight may also prove to be a fruitful 
starting point for the analysis of sacrifice in the literary writings of a canoni-
cal Western author such as Friedrich Hölderlin. Although our reading of Der 
Tod fürs Vaterland has lead us to a one-dimensional view on sacrifice, it would 
be premature to discard the theme of sacrifice in Hölderlin’s thought as self- 
evident. To show its layered and multifaceted significance in Hölderlin’s 
oeuvre, we will turn to the contemporaneous text mentioned in the title of this 
chapter, which also carries ‘death’ in its title: Der Tod des Empedokles.
3 The Myth of Empedocles
In a letter to his publisher Neuffer, October 10, 1794, Hölderlin announces 
his initial idea to write a tragedy about the death of Socrates according to the 
death of a young pilot. See Karl Ritter, Stukas (Germany, 1941), http://www.wagneropera.net/
Themes/Wagner-In-Movies-Stukas-1941.htm.
7   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 226. “And messagers of victory arrive: The 
battle’s/ Ours! Live, O Fatherland, remain there on high/ And don’t count the dead! O my 
belovèd,/ Not one too many has died for you. See Hölderlin, Odes and Elegies, 55.
8   Kathryn McClymond, “Death Be Not Proud: Reevaluating the Role of Killing in Sacrifice”, 
International Journal of Hindu Studies 6, nr. 3 (2002); Kathryn McClymond, Beyond Sacred 
Violence: A Comparatie Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
9   The seven activities are: selection, association, identification, killing, heating, apportion-
ment and consumption. Kathryn McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence, 29–33.
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ideals of Greek drama.10 Three years later – working on the second volume of 
his epistolary novel Hyperion – Hölderlin refers to a detailed plan for a mourn-
ing-play in a letter to his brother: “Ich habe den ganz detaillierten Plan zu einem 
Trauerspiel gemacht, dessen Stoff mich hinreißt.”  11 The subject matter that 
captivates Hölderlin is no longer the death of Socrates, but the mythical death 
of another ancient Greek philosopher, Empedocles. This pre-Socratic thinker 
who is famous for his cosmogony of the four classical elements of fire, earth, 
water, air and their mixture and separation through the forces of Love and 
Strife, is said to have thrown himself into the Mount Etna volcano.12
In the original design of the tragedy, laid down in the so-called Frankfurter 
Plan, Hölderlin envisions his Empedokles as a traditional five-act tragedy. In 
the following three years, Hölderlin’s work on the project results in a num-
ber of different texts. He subsequently composes three unfinished versions of 
Der Tod des Empedokles, of which the first is the largest and most complete.13 
After the second version, Hölderlin also writes a theoretical essay entitled Die 
tragische Ode. This article contains a section called “Grund zum Empedokles”, 
where Hölderlin unfolds a foundation for his play which builds on his newly 
gained insights into dramaturgy. A short poem from the same period is also 
dedicated to Empedocles’ death. In our discussion, we will concentrate on the 
subsequent versions.14
10   Friedrich Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band II, ed. Michael Knaupp, 3 vol., vol. 2 
(München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1992), 550.
11   Ibid., p. 661: translation: “I have made the very defailed plan for a tragedy with a very 
fascinating subject.”
12   Though Hölderlin consulted several authors on the life and work of Empedocles, he 
mainly relied on the account of Diogenes Laertius in Lives and Opinions of Eminent 
Philosophers (VIII, 51–53), of which he posessed the Greek Latin edition of Stephanus 
(1570). See Friedrich Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band III (ed. Michael Knaupp, 
3 vols., vol. 3; München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1993), 327–328.
13   In a letter to Neuffer on July 3, 1799, Hölderlin defines the rejection of all accidental 
elements as an essential feature of tragedy. See Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, 
Band II, 781. The different versions, from the Frankfurter Plan to the third and final version 
of Der Tod des Empedokles, illustrate this progressive “Verläugnung des Accidentellen” 
(disavowal of the accidental). Only the third version displays a unity of time and 
place. See Maria Cornelissen, “Die Manes-Szene in Hölderlins Trauerspiel ‘Der Tod des 
Empedokles’ ”, Hölderlin Jahrbuch 14 (1965/1966), 98.
14   Different editions of the Empedokles exist, which differ from each other significantly. 
See Friedrich Beissner, “Hölderlins Trauerspiel ‘Der Tod des Empedokles’ in seinen drei 
Fassungen”, in Hölderlin. Reden und Aufsätze (F. Beissner; Köln-Wien: Böhlau Verlag, 
1969). We will use the 1992 edition of Michael Knaupp.
 75“Das Opferthier, das nicht vergebens fällt”
4 Sacrifice as Victimage
The first version opens with a dialogue between Panthea, a young woman from 
Agrigentum, and Delia, a visitor to the city. They meet in front of Empedocles’ 
garden and talk about him incessantly with fearful adoration. Empedocles is 
characterized as a semi-divine figure who lives harmoniously with plants, 
earth, water and the clouds.
Man sagt, die Pflanzen merkten auf
ihn, wo er wandre, und die Wasser unter der Erde
strebten herauf da wo sein Stab den Boden berühre!
und wenn er bei Gewittern in den Himmel blike
theile die Wolke sich und hervorschimmre der
heitre Tag.15
Panthea relates the recent miraculous cure from her deadly illness by 
Empedocles, affirming his superhuman command of nature. The first scene 
ends with a foreshadowing of Empedocles’ death, which is inimitable to com-
mon mortals. The wrath of the gods is insinuated as a possible cause of his 
demise.
(. . .) denn groß ist auch der Tod der Großen.
Was diesem Manne widerfährt,
Das, glaube mir, das widerfährt nur ihm,
Und hätt’ er gegen alle Götter sich
Versündiget und ihren Zorn auf sich
Geladen (. . .)16
In the second scene, this possibility has become real. Critias, the archon 
(ruler) of Agrigentum and the priest Hermocrates, both declared enemies 
15   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 769. “They say the plants gaze up at/ him 
as he walks by, and the waters ‘neath the earth/ strive upward to the surface when his 
staff grazes the ground!/ and when in a storm he looks at the sky/ the clouds part and 
reveal the shimmering/ cheerful day.” See Friedrich Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; 
A Mourning Play, tr. David Farrell Krell (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2008), 38.
16   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 773. “For great is also the death of the great/ 
what is coming to confront this man,/ Believe me, will confront but him alone,/ And if 
he were to sin against all gods, and/ Invite their wrath upon him (. . .).” See Hölderlin, The 
Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 42.
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of Empedocles, conspire to bring him down. The opportunity seems ripe 
because apparently Empedocles has made himself vulnerable by commit-
ting a fatal mistake. “Denn es haben/ Die Götter seine Kraft von ihm genom-
men,/ Seit jenem Tage, da der trunkne Mann/ Vor allem Volk sich einen Gott 
genannt.” 17 Empedocles has publicly declared himself a god in front of the 
people of Agrigentum. Hermocrates and Critias plot to bring about the expul-
sion of Empedocles on account of the inexcusable hubris (arrogance) of rank-
ing himself among the gods: “Damit er nimmerwiederkehrend dort/ Die böse 
Stunde büße, da er sich/ Zum Gott gemacht.”  18
When Empedocles enters the stage in the following scenes, he is shattered 
by feelings of guilt and abandonment, as he confesses to Pausanias, his favorite 
pupil: “(. . .) ich allein/ War Gott, und sprachs im frechen Stolz heraus – / O glaub 
es mir, ich wäre lieber nicht/ Geboren!” 19
In a dramatic confrontation with a crowd of angry citizens, led by Critias 
and Hermocrates, the priest pronounces a violent curse upon Empedocles 
which seals his banishment from the polis:20
 (. . .) du hast mit uns
Nichts mehr gemein, ein Fremdling bist du worden
Und unerkannt bei allen Lebenden.
Die Quelle, die uns tränkt, gebührt dir nicht
Und nicht die Feuerflamme, die uns frommt, (. . .)
Und wenn du stirbst, die Grabesflamme dir
Bereitet, wehe dem, wie dir! – hinaus!21
17   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 775. “The gods have robbed him of his force, 
ever since/ The day the man, besotted, to be sure, in front of all/ The people recklessly 
proclaimed himself a god.” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 44.
18   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 777. “That there, never to return again,/ 
He’ll pay, and dearly, for that evil hour he/ Made himself a god.” See Hölderlin, The Death 
of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 46.
19   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 784. “I alone/ Was god, and spoke it out in 
haughty insolence – /Oh, believe me, would I never had/ Been born!” See Hölderlin, The 
Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 53.
20   Though the curse is not a death sentence in the physical sense, the banishment from the 
polis does entail the deprivation of vital resources and – worse than a death penalty – 
the refusal of a proper burial in the future.
21   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 789. “(. . .) you and we/ Share nothing any 
longer; a stranger now,/ You are unknown to all that lives./ The source that slakes our 
thirst is not/ For you, nor is the fire that serves us well; (. . .) And when you die, whoever 
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In the second version of Der Tod des Empedokles, the envy of his antagonists 
and their machinations are emphasized even stronger, when Hermocrates 
states unequivocally: “Er oder wir! Und Schaden ist es nicht/ So wir ihn opfern. 
Untergehen muß/ Er doch!”  22
In the first Act of version I of the play and in the corresponding scenes of the 
second version, the meaning of Empedocles’ sacrifice originates in his hubris. 
By unthinkingly declaring himself equal to the gods, the great man brings 
about his own downfall. This is what makes Empedocles an essentially tragic 
figure, whose desire for elevation leads to his fall into the depths.23 Feeling 
isolated from the gods and excluded from the community, he finds himself 
in a state of paralysis. In his banishment from the polis, Empedocles appears as 
a victim (‘Opfer’).24 His sacrifice is an act of atonement for the violation of the 
divine and social order.25
5 Sacrifice as a Speculative Death
The motive of sacrifice as victimage finds a dramatic reversal in the second act 
of the play. Roaming through the wild, Empedocles and Pausanias arrive at a 
peasant’s hut where they beg for food and shelter. But the owner, having rec-
ognized Empedocles as the banned and cursed Agrigentian, refuses any hos-
pitality and chases them away. Completely exhausted, they find a place to rest 
at a fountain. The moment Empedocles drinks water from the well, he regains 
his former power and finds his own Quelle (source) again. Hölderlin explicitly 
added a stage direction to underline the transfiguration of Empedocles from 
sets a flame upon/ Your funeral pyre-woe to him and you! begone!” See Hölderlin, The 
Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 58–59.
22   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 845. “It’s him or us! We do no harm when/ 
We sacrifice the man. He must go down/ In any case!” See Hölderlin, The Death of 
Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 118.
23   In this context, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe refers to the double meaning of the Latin word 
altus. See Jane Hiddleston and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, “Stagings of Mimesis: an inter-
view”, Angelaki Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 8, nr. 2 (2003), 63.
24   In German, the word Opfer has a double meaning, signifying both ‘sacrifice’ and ‘victim’.
25   It would be interesting to approach this motive from a Girardian perspective. On the one 
hand, mimetic desire and communal scapegoating seem to be pervasive. But the scheme 
is complicated by the fact that the object of desire and the scapegoat seem to coincide 
in the figure of Empedocles. Moreover, there are many implicit analogies to be found 
between Empedocles and the figure of Christ (miraculous healing, elevation and con-
demnation by the crowd, accusation of claim to divinity etc.).
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an outcast and humiliated victim into the hero he used to be: “Von hier an muß 
er wie ein höhers Wesen erscheinen, ganz in seiner vorigen Liebe und Macht.”  26 
The return to his original strength at the same time leads to a clear vision of a 
future destination:
Siehest du denn nicht? Es kehrt
Die schöne Zeit von meinem Leben heute
Noch einmal wieder und das Größre steht
Bevor; hinauf, oh Sohn, zum Gipfel
Des alten heilgen Aetna wollen wir27
From now on, Empedocles’ determination to climb Mount Etna only increases. 
The people and leaders of Agrigentum, who soon feel the absence of their 
benefactor, regret their decision to expel Empedocles. They follow him and 
urge him to return, offering unlimited honors and power. Empedocles declines, 
in a reply that exposes his resolute decision and acceptance of his fate:
Laßt diese Glüklichen doch sterben, laßt
Eh sie in Eigenmacht und Tand und Schmach
Vergehn, die Freien sich den Göttern liebend
Opfern, denen alles Erstgeborene
Der Zeit ist heilig. Mein ist diß.28
To freely and lovingly sacrifice himself to the gods, this is the will and the fate 
of Empedocles. How can the meaning of such a death be understood?
According to Joseph Suglia, the necessity of Empedocles’ death derives 
from the “reflective idealist pathos for reconciliation between the self and the 
26   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 810. “From now on Empedocles must 
appear as a higher form of essence, altogether restored to his prior love and power.” 
See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 78.
27   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 811. “Have you not seen? They are recurring/ 
The lovely times of my entire life again today/ And something greater still is yet to come;/ 
Then upward, son, upward to the very peak/ Of ancient holy Etna, that is where we’ll go.” 
See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, p. 79.
28   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 827. “Allow the most felicitous of human 
beings/ To die before they fall to self-aggrandizement,/ Frivolity, and shame; let free 
humanity, upon/ The fitting hour, offer itself as a loving sacrifice unto the gods,/ For 
whom time’s early harvest is holy. This is mine.” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; 
A Mourning Play, 97.
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world.”29 Already the Frankfurter Plan shows Empedocles’ desire for unifica-
tion with the infinite nature.30 Empedocles’ suicide is therefore a philosophi-
cal death; an intrinsically motivated death to overcome the chasm between 
the self and the outer world, or, in Fichtean terms, between ‘Ich’ and ‘nicht-Ich’ 
(‘I’ and ‘non-I’). The French philosopher Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe also points 
to the evident speculative desire of Empedocles as constituting the heart of 
the play:
Empédocle y est la figure même du désir spéculatif et de la nostalgie de 
l’ Un-Tout, souffrant de la limitation temporelle et voulant s’arracher à la 
finitude. Le drame s’organise alors – je simplifie – autour du débat inté-
rieur du héros (. . .). Son seul sujet practiquement, c’est la justification du 
suicide spéculatif.31
The dialectical structure and the speculative desire to overcome oppositions 
is profoundly discussed in the enigmatic text Der Grund zum Empedokles, in 
which Hölderlin elaborates the fundamental principles of the tragedy.32 In this 
document, another dialectic pair is added to the speculative scheme:
Natur und Kunst sind sich im reinen Leben nur harmonisch entgegenge-
setzt. Die Kunst ist die Blüthe, die Vollendung der Natur; Natur wird erst 
göttlich durch die Verbindung mit der verschiedenartigen aber harmoni-
schen Kunst, wenn jedes ganz ist, was es seyn kann, und eines verbindet 
sich mit dem andern, ersezt den Mangel des andern (. . .) dann ist die 
Vollendung da, und das Göttliche ist in der Mitte von beiden.33
29   Joseph Suglia, “Empedokles and the Absence of Sacrifice”, Focus on German Studies 
10 (2003), 12.
30   Ibid.
31   Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, L’imitation des Modernes, Collection La Philosophie en effet 
(Paris: Galilée, 1986), 60–61. “Empedocles is here the very figure of speculative desire and 
nostalgia for the One-Whole, suffering from temporal limitation and wanting to escape 
finitude. The drama is then organized (I am simplifying) around the hero’s internal debate 
(. . .) Its sole subject, virtually, is the justification of speculative suicide.” See Christopher 
Fynsk (ed.), Typography: Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1989), 228.
32   Joseph Suglia, “Empedokles and the Absence of Sacrifice”, 15.
33   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 868. “When life is pure, nature and art 
oppose one another merely harmoniously. Art is the blossom, the perfection of nature; 
nature first becomes divine when it is allied with art, which differs from it in kind but is 
in harmony with it, first when each is everything it can be and when each allies itself with 
the other, supplying what the other lacks (. . .) at that point perfection is achieved and 
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Hölderlin introduces the opposition organisch and aorgisch, to describe the 
all-important dialectic movement between art and nature. It is in their recipro-
cal relation (Wechselwirkung), that the opposition between the immeasurable 
and destabilizing forces of nature and the measuring order of art can reach a 
higher harmonic level. Along these lines, Empedocles’ auto-sacrifice symbol-
izes the extreme limit of the dialectic pairing of the organic and the aorgic.
We have distinguished two meanings of sacrifice which run as separate 
layers through Hölderlin’s text. Using Empedoclean terms, one could char-
acterize the first motive of sacrifice as a movement of repulsion and strife. 
Empedocles’ sacrifice is an extrinsically imposed act of atonement. Cursed 
and victimized, Empedocles has become an outcast from the community. The 
second account of sacrifice, on the other hand, is motivated by an inner long-
ing to reunite the fundamental antinomies of finitude/infinitude, art/nature 
and between the organic and aorgic. The moment Empedocles reconnects to 
his inner source of strength, he is attracted to the fire of the volcano of Mount 
Etna, beckoning to come up and fulfill his philosophy, his chosen destiny.
6 Sacrifice as a Black Sin
The third version opens with a monologue by Empedocles, who has just woken 
up from his sleep. Both sacrificial motives mentioned above are unmistakably 
present and seem to reinforce each other in his words. Empedocles speaks of 
the ridicule, humiliation and curse (“Schmach”, “Hohn”, “Fluch”) which accom-
panied his banishment from the polis. But he also designates it as just, curative, 
and a blessing (“wohl verdient”, “heilsam”, “Seegen”). Describing himself as a sin-
ner, incapable of love for mankind, and a dreamer, he has now been released 
from all human bonds to freely embrace his fate. The speculative nature of 
this fate leaves no doubt. Empedocles evokes the volcano (“Vater Aetna”) and 
the beckoning of Nature: “Du rufst, du ziehst mich nah und näher an.”  34 The 
flame of death is calling: “Du zauberische/ Furchtbare Flamme! (. . .)/ Mir wirst 
du helle, denn ich fürcht es nicht/ Denn sterben will ich ja. Mein Recht ist diß.”  35
the divine stands at the midpoint of the two.” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; 
A Mourning Play, 114.
34   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 885–886. “You call, you draw me close and 
closer to yourself.” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 173.
35   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, p. 886. “you thaumaturgic/ Frightful flame! 
(. . .)/ I’ll see you clearly in the light, for I am not afraid./ And, yes, I want to die. This is my 
right.” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 173.
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Even the devotion of his beloved pupil Pausanias, the only remaining tie 
to worldly existence, cannot change Empedocles’ determination. At the end 
of the second scene, he sends Pausanias away: “Da ich geboren wurde, wars 
beschlossen . . ./ Wir müssen scheiden, Kind! und halte nur/ Mein Schiksaal mir 
nicht auf, und zaudre nicht.” 36
The second scene ends with a statement that conveys the inevitability of 
Empedocles’ will and fate in the strongest possible way: “Und was geschehen 
soll, ist schon vollendet.” 37
However, with the sudden appearance of a new and mysterious character in 
the third scene the justification of Empedocles’ speculative suicide is abruptly 
challenged. In ironic and provocative terms, Manes the Egyptian defies 
Empedocles to quickly consummate the deed: “Nun! säume nicht! bedenke dich 
nicht länger/ Vergeh! vergeh! Damit es ruhig bald/ Und helle werde, Trugbild!”  38
Initially, it is not clear whether Manes himself is not a mirage, a “Trugbild”. 
When demanded to disclose his identity, “Was! woher?/ Wer bist du, Mann!”, Manes 
reveals himself as a mortal, “ein Sterblicher, wie du”. It becomes clear that 
Manes is an old teacher of Empedocles, an omniscient sage (“Alleswissender”). 
The appellation “Aegyptier” symbolizes his intimate knowledge of the divine 
Nomos, the eternal fate which transcends all individuality.39 Manes under-
stands the sacrificial nature of the fate which Empedocles has chosen for 
himself:
Umkränze dir dein Haupt, und schmük es aus,
Das Opferthier, das nicht vergebens fällt.40
36   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, p. 890. “For at my birth, already then, it was 
concluded (. . .)/ We have to part, my child! do not/ Delay my destiny, do not procrasti-
nate.” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 177.
37   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 895. “And what/ Is yet to happen already is 
accomplished.” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 182.
38   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 895. “Now! do not delay! don’t ponder 
any longer/ But pass away! yes, pass! that we may have some quiet/ And a brighter day, 
mirage!” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 182.
39   See Cornelissen, “Die Manes-Szene in Hölderlins Trauerspiel ‘Der Tod des Empedokles’ ”, 102.
40   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 896. “Enwreathe your head and decorate/ 
The sacrificial beast that does not fall in vain.” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; 
A Mourning Play, 183.
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But in the rhesis (speech) which follows, Manes questions the legitimacy of 
Empedocles’ speculative death and it is his auto-sacrifice which is exposed as 
a “Trugbild”:41
Nicht unbesonnen, wie du bist, hinab –
Ich hab ein Wort, und diß bedenke, Trunkner!42
Manes’ doubts whether Empedocles is the savior of his time:
Der Eine doch, der neue Retter faßt
Des Himmels Stralen ruhig auf (. . .)
Die Menschen und die Götter söhnt er aus (. . .)
Bist du der Mann? derselbe? bist du diß?43
Empedocles’ sacrifice would merely be a vain death, and Manes calls it a black 
sin: “Nur Einen adelt deine schwarze Sünde.”  44 Empedocles replies in what may 
be the most enigmatic passage of the play. He speaks of the retreat of the god 
of his people, and his country’s demise:
Denn wo ein Land ersterben soll, da wählt
Der Geist noch Einen sich zulezt, durch den
Sein Schwanensang, das lezte Leben töne.45
41   Hölderlin uses the same phrase in the “Grund zum Empedokles” when he describes the 
very moment of organic and aorgic unification: “Aber die Individualität dieses Moments 
ist nur ein Erzeugniß des höchsten Streits, seine Allgemeinheit nur ein Erzeugniß des 
höchsten Streits (. . .) so daß der vereinende Moment, wie ein Trugbild, sich immer mehr 
auflöst (. . .)”, see Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 869. “Yet the individual-
ity of this moment is but a supreme strife, and its universality is but a product of that 
supreme strife (. . .) the outcome will be that the unifying moment, like a mirage, will dis-
solve more and more (. . .),” see Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 145.
42   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 897. “Abandon me and go down thought-
lessly, not as you are;/ I have a word that you must ponder, my besotted friend!” 
See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 184.
43   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 897. “The one, however, the newborn savior, 
grasps/ The rays of heaven tranquilly (. . .)/ The human being and the gods he reconciles;/ 
Are you that man? the very one? are you this?” See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; 
A Mourning Play, 184.
44   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 897. “Only one is ennobled by your 
black sin.”
45   Ibid. 899. “For when a country is about to die, its spirit at the end/ Selects but one among 
the many, one alone through whom/ Its swan song, the final breaths of life, will sound.” 
See Hölderlin, The Death of Empedocles; A Mourning Play, 186.
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In spite of Manes’ disapproval, Empedocles claims his right to the forbidden 
fruit (“verbotne Frucht”) of his suicide. However, when Manes inquires in resig-
nation about Empedocles’ intentions (“So gehst du nun?”) the answer is “Noch 
geh ich nicht, o Alter!” 46
The postponement of the act of suicide is to be read as a sign of hesitation 
and fundamental doubt.47 At this point, the third version is aborted and this 
also marks the deadlock of Hölderlin’s entire project.
7 After Tragedy
Hölderlin’s project to create a tragedy for modern times fails: all three versions 
remain unfinished and fragmented. But this very stagnation also represents 
a turning point in Hölderlin’s thought. In his exemplary analysis, Lacoue-
Labarthe characterizes Hölderlin’s standstill as a “césure du spéculative”, 
an interruption which opens new perspectives and which will eventually allow 
him to breach the dominant mimetic scheme of his time. We will explain this 
in the following.
While Hölderlin gives up on Empedocles, he starts translating the work of 
Sophocles. According to Lacoue-Labarthe, this return to the ultimate Greek 
tragedy is a fruitful ‘regress’ through which Hölderlin develops his answer to 
two elemental questions: first, the problem of theatre (is tragedy still possi-
ble?). Second, the difficulty of translation (do the Greek still talk to us and how 
can we make them speak to us?).48
Both questions are inherently linked to – and can be interpreted as a more 
precise investigation of – a broader issue, which preoccupied all leading intel-
lectual figures at the end of the eighteenth century. It is the problem of mimesis 
and the search for a modern identity which more than anything haunts con-
temporary Germany. A first answer to the obsessive quest for a German iden-
tity is given in the widely influential work of Johann Joachim Winckelmann 
(1717–1768). For Winckelmann, the only possibility of a unique German iden-
tity lies in the imitation of the Greeks, as he expressed in the famous formula: 
46   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band I, 900. Manes: “So, you will go now?” 
Empedocles: “Not yet do I go, old man!”
47   Joseph Suglia rightly emphasizes the fact that in the play, “which announces the death 
of a tragic hero – death takes place nowhere in the space of its presentation.” Suglia, 
“Empedokles and the Absence of Sacrifice,” 11.
48   Lacoue-Labarthe, L’imitation des Modernes, 78.
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“Der einzige Weg für uns, groß, ja, wenn es möglich ist, unnachahmlich zu werden, 
ist die Nachahmung der Alten.”  49
This position is superseded by Friedrich Schiller (1759–1805) who proposes 
a different solution. In his essay “Über naive und sentimentalische Dichtung” 
from 1795, Schiller introduces an antagonism between ‘naiv’ and ‘sentimen-
talisch’, where ‘naiv’ corresponds with nature and the natural, and ‘sen-
timentalisch’ with culture and the cultural.50 This opposition also has a 
historical dimension: the Greek were ‘naiv’, we moderns on the other hand 
are ‘sentimentalisch’.51 A return to the ‘naiv’ is not possible for modernity: this 
option is sealed. For Schiller, modernity can only achieve reconciliation with 
nature through a synthesis with its culture and art:
Sie sind, was wir waren, sie sind was wir wieder werden sollen. Wir waren 
Natur, wie sie, und unsere Kultur soll uns, auf dem Wege der Vernunft 
und der Freiheit, zur Natur zurückführen.52
This speculative scheme of transcending the opposition between ‘naiv’ and 
‘sentimentalisch’ by means of a dialectical resolution constitutes the theo-
retical framework for Hölderlin’s Empedokles. In the speculative nature of 
Empedocles’ death, overcoming the divide between organic and aorgic, 
Schiller’s ideas and aspirations reverberate. Only with the impasse of his proj-
ect, Hölderlin starts to free himself from this dominant Schillerian scheme.
49   Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Gedanken über die Nachahmung der griechischen Werke 
in der Malerei und Bildhauerkunst (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 1755/2007), 4. “The only way 
for us, to become great, or even, if this is possible, to become inimitable, is the imitation 
of the ancient Greeks.”
50   Friedrich Schiller, Friedrich von Schiller. Werke in zwei Bänden, 2 vols., vol. 2 (München: 
Knaur Klassiker), 642–710.
51   According to Lacoue-Labarthe, this dialectic pair also entails a whole series of philosoph-
ical oppositions, derived from Kant: intuitif-spéculatif, objectif-subjectif, immédiat-
médiat, sensible-idéal, fini-infini, nécessaire-libre, corps-esprit. Lacoue-Labarthe, L’imitation 
des Modernes, 75.
52   Friedrich Schiller, Friedrich von Schiller. Werke in zwei Bänden, 643. “They are what we 
were; they are what we ought to become once more. We were nature as they, and our 
culture should lead us back to nature, upon the path of reason and freedom.”
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8 The Chasm between Greek Culture and Modernity
In 1801, Hölderlin writes a notable letter to his friend Casimir Böhlendorff. In 
this letter, the fruits of Hölderlin’s immersion in the questions of tragedy and 
mimesis come to the fore.
While discussing a dramatic idyll of his friend, Hölderlin makes a remark 
about a deep difference between Greeks and moderns:
Denn das ist das tragische bei uns, daß wir ganz stille in irgend einem 
Behälter eingepackt vom Reiche der Lebendigen hinweggehn, nicht daß 
wir in Flammen verzehrt die Flamme büßen, die wir nicht zu bändigen 
vermochten.53
The tragedy of modernity is its absence of a meaningful death. The pathos of 
life and therefore the possibility of a tragic and heroic death, which the Greek 
possessed, are no longer accessible to us. This is why Hölderlin’s attempt to 
carry the meaning of Empedocles’ death into modernity was doomed to fail. 
Elaborating on this lack of fate – or dysmoron – in the modern condition, 
Hölderlin detects an underlying chiastic structure in the divide between 
Greeks and moderns. While the Greek were naturally endowed with sacred 
pathos (“heiliger Pathos”) in their lives, their art – from Homeric times on – has 
acquired austerity (“Nüchternheit”). These oppositions are reversed in moder-
nity: we can attain pathos in our art, while our lives are imbued with austerity.
Deßwegen sind die Griechen des heiligen Pathos weniger Meister, weil es 
ihnen angeboren war, hingegen sind sie vorzüglich in Darstellungsgaabe, 
von Homer an, weil dieser außerordentliche Mensch seelenvoll genug war, 
um die abendländische Junonische Nüchternheit für sein Apollonsreich 
zu erbeuten, und so wahrhaft das fremde sich anzueignen.
53   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band II, 913. “For this is the tragic to us: that, 
packed up in any container, we very quietly move away from the realm of the living, [and] 
not that – consumed in flames – we expiate the flames which we could not tame.” See 
Friedrich Hölderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory, tr. Thomas Pfau, Intersections (Albany: 
State University of New York Press, 1988), 150.
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Bei uns ist es umgekehrt. Deßwegen ists auch so gefährlich sich 
die Kunstregeln einzig und allein von griechischer Vortreflichkeit zu 
abstrahiren.54
The chiastic rupture envisioned by Hölderlin bears far-reaching consequences. 
Hölderlin discovers a deep-rooted duality in Greek culture itself, which under-
mines the previous classicistic solutions of imitation. Greek art has achieved 
an occidental austerity and is itself divided from the archaic, oriental Greece 
of sacred Pathos. Only imitating Greek art would therefore amount to repeat-
ing the appropriation of austerity instead of solving our need to appropriate 
pathos. Still, Hölderlin’s distinction between “abendländische Nüchternheit”, 
which is innate, “Eigen” to the Occident, and the “heiliger Pathos”, which is for-
eign (“Fremd”) to us, does not eliminate but only changes the relevance of the 
Greek example:
Aber das eigene muß so gut gelernt seyn, wie das Fremde. Deßwegen 
sind uns die Griechen unentbehrlich. Nur werden wir ihnen gerade in 
unserm Eigenen, Nationellen nicht nachkommen, weil, wie gesagt, der 
freie Gebrauch des Eigenen das schwerste ist.55
According to Peter Szondi, this passage by Hölderlin has been widely misinter-
preted and has given rise to a distorted image of the poet. In his groundbreak-
ing and authoritative interpretation of the Böhlendorffbrief, Szondi mentions 
Wilhelm Michel as a representative of a reading of the letter as a formula-
tion of a historical mission (“historischer Auftrag”).56 Hölderlin’s words are 
understood as a call to the Occident to obtain a new superiority by means of 
capturing the foreign pathos – “Leidenschaft” in Michel’s terms – in a struggle 
against its own austerity (“Bestimmtheit”). Evidently, such an “abendländische 
54   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band II, 912. “Hence the Greeks are less master of 
the sacred pathos, because to them it was inborn, whereas they excel in their talent for 
presentation, beginning with Homer, because this exceptional man was sufficiently sensi-
tive to conquer the Western Junonian sobriety for his Appolonian empire and thus to veri-
tably appropriate what is foreign. With us, it is the reverse. Hence it is also so dangerous 
to deduce the rules of art for oneself exclusively from Greek excellence.” See Hölderlin, 
Essays and Letters on Theory, 149–150.
55   Hölderlin, Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, Band II, 913. “Yet what is familiar must be learned 
as well as what is alien. This is why the Greeks are so indispensable for us. It is only that 
we will not follow them in our own, national [spirit] since, as I said, the free use of what is 
one’s own is the most difficult.” See Hölderlin, Essays and Letters on Theory, 150.
56   Peter Szondi, Schriften I (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1978), 350.
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Wendung” would be foremost a German task, which would make Hölderlin a 
sanctified German leader.57
Against such an interpretation, Szondi emphasizes Hölderlin’s doubts of 
equaling – let alone surpassing – the Greek example. The poet has the double 
task of learning to use the innate freely (“das Eigene frei gebrauchen”) and of 
appropriating the foreign (“sich das Fremde aneignen”). Only a fruitful balance 
between both, Eigenes and Fremdes, can produce the tension and interplay in 
an artwork that guarantee its life (“Lebendigkeit”) and meaning.
9 A Shattered Foundation of Tragedy
In 2007, the French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy delivered a lecture in Gießen, 
entitled Nach der Tragödie.58 In this lecture, held in memory of his close friend 
and collaborator Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy alludes to the modern condition 
(“abendländische Conditio”) as nihilistic in its ultimate consequences.59 The 
origin of tragedy for Nancy – as it was for Hölderlin – coincides with an irre-
versible loss. Tragedy is a departure from the archaic cult which produced 
the presence of the gods through sacrifice: “Tragedy itself, already, comes after. 
It comes after religion, that is to say, after sacrifice.”60 This results in a distorted 
relationship of the Occident with death: “It is the relation to death that it 
has – or believes it has – lost or unsettled through sacrifice, and later through 
tragedy.”61
We started with a poem of Hölderlin which seemed to suggest a clear solu-
tion to this modern predicament. The quest for a meaningful death (“Umsonst 
zu sterben, lieb’ ich nicht”) is answered by the choice of sacrificing oneself for a 
57   Szondi also cites Michel’s qualifications of Hölderlin as “Wortführer des Nordens” and 
“Gesetzsprecher des Deutschtums”.
58   Jean-Luc Nancy, Nach der Tragödie, tr. Jörn Etzold and Helga Finter (Stuttgart: Jutta 
Legueil, 2008). Nancy held the same lecture in April 2008 in NYU. An English transla-
tion which is to be published was provided by Micaela Kramer. See Jean-Luc Nancy, After 
Tragedy, (ed. Micaela Kramer, Catastrophe & Cesura; Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe Today; 
New York: New York University Press and Cardoso Law School, April 10–12, 2008).
59   In words which bring to mind the famous last stanza of Hölderlin’s Schicksalslied, Nancy 
states: “But we do not emerge (or extricate ourselves) from anything, nor do we head 
towards anything. We are given no origin, no destination, and we are promised no way 
out.” See Nancy, After Tragedy, 3.
60   Ibid., 10.
61   Ibid., 18.
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higher ideal. The violent and heroic act of dying for the fatherland (“doch Lieb’ 
ich, zu fallen am Opferhügel”) seems to hold the promise of reawakening the 
sacred pathos.
A similar promise appears to have inspired Hölderlin’s attempt to create a 
tragedy for modern times. The death of Empedocles can only be meaningful 
if it is understood as a sacrifice for a higher purpose, be it as an act of atone-
ment between the gods and the community, or as a heroic surrender of indi-
vidual existence to reach an all-unifying synthesis. When the possibility of 
Empedocles’ sacrifice (“Das Opferthier, das nicht vergebens fällt”) is radically 
questioned, the foundation of the tragedy is shattered. This aporia inevitably 
forces a radical reconceptualization of modernity and national identity.
What remains is an attitude of retreat. Hölderlin’s poetry can no longer lead 
us out of modern despair or provide guidance to (national) identity.62 But 
Hölderlin’s questions and groundbreaking insights have the power to pro-
foundly enrich our understanding of sacrifice.
62   As Götz Schmitt convincingly demonstrates, even the identity of the Fatherland in 
Hölderlin’s “Der Tod fürs Vaterland” is far from self-evident. Schmitt refers to Hölderlin’s 
unbroken belief in the ideals of the French Revolution and the possibility to accom-
plish reforms under French authority. Instead of a contemporary historical reference 
for “Vaterland”, he lists a number of alternatives such as “die Hermannsschlacht, die 
Schweizerkriege, Marathon und die Perserkriege.” See Schmitt, “Der Tod fürs Vaterland; 
Hölderlin’s Ode und die Geschichte”, 361.
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The Nonviolent Sacrifice: The Role of Tapasya  
in Nonviolence
Saskia L. E. van Goelst Meijer
1 Introduction
According to René Girard, one of the leading thinkers on the role of sacrifice 
in human society, violence lies at “the foundation of the world” as we know it.1 
His theory holds that violence is part of the dynamic of human communities 
because human beings are mimetic creatures. Mimesis, according to Girard, 
is the unconscious imitation of desires in which everyone is engaged, which 
leads people to desire the things their important others desire. Because  people 
desire the same things as the people around them, this eventually leads to 
intense rivalry. This predicament would create complete social chaos, a situ-
ation of all against all were it not for a periodic release of tension in the form 
of violence against a scapegoat. Blaming a scapegoat for the tension and the 
violence in the group unites its members against a common enemy. A sacrifice, 
then, is a ritualized form of ousting a scapegoat.
In his narrative on the Kapsiki people in this volume, Walter van Beek shows 
that sacrifice can enhance the sense of community and belonging. Tensions 
and problems seem to be reduced through such a ritual.2 According to Girard, 
this can be explained because the sacrifice is a ritualized reminder of how pre-
vious inter-group violence was reduced by ousting the scapegoat. Furthermore, 
it allows for an accepted amount of violence to take place, in a confined set-
ting, which in turn helps to prevent large amounts of violence from erupting 
within the community. Thus, sacrifice, community, and violence (and tempo-
rary peace) are necessarily connected.
That this connection between sacrifice and violence is only one possible 
view on sacrifice Kathryn McClymond shows in her book Beyond Sacred 
Violence.3 She advances that although violence often is a part of sacrifice, the 
1   René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World (Stanford, CA.: Stanford 
University Press, 1987).
2   See the contribution of W. E. A. van Beek in this volume.
3   Kathryn McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence: a Comparative Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008).
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two are not interchangeable. Because sacrifice, as Van Beek suggests as well, 
plays such an important role in bringing communities together, she urges us to 
consider a broader understanding of sacrifice. Violence against a scapegoat is 
only one (and as McClymond states: limited) way in which sacrifice can serve 
to create unity.
It is noteworthy, in my view, that nonviolence thinkers, practitioners, and 
movements often use the image of sacrifice. Moreover, in the context of non-
violence thinking sacrifice is also connected to the strengthening of commu-
nities. However, it is not connected to the use of violence. The question I will 
try to answer in this article is: how can we understand the concept and role of 
sacrifice in a process of nonviolence?
In the following paragraphs, I will first briefly introduce tapasya, the term 
I use in my own analyses of nonviolence to denote the element of sacrifice 
and the acceptance of suffering present in all nonviolent practices. I will then 
explore Girard’s ideas on mimesis and sacrifice. I will go on to explore an alter-
native reading of the Epistle to the Hebrews, the Bible text that, according to 
Girard, is chiefly responsible for the creation of a sacrificial understanding of 
the Gospels. However, Eugene Webb suggests that the text actually points to a 
different understanding of sacrifice, tied to nonviolence. By looking at Webb’s 
interpretation of Hebrews, and comparing his notion of sacrifice to the writ-
ings of major nonviolent actors in modern history, we might gain some insight 
into the role of sacrifice in nonviolence thinking. I will show that tapasya 
points to a nonsacrificial (in Girardian terms) understanding of sacrifice. In 
the last sections, I will explain this difference and draw on the popular uprising 
against the dictatorship in the Philippines in the 1980s as a practical example.
2 Nonviolence
The roots of nonviolence as a way toward (social) change lie in the work of 
Mohandas Gandhi, who was the first to use mass organized nonviolence to 
significantly alter the sociopolitical reality of his age. His understanding of 
nonviolence included not merely the absence of violence but also what was 
to take its place. He understood nonviolence as a concrete tool that could be 
used to create change, a tool for which he used the term satyagraha or truth-
force. Gandhi construed nonviolence in a new, systematic and pro-active way 
that made it applicable to modern society. His work directly inspired others 
like Martin Luther King, Lanzo del Vasto and Dom Helder Camara and still 
functions as a jumping-off point for many others, individuals or organizations 
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that want to work with nonviolence.4 They take up Ghandi’s concepts and 
translate them to their own circumstances, expanding and elaborating differ-
ent elements. When looking closely at these theories and practices of non-
violence from around the world, five core elements emerge that together create 
a dynamic framework. These five elements, in their Sanskrit terms originating 
from Gandhi’s work, are: satya, or truth-seeking, ahimsa or “the absence of the 
intention to do harm”, sarvodaya meaning “the welfare of all”, svadeshi/svaraj 
which points to autonomy, and tapasya or self-suffering. These are ancient 
religious terms, reconceptualized by Gandhi in a way that made them suit-
able for sociopolitical action. As said above, their meaning has expanded even 
more through the work of subsequent nonviolence scholars and practitioners.5 
Each of these elements is a complex and layered notion and in this article 
I cannot do justice to all of them. My focus here is on the element of tapasya.
2.1 Tapasya
Out of the five core elements of nonviolence tapasya is perhaps the most dif-
ficult to come to terms with, certainly in a Western context. Its most common 
translation in the context of nonviolence: self-suffering, brings to mind the 
idea that nonviolence involves accepting the violence or wrong-doings of 
the other without responding to them. This interpretation is linked to another 
common misinterpretation of nonviolence as passivity and acquiescence in 
the face of conflict or injustice.6 In this paragraph, I will try to show how both 
tapasya and nonviolence in general point to something completely different.
The Sanskrit term tapasya literally means “produced by heat”, and goes back 
to the root tapas meaning heat, suffering, or austerity. Kathryn McClymond 
writes that the term is already found in the Rig Veda, one of the oldest Hindu 
texts, and its meaning evolved from pointing to the heat of the ritual sacrificial 
fire to being associated with the ‘inner heat’ of asceticism.
4   See for instance: Alland, A., & Alland, S., Crisis and Commitment: the Life History of a 
French Social Movement (London, Routledge 2001); Ansbro, J. J., Martin Luther King, Jr.: 
Nonviolent Strategies and Tactics for Social Change (Lanham, Md.: Madison Books, 2000); 
Câmara, H., Spiral of Violence (London: Sheed and Ward, 1971); Lanza del Vasto, J. J., Warriors 
of Peace: Writings on the Technique of Nonviolence (New York: Knopf, 1974).
5   Not all nonviolence movements or practitioners use these terms, but the principles that they 
represent can be found in all works on nonviolence.
6   John Roedel, “Vulnerability Not Tolerance: How Nonviolence Works”, in Vulnerability and 
Tolerance (presented at the Colloqium on violence and religion, Amsterdam, 2007).
van Goelst Meijer9�
. . . devotional practices that are understood to generate a kind of spiri-
tual heat are, in effect, replicating one of the activities performed in tra-
ditional sacrifice: heating, which is, of course, simultaneously destructive 
and constructive. In traditional sacrifice a distinct material substance is 
heated on an outdoor altar. In devotional practices an internalized, sub-
tle substance is heated by devotional practices within the body.7
Thus, tapasya refers to “that which is produced by the inner heat of austerity or 
suffering”. Over the centuries the term has also come to mean “the undertaking 
of personal discipline” and is also translated as self-control, (spiritual) effort, 
tolerance, or transformation.8
2.2 Tapasya in Nonviolence
In Gandhi’s work, tapasya is one of the key aspects of a nonviolent process. 
Nonviolence is to Gandhi a spiritual quest as much as a sociopolitical one. 
In fact, he does not view those two realms as truly separate. The quest for truth, 
which he sees as the essence of his work, is a quest for God or Ultimate Reality. 
His goal is to attain enlightenment.9 But, Gandhi realizes, such an internal 
quest for truth is meaningless without living up to it in the public realm.
Because self-purification is an essential element in the attainment of 
enlightenment in the Hindu tradition, Gandhi takes a vow of asceticism which 
forms the base of his tapasya.10 However, in the course of his lifetime, his 
understanding of this vow changes. From the vow of celibacy and abstinence 
of an earnest spiritual seeker, Gandhi comes to regard it as a mode of conduct 
that has important sociopolitical implications. Likewise, in a more general 
sense, his understanding of tapasya changes from a purely personal process of 
purification to an essential element in a nonviolent process of social change.
In his writings, Gandhi uses the term tapasya in different ways, even though it 
always contains elements of its original meaning of purification through inter-
nal suffering, and of sacrifice and transformation. He subverts the ‘reasonable’ 
idea of eliminating suffering for oneself, and throughout his writings provides 
different motivations for doing so. One of the motivations is that it can easily 
7    McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence, 156–157.
8    See for instance Deborah Adele, The Yamas & Niyamas Exploring Yoga’s Ethical Practice 
(Chicago, Ill: On-Word Bound Books, 2009).
9    Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, An Autobiography: The Story of My Experiments with 
Truth, trans. Mahadev Desai (Ahmdabad: Navajivan Publishing House, 1927), 133–144.
10   This vow is called Brahmacharya in the Hindu tradition and is a vow to lead a life of reli-
gious seeking and includes restrictions on diet, conduct and possessions.
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become an excuse for using violence. If eliminating suffering from one’s life is 
a reasonable motivation for doing things, it can become a reason to inflict suf-
fering on others. Tapasya is thus a way of directing attention away from the self.
Furthermore, Gandhi uses tapasya to refer to the process of overcom-
ing fear, specifically the fear of suffering and death, and to the cultivation of 
self-discipline.11 He wants practitioners of nonviolence to give up the habit to 
‘fight or flight’, and to commit themselves to nonviolent behaviour under all 
circumstances, while staying put in the situation and addressing the conflict 
or injustice at hand. Part of that process is the firm internal struggle to over-
come ill will against the opponent, and even taking this one step further by 
cultivating love for the adversary. This is a moral standpoint, but it also has 
a very practical aspect. The willingness to suffer instead of retaliating when 
being confronted with violence or injustice is the only attitude that breaks 
a cycle of violence. Justice can only be won, so states Gandhi, by a love that 
does not impose suffering on the (unjust) other.
Related to this understanding is tapasya as a means to “penetrate the heart” 
of those to whom we are appealing. Gandhi uses tapasya as a tool to make the 
suffering visible by undergoing it openly. Gandhi wants to demonstrate that 
the injustices people face are afflicted on them by other humans. By making 
this visible, it becomes clear that because it is perpetrated by other people 
it can also be corrected, the injustice can be stopped.12 But for that to hap-
pen, the problem has to be acknowledged. He argues that appealing to reason 
alone sometimes is not enough to get the message across. Visible “suffering”, he 
argues, “opened the eyes of understanding.”13
As Gandhi sees it, tapasya is a complex and dynamic element. Separately, 
suffering and love are not enough. Simply loving your opponent without an 
attempt at change is impotent. Suffering by itself has very little value and 
if accompanied by hatred and anger would even be counterproductive.14 
Combined they instigate action and change. One has to actively engage in 
tapasya and be willing to suffer for one’s goal, refusing to comply with untruth 
11   Joseph W. Groves, “Revisiting ‘Self-suffering’: From Gandhi and King to Contemporary 
Nonviolence”, in Nonviolence for the Third Millennium: Its Legacy and Future (Macon, Ga.: 
Mercer University Press, 2000), 201–228.
12   Ronald J. Tercheck, “Conflict and Nonviolence”, in The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi, 
eds Judith M. Brown and Anthony Parel (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 117–34.
13   Manfred B. Steger, “Searching for Satya through Ahimsa: Gandhi’s Challenge to Western 
Discourses of Power”, Constellations 13, no. 3 (2006): 332–348 (344).
14   Bhikkhu C. Parekh, Gandhi: a Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997).
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and accepting the consequences.15 Thus, tapasya is a medium of change and 
transformation of oneself, the opponent, and the situation at large.
The concepts of sacrifice and suffering are also central to the work of 
Martin Luther King, who was deeply inspired by Gandhi, but in a much more 
psychological way.16 King described his nonviolent philosophy in his article 
“An Experiment in Love”.17 Like Gandhi, he stresses the importance of accept-
ing suffering and giving up all inclinations to self-preservation as the essence 
of nonviolence:
. . . that [which] characterizes nonviolent resistance is a willingness to 
accept suffering without retaliation, to accept blows from the opponent 
without striking back. “Rivers of blood may have to flow before we gain 
our freedom, but it must be our blood”, Gandhi said to his countrymen. 
The nonviolent resister is willing to accept violence if necessary, but 
never to inflict it. He does not seek to doge jail. If going to jail is necessary, 
he enters it as “a bridegroom enters the bride’s chamber”.18
According to King, nonviolent resistance led people to self-respect, courage, 
and inner strength,19 which he called the emergence of a new kind of power. 
King wrote:
Humanity is waiting for something other than blind imitation of the 
past. If we want truly to advance a step further (. . .) we must begin to 
turn mankind away from the long and desolate night of violence. May 
it not be that the new man the world needs is a nonviolent man? (. . .) This 
not only will make us new men, but will give us a new kind of power (. . .). 
It will be power infused by love and justice.20
How can we understand this ‘new kind of power’ as a social and psychologi-
cal reality? Here I turn to Kenneth Boulding’s analysis of power, in which he 
15   Judith M. Brown and Anthony Parel eds, The Cambridge Companion to Gandhi (Cam-
bridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 258–262.
16   Groves, “Self-Suffering.”
17   King, M. L., A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther 
King, Jr. (New York: HarperCollins, 1990).
18   King, Essential Writings, 18.
19   Groves, “Self-Suffering.”
20   King, Autobiography, 332.
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distinguishes integrative power as the kind of power both Gandhi and King 
talk about.
3 Integrative Power
Power is sometimes related to the ability to make others do what we want.21 
In a more general sense, peace scholar Kenneth Boulding states, it is the ability 
to “get things done.”22 According to Boulding, power can be exercised in three 
different ways, depending on the consequences. These three ways he calls the 
“faces” of power. First he discerns threat power, which can be paraphrased as: 
“You do what I want or I will do something you don’t want.”23 It underlies all 
forms of punishment and retaliation.
The second form of power is exchange power, the power to produce and 
trade. This is paraphrased as: “You do something I want and I’ll do something 
you want.”24 Together the first and the second form are often called ‘the carrot 
and the stick’. The third kind of power is called integrative power. It is the power 
to create relationships and bring people together. Integrative power is sum-
marized as: “I’m going to be authentic and we’ll end up closer together.”25 For 
Boulding, from the three ‘faces’ or ways of wielding power, integrative power is 
the most important. Integrative power is the power of human relationships. It 
is connected to everything that establishes a relationship either on a personal 
level or in the form of institutions or organizations. Love, respect, legitimacy 
and consent are all expressions of integrative power.
In everyday life most forms of exercising power consist of a combination of 
the three faces. But there is a difference in emphasis in various areas. Exchange 
power is most prominently present in anything connected to the economy, but 
also to anything in which incentives (the carrot) are used to get things done. 
Yet also legitimacy and trust, both forms of integrative power, play a huge role 
for instance in the stock exchange, and without regulations and the  penalties 
21   Max Weber, “Power”, in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, eds H. H. Gerth and 
C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 159–262.
22   Boulding, Three Faces of Power, 15.
23   Boulding, K. E., Nonviolence and Power in the Twentieth Century, in Nonviolent Social 
Movements: A Geographical Perspective, eds S. Zunes, L. R. Kurtz, & S. B. Asher, (Malden, 
Mass.: Blackwell, 1999) 9–17 (10).
24   Nagler, M. N., The Search for a Nonviolent Future: A Promise of Peace for Ourselves, Our 
Families, and Our World (Novato, Calif.: New World Library, 2004), 29.
25   Nagler, Search for a Nonviolent Future, 29.
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to back them up production and trade cannot proceed. Threat power is pres-
ent not only in the military but wherever some form of penalty is used to 
make things happen (the stick). The military symbolizes threat power, but 
cannot exist without exchange power in the form of money, nor without 
integrative power in the form of morale and legitimacy. Underlying all forms 
of power is integrative power. Systems and institutions can only function 
if people cooperate. Even in the most rigid dictatorship, as soon as enough 
people stop cooperating, the system collapses.
Since all human beings exist within relationships, integrative power is open 
to all, even to those who are traditionally assumed to have no power. “It is this 
definition of power, as a process that occurs in relationships, that gives us the 
possibility of empowerment.”26 Both Gandhi and King asserted that the kind 
of power used in processes of nonviolence can emerge by being authentic and 
truthful and by going through the inner process of shifting our sense of person-
hood away from our self and giving up our inclination to enhance or preserve 
our own interests.
For a better understanding of these ideas, it may be worthwhile to look 
more in-depth at René Girard’s views, who connects sacrifice to violence. 
Furthermore, we may examine the work of Eugene Webb, who provides an 
alternative reading of some of Girard’s sources, one that points more towards 
nonviolence.
4 René Girard: Mimetic Desire
René Girard is one of the leading thinkers on the role of violence and sacrifice 
in human society. His theory of mimetic desire describes how and why human-
ity is locked in an on-going cycle of violence, even though we find (temporary) 
ways to limit violence to a minimum. Girard claims that violence lies at the 
“foundation of the world” as we know it.27 At the heart of Girard’s theory is 
the concept of mimetic desire. Simply put, it is the unconscious tendency 
present in all human beings to imitate the desires of significant others. In 
other words, people desire things because important people around them 
(models) desire them. This leads to conflict because the model becomes a rival 
with whom we have to compete, or so it seems, for the object of our desire. 
Because mimesis happens in every person, these conflicts can become so 
26   Nanette Page and Cheryll E. Czuba, “Empowerment: What Is It?”, Journal of Extension 37, 
no. 5 (1999).
27   Girard, Things Hidden.
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all-pervasive in communities that they destroy the societal structure if they are 
not restrained in time.
Girard states that our deepest desire is actually not for objects – our deep-
est desire is to be.28 Ultimately, we are not really interested in the actual object 
that our models desire, but in their “being”, or as Oughourlian puts it, in their 
autonomy, or sense of self.29 Powerful others make us feel they know “how to 
be”, and that the things they desire support them in their “being”. People desire 
what important others desire, because they feel those things will in turn sup-
port them in their own “being”.30 They do not realize that the desires of the 
model are mimetic as well, tied to the desires of yet another model.
Early in their evolution, human beings discovered that if rising tensions and 
violence are diverted and laid upon a victim, they are relieved in the rest of the 
group. This process of victimization is called scapegoating. A person or a group, 
appearing to be vulnerable for some reason, gets blamed for the tensions and 
violence.31 Then, through the same process of mimesis, the blame and hatred 
against this scapegoat become shared feelings within the community. Former 
rivals become new allies by ‘ganging up’ against the common enemy. The 
scapegoat is driven out of the community, defeated or marginalized. His or 
her well-being is sacrificed to preserve the well-being of the group. This leads 
to a temporary relief from the violence and animosity, but since nothing has 
really changed (people remain mimetic beings) the process is bound to repeat 
itself in the future. Imperative in this process is that the people who as a group 
sacrifice the scapegoat are ignorant of what they are doing. For the mechanism 
to work it is necessary that the group is convinced that the victim is rightfully 
blamed. This, however, makes anyone a potential scapegoat at some point. 
Because ousting the scapegoat is only a temporary solution, somewhere in the 
future a new victim will (have to) be found to once more release the tension.
Societies have found different ways of dealing with this threat, for instance 
through laws, but also through ritual sacrifice. Such a ritual, in which not a real 
victim but a substitute is sacrificed, serves, according to Girard, as a reminder 
of the actual moment of scapegoating. It reminds the audience of both the 
initial violence and the peace that came after the scapegoat was sacrificed. 
Furthermore, such a ritual serves as a temporary outlet for the violence in the 
28   James G. Williams, The Girard Reader (New York: Crossroad, 1996), 227.
29   Jean-Michel Oughourlian, The Genesis of Desire, trans. Eugene Webb (East Lansing: 
Michigan State University Press, 2010).
30   Williams, Girard Reader; John Roedel, “The Emptiness of the Kingdom: Using Anti-
colonial Theory to Re-read Girard” (presented at the Colloquium on violence and religion, 
University of Notre Dame South Bend, Indiana, 2010).
31   Williams, Girard Reader.
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group, in a contained setting. But these systems of restraint, in turn, help to 
keep the scapegoat mechanism hidden and thus contribute to the necessary 
continuation of sacrifice. Whenever the system suffers from stress, or collapses, 
real violence may once more flare up, leading to real victims. What might work 
to end this cycle of violence, in Girard’s vision, is the public discovery and 
understanding of the scapegoat mechanism. Understanding the mechanism 
and its consequences would provide humanity with a rational choice to act 
differently.
4.1 Jesus’ Sacrifice
According to Girard, the Jewish prophetic tradition was evolving towards the 
discovery and disclosure of the scapegoat mechanism.32 The life of Jesus of 
Nazareth, in his view, is the culmination of that process. Girard states that the 
death of Jesus on the cross was meant to lay bare the mimetic process by pro-
viding a public example, and not as a sacrifice to appease God (as interpreted 
in modern Christianity).33 Jesus’ innocence is so very obvious that when he is 
picked as a scapegoat, “violence reveals its own game.”34 However, as Girard 
states, the revelation was “more than its recipients could bear” and, in time, 
the Gospels were being interpreted in a sacrificial way.35 This helped to create a 
Christian tradition that revolved mostly around the sacrifice of Jesus who died 
on the cross to wash away the sins of the world. And so, instead of uncover-
ing the scapegoat mechanism for society at large and instigating a paradigm 
shift, the narrative of Jesus, interpreted in a sacrificial way, actually helps to 
keep the process hidden. Girard sees the Epistle to the Hebrews as the main 
biblical text in which this misinterpretation was made. Because of this mis-
interpretation, even in our society today processes of scapegoating and sacri-
fice and the violence that accompanies them can be found everywhere. This 
sacrificial violence is tied, according to Girard, to a form of self-preservation 
in which the violence is laid on the other, a scapegoat, to get rid of it in our 
own society.
Interestingly enough, Eugene Webb, emeritus professor of International 
Studies and Comparative Religion at the University of Washington, has a very 
different interpretation of the Epistle to the Hebrews, and claims Girard has 
32   Girard, Things Hidden.
33   René Girard, The Scapegoat (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).
34   Girard, Things Hidden, 205.
35   Eugene Webb, “René Girard and the Symbolism of Religious Sacrifice”, Anthropoetics – 
Journal of Generative Anthropology XI, no. 1 (2005): 1.
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made an oversight.36 In fact, in Webb’s interpretation, the sacrifice in Hebrews 
points to nonviolence.
4.2 The Epistle to the Hebrews
The Epistle to the Hebrews, a Bible text consisting of an anonymous, early 
Christian homily, depicts a community of believers in the middle of a hostile 
environment.37 The text’s aim is to affirm and inspire the faith of the com-
munity in difficult times and motivate the people to remain steadfast.38 It is 
the only book in the New Testament in which sacrificial imagery takes such 
a central place, and the text is often interpreted in a literal way, as pointing to 
the necessity of sacrificial offerings.39 Eugene Webb suggests that Girard cor-
rectly states that the traditional reading of Hebrews is sacrificial. But, accord-
ing to Webb, Girard himself makes the same mistake. Instead, the text should 
be read metaphorically. Not the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews misun-
derstood the story of Jesus but the medieval interpreters of the text. Webb 
states that in fact the author of Hebrews urged his intended audience to live a 
nonviolent life, and that the metaphors would have been well understood at 
the time.40,41
To show the metaphoric meaning of the sacrifice in Hebrews, Webb starts 
by re-interpreting some key elements of the text. The first is the image of Jesus 
as the son of God. In the Jewish community of the first century, Webb claims, 
referring to someone as the son of God did not necessarily mean that this per-
son was seen as divine. It referred to either a person who was living in accor-
dance with the laws of God or a calling upon people to do so. In that latter 
36   Ibidem.
37   Harold W. Attridge, Essays on John and Hebrews (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).
38   Ibidem; Christopher A Richardson, Pioneer and Perfecter of Faith Jesus’ Faith as the Climax 
of Israel’s History in the Epistle to the Hebrews. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012).
39   Gabriella Gelardini, “Hebrews, an Ancient Synagogue Homily for Tisha be-Av: Its 
Function, its Basis, its Theological Interpretation” in: G. Gelardini ed., Hebrews: Contem­
porary Methods, New Insights, Biblical Interpretation Series v. 75 (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 
2005), 107–124.
40   Webb, “Symbolism of Sacrifice.”
41   In recent years René Girard has himself come to a similar insight and mentions in an 
interview that his conclusions on the Epistle to the Hebrews, based on the sacrificial 
language alone, has been a misinterpretation. See: R. Adams and R. Girard, “Violence, 
Difference, Sacrifice: a Conversation with René Girard”. Religion & Literature, 25, no. 2 
(1993): 9–33. See also: M. E. Hardin, “Violence: René Girard and the Recovery of Early 
Christian Perspectives”, in Brethren Life and Thought no. 37 (1992): 107–120.
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sense it was also used for the people of Israel as a whole. It was a call upon the 
Israelites to live righteously.42
To say in the first century Jewish milieu that Jesus was ‘son of God’ was 
to say that he truly fulfilled the calling of Israel to live in sonship to God.43
Webb’s claim is substantiated by other scholars, who note that in the Semitic 
context of the Hebrew Bible “son” is often used to denote close affiliation, not 
just literal sonship.
In Semitic usage “sonship” is a conception somewhat loosely employed 
to denote moral rather than physical or metaphysical relationship. Thus 
“sons of Belial” (Jg 19:22 etc.) are wicked men, not descendants of Belial; 
and in the NT the “children of the bride chamber” are wedding guests. 
So a “son of God” is a man, or even a people, who reflect the character 
of God.44
Also, the term “son of God” seems to indicate metaphorically leaders and 
rulers, “the first among their people”, who were thought to be exemplary 
and who based their authority in God.45 Likewise, Webb states, we should 
regard the image of sacrifice in Hebrews in a metaphorical way. Hebrews does 
not portray Jesus as fulfilling a sacrifice of atonement, to appease God or to 
mitigate the mimetic violence. Jesus is not portrayed as fighting for his own 
survival but as choosing to lay bare the scapegoat mechanism by undergoing 
it, so that others might see it for what it is. The sacrifice consists in the surren-
der of his own well-being. But this is not to say that he sacrificed himself in the 
traditional (Girardian) sense.
Raymund Schwager, a theologian and Girardian scholar, supports this view.46 
He states that the author of Hebrews uses the notion of sacrifice metaphori-
cally and is thus able, “through a massive hermeneutical reinterpretation”, 
42   For a comprehensive outline of the Semitic use of the term “son of God” and its use in the 
Hebrew Bible and among the early Christians, see S. Herbert Bess, “The Term ‘Son of God’ 
in the Light of the Old Testament Idiom”, Grace Journal 6, no. 1 (1965): 16–23.
43   Webb, “Symbolism of Sacrifice”, 4.
44   James Hastings, Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible ([Hendrickson, MA]: Hendrickson 
Publishers, 2005), 143.
45   Aherne, C., Son of God, in The Catholic Encyclopedia, C. G. Hebermann, E. A. Pace, 
C. B. Pallen, T. J. Shahan, & J. J. Wynne eds, (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1912).
46   Raymund Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine of 
Redemption (New York: Crossroad, 1999).
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to give it a completely new meaning.47 Jesus answers the call to live in son-
ship by not fighting his opponents and by suffering the crucifixion willingly. 
He sees his opponents as people who do not really know what they are doing. 
In Girardian terms, they act under the influence of the mimetic process and, 
like most people, are not aware of that. Jesus is aware of it and thus he is able 
to see them as victims along with him.48
He himself [Jesus] was a victim insofar as he was killed and they were 
victims in killing, insofar as they were under the spell of an external 
power. For him, then, killing was an act done both to him and to them, 
even if in very differing ways.49
Thus, Jesus stands no longer in opposition to his antagonists. He sides with all 
the victims of the mimetic mechanism and undergoes the scapegoat mecha-
nism together with them. From that angle, the division between perpetrator 
and victim of violence ceases to exist. Through this action Jesus transforms the 
passivity that is inherent in the mimetic process. “Suffering which is affirmed 
becomes a new form of activity.”50 This inner transformation is what the 
author of the Epistle to the Hebrews metaphorically calls a sacrifice. Schwager 
points out that this is not a simple act of self-destruction. Jesus complies with 
the actions of his antagonists, but not with their motives. “Jesus’ judges and 
his executioners wanted to punish a criminal; he himself on the other hand 
wanted to give himself (. . .) for the many.”51
5 Tapasya as Non-Sacrificial Sacrifice
In their writings on nonviolence, both Gandhi and King speak of the role of 
sacrifice and the dedication of one’s life to the well-being of all, rather than 
adhering to self-preservation at the expense of the other, something Girard 
himself calls “unanimity minus one”.52 The sacrifice that tapasya refers to is 
47   Ibidem, 183.
48   Based on Schwagers theory, Poong-In Lee (2011) comes to the conclusion that not only is 
a non-sacrificial reading of Hebrews possible, in fact it is one of the Bible texts that to a 
large extent supports Girard’s theories.
49   Schwager, the Drama of Salvation, 187.
50   Ibid.
51   Ibid.
52   Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 259.
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the creation of a situation in which the humanity of all people can rise to the 
surface. Schwager’s example of Jesus’ identification with his opponents points 
in this direction.53 By regarding them not as opponents, but as fellow victims, 
their humanity is stressed and rivalry is diminished. Roedel adds to this:
Within mimetic theory, this requirement of absolute nonviolence, 
renouncing vengeance and even self-defense, derives from an under-
standing of violence as arising from rivalries that the parties involved are 
unable to recognize. It denies the commonly held distinction between 
self-defense and the violence that one initiates, because it holds that 
both are the product of rivalries in which all parties are responsible.54
Moreover, Gandhi and King assert that such a shift in personhood, away from 
the self, leads to the emergence of a different kind of power or force, which 
can be harnessed to achieve tremendous results. Both Gandhi and King under-
stand nonviolence as essentially the wielding of this force, which Boulding 
calls integrative power. To Gandhi and King, nonviolence is concerned with 
both the (internal) process of bringing out this power and the (external) pro-
cess of implementing it. From this concept of integrative power we can come 
to an understanding of why sacrificing the self is not the same as self-sacrifice. 
This is a transformative process that rests on a profound understanding of 
the self as relational, in which hurting another person ultimately means hurt-
ing the self, and vice versa, since self and other are intertwined. The intentional 
aspect of tapasya then becomes clear. It indicates a sacrifice of the “separated” 
self with the intention to benefit “the whole” (sarvodaya). Sacrificing the self 
is a transformative process that leads to and rests on integrative power and 
includes a conception of the self as relational. The shift of focus is not towards 
self-negation, but rather towards relationship. A sacrifice of the self, made 
with the intention to benefit “the whole” with an aim to intensify the relation 
between the whole and the self is completely different from self-sacrifice.
Girard posits that it is possible to interpret the Gospels in either a sacrificial 
or non-sacrificial way. In a similar vein, I propose there can be a non-sacrificial 
way of looking at the concept of sacrifice itself. According to Eugene Webb, 
the Epistle to the Hebrews should be read as a metaphor. The sacrifice that 
is mentioned in the text does not point to a literal sacrifice in the Girardian 
sense, but to the sacrifice of “self”, which happens through a process of 
53   Schwager, Drama of Salvation.
54   Roedel, “Emptiness”, 2.
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(self-)transformation. I suggest that tapasya in nonviolence, which invokes 
sacrificial imagery, refers to precisely such a non-sacrificial sacrifice.
Although neither Gandhi nor King use any of the Girardian terms, the role 
of tapasya or self-suffering they describe is to expose the working of violence 
in specific situations so that a transformation becomes possible.55 For this, 
as Gandhi has pointed out, reason alone is not enough. For the mechanism 
to become consciously understood it has to be made clearly visible. To become 
free from the imprisonment of the mimetic mechanism, one needs to develop 
insight into its structure and to be willing to give up all the ‘normal’ comforts 
that it brings, among which are a sense of power, a sense of ‘fitting in’, and 
a sense of being protected from intense vulnerability. Giving up ‘normalcy’ can 
certainly feel like a sacrifice, and this is what tapasya refers to.56
Girard himself remains sceptical about the practical realities of a non- 
violent society, but he states that it could only emerge when people con-
tinuously refuse to act in accordance with it: “Only the unconditional and, 
if necessary, unilateral renunciation of violence can put an end to [mimetic 
rivalry].”57 He continues to state that “it means the complete and definitive 
elimination of every form of vengeance and every form of reprisal in relations 
between men.”58 I maintain that the practice of nonviolence is an attempt at 
the first and that tapaysa points to the second statement.
How then can we translate the above into concrete notions for the study 
and practice of nonviolence today? To answer that question it might be helpful 
to look at a practical example of a nonviolent movement in which this dynam-
ics has played a central role.
6 Alay Dangal
One of the problems nonviolence thinkers and practitioners are facing is 
the absence of a positive term for nonviolence as a practice and an attitude. 
There is no term in use today that captures the wielding of integrative power 
as well as the attitude of serving the whole rather than preserving the self. 
55   John Roedel, “Sacrificial and Nonsacrificial Mass Nonviolence,” Contagion: Journal of 
Violence, Mimesis, and Culture 15, no. 1 (2008): 221–236.
56   D. Dennis Hudson, “Self-sacrifice as Truth in India”, in Sacrificing the Self: Perspectives on 
Martyrdom and Religion, ed. Margaret Cormack, AAR the Religions (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 132–152.
57   Girard, Things Hidden, 197.
58   Ibidem.
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This means that in many instances practitioners of nonviolence have come 
up with their own terms to describe their efforts. During the people’s upris-
ing in the Philippines against the regime of president Marcos in the 1980s, 
the term of choice was alay dangal, Tagalog for “to offer dignity”.59 The non- 
violent struggle of the Philippine people, aided by the International Fellowship 
of Reconciliation (IFOR) and grassroots organizations tied to the Catholic 
Church, came to rest on the practice of offering dignity.60
According to the movement’s organizers, the Catholic teachings held that 
human dignity was given to each and every individual and was unalterable and 
inextinguishable. In the contemporary situation of dictatorship and oppres-
sion, however, this dignity of the people was ignored. Inspired by the work of 
both Gandhi and King, which rests on a relational worldview in which one’s 
dignity is tied up with that of all others, the organizers felt this also meant 
the oppressors ignored and diminished their own dignity. In other words, the 
Philippine community was in need of the restoration of its dignity. Restoring 
dignity through offering it to every person would become the way to resist.
The movement itself was one form of offering dignity, embodying the 
refusal to live under undignified circumstances any longer. The practice of alay 
dangal involved the willingness of the protesters to suffer the retaliations of 
the regime, forgoing their own safety, fear and anger. It also meant that the 
resisters kept addressing the soldiers, who were sent to contain and beat down 
the protests, as individuals instead of representatives of the military. In other 
words, they addressed them not as opponents but as fellow humans. The resist-
ers offered gestures of friendship, such as the sharing of food, and refused to 
resort to any form of humiliation, violence or degradation. Eventually, this led 
many soldiers to desert and join the uprising, unwilling as they were to answer 
dignity with violence and humiliation. Desertions subsequently escalated to 
such an extent that the Marcos regime fled the country.61
This dynamic of dignity and humiliation forms the core of the work of Evelin 
Lindner, the Founding President of Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies.62 
In her view, humiliation is the essence of violence, dignity being its opposite. 
59   Tagalog is one of the main languages spoken in the Philippines.
60   CORD-Mindanao, AKKAPKA and NAMFRE a.o. For more information see Stephen Zunes, 
“The Origins of People Power in the Philippines”, in Nonviolent Social Movements: 
a Geographical Perspective, eds Stephen Zunes, Lester R Kurtz, and Sarah Beth Asher 
(Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 129–157.
61   See for instance Eli Sasaran, “A Consistent Ethic of Dignity: The Philippines People Power 
Movement”, Peace Power, winter 2006.
62   See also: www.humiliationstudies.org.
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Perhaps surprisingly, Lindner ties dignity to humility and maintains that they 
are very closely related and, moreover, that humility and dignity provide heal-
ing for humiliation and violence.
While humiliation is painful, a closely related word, namely humility, 
points at healing, particularly in a normative context that is defined 
by human rights. Inclusive and shared humility, embedded in relation-
ships of mutual respectful connection, can heal wounds of humiliation 
and prevent future mayhem. Arrogant dominators need to be met with 
respect and not subjected to humiliation – they need to be humbled 
into adopting shared humility and mutual recognition of equal dignity. 
Victims who feel humiliated, do not undo this humiliation by brutal arro-
gation of superiority over their perceived humiliators, but by inviting 
everybody into mutuality, into connecting in shared, wise humility.63
Humility is not the same as self-humiliation. Rather, it points to a secure sense 
of self, self-dignity, and so being able to draw the focus away from the self. 
By consciously ‘offering’ dignity to everyone around (even to those whom 
we might feel do not deserve it), we cut through the vertical conceptions of 
humanity that are so intertwined with mechanisms of violence and scapegoat-
ing. We sacrifice our self-preserving tendencies, our habitual patterns tied to 
our fears of being too vulnerable and powerless. As Girard showed, these ten-
dencies run deep and the risk of being vulnerable is real, but letting go of them 
leads to a transformation in the direction of a truer sense of autonomy, another 
way of ‘being’ and a different kind of power. This dynamic of sacrificing the self 
for the shared dignity of all people, bringing integrative power to the surface, is 
captured in alay dangal, that is to say, creating an example of nonviolence as a 
life stance in which tapasya, an attitude of humility, sacrificing the desire-self 
and offering dignity (and the study of how to do this) are central.
63   Evelin Lindner, Making Enemies: Humiliation and International Conflict, Contemporary 
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Through Fire: Creative Aspects of Sacrificial Rituals 
in the Vedic-Hindu Continuum
Albertina Nugteren
1 Introduction
The place is Panauti, some 32 kilometres to the Southeast of Kathmandu, 
Nepal. The date is June 26, 2011. Standing on the Triveṇi-ghāṭ (literally: ‘the 
cremation platform at the three-forked confluence’) I watch a corpse slowly 
burn to ashes. Situated on the extreme end of a wedge between two merging 
rivers this cremation platform is one of the most sacred places for Hindus in 
South Asia: two rivers are said to be joined by a third (‘subterranean’) invisible 
river, the mythic Padmāvatī, at precisely this point. Ashes scattered over this 
sacred confluence from which three rivers move forward as a single current are 
believed to float straight to heaven, making any further reincarnation of the 
deceased unnecessary.
The sheer physicality of a corpse (a person who had been alive less than 
24 hours ago) being cremated on an open pyre placed directly in front of the 
sacred confluence of two rivers impresses itself on the senses in such a way 
that my mind opts out. Vivid intersensorial impressions take over my usual 
mental control. Such a lucid state of shock may not be to everyone’s liking, but 
as a direct encounter with a burning body in the heat of a summer day I have 
literally faced death through all my senses.
In the course of almost four decades of fieldwork I have witnessed various 
sacrifices, as well as various open-air cremations, but it is here, in front of a 
pyre auspiciously placed where three rivers are said to mingle (even if only 
two are visible to the human eye), that the classic name for Hindu cremation, 
antyeṣṭi, ‘final sacrifice’, acquires its full meaning. It is by giving one’s own body 
as a sacrificial gift into the open fire that one of the deepest secrets of the 
sacrificial cult is fulfilled. Hindu sacrificial logic may have its flaws when 
applied in hasty humdrum machinations and routine priestly practices, but at 
death, by this sacred confluence, the system certainly makes sense. Its logic is 
both poetic and dramatic. How? And why is one’s own dead body the ultimate 
sacrificial gift? What kind of god, what priest, what system of cosmic retribu-
tion would require such a gift?
The Hindu sacrificial complex is a many-hued fabric, an antique carpet 
woven with the shimmering threads of multiple myths and patterned practices. 
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In order to unravel some of the main narratives underlying Hindu sacrifice 
I have to make choices. From the sheer limitless variety of mythic imaginations 
and esoteric inspirations found in ancient hymns and speculative texts I select 
four. I am well aware that the subjectively chosen pattern presented here cele-
brates a challenge of choices, a poetics of possibilities, a game within a gamble 
of endless combinations and explanations. In a way Vedic sacrifice itself may 
be characterized as a gamble, as in the words of Jan Heesterman:
It is the renewal of the past and the gamble for the future (. . .) deciding 
each time anew, through endless rounds of winning, losing, and revanche, 
the state of human affairs here and in the hereafter.1
In this contribution I try to make sense of Hindu sacrifice by focusing on four 
key narratives. Those narratives may provide clues to the enigma of sacri-
fice by offering an associative logic partially explaining the system. They are 
ancient cosmogonic stories in which, respectively, heat, dismemberment, milk 
and sperm figure as the key ingredients that determined sacrifice’s decisive 
features. By picking out those four threads the fabric of the sacrificial sys-
tem becomes ‘readable’, the pattern ‘discernable’. And in the end, in order to 
understand why cremation ritual is still named ‘the final sacrifice’ today, we 
will return to our beginnings. But first we need a few words on the context in 
which the Vedic-Hindu sacrificial system unfolded over time, how the inherent 
violence was accounted for, and, more generally, how Vedic sacrifice became a 
topic in the academic study of religion.
2 ‘The Womb of Order’2
Western academic engagement with Vedic sacrificial ritual has been intense 
ever since Vedic texts were studied, translated, commented upon, and 
made sense of in particular frames of interpretation. Apart from the near 
1   Jan C. Heesterman, The Broken World of Sacrifice: An Essay in Ancient Indian Ritual (University 
of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1993), pp. 2–3.
2   This subtitle is derived from the much-used phrase “yajño vai ṛtasya yoṇiḥ” (Śatapatha 
Brāhmaṇa 1.3.4.16): “Sacrifice is the womb of order.” There is a clear parallel to that other 
phrase “agnir vai yoṇir yajñasya” (ŚB 10.1.2.2; cp. ŚB 3.1.3.28): “Agni is the womb of sacri-
fice.” For further sexual symbolism (womb, sperm etc.) in Vedic sacrifice, see notes 26 and 
28. In particular, see Ganesh Umakant Thite, Sacrifice in the Brāhmaṇas (PhD dissertation 
University of Poona: Poona, 1975), p. 257 ff.
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 impossibility to extract a coherent world view from this particular genre of 
priestly texts, Western interpretation of Vedic sacrificial practice in a compara-
tive perspective has often suffered from an Abrahamic preoccupation with 
sacrifice as atonement: for sins or at least for infelicitous conditions in need 
of reconciliation.3 In contrast, many Hindu debates, apart from complicated 
matters of a tradition-technical nature, long tended to focus on issues such as 
the tension between, on the one hand, the desire for worldly goods or fame 
in the here-and-now, and on the other hand the ultimate desire for heaven 
or even the end of rebirth.4 To borrow David Mandelbaum’s formulation of 
two quite distinct complexes of belief and prosaic religion in South Asian reli-
gions, and apply it to sacrifice, there is an ongoing pull between the “pragmatic 
complex” and the “transcendental complex”.5 Clearly, it is acknowledged that 
the act of sacrifice is motivated by some sort of desire,6 be it of the pragmatic- 
karmatic (this-worldly) or the transcendental-svārgik (heavenly) type. 
Whatever the intention behind a sacrifice may be, in the Hindu context any 
sacrificial ritual needs a stated intent (saṃkalpa) just as it needs a person 
(yajamāna) to whom the merits of the sacrifice would fall.
Today other preoccupations and tensions become visible. One of these is 
the high-Hindu abhorrence of the killing of animals in the sacrificial arena.7 
3   For a general and comparative orientation I used, among other works, Jeffrey Carter (ed.), 
Understanding Religious Sacrifice: A Reader (Continuum: London/New York, 2003); Robert 
G. Hamerton-Kelly (ed.), Violent Origins: Walter Burkert, René Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith 
on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation (Stanford University Press: Stanford, 1987); Albert I. 
Baumgarten (ed.), Sacrifice in Religious Experience (Brill: Leiden/Boston, 2002); Ivan Strenski, 
Theology and the First Theory of Sacrifice (Brill: Leiden/Boston, 2003); Rick F. Talbott, Sacred 
Sacrifice: Ritual Paradigms in Vedic Religion and Early Christianity (P. Lang: New York, 1995).
4   For views from Indian authors, see, for instance, Ganesh Umakant Thite, Sacrifice in the 
Brāhmaṇa-texts (see note 2); Naama Drury, The Sacrificial Rtual in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 
(Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi, 1981); Veena Das, ‘Language of Sacrifice’, MAN 18 (3) (1983), 
pp. 445–462; George Praseed, Sacrifice and Cosmos: Yajña and the Eucharist in Dialogue 
(Decent Books: Delhi, 2009).
5   David G. Mandelbaum, ‘Transcendental and Pragmatic Aspects of Religion’, American 
Anthropologist (New Series) 68 (5) (1966), pp. 1174–1191.
6   Although the word desire (kāma) is used here, it refers to a technical discussion about dis-
tinctions in motivations for organizing rituals, one of which is indicated as kāmya (connected 
with an explicit desire for stated results), and should not be confused with the discussion on 
Girard’s theories on ‘mimetic desire’, which presents sacrifice as a substitution for some prior 
historic or mythic murder.
7   As in Herman W. Tull, ‘The Killing that is not Killing: Men, Cattle, and the Origins of 
Non-violence (ahiṃsā) in the Vedic Sacrifice’, Indo-Iranian Journal 39 (1996), pp. 223–244; 
J. E. M. Houben and K. R. van Kooij (eds), Violence, Non-violence and the Rationalization 
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Another is the tendency to justify Vedic sacrificial rituals in terms of contem-
porary scientific insights, as occurs in the fields of ecology/environmentalism 
and of promoting social harmony.8 In this ongoing discourse, Vedic sacrifice 
is presented as an ahistorical technology that yields practical results and 
promotes public health, social cohesion, and the national economy. Its sup-
posed rainmaking powers today still refer to early textual sources, echoed by 
many later apologists. A third contemporary preoccupation is the widespread 
superimposition of the interpretation of the Bhagavadgītā onto the sacrificial 
system. This implies for many that ‘true’ sacrifice is any action performed 
without a desire for personal good (niṣkāma-karma); indeed, one’s only desire 
should be for the common-cosmic good (lokasaṃgraha). Even though the 
scope of sacrificial effects may vary, from individual to community to society at 
large, even including the entire cosmos, sacrifice is seen as the womb of order 
(ṛtasya yoṇi), then as well as now.
At the same time anti-sacrifice articulations may almost be as old and as 
strong. One of the first historical figures opposing Vedic sacrifice is the Buddha, 
but he was far from unique in this. He may have been preceded as well as suc-
ceeded by nameless others – for instance, in circles of renunciants and yogis 
who opted out because of either definite anti-violence sentiments or a far-
reaching internalization of sacrifice.9 The gaze of Buddhism, Jainism, the Yoga 
school of philosophy, and the later devotional (bhakti) movements may well 
have been an influential factor in creating a fascinating curve in brahminic 
identity politics. In mid- and late Vedic times there had been some opposition 
against brahmin priests, who represented both the this-worldly (saṃsārika) 
technology of sacrificial merit and the killing of animals. In this light, it is 
striking that over the centuries the brahmins’ position gradually turned into 
the exact opposite: they began to define themselves and their ritual activities 
more and more in terms of rigorous non-violence and purity. It is no coin-
cidence that in contemporary India ‘sāttvik’ food, that is, ‘pure’ vegetarian 
(non-violent) food, is most closely associated with the brahmin class and high-
Hindu temples and lifestyles. Although today both animal sacrifice (mainly by 
non-brahmin priests) and non-vegetarian food habits are much more wide-
spread than scholars often perceive when assessing Hinduism-by-the-book, 
of Violence in South Asian Cultural History (Brill: Leiden/Boston, 1999); Brian K. Smith and 
Wendy Doniger, “Sacrifice and Substitution”, Numen 36 (20 (1989), pp. 189–224.
8   As in various articles in the Times of India in the first half of 2011, see notes 48 and 49.
9   Yael Bentor, ‘Internalized Fire Rituals in India and Tibet’, Journal of the American Oriental 
Society 120 (4) (2000), pp. 594–613.
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over three millennia brahminic self-definition has undergone a radical shift 
in this regard.
Far from having died down, as was expected some decades ago, today pub-
lic Vedic sacrifice has entered into new transnational and transcultural public 
spheres. Not only has it become a transnational phenomenon as a result of 
South Asian migration flows, also it has entered the domain of global well-
being, religious environmentalism, public entertainment and the educa-
tional sector where it is presented as an archaic spectacle, an art form, and 
a living museum. To put things into perspective, it should be noted that 
sacrificial offerings are still part and parcel of lived religion in South Asia, 
albeit in considerably more modest forms than the grand spectacles of royal 
Vedic sacrifices which erroneously tend to be taken as the standard for 
what Vedic sacrifice in its heydays might have been.10 In this regard, it should 
be pointed out that traditionally there are two types of sacrifices: obligatory 
(nitya) and optional (kāmya). Sacrifices were obligatory for those qualified 
males who had established their own sacrificial fire(s) at home. Once some-
one had established these fires (after completion of his Veda study, after mar-
riage, or after his father’s death), they had to be maintained on a daily, monthly, 
and annual basis. Domestic sacrificial fires could also serve as the source for 
other sacrificial fires, such as the firebrand used for lighting the funeral pyre. 
Maintaining one or three (never two, as this would bring bad luck) domes-
tic fires brought a life-long commitment. In a way such priests kept their fires 
going for the cosmic good. In contrast, optional sacrifices were performed 
according to individual wishes. These sacrifices were performed at the request 
of a ritual patron (yajamāna) on special calendrical occasions or when he 
wanted to obtain specifically stated ends such as health, wealth, or other forms 
of success. In such cases, the priest was merely the facilitator.
Theories on ritual sacrifice mostly derive their ideas from the Western world 
with its focus on sacred texts as well as from the theories of Western anthro-
pologists based on the particular places where they had collected their field 
data. Some of the theorizing about the origin and function of sacrifice has 
indeed been applied to the South Asian situation and has been inspired by 
it at the same time. From Marcel Mauss to Veena Das, from René Girard to 
Kathryn McClymond, and from Sylvain Lévi to Jan Heesterman, Catherine 
Bell, Frits Staal, Wendy Doniger, Axel Michaels and Frederick Smith: there is 
10   Frederick M. Smith, The Vedic Sacrifice in Transition (Bhandarkar Oriental Research 
Institute: Pune, 1987). See also Brian K. Smith, ‘Vedic Fieldwork’, Religious Studies Review 
11 (2) (1985), pp. 136–145.
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an  ongoing reflection on aspects of Vedic sacrificial ritual that finds its way to 
global debates on ritual studies.11
Varying from simple heart-felt expressions of gratefulness for a rich harvest 
to staggeringly complicated ritual actions of communion and communication, 
sacrifice in the Vedic-Hindu continuum covers the entire range from token gifts 
(dāna) to the gods to a complex world-maintaining activity (lokasaṃgraha). 
In many cases, various distinct elements are interwoven, and any attempt to 
reduce them to a single theory is to lose sight of the variety, the complexity, 
and the living reality.
3 The Enigma of Existence
We are faced with the astonishing fact that the Vedas, first sung on the Indian 
subcontinent around 1500–1200 BCE, but probably reflecting much earlier ges-
tation processes, were not written down until just a few hundred years ago. 
The verses of the Ṛgveda had been memorized and finally codified in Vedic 
Sanskrit before or around 1000 BCE. The ‘proper’ performance of their sacred 
rites was a matter not only of an extremely and increasingly demanding tech-
nical ‘knowledge’ and performative expertise, but also of ‘understanding’ a 
number of riddles, enigmatic phrases, rhetorical questions, and esoteric imag-
ery. Possible answers to such enigmas may have provided keys to the myste-
rious power that supposedly made sacrifice effective and held together the 
universe as a whole. The person who could come up with a plausible answer 
(known as a brahman) was considered worthy of performing those rituals. This 
11   Examples of this are: Barbara A. Holdrege (ed.), ‘Ritual and Power; based on the 
Proceedings of the Santa Barbara Conference on Ritual and Power’, a thematic edition 
of Journal of Ritual Studies 4 (2) (1990); René Girard’s French publication Le Sacrifice 
(Bibliothèque nationale: Paris, 2003; English translation published as Sacrifice (Michigan 
State University Press: East Lansing, 2011), in which he explores the Brāhmaṇas based 
exclusively on Sylvain Lévi’s La Doctrine du Sacrifice dans les Brāhmaṇas (Ernest Leroux: 
Paris, 1898). As in Girard’s other work on sacrifice, he reads Vedic sacrifice in terms of 
violence, albeit ‘muted’ violence, as is obvious in the term for killing: śam-, to pacify, put 
to rest. Kathryn McClymond, in her book Beyond Sacred Violence: A Comparative Study 
of Sacrifice (The Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore, 2008), argues that by going beyond this 
focus on ritual killing one can come to a more polythetic understanding of sacrifice. See 
also her earlier article, ‘The Nature and Elements of Sacrificial Ritual’, Method & Theory 
in the Study of Religion 16 (2004), pp. 337–366. A wide array of ritual dynamics in various 
fields of studies, including sacrifice, is found in Axel Michaels (gen. ed.), Ritual Dynamics 
and the Science of Ritual 1–5 (Harrassowitz: Wiesbaden, 2010–2011).
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‘solution’ or right answer indicated a deeper understanding of the link that 
bound all things together: the very term for this mystifying secret that made 
sacrificial acts effective, brahman, denoted a power that could be known and 
manipulated as a way to re-integrate and maintain the world. The performance 
of Vedic sacrifice thus gradually became a rite of ontological significance on 
which all cosmic order (ṛta) was believed to depend.
The visions of the Vedas were to be sung, not merely stated, as well as 
ritually performed. In the world of Vedic sacrifice, the agency of the priest- 
performer was seen as crucial. He acted as a technician of the sacred, and 
should painstakingly stick to the regulations, as it was believed that a botched 
sacrifice could tilt the entire universe.12 Over time, Vedic ritualists construed a 
rational-mechanistic universe strictly contained within the ritual enclosure. 
Vast cosmic processes were reduced to the controlled world of the sacrificial 
process by setting up the identifications that anchored the macrocosm into the 
microcosm of all the discrete elements of the ritual process: the sacrificial field, 
the implements, the substances, the words, the acts, the actors. It was only 
later, by the time of the Upaniṣads, that some thinkers began to teach that a 
deeper understanding of the great Brahman, a term that indicates the encom-
passing source of any manifest sacrificial power (brahman), was more impor-
tant than the outward performance of rituals themselves. Yet many priests 
went on to perform the sacred rites, with or without access to this profound 
underlying truth.
In a way, the ritual performance itself could be a gate to a gradually deeper 
understanding of the underlying forces. Imagination based on the original 
visions of the ṛṣis made Vedic ritualists design a technology of the sacred, or, 
as Jan van Baal calls it, “a particularly effective means of communication with 
the universe.”13 Rites were understood to contribute to (and even establish or 
re-establish) the radiance of all creation. And by going attentively through the 
ritual processes, the ritual performer could win deep insights. Whether this 
performer was a Vedic seer, a ritualist, or a contemplative yogi, at stake, ideally, 
was to envision, express, and tap into a powerful wholeness, Brahman. Vedic 
sacrificial ritual, then, was a tour of the imagination around ‘being’ itself: satya, 
a word that connotes both ‘being’ and ‘truth’. The original visions of the Vedic 
seers, the intricacies of proper performance as well as the inner attunement 
12   As in Ute Hüsken (ed.), When Rituals Go Wrong: Mistakes, Failure, and the Dynamics of 
Ritual (Brill: Leiden/Boston, 2007).
13   Jan van Baal, ‘Offering, Sacrifice and Gift’, originally published in Numen, volume XXIII 
(1976), pp. 161–178. Reprinted in Jeffrey Carter (ed.), Understanding Religious Sacrifice: 
A Reader (Continuum: London/New York, 2003), pp. 276–291.
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to satya: all three were justified. They were culture-specific attempts at reinte-
gration and rejuvenation of a once-established truth. But why reintegration? 
What had happened, what had gone wrong?
From the Vedic textual perspective the world may be praised as a wonder-
ful place – shimmering with light, rosy with dawn, bursting with fertility, and 
softly glowing with the tranquility of dusk when the cows come home for the 
night – but it is a world never to be taken for granted. It is a world constantly 
under threat of fraying at the edges, of getting old and tired, and of losing 
its coherence by forces of disintegration and dissolution. This may sound as 
nothing particularly dramatic; death, decay and dissipation are simply 
the disturbing facts of life. Such forces of contingency were not necessarily 
considered to come from outside, as external enemies, or as the results of 
atrocities or sins committed by men; rather they were part of the game, inher-
ent in the powerful wholeness of evolution. This wholeness – the manifested 
world, laukika – however, is a second-order state of things: it is derived from an 
earlier original state.
There is not necessarily an evil force at work here. Rather, precisely because 
the world has evolved from a primordial state of non-being at the very begin-
ning (āgre), the arch towards death or dissipation is a natural corollary of exis-
tence. The more visionary of early Vedic thinkers thought that by regularly 
returning to that first creative moment, that generative burst of singularity 
into multiplicity, they could rejuvenate the world.14 It was imagined, by them, 
that this original ‘event’, this crucial and formative moment, had been a matter 
of heat and fire, an explosion of cosmogonic sparks flying forth from the very 
first ‘body’ in this universe, that of Puruṣa-Prajāpati.15 And this may explain 
why heat and fire are so constitutive in the whole sacrificial complex.16
14   In a totally different context, that of contemporary civil society, I gained deeper insights 
into the need for regular renewal of “emotional energy” (EE) through periodic repeti-
tion of rituals from Randall Collins, Interaction Ritual Chains (Princeton University Press: 
Princeton, 2004). For a creative and critical use of Collins’ model of interaction ritual 
and ritual chains, see, among others, Elisabeth Summers-Effler, ‘Ritual Theory’, in Jan 
E. Stets and Jonathan A. Turner (eds), Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions (Springer: 
Dordrecht/New York, 2006), pp. 135–154, particularly pp. 138–139.
15   Puṃs or Puruṣa is the first Person, whereas Prajāpati means Lord of Creation. As both 
names are used rather indiscriminately and interchangeably throughout the Ŗgveda and 
Brāhmaṇa passages studied here, I hyphenated the two.
16   Perhaps unexpectedly, there is a tight connection with water as well: it is told that Agni, 
before he manifested himself in the cosmic drama, had been hiding in the depths of the 
primeval ocean. This makes Agni a central figure in two types of cosmogonic solutions: 
“the separation of creative fire from chaotic water and the creation by the ritual  sacrifice 
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3.1 The First Narrative: Heat
Our first sacred narrative holds that in the beginning Puruṣa-Prajāpati (‘That 
One’) existed all by himself. He was surrounded by unformed universe upon 
universe, splendid shimmering worlds of light and energy. But at some point 
he began to become conscious of himself, and to feel lonely. He was, essen-
tially, a single being surrounded by nothing but yet-uncreated, undivided void. 
Upon this awareness he began to build up inner heat (tapas), and still more 
heat, so strong that finally he burst, and exploded, outward, in a tremendous 
blaze of sparks and glowing energy that filled the surrounding darkness of yet-
unformed life.17 All those luminous parts that flew from his body correspond-
ingly formed the various regions, elements and beings in the world.
It was by this intense heat that the world was fashioned and that the One 
became many.18 Unified primeval truth had disintegrated into innumerable 
broken parts. Although Vedic poets may have been able to trace multiple real-
ity back to that intuited primordial oneness, from that mythic cosmogonic 
moment onwards life is what it is: evolving, multiplying, distancing itself from 
its source, and therefore: dissipating, losing its energy, and thus in need of peri-
odic renewal. We find, in this first narrative, some of the basic images con-
stituting the Vedic worldview: heat, fire, sweat, sparks, eruption, resulting in 
division of the original wholeness, and disintegration into separate life forms.
3.2 The Second Narrative: Dismemberment19
Our second narrative views this aspect of a shattered primeval body from a 
slightly different angle. The crucial passage is as follows:
When, with Puruṣa as their offering, the gods performed the [first] sac-
rifice, (. . .) they anointed that primordial being, Puruṣa, in the form 
of a sacrifice (. . .) the gods sacrificed by means of him (. . .) and from 
that [first] sacrifice, that act of total giving, (. . .) [all creation] (. . .) was 
of a god”; see George M. Williams, Handbook of Hindu Mythology (CLIO-ABC: Santa 
Barbara, Calif., 2003), p. 17. Specifically on heat, see Uma Marina Vesci, Heat and Sacrifice 
in the Vedas (Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi, 1985); on heat and fire, see David Knipe, In the 
Image of Fire: Vedic Experiences of Heat (Motilal Banarsidass: Delhi, 1975).
17   The term for creation is sṛṣṭi: what is poured forth. Sṛj- means to emit.
18   Main source: Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa 2.2.9, 1–10.
19   Dismemberment of the animal victim as a craft, and as an intricate cosmogonic re- 
enactment, is elaborated upon in Charles Malamoud, ‘Paths of the Knife: Carving up the 
Victim in the Vedic Sacrifice’ in Indian Ritual and its Exegesis, ed. by Richard F. Gombrich, 
Oxford University Papers on India 2 (1) (Oxford University Press: Delhi, 1988), pp. 1–14.
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obtained, when gods, offering sacrifice, tied up Puruṣa as the sacrificial 
animal. With this sacrifice the gods sacrificed with/to sacrifice.20
In this additional vision, the setting in which the creative drama is played out 
is no longer a void. Puruṣa-Prajāpati no longer dwells strictly alone. Although 
shady, vague, unsubstantial, merely present at the margins, barely there, 
somehow other beings exist alongside him. They may be no more than his 
own meandering thoughts, turning into nameless assistants (or, if one wishes, 
opponents, henchmen even). And essentially he is still one and whole, but at 
the brink, in darkness, gods, seers and sages hover.21 Who are these gods? Are 
they faceless deities, nascent forces, shadows, mere figments of his own imagi-
nation? Whatever these gods are, they have some agency. They may merely 
have executed his will. Nevertheless, they were considered to have been instru-
mental in the first foundational sacrifice. Also, who are those seers mentioned 
here, presented as visionaries brought onto the stage as witnesses, as narrators, 
as poet-singers, as scribes who could record the ‘events’ in glowing visions to 
future humankind? Cosmic drama indeed, with scribes sitting ready with their 
writing tablets in order to record it for posterity.
Naturally, many questions remain. In our first narrative we found a mythic 
event in which such a fiery heat had built up in that first being that he exploded; 
from his shattered fragments this world came into being. This may be taken in 
an almost completely naturalistic vein. Creation ‘happened’ through a cosmo-
gonic explosion. In our second narrative, however, there is no such linear 
logic. It goes around in circles, as it were. It circles around the image of a first 
being offering itself through the shady agency of rather insubstantial gods and 
under the eyes of narrators installed at the edge of the stage. Why did he make 
this resolve, what necessitated this drama of the first sacrifice, a self-sacrifice 
even? What necessitated this first sacrifice? Why this offer, this division, this 
distribution of matter through a conscious act of violence? The narrative, 
which recurs in various alternative text passages, sometimes paints a world 
in which there is nothing but this first being. In other passages, this being 
is indicated in all his vastness (Virāj) but already contains the main categories 
of the world known to us (such as gods, seers and sages). But whatever varia-
tions we may encounter, in the main phrases it is imagined that the order of 
the world, with all its known life forms, has come forth from this original act 
20   Main source: Ŗgveda 10.90.1–16.
21   Ŗgveda 10.90.7.
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of sacrifice. This dramatic act of cosmogonic self-sacrifice thus forms the 
beginning of multiple existence.22
All creation originated from this initial sacrifice, whether self-willed or 
forced, in stages, in circles. The first being’s own thoughts had served to pro-
duce the gods (and alternatively also seers, sages, and the paraphernalia for the 
sacrifice), and his own body subsequently served as the material from which 
the universe was organized through dismemberment and apportionment.23 
Other passages relate that the gods came much later (famously formulated as: 
“the gods are on this side of creation”). Whatever their origin, this first category 
of created beings – vaguely and dimly present during the original sacrifice – 
may well form an intermediate category, inter-beings between the One and the 
many. Their role, however, would later become more clear as some of those, 
the poet-singers, belonging to the class of the first ‘witnesses’, would mediate 
to the world the salvific institution of sacrifice. Sacrifice, on this account, was 
a precious gift to the world by those who remembered. Sacrifice, both onto-
logically and symbolically, is an imitation, a replay, a ritual re-enactment of 
the foundational ‘event’ they had been privileged to attend. When we focus on 
their role as mediators, suddenly the genius of the Vedic verses is revealed to 
us: if none had ever been present at such a literally groundbreaking event, how 
could we ever know? Would the world not be left alone, forever wondering, 
forever closed in on itself? Instead, silent witnesses, shady beings, vague pres-
ences at the margins of the cosmic stage are only indicated, as mere footnotes 
to the drama. Their vital importance, bridging the chasm between mythic time 
and present time, becomes clear only later: as divinely inspired poets they not 
only bear witness to the cosmogonic event, they also transmit the salvific tool 
to posterity: the institution of sacrifice.
3.3 The Third Narrative: Milk
Vedic sacrifice requires fire. In our third narrative, in a direct association 
with the first myth, in which heat had built up in that first being, we find the 
22   On self-sacrifice, see Jan C. Heesterman, ‘Self-sacrifice in Vedic Ritual’, in Gilgul: Essays on 
Transformation, Revolution, and Permanence in the history of religion, ed. by Sha ʾul Shaked 
and David Shulman (Brill: Leiden/Boston, 1987), pp. 91–106.
23   I have gratefully used Kathryn McClymond’s emphasis on apportionment as one more 
parallel between the cosmogonic and the re-enacted sacrifice, in her book Beyond Sacred 
Violence (see note 11). It is telling that the chapter entitled “Liquid Sacrificial Offerings” is 
the largest in this book. She not only provides a corrective to the preoccupation previous 
scholars had with killing the animal victim, she delves deeper into the less spectacular 
liquid oblations such as vegetal juices and dairy offerings.
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 centrality of fire. In the beginning he/it existed alone. He felt the urge to create, 
to multiply himself. In the process of heating up, he generated Agni (Cosmic 
Fire) from his mouth. And since Agni was generated from his mouth, Fire, 
eternally hungry, needs food. Predictably, this first creature, the ravenous 
Fire, turns towards Prajāpati as food. Preventing that he himself, Prajāpati, 
would become the first victim ever (as he actually was in the second narrative!) 
he inventively and creatively rubs his hands – and milk is produced. Ravenous 
Agni should have been happy with this (just as Vedic sacrificial fire is now very 
happy with milk oblations), but since Prajāpati had rubbed his hands in order 
to produce the first oblation, the milk was full of hair. Agni declined. Prajāpati 
could do nothing but throw away the milk-with-hair, and lo! This became the 
plants and trees on earth.24 When he rubbed his hands a second time, again 
milk was produced, but without hair this time, since he had rubbed his palms 
together, and human palms are without hair.25 Ever since, milk or its ‘essence’, 
clarified butter, has been one of the main oblations.26
After having created Agni, and having found a way to satisfy Fire’s raving 
hunger, Prajāpati could continue with his creation-sacrifice. Sacrifice, in this 
version, was instituted by Prajāpati when threatened by his own offspring. In 
order to ward off being eaten alive by his own firstborn, he produced a nourish-
ing liquid offering by rubbing his hands. So after he had used his own mind to 
create Fire, he used his own body to create milk and used it as dravya, the first 
and foremost sacrificial substance to be offered into the fire until today.
In South Asian narratives, we see that the motif of ‘rubbing in order to cre-
ate’ is found in various contexts covering three millennia of storytelling and 
ritual practice. Not only is rubbing or friction one of the traditional ways to 
24   On cosmogonies in relation to trees, see Chapter I in Albertina Nugteren, Belief, Bounty, 
and Beauty: Rituals around Sacred Trees in India (Brill: Leiden/Boston, 2005).
25   Main source: Śatapathabrāhmaṇa 2.2.4.1–8.
26   Surprisingly enough, milk or butter symbolism in the Vedic-Hindu continuum is hardly 
ever treated as a subject in its own right, whereas cattle are, such as in Deryck Lodrick, 
‘Symbol and Sustenance: Cattle in South Asian Culture’ Dialectical Anthropology 
29 (2005), pp. 61–84. Instead we find milk or butter listed as one of the main ritual sub-
stances (“tongue of the gods”, “navel of immortality”) in the Ṛgveda, or as auspicious food, 
such as in R. S. Khare, The Eternal Food: Gastronomic Ideas and Experiences of Hindus 
and Buddhists (SUNY Press: Albany, 1992) or in Arjun Appadurai, ‘Gastro-Politics in Hindu 
South Asia’ (American Ethnologist 8 (3) (1981), pp. 494–511. For the sexual connotations of 
milk, butter and ghī, see Wendy Doniger, Tales of Sex and Violence: Folklore, Sacrifice, and 
Danger in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1985). For a gen-
eral treatment of milk as a vital substance in religious meaning-making practices in early 
civilizations, see Finbar McCormick, ‘Cows, Milk and Religion: The Use of Dairy Products 
in Early Societies’, Anthropozoologica 47 (2) (2012), pp. 101–113.
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produce sparks for the sacrificial fire (as by rubbing two pieces of dry wood 
together), the act of rubbing is considered to be generative par excellence. 
One example often retold in this regard is provided by the popular tale of the 
goddess Pārvatī, who for some reason could not entice her divine husband 
Śiva to let her conceive in the natural way through completed sexual inter-
course. In desperation, after having rubbed the skin of her arms, she created 
her famous and beloved son Gaṇeśa from the oily rub-offs produced from her 
own radiant skin.
As on a stage, we now have various characters: a first being, heat/sweat/
fire, the various officiants and their utensils, the great sacrifice, the basic order 
of existence, and sacrificial food. The last actor, the last requirement in this 
list, may not come as a surprise to us, because what/who is missing, at least in 
this selective combination of narratives, is a female. Remember it was not a 
gendered universe yet. What had evolved from Puruṣa-Prajāpati, in a two-step 
process, was essentially a non-gendered world. The first being had created by 
using his/its own imagination and body form as building material. This could 
well have worked out disastrously once Agni posed a serious threat: the first-
born turned against his progenitor to devour him. Ingeniously, this was averted 
by offering the ravenous Fire sacrificial milk (and creating the green world 
in the process, as a by-product; this is why one should not cry over spilled 
milk . . .). But in yet another version Prajāpati took the gendered route: our 
fourth narrative.
3.4 The Fourth Narrative: Sperm
Picture this first being, gradually turning into a person now, a male: he felt 
lonely, and desired a second being: “He looked around and saw nothing other 
than himself.” He divided himself by falling (pat) into two pieces (the eternal 
dualism). In this way, from him, as pati (meaning lord as well as husband), a 
wife (patnī) was born. Inflamed with love and desire, he wanted to unite with 
her. But how could this be right when she was, in effect, his own daughter? 
Wanting to conceal herself from her father, this first woman fled. In the process 
of trying to escape her father, she disguised herself in various forms. When she 
fled as a doe, he became a stag and hunted her down. As he was on the point of 
mounting her, one of the gods, the fierce Rūdra, took his bow and shot an arrow 
to prevent the incestuous and violent act. This interruption caused Prajāpati’s 
seed to be spilled prematurely. It fell on the ground and formed a milky lake. 
What happened to the ravaged lady is not told here.27 The other gods deliber-
ated that this precious first seed should not get lost. They threw it into the fire 
27   In fact her name is Uṣas, Dawn. She re-emerges in other stories and came to fame as the 
first rosy shimmer over the horizon, to be greeted with reverence every morning.
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(literally: “surrounded it with Agni”), in a reverent act of sacrifice. And from 
this first sacrificial gift, this first oblation, sperm, all beings came forth.28
The first female had gracefully entered the stage, and yet it was a failed 
attempt. She had been evoked by Prajāpati’s loneliness, but her role had been 
merely to raise his desire and elicit his sperm. Creation, in this narrative, once 
more took place through a sacrificial gift (sperm, a milk-like lake) thrown 
into the sacrificial fire as the first oblation. This first woman had proved no 
success so far, or putting it mildly, had merely been instrumental, whereas 
sacrifice, once again, had been successful. Exit woman, for now. Remaining, on 
that stage, as main characters: an all-male gathering around the sacrificial fire. 
And truly, this is what Vedic sacrifice looks like until today: an all-male gather-
ing around the sacrificial fire, a collection of technicians of the sacred, busy 
repeating and re-enacting those first cosmogonic events.
4 A Blueprint
After having introduced a selection of text passages – selected by my own asso-
ciative thinking rather than by text-historical and text-inherent boundaries – 
I have patched together a minimum of a founding narrative. It may serve as a 
possible explanation of the institution of sacrifice as a generative act as well as 
offer a clue to the institution of sacrifice as a repetitive act.
Not only was sacrifice considered the very source of things, sacrifice must 
be repeated over and over again as an act of maintenance and rejuvenation. 
This needs some explanation. One of the reasons why the original cosmo-
gonic sacrifice had to be regularly repeated in the human realm is found in 
the Vedic struggle with the passage of time, and subsequently with dissipation 
and death. Why was it that sacrifice became the overriding concern of Vedic 
ritualists? Even if Prajāpati’s self-sacrifice may have gloriously been consid-
ered the source of all creation, in the mundane world this established order of 
things was found to be in continuous need of sustenance, as a parallel to Agni 
who was found to be continuously hungry.29
28   Main sources: Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 1.4.1–6; Aitareya Brāhmaṇa 3.33–34; Śatapatha 
Brāhmaṇa 1.7.4.1–8. On the symbolism of sperm, sperm as a sacrificial gift, sexual uni-
fication as sacrifice, and the eating contests during weddings when young men have to 
eat loads of clarified butter as some kind of fertility ritual, see various works by Wendy 
Doniger.
29   For parallels in later narratives and sacrificial practices, especially in South India, see 
David Shulman, The Hungry God: Hindu Tales of Filicide and Devotion (University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago/London, 1993).
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Just as the phenomenal world was seen to depend on food, the greater 
order of things was considered to need some form of sustenance. From today’s 
vantage point, it could be stated that the purpose behind the Vedic sacrificial 
system as a whole was to maintain the established order, ṛta. The early texts, 
however, are not only wayward, contradictory and obscure, they are also full of 
riddles, enigmas and contests that could not be resolved. One of these is the 
contest in which Prajāpati, the Creator, defeated his rival, Death (Mṛtyu). In 
some extremely dense passages, it is narrated how the deadlock of the long-
lasting struggle between Creator and Death was broken only by the revelatory 
vision of the law of equivalence (saṃpad, saṃkhyāna). In other words, the 
moment when that first being, who had engineered creation by cleverly using 
both his mind and his body, had to stave off this most formidable adversary – 
the threat of time, death and decay, and eventually nothingness – he found 
that there was a secret key to this universe: the circularity of time. Not 
acceptance of a mono-linear reality ending in death was the answer to this rid-
dle, but, instead, a deeper insight into time as an endless cycle. Consequently, 
the key to ongoing existence would be repetition, repetition of the initial 
sacrifice, rhythmic periodic replenishment. And the basic rule would be the 
application of the hermetic law of equivalences: “as above, so below”, or rather 
“as once, so now”.30
When this principle of correspondence had provided the master key, the 
ancient ritualists could break up the contest with Time-Death as an adversary 
and establish a system to fend off death by closely following time’s rhythm 
with its daily, bi-monthly, seasonal and yearly recurrence. It is exactly on those 
‘joints’ of time that sacrifice is the remedy against the dissipation of energy. 
Vedic sacrifice is regulated and made effective by equating all ritual acts, all 
parts, all utensils, all persons, all words, all substances to their original cosmic 
counterparts, the shattered bits and pieces of the First Being. Those mystically 
gifted persons who grasped this intricately layered law of correspondences 
intuited that the same meaningful substance as in the beginning (āgre), in 
that first cosmogonic act of sacrifice, should be offered into the sacrificial fire 
at precisely those precarious ‘joints’ of time. In doing so, repeatedly, painstak-
ingly, they could prevent the inherent threat of depletion that was most real at 
moments of transition.
This associative logic provided the prescribed rhythm of brahminic sacri-
fices through days, phases of the moon, seasons and years. It also resulted in 
the subjection of sacrifice to the exacting rules of ritual. And gradually the 
institution of sacrifice, yajña, proliferated and came to dominate social life. 
30   For a particularly poetic rendering of this passage, see William K. Mahony, The Artful 
Universe: An Introduction to the Vedic Religious Imagination (SUNY Press: Albany, 1997).
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Ideally, it accompanied not only the calendrical ‘joints’ of time, but also the 
transitions from one phase on the axis of individual life to another. This is 
how, in the domestic domain, crucial life cycle events such as birth, initiation, 
marriage and death also became occasions for which sacrifices were ordained. 
Other great transitions, such as the start of a king’s rule, were to be similarly 
marked with sacrifice, although the relationship of king and brahmin was nec-
essarily a contradictory one, based on the opposition between the temporal 
and the transcendent.31
In taking the body of Prajāpati – who had first been central in the cosmo-
gonic process, and then in his conquest of death by the visionary insight into 
the secret law of correspondence and equivalence – as the grid and basic out-
line of the year (of which the joints indicated the axial moments in which 
an act of sacrifice was needed), Vedic ritualists had established a system of 
extraordinary logic.32 This system required the performer not merely to per-
form well, but also to know and understand. This esoteric ‘understanding’ later 
began to have a value of its own, as became manifest in the Upaniṣadic interi-
orization of sacrifice and in the Mīmāṃsā theory of ritual. The Vedic passages 
referred to above, thus served, in various ways, as a charter of as well as a blue-
print for sacrifice. And they still do so today.
5 The Pyre
In order to understand cremation as an individual’s final (antya) sacrifice (iṣṭi), 
we should keep in mind two crucial insights from the selection of myths and 
narratives given above: the circularity of time and the centrality of fire.
Agni, Prajāpati’s first-born, is likened to a womb (yoṇi). It is fire into which 
the sacrificial gift (dravya) is offered. It is fire around which the gods gather 
to partake in the sacrificial meal. It is fire that transports the sacrificial sub-
stances to the gods in the form of smoke (thus starting the naturalistic cycle 
of smoke-heaven-clouds-rain-new life forms). And it is from fire that all cre-
ation once sprung. But Agni may also bring death and destruction, as we saw 
in the second narrative. Ravenous Fire, once born, turned towards its creator 
and wished to devour him. Agni was kept at bay by being fed with milk, just 
as he is now being fed with milk, or another substance derived from milk such 
31   Jan C. Heesterman. The Inner Conflict of Tradition: Essays in Indian Ritual, Kingship, and 
Society (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1985).
32   Jan Gonda, Prajāpati and the Year (Noord-hollandse Uitgeversmaatschappij: Amsterdam/
Oxford/New York, 1984).
 ��5Through Fire
as clarified butter, being poured into the sacrificial fire by the priests. Today 
this practice of offering libations of milk or butter continues in the frequent 
homas and havans (simple fire sacrifices) and likewise in the ubiquitous Hindu 
pūjā, a devotional service in which fire has taken the form of a burning light, 
such as an oil lamp or clay saucer with a wick drenched in oil.
At the end of the second narrative we found a new dimension: the threat of 
death. This topic entered the chain of narratives foremost in the sense of the 
potential threat posed by fire, as fire is eternally hungry and ready to devour 
anything. On a further note, fire is an efficient way to dispose of discarded 
matter. This is the point where I zoom in on a particular practice of disposal 
through fire, the general practice of burning the dead on a pyre. Not only is the 
habit of consigning a deceased’s body to the flames of the funeral pyre one of 
the most conspicuous uses of fire in the Vedic-Hindu continuum, it is tellingly 
termed antyeṣṭi, the final and ultimate sacrifice.33
It is no coincidence that the most common word for a person’s final rite 
of passage indicates a sacrifice. This final rite was traditionally staged as an 
actual sacrifice, especially in the case when an āhitāgni (a priest who commit-
ted himself to tend his three sacred fires daily) had died. He was consumed 
by flames generated by embers from his own sacrificial fire, along with all his 
ritual paraphernalia. His fires thus literally died with him. And his eldest son 
could only succeed him by setting up his own fires. But not only in the case of 
an āhitāgni were cremation rites called the final sacrifice; antyeṣṭi became the 
general term for that last rite, and it still is, worldwide.
One of the texts says: “And whenever one dies and is placed in the fire, one 
is reborn from the fire just as he is born from his mother and father (. . .).”34 
One underlying idea was found earlier in our second narrative: burning the 
body in the cremation fire makes rebirth possible. Fire is creative, and so is 
the cremation fire. In order to proceed to the next stage, the deceased has to 
leave his body behind. Fire facilitates the body’s disintegration and return 
to the elements. Already Chāndogya Upaniṣad 3.17.5 considers death a sacri-
fice, even the culmination of all sacrifice: it is the final self-sacrifice feeding 
the funeral fire. Often at this point in a cremation ritual, the locus classicus 
33   The antyeṣṭi is most probably the only rite which involves both a yajña (sacrifice) and a 
saṃskāra (rite of passage). It should be noted, however, that in death rites it is not the 
vedi or vihāra where the offering is being made, but the pyre. See also Hertha Krick, Das 
Ritual der Feuergründung (Agnyādheya) (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie 
der Wissenschaften, 1982), p. 5.
34   Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa 2.2.4.8.
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on the body’s return to the elements is quoted literally.35 In this way, not only 
is the cosmogonic sacrificial dispersal of Puruṣa-Prajāpati’s body repeated in 
the final self-sacrifice of a person on the pyre, the elements of the human body 
are said to return to their respective elements, thus becoming sacrificially 
reintegrated into the cosmos.36 Fire is both destructive and creative. Fire 
destroys and turns into ashes what was once a living being, but in doing so 
it reintegrates the singular body into the cosmos by returning the various 
body parts to their corresponding cosmic elements. Fire, therefore, is a womb: 
it gestates. Subsequent rituals should turn the deceased into an established 
ancestor, and guide him onwards to a new cycle anticipating rebirth, that is, 
re-creation in some new form.
Death rites should be executed correctly.37 They last at least twelve days and 
theoretically even an entire year. The cremation ritual itself involves all or most 
of the familiar elements of a sacrifice: fires, purification rites, circumambula-
tion, offerings of gold, clarified butter and other purificatory and alimentary 
substances, fasting, mantras, gifts, and the services of various officiants. There 
is no apportionment of the sacrificial substance here, although there are some 
indications that in the past a cow (or merely its hide) was burned together 
with the deceased.38 Today, in cow-venerating India, a living cow (or its substi-
tute, a piece of gold) may still be given to the officiating brahmin priest.
35   Atharvaveda 17.2. It needs further textual as well as empirical investigation to ascertain 
that in actual practice the formula for a person’s cremation is (supposed to be) the same 
as that uttered for the sacrificial animal. If so, this would be one more substantiation of 
cremation as a sacrifice with the body of the deceased as the sacrificial gift. The corre-
spondence between a human body and the elements to which it returns at death evoke 
the first cosmogonic sacrifice, that of Prajāpati’s body from the scattered fragments of 
which all elements and entities had evolved. The ensuing system of correspondences 
is based on this rudimentary associative logic: the organ of speech (vāk) is supposed to 
return to fire, the organ of sight/the eye (cakṣus) to the sun, the vital force (prāṇa) to the 
air, and mind (manas) to the moon.
36   Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad 3.2.13.
37   The most foundational text on ritual practices of dying, death and disposal is the Garu 
ḍa Purāṇa. Many priests today use their own manuals. See Jonathan Parry, Death in 
Banares (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1994); For death rituals in Nepal, espe-
cially in Bhaktapur, see Niels Gutschow, Axel Michaels a.o., Handling Death: The Dynamics 
of Death and Ancestor Rituals among the Newars of Bhaktapur, Nepal (Harrassowitz: 
Wiesbaden, 2005).
38   The practice of co-cremation, known as satī (or, in colonial spelling, suttee), in which a 
wife either chose or was forced to accompany her deceased husband in death, followed 
a completely different line of reasoning too complicated to introduce within the central 
theme of sacrifice or self-sacrifice.
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Behind the alchemistic notion of a new life rising from the ashes, there is 
a culture-specific notion prompting elaborate post-funerary rituals. They are 
considered essential to help the spirit of the deceased to turn from the inauspi-
cious status of a wandering disembodied ghost (preta) into that of an ances-
tor (pitṛ). The funeral fire consumes the body – it not only resembles but is a 
sacrifice – and transports its essence to the gods or the world of the ances-
tors. It is imagined that it is in the interest of the entire family – its various 
generations now alive as well as those ancestors waiting to be reborn – that 
such rites be performed properly.39 In these post-pyre rites we see the ‘creative’ 
dimension of sacrifice in greater detail. Ashes are normally gathered and kept 
in a clay pot as long as the ritual impurity lasts. Afterwards the ashes may be 
scattered over flowing waters or buried beneath a sacred tree. As such even the 
ashes become part of the re-creative process, literally so.
But there is more. If we take the institution of sacrifice to be the ritual 
re-enactment of the cosmogonic event in which Puruṣa-Prajāpati had offered 
himself as the prototypical victim, then, in the light of the adagium “as above 
so below/as once, so now” a human person would be obliged to do the same 
and offer himself as puruṣāhuti (‘man himself as the sacrificial gift’) in his own 
sacrificial fire. If sacrifice is to be an echo or a mirror of that primordial sacri-
fice, then, to the discerning sacrificer, all other substances given in a lifetime 
of offerings must be no more than substitutes, postponing the ultimate and 
‘full’ sacrifice (pūrṇāhuti), the act of offering one’s self at the moment of death. 
In an ancient line of thinking, the body was considered a loan from the gods, 
especially from Yama, the god of the dead. This debt was to be paid back at the 
moment of death.40 This may have caused the term antyeṣṭi, ultimate sacri-
fice, to linger in much wider circles than those privileged to perform sacrifices. 
Death is democratic: it happens to all. In fact, antyeṣṭi may well be considered 
the most wide-spread and democratic instance of the continued salience of 
Vedic sacrifice.
39   For instance, David M. Knipe, ‘Sapiṇḍikaraṇa: The Hindu Rite of Entry into Heaven’, in 
Religious Encounters with Death: Insights from the History and Anthropology of Religions, 
ed. by E. Reynolds and E. H. Waugh (State University Press: London/University Park 
Pennsylvania, 1997), pp. 112–124.
40   Mark Elmore, ‘Contemporary Hindu Approaches to Death: Living With the Dead’, 
in Kathleen Garces-Foley, Death and Religion in a Changing World (Amonk/London: 
M. E. Sharpe 2006), pp. 23–44.
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6 Sacrifice in the Vedic-Hindu Cultural Continuum
The selected narratives provide a speculative clue to the central position of 
sacrifice in the Vedic-Hindu cultural continuum. Although the actual practice 
of Vedic sacrifice has declined, it is still alive, and may even undergo a modest 
form of comeback and rejuvenation. But from very early onwards it did not go 
uncontested, such as in Buddhist, Jain, and other heterodox milieus, in which 
especially killing of the animal victim was opposed. In addition to this, as early 
as the Brāhmaṇas and Upaniṣads there were tendencies to prefer a more inter-
nalized performance. The tendency to transcend the complicated, contested, 
and costly material aspects of sacrifice continued and fully emerged in the 
spread of Hindu theism, bhakti, and vegetarianism.41 Moreover, the institu-
tion of full-blown ostentatious Vedic practices such as extended Soma-yajña, 
Atirātra-Agnicayana, Rājasūya, and especially the year-long royal horse sacri-
fice, the Aśvamedha, may have been regarded by emancipating other classes 
and castes in Indian society as a clear case of brahmin self-aggrandisement.
In the second half of the twentieth century there was a scholarly tendency 
to maintain that all such grand sacrifices were dying out, as was also expressed 
by Frits Staal, in 1975, when he was instrumental in organizing and recording 
an extensive Agnicayana in Panjal, Kerala.42 It was claimed that this venture 
was unique, being performed by those few Nambudiri brahmin families who 
had kept an unbroken 3,000-year-old tradition. Its full recording (funded by 
various American academic associations), including preparation and rehears-
als, was regarded justified as a way to keep the minutiae of this particular 
41   Such as expressed by Frederick M. Smith, ‘A Brief History of Indian Religious Ritual and 
Resource Consumption: Was there an Environmental Ethic?’ (Asian Ethnology 70 (2011), 
pp. 163–179). One of my own motives for researching cremation rituals in India, Nepal and 
Bhutan, in that summer of 2011, was a critique of the so-called Religious Environmentalist 
Paradigm (REP): if indeed South Asian religions and cultures had been (and still is) so 
environmentally friendly as is often maintained, how could the staggering quantities of 
dry wood needed for the open pyre be defended in the light of disastrous deforestation 
today? Albertina Nugteren, ‘Wood, Water, and Waste: Mortuary Practices in India and 
Nepal’ (in Roots of Wisdom, Branches of Devotion: Plant Life in South Asian Religions and 
Culture, ed. by Fabrizio M. Ferrari and Thomas Dähnhardt, in press).
42   The film recording the Agnicayana performance has been released as R. Gardner and 
J. F. Staal, Altar of Fire (University of California Extension Media Center and Harvard 
University Film Study Center: Berkeley/Harvard, 1976). The two-volume book was 
published as Frits Staal et al., Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar (Berkeley: Asian 
Humanities Press, 1983). See also the Dutch NOS documentary Het vuuraltaar (broadcast 
on September 8, 1987).
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ritual for posterity before it would become extinct forever. Its documents 
(an encyclopedic book in two volumes, a film, and audio recordings) presented 
the Atirātra-Agnicayana of 1975 as perhaps having been “performed for the 
very last time”. But this has been proven wrong. Not only has there been a rep-
etition by the same community of Nambudiri priests in 1990, 2006, and 2011, 
other grand sacrifices were held in other places. We now assume that com-
parable grand – scale Vedic sacrifices have been going on in isolated pockets 
in India at irregular intervals over three millennia, most of them unknown to 
Western academics and to most Indian priestly scholars as well, for the simple 
reason that they remained mostly unrecorded.
In a fascinating article, ‘Veda on Parade: Revivalist Ritual as Civic Spectacle’, 
Timothy Lubin relates how he – more or less accidentally – became one of the 
celebrities in a many-days long Vedic sacrifice in rural Maharashtra, in 1992. 
One of the article’s insights is supported by attention the author pays to what 
goes on in the margins. He thus confirms earlier observations in fieldwork 
done by colleagues that contemporary Vedic sacrifice may still be done ‘by the 
book’, but simultaneously, especially in off-center ritual activities, becomes 
a form of Hindu pūjā. By shifting his gaze occasionally to non-ritualized or 
peripheral ritual activities taking place at the margins, such as devotion shown 
in front of additional shrines for deities and gurus, museum-like displays 
including plaques mentioning the technical name of each item in the sacrifice, 
printed publicity, and open proselytizing, Lubin shows how both continuity 
and change become obvious.43
Likewise, Frederick M. Smith, in a contribution titled ‘Indra Goes West: 
Report on a Vedic Soma Sacrifice in London’, comments on an elaborate Vedic 
sacrifice performed in Roundwood Park, London, in 1996.44 Silke Bechler refers 
to a 1,008-hour sacrifice in Bad Meinberg, Germany, held in 2008, and even 
more could be mentioned.45 These cases not only illustrate that ritual knowl-
edge is stored in texts as well as in bodies, oral transmissions, and collective 
43   Timothy Lubin, ‘Veda on Parade: Revivalist Ritual as Civic Spectacle’, Journal of the 
American Academy of Religion 69 (2) (2001), pp. 377–408.
44   Frederick M. Smith, ‘Indra Goes West: Report on a Vedic Soma Sacrifice in London’, History 
of Religions 36 (3) (2000), pp. 247–267.
45   Silke Bechler, “Globalized Religion: The Vedic Sacrifice (Yajña) in Transcultural Public 
Spheres”, Asia Journal of Global Studies 4 (1) (2010/2011), pp. 21–34, as well as in Derrick 
Nault et al. (eds), Experiencing Globalizations: Religion in Contemporary Contexts 
(Anthem Press: London, 2013), pp. 59–77. See also of the same author, ‘The Performance 
of Contemporary Vedic Sacrifices in Private and Public Spheres of India’, in Axel Michaels 
and Christoph Wulf (eds), Emotions in Rituals and Performances (Routledge: New Delhi, 
2012), pp. 250–256.
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memories, but also that the need for certain rituals may rise and wane, and 
reappear with slightly different metanarratives. What was once expressed as 
a need to reinforce elementary powers for the rejuvenation of the cosmos, or 
to build up an immortal body for the sacrificer, may now also be expressed in 
terms of scholarly, didactic, artistic, and touristic purposes.
But this focus on the more spectacular and grand Vedic sacrifices, which 
almost vanished from the ritual arena with the arrival of temple worship and 
the Āgamic pūjā, may obscure that a considerable number of Hindus still 
practice the five great daily sacrifices (pañca-mahāyajñas) in a simplified form, 
discretely, devotedly, without any spectacle, at home.46
7 Perspectives
Ethnographic accounts of actual sacrifices in contemporary South Asia or 
even diasporic contexts throw new light on the diversity, ritual dynamics, and 
shifts in underlying motives for the continued performance of sacrifices. Some 
aspects of South Asian sacrificial traditions have even selectively been appro-
priated by a new type of global entrepreneurs in the spiritual supermarket or 
integrated into art projects by artists such as Wolfgang Laib.47
Vedas and Vedic ritual have, theoretically, a high status, although the actual 
practice of full-fledged Vedic ritual has long been marginal. Ongoing Vedic prac- 
tice in several rural areas had remained largely undetected and below the radar 
screen of (Western) scholars. Today we even notice a  modest comeback: no 
one could have foreseen the recent emergence of energetic sponsorship among 
brahmin traditionalists, vigorous patriots, and even diasporic communities 
such as in New York after ‘9/11’. Vedic sacrifices are now typically promoted as at 
once eternal and modern-scientific.48 Their supposed  rain-producing effects 
46   This fivefold daily sacrifice consists of the following: devayajña (an offering to the gods), 
pitṛyajña (offering to the ancestors), bhūtayajña (offering to the spirits), nṛyajña (offering 
to humans, i.e., generosity), and brahmayajña (offering to Brahma, i.e., study). The most 
ancient source for this is probably Śatapata Brāhmaṇa 11.5.6.1–3.
47   Wolfgang Laib’s exhibition in the Fondazione Merz, Turin, Italy, in 2009, started with a 
Vedic fire ritual in South India, and closed with a second fire ritual in Turin, “celebrated by 
45 Brahmin priests from one of the most important temples in South India (. . .) It is about 
creation, sustenance and destruction and renewal (. . .) This is a unique cultural event that 
can rarely be witnessed in a Western country (. . .).” Source: http://fondazionemerz.org/
en/eventi/rito-del-fuoco/, accessed October 14, 2011.
48   Typically phrased by one of the Brahmin scientist-priests, head of the research team for 
the twelve-day Atirātra sacrifice in the village of Panjal, Kerala, April 2011: “The essence 
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are applied to the domains of public health and environmental well-being. It 
goes without saying that many oppose this trend, for various reasons.49
Apart from the slightly frivolous recent developments, there is another rea-
son why the Vedic sacrificial system continues to fascinate. In the words of 
life-long Vedic scholar Jan Gonda: “No other nation of antiquity has left us so 
detailed, considered, and systematic descriptions of their ritual and ceremo-
nial as the Vedic specialists.”50 Indeed, Vedic sacrifice continues to offer much 
food for thought. And the open cremation fire, with which this article started, 
is one of the most obvious and ubiquitous illustrations of this.
of the ritual is pure science. It is a way of celebrating the big bang or the creation of the 
universe which began with a ball of fire.” (‘Age-old Kerala Fire Ritual a Natural Purifier?’ 
Times of India, May 12, 2011).
49   See also Times of India January 18, 2011 (‘Stoking a Vedic Fire’); June 13, 2011 (‘Rekindling 
a Vedic Fire Ritual’); and July 16, 2011 (‘Trial by Fire’), and www.parihara.com on April 15, 
2011 (‘Rain Lashes Kerala Village as Fire Ritual Ends’) posted by Madhusree Chatterjee. 
Accessed October 14, 2011.
50   Jan Gonda, The Ritual Sūtras (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1977), p. 470.
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Sacrifice in Early Christianity: The Social 
Dimensions of a Metaphor
Gerard Rouwhorst
1 Introduction
For centuries, the use of the word ‘sacrifice’ in relation to Christianity has 
sparked off fierce debates among both Christians and scholars who studied 
Christianity. As is often the case with much discussed terms, the word  ‘sacrifice’ 
has given rise to misunderstandings and confusion. This is for one part due to 
the complexity of the ritual practices to which the term primarily refers.1 It 
may refer to blood sacrifices, in particular to the ritual slaughter of animals – 
upon which most research and discussions have concentrated – but also to 
vegetal offerings. Further, sacrifices can involve a variety of ritual activities 
and elements: The preparation of the sacrificial substance or animal, the kill-
ing (when the sacrifice that will be offered is an animal), the offering itself, 
the apportionment and the consumption. Moreover, just like all other rituals, 
sacrifices can be studied from various angles.2 One may focus on the details 
of the ritual performance, on the religious meanings that are attributed to the 
sacrificial actions by the participants, and on the social or psychological func-
tions they fulfill. One of the major pitfalls of the study of sacrificial practices 
consists in thinking in terms of a typical, more or less universal type of sacri-
ficial ritual – for instance, the ritual slaughter of animals – and, on that basis, 
drawing conclusions about ‘sacrifice’ as a universal human activity.
A further source of confusion with respect to the word ‘sacrifice’ in the 
Christian tradition lies in the fact that originally the term sacrifice was used in 
a metaphorical way as referring to non-ritual activities and realities. The key 
1   See for the variety of sacrificial rituals and the elements they involve especially: Kathryn 
McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence. A Comparative Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2008).
2   See for an overview of the various scientific approaches to sacrifice and the major theo-
ries: McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence, 3–17. See further Maria-Zoe Petropolou, Animal 
Sacrifice in Ancient Greek Religion, Judaism, and Christianity, 100 BC to AD 200 (Oxford 
Classical Monographs; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1–31, and Jonathan Klawans, 
Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple. Symbolism and Supersessionism in the Study of Ancient 
Judaism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 17–48.
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to this metaphorical interpretation is to be found in the life and the death of 
Jesus Christ, which are understood as a self-offering and constitute the model 
of the Christian way of life. All sacrifices described in the Hebrew Bible, both 
the animal sacrifices and the vegetal offerings, were viewed through this meta-
phorical lens.
Of course the word sacrifice and sacrificial terminology were soon used to 
designate new Christian rituals that were considered sacrifices and offerings – 
in particular, the Eucharist. Yet the Christian metaphorical interpretation 
of the pre-Christian sacrificial rituals has left its mark on those Christian 
rituals as well; and it should not be overlooked that, in spite of the frequent use 
of sacrificial metaphors and of terms derived from sacrificial cults, they were 
essentially different from the sacrifices known from Greek and Roman religion 
as well as from the Jewish Temple in Jerusalem.3
2 Social Structures of Early Christian Communities
Although the Christian concept of sacrifice has played a crucial role through-
out the history of Christianity and has always been one of the leitmotivs of 
Christian theology and liturgy, it has simultaneously undergone continual 
metamorphoses. The term ‘sacrifice’ and related terms have been used to des-
ignate a great variety of theological ideas, moral virtues, and ritual practices. 
Various factors have played a role in the transformations of the metaphor of 
sacrifice throughout the centuries and in the disputes to which it has given 
rise. These transformations were of course closely connected with the history 
of Christian theological doctrine and were profoundly affected by it. Still, one 
should not overlook the importance of non-theological aspects. Especially, 
the social structures of Christian communities, which throughout the history 
of Christianity have continuously been changing, deserve attention. In fact, 
if sacrifice is associated with the notion of giving or offering oneself – as it is 
the case in Christianity – the question arises who is supposed to give himself 
or herself to whom and for what purpose. Is the individual Christian supposed 
to sacrifice him- or herself for the sake of the community, or should s/he rather 
do so in order to achieve a higher spiritual goal? Much will depend on the 
3   Cf. for the origins and history of the Christian concept of sacrifice Robert Daly, Sacrifice 
Unveiled. The True Meaning of Christian Sacrifice, (London/New York: T&T Clark, 2009). 
See also Frances Young, The Use of Sacrificial Ideas in Greek Christian Writers from the New 
Testament to John Chrysostom (Patristic Monograph Series 5; The Philadelphia Patristic 
Foundation, Ltd, 1979); Idem, Sacrifice and the Death of Christ (London: SPCK, 1975).
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relationship between the individual and society and more specifically on the 
group cohesiveness. To what extent does a Christian community offer a sense 
of security and the feeling of having a home? And what claims does that com-
munity have on someone?
There is a second reason why insight in the structures of Christian com-
munities is important for understanding the role of the concept of sacrifice 
in the history of Christianity. We have already alluded to the complicated pro-
cess of de-ritualizing and ritualizing which was instigated by the Christian 
concept of sacrifice. Initially, the ritual practice to which the term ‘sacrifice’ 
primarily referred was rejected as being tied up with the Temple cult and with 
paganism. However, the concept of sacrifice rather soon became applied to 
Christian rituals and began influencing Christian processes of ritualizing.
Rituals have a markedly social dimension and fulfill social functions. More 
specifically, they may serve to mark what the British anthropologist Mary 
Douglas has called the group and the grid dimension of communities, that is 
to say, respectively, the external boundaries which separate the members of a 
community from those who do not belong to it, and the internal boundaries: 
The social roles to which the members are supposed to conform and the hier-
archical divisions they are asked to respect.4 Conversely, the importance which 
is given to rituals and the way they function, is strongly dependent on those 
internal and external boundaries.
In the following, I will try to illustrate the interrelatedness between the 
development of the Christian concept of sacrifice and the changing social 
structures of Christian communities, making use of the group and grid distinc-
tion. I will focus on the period of early Christianity when the contours of the 
Christian concept of sacrifice started becoming visible and the social struc-
tures of the Christian communities began taking shape.
4   See for the concepts of group and grid as developed by Mary Douglas especially the 
following books of this anthropologist: Purity and Danger. An Analysis of Concepts of Pollution 
and Taboo (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966) Natural Symbols (London: Barrie and 
Rockliff/Cresset Press, 1970; new edition with new introduction: New York: Pantheon Books, 
1982); Cultural Bias (London: Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland. 
Occasional paper 35, 1978); reprinted in In the Active Voice (London and Boston: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1982), 183–254. See further various articles collected in Implicit Meanings. 
Selected Essays in Anthropology (London & New York: Routledge, Second Edition, 1999). See 
for the person and the work of Mary Douglas: Richard Fardon, Mary Douglas: An Intellectual 
Biography (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
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3 Three Types of Early Christian Communities
While studying early Christian communities, one is at first sight confronted 
with a confusing plurality of social structures. However, at closer inspection, it 
turns out that this variety can be reduced to three major types of  communities.5 
Two of them we mainly, though not exclusively, encounter in the three centu-
ries before Constantine when Christians constituted a small minority in the 
Roman Empire. The third type appears in the fourth century when Christianity 
gradually grows into the public majority religion of the Empire.
3.1 The First Communal Structures
The first type of community is characterized by the combination of its small-
size and well-demarcated external boundaries on the one hand and rather 
loosely organized structures on the other hand. Speaking in sociological terms, 
they exhibited the features of ‘sects’, small communities which find themselves 
in a high state of tension with their environment.6 The members of those com-
munities met in private houses (house churches) and were highly critical of 
the morals, principles and beliefs as generally accepted by the (Greco-Roman) 
society in which they were living. They refused to participate in the rituals 
and feasts which fulfilled both religious and social functions in that society. 
Christians belonging to these small churches considered their communities 
holy. Their emphasis on the holiness of the community was clearly reflected 
in their rituals. The rules for partaking in their communal meals – often called 
‘Eucharists’ – were strict.7 To be admitted to them, one needed to have been 
purified by baptism. Compared to the group dimension, the internal boundar-
ies (‘grid’) were less clearly demarcated. The roles and the tasks of the com-
munity leaders and of those who were presiding the liturgical meetings were 
often not very clearly defined. Finally, apart from baptism and communal 
meals, there were rather few rituals. The liturgical year, for instance, was in an 
embryonic stage of development.
5   Cf. for the following my article “Christian Initiation in Early Christianity,” Questions litur-
giques 87 (2006): 100–119 (= Initiation chrétienne et la liturgie. Hommage au Prof. Em. Dr. Jozef 
Lamberts (Textes et études liturgiques XXII) (ed. L. Leijssen; Leuven: Peeters, 2008), 104–123.
6   Thus Rodney Stark, The Rise of Christianity (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publishers, 
1997), 25.
7   Cf. Wayne Meeks’ characterization of the Lord’s Supper in the Pauline letters as a ‘ritual of 
solidarity’. Wayne Meeks, The First Urban Christians. The Social World of the Apostle Paul 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983), 157–162. See also my article “Table 
Community in Early Christianity,” in A Holy People. Jewish and Christian Perspectives on 
Religious Communal Identity (eds M. Poorthuis and J. Schwartz; Leiden: Brill, 2006), 69–84.
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3.2 “Spiritual Searchers”
The second community model I want to distinguish is that of the “spiritual 
searchers”, who emphasized the importance of individual religious and spiri-
tual growth. To this category the great variety of movements belonged which 
are commonly labeled as Gnostic. Using Douglas’ group-grid model, one may 
characterize them as a “weak group” and a “weak grid”. Christians belonging 
to this category had in common with members of the first type of Christian 
community that they were very critical of the society in which they were 
living. They rejected its way of life as well as its institutions. What made them 
different was that they stressed the importance of the soul’s spiritual jour-
ney rather than the fact of belonging to a church. These Christians formed 
communities, but the type of community they were looking for consisted of 
like-minded spiritually advanced searchers. At least some of these Christians 
were highly critical of ecclesiastical institutions and hierarchical structures. 
When not rejected outright, the importance of collective rituals was at best 
minimized. In any case, emphasis was laid on the spiritual meaning and the 
spiritual attitude of the individual who participated in the rituals rather than 
on the objective performance of the rituals.
3.3 Post-Fourth-Century Church Communities
From the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth century, the number 
of Christians increased considerably, and, what is even more important, the 
relationship between Christianity and its environment changed (especially so 
after the conversion of Constantine). This development resulted in the third, 
more stratified church model. The Christian communities of the fourth century 
included various categories of faithful that may be distinguished on the basis 
of their participation in church life. Thus there were 1) catechumens who had 
enrolled themselves as candidate Christians, but had not yet been baptized; 
2) Christians who had been initiated and were full members of the Christian 
communities; 3) penitents, people who had been baptized, but by committing 
a grave sin had temporarily been regressed to the status of catechumens, and 
finally 4) men and women who were leading a monastic life and strived for 
a more radical Christian life than the rest of the baptized Christians. Apart 
from this differentiation, the fact that the number of Christians increased 
necessitated a further structuring of the leadership of the Church: The roles 
and the tasks of the ordained leaders (bishops, presbyters, deacons) and their 
position vis-à-vis the lay people became more precisely defined and demar-
cated. In terms of group and grid, the group boundaries became more 
differentiated and the grid became stronger. More or less simultaneously with 
this process of differentiation and stratification, a rather spectacular increase 
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and elaboration of Christian rituals took place. It will suffice to mention the 
elaborated rituals of Christian initiation, the development of the ritual of 
the Eucharist, and the evolution of the Christian calendar.8
4 Metaphors of Sacrifice
Obviously, this subdivision of early Christian communities into three major 
types involves a certain simplification. Still, it may be helpful in providing 
insight in many aspects of early Christianity, especially the various ways in 
which the metaphor of sacrifice was used and ritualized.
4.1 Sacrificial Metaphors in Small-Scale Early Christian Communities
In sources derived from small-scale, mostly egalitarian, tightly cohesive 
Christian communities from the period before Constantine, sacrificial motifs, 
ideas and terms appear frequently and play an important role. On the one 
hand, they are to be found in numerous anti-sacrifice polemics that are 
directed against both pagan and Jewish sacrifices, for example, the Epistle of 
Barnabas, the writings of Justin, Irenaeus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen.9 
At the same time, both the New Testament itself and numerous writings 
dating from the second and third centuries testify to the tendency to ‘spiri-
tualize’ motifs that are related to the Jewish sacrificial cult. That is, instead of 
being rejected outright, these motifs are considered to be referring to the self-
giving of Christ and the way of life Christians are supposed to lead. In this way, 
they are used to develop the Christian concept of sacrifice I have mentioned 
at the beginning of this chapter. Even if this is hardly surprising and fits in 
with the overall character of early Christianity, one may note some tendencies 
which appear typical of the first three centuries of Christianity.
Firstly, sacrificial terminology is rarely used in texts dealing with the litur-
gical traditions of early Christians. In so far as sacrificial concepts and meta-
phors from the Hebrew Bible are used to indicate Christian rituals, this often 
seems to be done with a supersessionist purpose, namely with the intention to 
emphasize that (Jewish) sacrifices are no longer of any use and have been 
replaced with alternative Christian ‘sacrifices’. These texts do not explicitly 
deal with the question what these alternative rituals might have in common 
8   See in this connection John F. Baldovin, “The Empire Baptized,” in The Oxford History of 
Christian Worship (eds G. Wainwright and K. B. Westerfield; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006), 77–132.
9   See for references to the relevant sources Young, The Use of Sacrificial Ideas, 79–96.
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with sacrifices and might justify their description in sacrificial terms. The most 
telling case in point is the use of sacrificial terminology with regard to the 
early Christian Eucharist.10 It often appears in the context of anti-sacrificial 
polemics in which the Eucharist is contrasted with the sacrifices of the Hebrew 
Bible. It does not always become clear, however, to what degree and in what 
respect the Eucharist itself is considered a sacrifice. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that when the Eucharist is described in sacrificial terms, reference is 
exclusively or primarily made to the (offering of) prayers, especially the giving 
of thanks, not to the bread and wine. Also how this sacrifice of prayer did 
relate to the self-offering of Christ, which is at the center of the New Testament 
institution narratives, remains somewhat unclear. It seems that  theological 
reflection on this question developed and crystallized only gradually. More-
over, this process appears to have run parallel to the elaboration of the ritual 
of the Eucharist, in particular to the incorporation of the institution narra-
tive in the Eucharistic prayer, which, according to recent liturgical scholarship, 
is nowhere evidenced before the middle of the third century and in several 
places even occurred much later.11
Secondly, at least as remarkable as the relatively scarce evidence of the use 
of sacrificial concepts in the description of early Christian rituals is the promi-
nent role these concepts play in some early Christian texts dealing with mar-
tyrdom. First of all, there is Ignatius of Antioch’s Letter to the Romans in which 
the author, longing to become a martyr, asks that it he be granted to be poured 
out as a libation on an altar (2,2) and to become a sacrifice (2,4).12 Further, the 
idea that martyrdom is the ultimate sacrifice also appears in the Martyrdom of 
10   See in particular Kenneth Stevenson, Eucharist and Offering (New York: Pueblo Publishing 
Company, 1986), 10–37. Cf. Young, The Use of Sacrificial Ideas, 256–266.
11   See Robert Taft, “Mass without the Consecration? The Historic Agreement on the Eucharist 
between the Catholic Church and the Assyrian Church of the East Promulgated 26 October 
2001,” Centro pro Unione. Semi-annual Bulletin, 63 (Spring 2003): 15–27 = Worship 77 (2003): 
482–509; Paul Bradshaw, “Did Jesus institute the Eucharist at the Last Supper?,” in Issues 
in Eucharistic Praying in East and West. Essays in Liturgical and Theological Analysis 
(ed. M. E. Johnson; Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 2010), 1–19 (published also in: Paul 
Bradshaw, Reconstructing Early Christian Worship (London: SPCK, 2009), 3–19. The ques-
tion arises whether other aspects of the Early Christian Eucharist, especially the breaking 
of the bread, may have involved a sacrificial connotation. Cf. my article « Faire mémoire 
par un geste: la fraction du pain » in « Faire mémoire. L’anamnèse dans la liturgie », 
Conférences Saint Serge LVIe Semaine d’Études Liturgiques Paris, 29 juin–2 juillet 2009” 
(eds A. Lossky and M. Sodi; Città del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2011), 75–86.
12   Edition of the Greek text: Karl Bihlmeyer, Wilhelm Schneemelcher, Die apostolischen 
Väter (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 19562), 98–99.
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Polycarp.13 When Polycarp is on the brink of being burnt alive, he is compared 
with a ram taken from a flock for sacrifice and he is called a well-prepared 
burnt offering (ch. 14). Moreover, he asked to be received by God as a rich and 
acceptable sacrifice and when he is surrounded by the flames, he is said to have 
spread an overwhelming fragrance like that of frankincense (ch. 15).14
In order to assess the historical significance of these passages, it is important 
to realize that these stories – and more in particular the Martyr Passions – did 
not just give accounts, historically correct or not, of the events described, but 
were primarily meant to be read in Christian communities. The heroes who 
suffered martyrdom functioned as examples of endurance and courage for the 
members of those communities.
4.2 Anti-Sacrificial Polemics in Gnosticism
In some respects, the attitude towards sacrifices displayed by early Christian 
communities belonging to the second model – in particular, Gnostic groups – 
is comparable to the one predominant in the small-scale churches dealt with 
in the preceding section. Both categories had at least two things in common: 
a) A rejection of sacrifices, especially bloody animal sacrifices, as they were 
practiced in Judaism prior to the destruction of the Second Temple and contin-
ued to be practiced in pagan temples; and b) the notion of a spiritual sacrifice 
which is offered by the (Gnostic) Christian who offers himself to the Highest 
God, in particular by addressing prayers of thanksgiving to Him.15 However, 
there are also some striking differences.
Firstly, the rejection of the Hebrew Bible sacrifices is more radical in so far 
as, according to Gnostic beliefs, those sacrifices were not offered to the Highest 
God, but to powers (archons) or demons who tried to get human beings impris-
oned and enslaved in a world created by an inferior god.16
Secondly, in some Gnostic sources critique of sacrifices is combined with 
polemic against non-Gnostic Christians, especially their leaders, who are 
13   Edition and English translation: Herbert Musurillo, Acts of the Christian Martyrs II 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 2–21.
14   The idea that the martyr’s death is a sacrifice is also found in the writings of Origen, 
especially in his Exhortation to Martyrdom. Cf. for this passage as well as for references to 
other texts of Origen: Young, The Use of Sacrificial Ideas, 228–230.
15   See Discourse on the Eighth and the Ninth (NH VI, 6), ch. 59–60 and Melchizedek (NH IX, 
1), ch. 16. English translation: The Nag Hammadi Library. Translated into English under the 
editorship of James M. Robinson (Leiden: Brill, 1977), 295–296 and 402.
16   See On the Origin of the World, 123 (NH II, 5 and XIII, 2). English translation: The Nag 
Hammadi Library, 156–157. Cf. Gospel of Philip (NH II, 3), 54–55 and 63 (Nag Hammadi 
Library, 133 and 138); Melchizedek (NH IX, 1), ch. 6–7 (Nag Hammadi Library, 401).
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blamed for continuing “the detestable sacrificial practices” of the Jewish 
Temple. A clear example of this polemic is to be found in the recently dis-
covered Gospel of Judas. The text contains a passage in which the disciples of 
Jesus tell him that they had a vision of the Temple and of twelve priests who 
were standing at an altar and were offering animal sacrifices.17 The interpre-
tation of the passage concerned gives rise to several difficulties,18 but it is 
clear that the sacrificial cult is rejected as being highly immoral and abhor-
rent. Even more remarkable is the way in which the vision of the disciples is 
explained by Jesus: The priests offering the sacrifices turn out to be none other 
than the disciples themselves. There can be no doubt that these disciples, 
for their part, symbolize the leaders of the (second century) orthodox Church 
which is attacked by the author of the Gospel of Judas. The passage certainly 
implies a severe criticism of some ritual practices that must have been current 
in that Church (although it remains hard to establish which Christian practices 
the author precisely had in mind).19
Thirdly, it is striking that, in Gnostic writings, the Hebrew Bible sacrifices 
are only exceptionally associated with the death of Christ, while this death is 
not described in sacrificial terms nor interpreted as a sacrifice brought for the 
redemption of the Christians.
And finally, in Gnostic literature, one encounters astonishingly diverse and 
even opposite attitudes towards martyrdom. Whereas some Gnostic texts hold 
martyrs in high esteem,20 in other Gnostic sources the ideal of martyrdom is 
17   Gospel of Judas, 38–41. Edition of the Coptic text and English translation: The Gospel of 
Judas together with the Letter of Peter to Philip, James, and a Book of Allogenes from Codex 
Tchacos. Critical Edition (eds R. Kasser, M. Meyer, G. Wurst, and F. Gaudard; Washington 
DC: National Geographic, 2007), 195–201.
18   Cf. for the interpretation of this passage my article “The Gospel of Judas and the Early 
Christian Eucharist,” in ‘In Search of Truth’: Augustine, Manichaeism and other Gnosticism. 
Studies for Johannes van Oort at Sixty (eds J. van den Berg, A. Kotzé, T. Nicklas, M. Scopello; 
Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies, 74; Leiden: Brill, 2011), 611–626.
19   It has been argued that the Gospel would be attacking a sort of early Christian Eucharist 
which was primarily considered as a commemoration of the sacrificial death of Christ 
and, moreover, was closely connected with a high esteem of the ideal of martyrdom. 
See in particular Elaine Pagels/Karen King, Reading Judas. The Gospel of Judas and the 
Shaping of Christianity (London: Penguin books, 2007), 51–52. Elsewhere, I have argued 
that this theory is based upon an anachronistic view of the development of the Eucharist 
in the first two or three centuries of the history of Christianity (Rouwhorst, “The Gospel 
of Judasˮ).
20   See Apocryphon of James (NH 1,2), 4–6 (Nag Hammadi Library, 31–32). Cf. for the inter-
pretation of this passage the footnotes added by Donald Rouleau to his French transla-
tion of the Apocryphon of James published in Ecrits gnostiques. La bibliothèque de Nag 
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put into perspective.21 Thus, the Valentinian Gnostic Heracleon minimizes the 
importance of confessing Christ before the magistrates, arguing that such a 
confession can be only outward and even hypocritical and that the real thing 
asked from Christians is to confess Christ by their faith and their everyday 
conduct.22 Some Gnostics even went so far as to straightforwardly criticize the 
propaganda for martyrdom and reject martyrdom itself. In the Gnostic writing 
which is known as the Testimony of Truth, martyrs are explicitly denounced 
and even ridiculed. They are called “foolish people” who “surrender themselves 
to ignorance without knowing where they are going and without knowing 
Christ” and as people who “do not bear witness to nobody but themselves” 
and who mistakenly believe that they will be saved by surrendering them- 
selves to death because of the Name (of God).23 The fierce rejection of mar-
tyrdom recalls a passage of Irenaeus’ Adversus haereses in which Gnostic 
opponents (Valentinians) are accused of scorning and despising the martyrs 
(III, 18, 5).24 All in all, although it remains difficult to obtain an exact idea of 
the various Gnostic positions, there can be no doubt that the ideal of martyr-
dom was considered with suspicion by many Gnostics. And at least to some of 
them, martyrdom must have been as repugnant as sacrificial rituals were to all 
Gnostics.
4.3 Excursus: The Writings of Cyprian of Carthago
Before we will turn to the third community model, which begins developing in 
the fourth century and is characterized by an increasing internal stratification, 
some remarks are in order about the writings of Cyprian, which date from the 
mid-third century. Although Cyprian is often considered to be a typical repre-
sentative of (orthodox or mainstream) Christianity of the first three centuries, 
Hammadi. Édition publiée sous la direction de Jean-Pierre Mahé et de Paul-Hubert Poirier 
(Bibliothèque de la Pléiade; Gallimard: Paris, 2007), 29, 31 and 39.
21   See for the following Annie and Jean-Pierre Mahé, Le témoignage véritable (NH IX, 3). 
Gnose et martyre (Bibliothèque copte de Nag Hammadi, Section «Textes» 23; Les Presses 
de l’université; Québec/Louvain: Laval/Peeters, 1996), 53–59.
22   See Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis IV, 9 (Patrologia Graeca 8, 1281B). Cf. fragment 50 
of Heracleon (A. Brooke, The Fragments of Heracleon, Cambridge 1891), 102.
23   Testimony of Truth (NH IX, 3), 31–34; (Nag Hammadi Library), 407–408.
24   Irenaeus, “Adversus haereses III,” in Sources chrétiennes 211 (eds A. Rousseau and 
L. Doutreleau; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2002), 358–359. See also Clement of Alexandria, 
Stromateis IV, 4 where Clement makes mention of heretics (Heracleon?) who claim that 
the “true martyrdom is the knowledge of the only true God . . ., and that the man is a self-
murderer and a suicide who makes confession by death” (1229B).
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his ideas about sacrifice appear to be unique for that period and do not easily 
fit in with either of the community models we have distinguished.25
To begin with, there are probably no other writings dating from this period 
in which sacrificial metaphors occur more frequently than those of Cyprian. 
Even more striking is, however, the important role those metaphors play in 
his theological views on the Eucharist. According to Cyprian, the Eucharist is 
a sacrifice offered by the Church and this is the case because it is the com-
memoration of the voluntary Passion of the Lord, which was the acme of true 
sacrifice. Furthermore, the commemoration and the offering of this sacrifice 
by the Church – which is carried out by the bishop who imitates Christ – 
should be actualized in the Christian way of life which in specific cases may 
lead to martyrdom.
How to account for the emphasis which Cyprian places on the sacrificial 
character of the Eucharist? At first sight, one might argue that this is due to 
the persecutions of Christians in the middle of the third century – during the 
reigns of the emperors Decian and Valerian – when Cyprian was active as a 
bishop and was confronted with Christians who tried to escape from martyr-
dom. There can be no doubt that Cyprian held martyrs in high esteem – he 
exhorted Christians to stand firm during persecutions – and that he died as 
a martyr himself (in 258 CE). Still, contrary to what we found in the writings 
of Ignatius and some of the Martyr Passions martyrdom is rarely described 
as a sacrifice by Cyprian. There must be a more important reason why the 
sacrificial character of the Eucharist is so detailed and stressed in Cyprian’s 
writings. The explanation is the authoritative character ascribed to the Last 
Supper tradition which serves as the model and archetype of the Eucharist. 
Tellingly, the mere fact that Christ had mixed water with wine is used by 
Cyprian as an argument in his refutation of Christians who defend the 
custom – apparently existing in North Africa – of drinking only water during 
the Eucharist.26 For the rest, it can be no coincidence that Cyprian is the first 
early Christian author to unambiguously attest the recitation of the institution 
narrative during the Eucharist! The increasing emphasis on the tradition of 
the Last Supper and the insertion of the institution narrative in the Eucharistic 
25   Cf. for the following Cyprian, Epistula 63 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum 
3, 2; Vienna, 1871), 4, 372–389. See also Raymond Johanny, “Cyprien de Carthage,” in 
L’eucharistie des premiers chrétiens (ed. R. Johanny; Paris: Beauchesne, 1976), 151–175; 
David Power, The Eucharistic Mystery. Revitalizing the Tradition (Dublin: Gill and 
MacMillan, 1992), 107–108; Enrico Mazza, L’action eucharistique. Origine, développement, 
interprétation (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1999), 141–154.
26   See Epistula, 63.
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prayer are primarily the result of a process of ritualizing which began to mani-
fest itself in the third century and would gain momentum in the fourth century 
when the stratified church model developed and became prominent.
4.4 The Stratified Church Model and Christian Ritualizing of the 
Sacrifice Metaphor
It is impossible to chart the use of sacrificial motifs in fourth century Christian 
literature, which is much more extensive than that of the first three centuries. 
I shall limit myself to two developments which reveal a marked difference with 
the preceding period.
In the first place, although persecutions of Christians had become past 
events, the stories about martyrs and their heroic deeds remained an important 
part of the collective Christian memory. Accounts of martyrdom proliferated.27 
The endurance and the courage of the martyrs, the often gruesome tortures 
and the excruciating pains they underwent, as well as the savagery of their 
persecutors, continued to supply material for sermons and to stimulate the 
imagination of the preachers and their audience. Apart from the huge produc-
tion of narrative sources, mention should be made of another phenomenon 
in connection with it: The rapid development of the cult of the martyrs from 
the middle of the fourth century onward. This involved the veneration of their 
dead bodies and their tombs, the transportation of their bones and other relics 
to churches, the foundation of special shrines which attracted large groups of 
people, and the institution of yearly commemorations.28
At the same time, traditions about martyrs and martyrdoms began fulfilling 
other functions than in the first three centuries. As long as there was a serious 
risk of persecution, one of the effects of the passion narratives was that they 
confronted the Christians with the possibility of martyrdom and encouraged 
them to stand firm. Once that risk was over and the distance from the histori-
cal events grew, martyrs continued to serve as role models for Christians, but 
they did so in different ways. Their heroic lives and the intrepidity with which 
27   See Susan Ashbrook Harvey, “Martyr Passions and Hagiography,” in The Oxford Handbook 
of Early Christian Studies (ed. S. Ashbrook Harvey and D. Hunter; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 602–627 (604–607).
28   Cf. H. Delehaye, Les origines du culte des martyrs (Subsidia hagiographica 20; Bruxelles: 
Société des Bollandistes, 19332); Peter Brown, The Cult of the Saints. Its Rise and Function 
in Latin Christianity (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981). Cf. further Johan 
Leemans, “General Introduction,” in Let us die that we may live. Greek Homilies on Christian 
Martyrs from Asia Minor. Palestine and Syria (c. AD 35–AD 450) (eds J. Leemans, W. Mayer, 
P. Allen, and B. Dehandschutter; London/New York: Routledge, 2003), 3–52 (5–14).
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they had faced tortures and death were exploited by numerous homilists29 to 
warn fourth-century Christians against the risk of taking Christianity and its 
demands too easily. Essential to the transformation the narrative traditions 
concerning the martyrs underwent in the fourth century was a tendency to 
‘spiritualize’ the ideal of martyrdom. Martyrs were for instance viewed as 
models for ascetics, who were fighting against the passions and the tempta-
tions of demons.30 But they also could serve as examples for the ‘ordinary’ 
Christians who were exhorted by the homilists to lead virtuous lives and to 
train themselves for the battles they had to wage in their lives.31 The transfor-
mation of the ideal of martyrdom naturally had implications for the ways in 
which sacrificial motifs were interpreted in sources dealing with martyrs.32 
In so far as sacrificial themes were considered as metaphors of martyrdom, 
they were indirectly affected by the spiritualizing tendencies the ideal of 
martyrdom itself underwent. They became metaphors of the virtues with 
which this ideal was associated.
A second and even more remarkable phenomenon which should be men-
tioned in this connection is the growing impact that the sacrificial metaphor 
had on the interpretation and especially on the gradual ritualizing of the 
Eucharist. Two ritual developments are of crucial importance: On the one hand 
the ritualizing of the preparation of bread and wine and, on the other, the ten-
dency to consider the Last Supper as the model and archetype of the Eucharist 
29   See for selections of interesting homilies and other sources connected with the cult of 
the martyrs and dating from the middle of the fourth century: Leemans et al., Let us die; 
see also St. John Chrysostom. The Cult of the Saints. Select homilies and letters introduced, 
translated, and annotated by Wendy Mayer with Brown Neil (Popular Patristic Series; New 
York: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 2006).
30   See Edward Malone, The Monk and the Martyr: The Monk as the Successor of the Martyr 
(Catholic University of America Studies in Christian Antiquity 12; Washington DC.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1950).
31   Cf. the article I have written about three homilies (of Gregorius of Nazianzus, John 
Chrysostom, and Augustine) dealing with the Maccabean Martyrs: “The Emergence of 
the Cult of the Maccabean Martyrs in Late Antique Christianity” in More than a Memory. 
The Discourse of Martyrdom and the Construction of Christian Identity in the History 
of Christianity (ed. J. Leemans; Leuven-Paris-Dudley: Peeters, 2005), 81–96. Cf. also: 
Raphaëlle Ziadé, Les martyrs Maccabées: de l’histoire juive au culte chrétien (Supplements 
to Vigiliae Christianae 80; Leiden-Boston: Brill 2007), 258–288.
32   Sacrificial themes appear in several fourth- and fifth-century martyr homilies. I limit 
myself to some examples: Basil of Caesarea’s Homily on the Forty Martyrs of Sebaste, ch. 6 
(PG 31, 508–526; Leemans, Let us die, 68–76 (73); Gregory of Nazianzus, Homily 15 on the 
Maccabean Martyrs (PG 35, 912–933; French translation: Ziadé, Les martyrs Maccabées, 
301–311).
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(a phenomenon which we also encountered in the writings of Cyprian). The 
preparation of bread and wine at the beginning of the Eucharist is more and 
more explicitly considered to be an offering (brought by the faithful or the dea-
cons) and often takes the character of an (offering) procession.33 Almost every-
where, the growing emphasis on the commemoration of the sacrificial death 
of Christ resulted in – and at the same time was further strengthened by – 
the insertion of the institution narrative.34 As a result of both developments 
greater prominence was given to the sacrificial character of the Eucharist.
5 Conclusion
Let me take stock of the foregoing observations about the function of the sacri-
ficial metaphor in the three types of community in relation to the social struc-
tures that were characteristic of these communities, especially their group and 
grid dimensions. My overall impression is that there exists a notable congru-
ence between these two factors.
1. The first two groups have a negative attitude in common towards the sac-
rificial rituals of both Judaism and the Roman Hellenistic world. Moreover, 
insofar as they were familiar with Christian rituals, these were rarely described 
in sacrificial terms. Obviously, there is a relationship between the rejection of 
the sacrificial rituals, especially those of the Jewish Temple, and the fact that 
early Christian communities tried to distinguish themselves from Judaism. 
Moreover, sacrificial motifs were only rarely associated with early Christian 
rituals because these rituals had hardly come into development. Still, the rejec-
tion of the Temple cult and of rituals fits in remarkably well with the ways 
in which the communities were structured, in particular with the weakness 
of the grid dimension in both types. The reason why the Gnostic groups in 
general were more fiercely anti-ritualistic than most other communities may 
33   See for the Byzantine tradition, Robert Taft, The Great Entrance. A History of the Transfer 
of Gifts and other Pre-anaphoral Rites of the Liturgy of St. John Chrysostom (Orientalia 
Christiana Analecta 200; Roma: Pontificium Institutum Orientalium Studiorum, 1978); 
see for the Roman tradition: Josef Jungmann, Missarum sollemnia, II, (Wien: Verlag 
Herder, 19523), 3–125 (3–34). Cf. for a comparison between Eastern and Western liturgi-
cal traditions: Gerard Rouwhorst, “The preparation of the gifts in the eucharistic liturgy,” 
Jaarboek voor liturgie-onderzoek, 17 (2001), 213–236 (221–227).
34   See for instance Baldovin, “The Empire baptized,” 98–105.
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be that not only the grid, but also the group dimension was weakly developed 
here, whereas it was very strong in the other communities.
2. The first two types differ most explicitly with regard to their attitude 
towards martyrdom, in spite of the fact that both were faced with it. I would 
suggest that this difference is closely connected with the strength of the group 
dimension in the first category and the weakness of it in the second. In case 
of external threat and persecution, strong group solidarity may strengthen 
the willingness to sacrifice one’s life for God or a higher purpose (and also 
for the sake of the ‘holy’ community), whereas a loosely knit community 
of spiritual searchers, which emphasizes the importance of finding one’s 
own spiritual path, will question the relevance of this ideal, or even ridicule it.
3. The spiritualizing of the ideal of martyrdom, which appears to be typical 
of stratified fourth-century churches, accords well with a community which is 
no longer threatened by persecution and begins feeling more at ease in society.
4. The fact that in these increasingly large-scale and stratified churches sac-
rificial notions are more frequently and explicitly applied to Christian rituals is 
first of all due to the spectacular growth of rituals in the fourth century, which 
stimulated the use of ritual terminology in general and sacrificial terminol-
ogy in particular. This phenomenon, for its part, is closely related to the fact 
that fourth-century church communities became larger and were forced to 
strengthen their grid dimension.
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Ritual Slaughter, Religious Plurality and the 
Secularization of Dutch Society (1919–2011)
Bart Wallet
1 Introduction
In most religious traditions food plays a significant role, both in the sacral and 
profane spheres of life. On the one hand, culinary traditions are interwoven 
with the celebration of religious festivals, while on the other hand dietary laws 
impact daily considerations concerning food. Throughout the centuries, food 
has functioned as an important identity marker for religious traditions, defin-
ing the borders between those who adhere to a certain tradition and those 
who do not.1 What people eat and drink, and how they do so, functions as 
an expression of their identity. As Feuerbach has pointedly summarized this 
insight: „Der Mensch ist, was er ißt“.2
The practices of ritual slaughter in Judaism and Islam, as part of their respec-
tive dietary laws, can likewise be considered expressions of religious identity.3 
Both textual and oral traditions, or, more specifically, mimetic traditions, have 
defined how animals should be slaughtered so as to be acceptable for human 
consumption. The detailed ways in which religious sources have addressed 
the slaughter of animals is an indication of how these two religious traditions 
intercede in daily life. One should be wary of reducing religion to a doctrine 
about the relation between God (or gods) and the world, or to a specific type 
of spirituality, for such reductions risk overlooking the importance of rituals 
and practices performed by the faithful. Religious practices, well-defined and 
precisely fulfilled, are expressions of the system of symbols that a particular 
religious tradition defines.4
1   David M. Freidenreich, Foreigners and Their Food. Constructing Otherness in Jewish, Christian, 
and Islamic Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).
2   Ludwig Feuerbach, „Das Geheimnis des Opfers oder Der Mensch ist, was er ißt (1862),“ 
in Gesammelte Werke 11 (ed. C. H. Beck; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1972), 26–52.
3   Jordan D. Rosenblum, Food and Identity in Early Rabbinic Judaism (Cambridge etc.: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 77–84, 154–157.
4   Michael L. Satlow, “Defining Judaism. Accounting for ‘Religions’ in the Study of Religion,” 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74 (2006): 837–860.
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These religious practices are especially challenged by modernity. They were 
thought to represent the supposed irrational alterity and were thus consid-
ered expressions of the anachronistic grounding of certain religious tradi-
tions. Many progressive eighteenth- and nineteenth-century intellectuals held 
Judaism in particular to be an anachronism in the modern era.5 Judaism’s 
associated practices, not least ritual slaughter, were consequently considered 
outdated and overdue for dissolution. Moreover, the social implications of 
Jewish dietary laws became increasingly debated and contested, especially 
provisions and restrictions which, in making it all but impossible for practic-
ing Jews to eat with non-Jews, resulted in partial social segregation.6
Ritual slaughter thus became both a test case for how modern societies 
contend with what are often considered socially deviant religious practices, 
and a challenge for the accepted range of tolerance. As I will demonstrate in 
this article, the ways in which ritual slaughter was or was not tolerated were 
an expression of the arrangement of religion in society. Changing ideological 
and political views of the role of religion, and consequently of attitudes towards 
religious minorities, immediately influenced the status of ritual slaughter. 
I will concentrate on one case study: The treatment of ritual slaughter in 
Dutch society from the start of the twentieth century until the more recent 
debates in 2011.
2  Growing Regulation and a Concern for Hygiene
From the sixteenth century onward, the Dutch Republic became home to two 
distinct Jewish communities. Sephardim, known as Portuguese Jews, came 
and settled primarily in the cities of the province of Holland. They were joined 
somewhat later by Ashkenazim, from the German countries and from Poland. 
Both communities displayed a strongly urbanized settlement pattern, but the 
Ashkenazim were present in more cities and towns than were the Sephardim. 
For all of them, however, the practice of shechita was of crucial importance, as 
without kosher food it would have been impossible to settle. The settlement 
history of Dutch Jewry thus followed a recognizable pattern until well into the 
nineteenth century: First, a kosher butcher, who functioned also as a shochet 
5   Victor Kal, De joodse religie in de modern wijsbegeerte. Van Spinoza tot Derrida (Kampen: 
Agora, 2000).
6   Michael L. Satlow, Creating Judaism: History, Tradition, Practice (New York etc.: Columbia 
University Press, 2006), 168–170.
 �49Ritual Slaughter, Religious Plurality and the Secularization
(ritual slaughterer), would settle in a particular place; other Jewish immigrants 
would join him there.
There existed no national regulation for ritual slaughter until the first half 
of the twentieth century. Local authorities, in having to regulate Jewish obli-
gations of shechita, realized that without such permission Jews would be 
unable to be part of Dutch society. Jewish communities in the larger cities were 
therefore permitted to have their own ‘meat halls’, where they could slaughter 
animals according to halakhic requirements. In Amsterdam, there were two 
Jewish ‘meat halls’ – one for the Sephardim, another for the Ashkenazim – 
each performing sheḥita according to the relevant tradition.7 In other cities, 
Jews were allowed to rent part of the general ‘meat hall’; in smaller towns and 
villages Jewish butchers slaughtered at their own properties.
Two developments in society and national politics caused the subject of 
ritual slaughter to appear on the agenda of politicians and intellectuals. The 
first development stemmed from a growing regularization of society during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As an expanding and increas-
ingly effective bureaucracy extended its reach over society, it came to include 
domains which had previously been unregulated or were dealt with locally.8 
The meat industry, ranging from butchers to abattoirs, was one of the many 
domains that became subjected to governmental regulations for the first time.
Second, a growing concern for hygiene stimulated political debate about 
the status of ritual slaughter. Especially after Pasteur’s discoveries relating to 
bacteria, authorities began to realize the importance of regulations that would 
prevent the spread of diseases, promote hygiene and educate citizens about 
healthier lifestyles. Measures ranging from the construction of sanitary  sewers 
and water supply systems to the creation of public parks were undertaken. 
A number of regulations were issued to guarantee the quality of the citizens’ 
daily food. In Amsterdam, the Portuguese Jew and medical doctor Samuel 
Sarphati played a major role in the growing attention for hygiene.9
Under influence of these two developments, a discussion rose about the 
practice of shechita and other slaughter methods. Initially, the Jewish method, 
in which an artery of an unstunned animal is cut in a single continuous 
7   Arend H. Huussen, “The Legal Position of the Jews in the Dutch Republic c. 1590–1796,” in 
Dutch Jewry: Its History and Secular Culture (1500–2000) (eds J. Israel and R. Salverda; Leiden: 
Brill, 2002), 25–42.
8   Hans Knippenberg and Ben de Pater, De eenwording van Nederland. Schaalvergroting en 
integratie sinds 1800 (Nijmegen: SUN, 1988).
9   Eduard S. Houwaart, De hygiënisten. Artsen, staat & volksgezondheid in Nederland 1840–1890 
(Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij, 1991).
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 movement with a sharp, unserrated knife, could reckon on a sizable degree of 
general sympathy, even beyond the Jewish community. It was considered to be 
more hygienic than other methods, and in 1896 the Minister of War ordered 
that the Jewish method be used in all military abattoirs. The decision was 
reconfirmed in 1905.10 The decree may have been partially inspired by a desire 
for convenience, as it would permit all soldiers – Christians and Jews alike – to 
eat the same kinds of meat, but undoubtedly it expressed also the idea that the 
shechita was a sound method of slaughter.
However, the generally accepted position of ritual slaughter became 
complicated by the rise of animal rights movements. Activists argued that 
shechita was a practice which unnecessarily harmed animals, a complaint 
that gained power by the introduction of new methods for stunning animals 
during slaughter. Such opposition was reinforced by the new status of science 
in society. Scientific discoveries had a huge impact on people’s outlook upon 
the world and were considered a demonstration of the gradual progression 
of Western civilization.11 Hegelian philosophies further strengthened these 
common ideas. Moreover, scientific research and practices were commonly 
placed in opposition to traditional practices. Ritual slaughter, for example, 
was labeled a traditional, pre-scientific practice, which, like other pre-modern 
slaughtering methods, should be forbidden. The rise of modern anti-Semitism 
complemented the series of arguments against shechita: Jews were described 
as alien elements and ‘dangerous bacteria’ infecting the body of society, and 
their slaughtering method was held to be clear evidence of this. The language 
with which ritual slaughter was attacked – it was branded ‘medieval’, ‘barbaric’ 
and ‘bloody’ – bears witness to anti-Semitic images of Judaism.
3 Ritual Slaughter in a Religiously Segmented Society, 1919–1945
Despite criticism from animal rights movements and the new role of science in 
society, shechita was not forbidden by the first Dutch law to regulate slaughter-
ing practices. In 1919, the parliament voted in favor of a Meat Inspection Act, 
which was effectuated by Royal Decree in 1920. This law is a clear manifesta-
tion of the growing tendencies towards increased regulation and concern for 
10   S. L. v. d. Geest, “Ritueele slachtwijze of bij den Christen-slager de halssnede,” Nieuw 
Israëlietisch Weekblad, October 7, 1910.
11   Solange Leibovici, “Zuiverheid als utopie. De foute kinderen van Pasteur,” in De hang 
naar zuiverheid. De cultuur van het moderne Europa (eds R. van der Laarse, A. Labrie, and 
W. Melching; Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1998), 85–122.
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hygiene. Indeed, the objective of the Meat Inspection Act was not the well-
being of animals, as the then marginal animal rights movements would have 
wished, but the health of Dutch consumers. The act contained a number of 
measures to improve quality standards, and introduced control mechanisms 
to guarantee Dutch consumers the best meat possible.
Ritual slaughter was permitted under the Meat Inspection Act, but only 
as an exception. As the prescribed standard method of slaughter included 
stunning – which, according to the rabbinic experts, was halakhically 
unacceptable – the Act included three possible exceptions: Home slaughter, 
emergency slaughter and Jewish ritual slaughter. The shechita nonetheless 
was still regulated, and only butchers and shokhatim who were accepted by 
the Dutch rabbinic authorities were allowed to perform ritual slaughters. The 
Dutch law thus accepted rabbinic authority on this particular subject and inte-
grated it into the system of regulation and control. The Dutch state, inspectors 
and abattoir directors were given control over the general aspects of compe-
tence, hygiene and quality of Jewish butchers, but had to abstain from official 
opinions on the act of ritual slaughter itself. The liberal principle which states 
that the government is not knowledgeable in sacra was thus upheld.12
The Jewish community was somewhat disappointed by the 1919 act. 
Spokesmen declared that they would have preferred an equal status of stan-
dard and ritual slaughter, as they considered a well-performed shechita at least 
just as good as stunned slaughter. However, the acceptance of Jewish ritual 
slaughter in the Netherlands, in a period of history when other countries 
were putting an end to it, should be interpreted from the broader perspective 
of how Dutch society dealt with religious diversity. After the introduction of 
universal suffrage in 1917, a development that had begun in the last half of the 
nineteenth century now became unmistakably clear: The Netherlands, rather 
than being an enlightened Protestant nation, as leading intellectuals and 
politicians in the nineteenth century had preferred to see the Netherlands, 
was in fact deeply segmented into various minority groups. No group, whether 
Catholics, Reformed Protestants, liberals or socialists, had a demographic and 
political majority. The only way in which Dutch politics and society could func-
tion was by cooperation between various minority groups.
The specific program for dealing with religious and ideological diversity in 
Dutch society until the 1960s has become known as the ‘pillarization model’.13 
12   Vleeschkeuringswet (1919); “Het ritueele slachten. De praktijk van de Rijkswet,” Het 
Vaderland, December 14, 1922.
13   Arend Lijphart, Verzuiling, pacificatie en kentering in de Nederlandse politiek (Amsterdam: 
De Bussy, 1968).
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Recent debate has rightly questioned various aspects of the standard interpre-
tation of this model, and modified the thesis in such a way that we are able 
to better distinguish between weak and strong communities.14 Yet it is clear 
that the rationale behind much of Dutch politics during this era was directed 
by the idea that society consisted of various communities, each of which 
should be given freedom to express itself publicly. Thus, the Jewish commu-
nity, although in many aspects a weak community without a large, extended 
‘pillarized’ infrastructure, was permitted to maintain religious practices that 
were crucial to it. The acceptance of shechita, from the broader perspective 
of Dutch religion policies, was but one example of the state accommodating 
religious diversity within society.
However, the Meat Inspection Act did not prevent increasing criticism 
being directed at shechita in Dutch society from the end of the 1920s and 
the beginning of the 1930s. Such criticism came from two parties, both of 
which were small in number and not in a position of notable political and 
societal influence. The first group of critics were freethinkers who, from an anti- 
religious agenda, objected to religious rites in general, and thus fiercely 
attacked ritual slaughter.15 The second group were animal rights movements, 
whose criticism of shechita was a continuation in their struggle for better 
treatment of animals.16
The protests were stimulated in part by new methods of stunned slaughter-
ing, such as electric stunning, that had been proposed by scientists. Opponents 
of ritual slaughter sought to convince rabbinic authorities to accept this 
new method as halakhically viable.17 International politics also empowered 
Dutch opponents of shechita: As part of dissimilation politics throughout 
Central and Eastern Europe, ritual slaughter was targeted as being barbaric, 
bloody and obsolete. With the Nazis’ rise to power in Germany, Jewish ritual 
slaughter was soon forbidden, in a move that garnered political support even 
from non-Nazi parties, such as the social democrats.
The influence of the German situation was easily discernible in the Dutch 
debate. For example, Dutch animal rights activists sent a letter of support 
14   Peter van Dam, Staat van verzuiling. Over een Nederlandse mythe (Amsterdam: Wereld-
bibliotheek, 2011).
15   “Een geconcentreerde aanval, Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad, May 18, 1928.
16   Such as Amor et Justitia, Sofiavereeniging tot bescherming van dieren.
17   W. H. Boomgaard, “Nieuwe bedwelmingswijze voor slachtvee,” (“New method of stun-
ning”; article reprinted from Correspondentieblad van de Geldersche vereeniging voor 
dierenbescherming. Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad, July 26, 1929).
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to Hitler, congratulating the Nazi Führer on his animal-friendly policies.18 
In marked contrast, the liberal Jewish politician I. H. J. Vos at one point tried 
to woe Jewish voters by placing an advertisement in a Jewish weekly that 
stated that Jewish interests, such as ritual slaughter, were apparently not safe 
with social democrats.19 The main Jewish social democrat, however, Henri 
Polak, was outraged by Dutch animal rights activists and their attempts to 
garner domestic political leverage from the German situation. Polak argued 
that Germany had in fact become one great torture room for Hitler’s political 
opponents and for Jews, and that animal rights activists, rather than protesting 
against these criminal acts against humans, were lauding Hitler for his love for 
animals instead.20
As long as Dutch politics were organized according to the ‘pillarization 
model’, prohibition of shechita stood no chance of being enacted. In this 
respect, the World War II was in fact an interruption of Dutch policies towards 
ritual slaughter. After the German occupation of the Netherlands, the second 
anti-Jewish measure – issued on July 31, 1940 – was a ban on unstunned slaugh-
ter practices.21 Given the exceptional circumstances, the Dutch chief rabbis 
opted to make a temporary exception and accept electric stunning as part 
of the shechita. This lenient decision may have been inspired by concerns 
for the health of Dutch Jews, the wish to secure jobs in the kosher food indus-
try, the impossibility of importing unstunned kosher meat, and by fear that 
Dutch Jews might otherwise start using non-kosher meat.
4 Ritual Slaughter in Post-War Netherlands, 1945–1970
Immediately after the war there were discussions among those involved 
in reconstructing Jewish community life about whether the authorities 
should be explicitly asked for permission for resuming unstunned shechita.22 
It was decided not to make such a request, however, as it was feared that the 
18   J. van Hessen, “Een telegram aan den Duitschen Rijkskanselier,” Het Vaderland, August 23, 
1933; “Het telegram aan den Rijkskanselier,” August 30, 1933.
19   Advertisement in Nieuw Israëlietisch Weekblad April 21, 1933.
20   Henri Polak, “De groote folterkamer,” (article reprinted from Het Volk. Nieuw Israëlietisch 
Weekblad September 20, 1933).
21   Leeuwarder Courant August 27, 1940; September 4, 1940.
22   The next paragraphs are chiefly based on: Bart Wallet, “In het land van dierenvrienden. 
Kleine geschiedenis van de rituele slacht,” (“In the land of animal friends; a small history 
of ritual slaughter”) Letter & Geest, Trouw, May 14, 2011.
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 authorities would not grant permission.23 In line with the general policy of 
the Dutch government-in-exile, those working to rebuild the Jewish commu-
nity considered the anti-Jewish measures, like all other German laws imposed 
during the occupation, to have been revoked. The Netherlands, in general, 
returned to its juridical status of May 10, 1940.24 Ritual slaughter resumed, first 
in Amsterdam and later elsewhere.
The war years, however, left traces. The animal rights movement soon 
demanded that the German measure relating to ritual slaughter not be 
lifted, and some local politicians – like the mayor of Winterswijk – refused to 
sanction shechita. As research has shown, Nazi propaganda caused a rise in 
anti-Semitic opinions in Dutch society in the immediate post-war period, and 
this was apparent when the issue of ritual slaughter was addressed again. In 
Dutch politics, however, those who wished to return to pre-war ‘pillarization’ 
policies prevailed over those who now advocated a new, united and more 
uniform society. This also meant that the practice of ritual slaughter was 
permitted again, as it was accepted as a religious act of an acknowledged reli-
gious community in Dutch society.
Other things changed, however. Dutch politicians, seemingly  indifferent 
to the exceptional causes underlying the Jewish community’s decline, noted 
that the community had become significantly smaller than it had been 
before the war. Therefore, they reasoned, the law permitting shechita needed 
to be adapted to the new situation, and they introduced two new elements 
into the Meat Inspection Act. First, from January 1, 1949, shechita was no 
longer permitted everywhere in the Netherlands, but only in official abattoirs 
in a few selected places: Almelo, Amersfoort, Amsterdam, Arnhem, Deventer, 
Eindhoven, Enschede, The Hague, ’s-Hertogenbosch, Utrecht, Winterswijk 
and Zwolle. Jewish butchers in smaller places, like Steenwijk, who had only 
recently resumed business, were hurt by this decision and now had to choose 
either to quit the business entirely or to become non-kosher. The second new 
element was the introduction of a criterion of need. Whereas before the war 
the Jewish butchers had also served a sizable non-Jewish clientele, from now 
on ritual slaughter would only be permitted per the need of the local Jewish 
23   Bart Wallet, “Kosjer Amsterdam. Voedsel, identiteit en samenleving,” in Sjehechejanoe. Die 
ons heeft laten leven. Geschiedenis van de Joodse Gemeente Amsterdam [NIHS] van 1945 tot 
2010 (eds B. Wallet, P. van Trigt, and H. Polak; Amsterdam: NIHS, 2011), 142–166.
24   More detailed in Koninklijk Besluit Bezettingsmaatregelen van den 17 Sept. 1944 (Goes: 
Gebr. Siepman, 1944).
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community. The number of Jews in a given area thus dictated the local quota 
for kosher meat.25
While ritual slaughter was thus again permitted, albeit only for consump-
tion by the Jewish community, a completely new phenomenon now elicited 
renewed public debate on the issue: Ritual slaughtering for export purposes. 
From the middle of the twentieth century, the kosher food market had become 
increasingly international, thanks to new methods for preserving food for 
longer periods.26 Dutch firms, wishing to profit from this development, now 
sought to export kosher meat to other countries. After the State of Israel was 
recognized by the Dutch government, in 1949, immediately the question 
arose whether exports of kosher meat to the new Jewish state were permitted. 
In Israel there was a tremendous need for kosher meat, which the country’s 
domestic meat production could not meet. The Dutch Ministry of Agriculture 
initially took a negative position on the issue, and objected to permitting ritual 
slaughtering for export purposes; the Foreign Ministry, however, was much in 
favor. After intense debate, economic motives emerged as the decisive factor. 
Export of kosher meat was permitted to two categories of countries: First, to 
countries where local production could not answer demand (read: Israel); and 
second, to countries where ritual slaughter was forbidden (the primary such 
country being Switzerland).
In post-war Netherlands, most political parties were willing to accept the 
Jewish minority and its religious practices, albeit within a new, smaller domain. 
Such willingness was generally based on the view that in the Netherlands Jews, 
just as Protestants and Catholics, enjoyed freedom of religion and should be 
permitted to express their faith publicly. Opposition in parliament was voiced 
only by the small, radical and conservative Reformed Protestant SGP party, 
which rejected the ‘pillarization model’ on the grounds that it legitimized 
religious plurality. The SGP strived for a theocracy, in which the Netherlands 
would have a Reformed Protestant character. In their opinion, ritual slaughter 
should therefore no longer be tolerated, and in 1966, SGP Member of Parliament 
C. N. van Dis demanded that the “horrible suffering of these animals” should 
end. Moreover, according to Van Dis, ritual slaughter was not prescribed in 
25   Kamerstuk Eerste Kamer 1948–1949, nr. 1000 XII, ondernummer 1000, Rijksbegroting 1949 
(Sociale Zaken).
26   Etan Diamond, And I Will Dwell in Their Midst. Orthodox Jews in Suburbia (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 114, 138–139.
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biblical Mosaic law, and thus must have been from later Jewish tradition – 
which he, from his own religious perspective, did not accept as authoritative.27
5 Ritual Slaughter and Multiculturalism, 1970–2000
The increasing number of Islamic migrant workers, who later became ‘new 
Dutchmen’, altered the debate on ritual slaughter in Dutch society signifi-
cantly. The Dutch law, thus far, had only permitted ritual slaughter accord-
ing to the ‘Israelite rites’ – as defined and controlled by the rabbinate. Ritual 
slaughter performed according to Islamic rites, so as to obtain halal meat, was 
still prohibited. In a debate on a measure to advocate the rights of the migrant 
workers in 1966, Member of Parliament for the social democrats (PvdA), S. van 
der Ploeg, demanded to know from State Secretary Bartels if there was need to 
include ‘Islamic rites’ in the law as well.28 After consulting representatives of 
the Islamic community, Bartels assured Van der Ploeg that it was unneces-
sary to change the law. What Bartels did not realize, however, was that he had 
spoken with leaders of the small and relatively progressive Ahmadiyya 
Muslims, who in no way represented the vast majority of Muslims who had 
settled in the Netherlands.29
Many Muslims, despite the prohibition, chose to slaughter clandestinely, 
especially on the occasion of Eid al-Adha’ (Festival of Sacrifice). This generated 
problems in society and resulted in police interventions. For instance, in 1969, 
police had to rescue three Moroccan migrant workers after they were attacked 
by local residents who were outraged at their wish to ritually slaughter a goat. 
Politicians and employers realized that they had to take some action30 and 
that, in order to create an attractive employment atmosphere for the much 
27   Aanhangsel Tweede Kamer 1965–1966 nummer 512, 973; C. N. van Dis, “Vragen inzake ritueel 
slachten,” De Banier, June 9, 1966; C. N. van Dis, “Beantwoording van de vragen inzake het 
rituele slachten,” De Banier, June 16, 1966.
28   Aanhangsel Tweede Kamer 1965–1966 nr. 419, vragen heer Van der Ploeg (PvdA) in verband 
met bezwaren Marokkanen tegen nuttigen vlees slachtdieren, January 25, 1965; Antwoord 
staatssecretaris Bartels, April 26, 1966.
29   W. A. Shadid and Pieter S. van Koningsveld, “Legal Adjustments for Religious Minorities. 
The Case of the Ritual Slaughtering of Animals,” in Islam in Dutch Society: Current 
Developments and Future Prospects (eds Wasif A. Shadid and P. S. van Koningsveld; 
Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1992), 2–25.
30   “Ritueel slachten wekt woede Haagse woonwijk,” Leeuwarder Courant, December 8, 1969.
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needed migrant workers, rituals dear to them should be accepted.31 In 1975, 
the Minister of Culture, Recreation and Social Work gave a special dispensation 
for Islamic ritual slaughter, especially when it was intended for Eid al-Adha’.32
In order to end continuing clandestine slaughtering, and because of the 
juridical inequality as compared to the Jewish community, slaughtering accord-
ing to the “Islamic rites” was finally legally accepted in 1977. Regulations for the 
Islamic rites were copied from the Jewish example, although comparable orga-
nizational structures, skilled professionals and detailed regulations were still 
lacking.33 Since 1977, Jewish and Islamic ritual slaughter in the Netherlands 
have been closely connected. Despite considerable differences between the 
practices, together they constitute legal ‘ritual slaughter’ in Dutch society. 
The demographic growth of the Islamic minority has resulted in continuing 
attention to ritual slaughter in the public debate.34
The cultural revolution of the 1960s had meanwhile changed the politi-
cal climate significantly. The ‘pillarized’ ideology became discredited, and 
was replaced by a progressive understanding of the Netherlands as a guid-
ing nation, where discrimination such as had been seen during the war years 
would never happen again. According to this perspective, ethnic and religious 
minorities (like the Jewish and Islamic communities) should be accepted and 
allowed to develop according to their own cultural codes and convictions. Thus 
the idea of the multicultural society was born. Progressive parties in particu-
lar, like the social democratic PvdA, D66, and PPR, used multiculturalism as 
their main prism in approaching the topic of ritual slaughter. From the begin-
ning of the 1980s until the mid-1990s expansion of European institutions and 
regulations made it necessary to debate the topic in parliament. For the PvdA, 
ritual slaughter became the test case for the new multicultural society. In 1984, 
Member of Parliament Flip Buurmeijer advocated the view that integration 
meant a process of mutual adjustment and therefore Dutch society had to give 
minorities ample opportunity “to experience their own identity”.35
31   Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1969–1970, nr. 10504, ondernummer 4, Nota buitenlandse 
werknemers.
32   “Moslims in ons land mogen ritueel slachten,” Nieuwsblad van het Noorden, November 29, 
1975.
33   Kamerstuk Tweede Kamer 1982–1983, nr. 17011, ondernummer 9, Europees Verdrag inzake 
slachtdieren; Memorie van Antwoord, July 18, 1983.
34   Iz.M. de Klerk, “Ritueel slachten. Niet alleen gevoelig voor de dieren,” typoscript, 
January 19, 1985.
35   Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1983–1984, Bijzondere Commissie voor het Minderhedenbeleid, 
Minderhedennota, February 6, 1984.
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The prevailing political opinion on ritual slaughter was voiced by Prime 
Minister Wim Kok during a political debate in parliament in 1999: “These are 
changes that render justice to the developing multicultural society. Rules 
are adjusted to do justice the normative convictions of newcomers”. The Dutch 
regulated approach to ritual slaughter, in abattoirs and with strict rules, was 
even regarded as an export product by the “guiding nation”.36 The Second 
Chamber demanded, in 1993, that the Minister defend the Dutch approach 
within the EU. Although the Ministry of Agriculture, while for the moment not 
addressing ritual slaughter for domestic purposes, sought several times to end 
the allowance for export, a parliamentary majority did not agree: The liberty of 
religion should be defended, especially towards countries that defied it, such 
as Switzerland.37
During this period, criticisms of ritual slaughter were voiced especially 
by those political parties that rejected the idea of multiculturalism. ‘Boer’ 
Koekoek, Member of Parliament for the right-wing populist Farmers’ Party, 
in 1976 decried “murdering animals with knifes, axes, hammers and sledges 
without any stunning”. The Secretary of State rejected this description of ritual 
slaughter and made clear that the Dutch government guaranteed minorities’ 
rights.38 The small Protestant parties – SGP, GPV, and RPF – also voiced a criti-
cal viewpoint towards ritual slaughter. For them, multiculturalism entailed a 
further step away from their vision of a Protestant nation, and they therefore 
tended to be critical of any measure that appeared to further anchor Islam in 
Dutch society.39
36   Cited after: Tetty Havinga, “Ritueel slachten. Spanning tussen religieuze tolerantie en 
dierenbescherming,” in Migratierecht en rechtssociologie, gebundeld in Kees’ studies 
(eds A. Böcker et al.; Nijmegen: Centrum voor Migratierecht en Instituut voor Rechts-
sociologie Radboud Universiteit, 2008), 211–220.
37   See e.g. Aanhangsel Eerste Kamer 1984–1985 nr. 40, vragen van de heren Van Bemmel (VVD) 
en Hofman (VVD) inzake ontheffingsbeleid voor export van vlees van ritueel geslachte die-
ren, April 15, 1985; Antwoord staatssecretaris Van der Ploeg, May 17, 1985.
38   Aanhangsel Tweede Kamer 1976–1977 nr. 714, vragen van de heer Koekoek (BP) inzake rit-
ueel slachten, December 30, 1976; Antwoord staatssecretaris Hendriks (Volksgezondheid en 
Milieuhygiëne) mede namens de Minister van Landbouw en Visserij, February 25, 1977.
39   Aanhangsel Tweede Kamer 1980–1981 nr. 352, vragen van de heer Van Rossum (SGP) 
inzake ritueel slachten (October 14, 1980); Antwoord minister Ginjaar (Volksgezondheid 
en Milieuhygiëne) (December 11, 1980); Handelingen Tweede Kamer 9–10 February 
1983; Aanhangsel Tweede Kamer 1982–1983 nr. 1181, vragen van de heren Leerling (RPF ) 
en Wagenaar (RPF ) over ritueel slachten, June 17, 1983; Antwoord staatssecretaris Van 
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Their critical approach was, however, paled in comparison to the con-
sistent campaign against ritual slaughter waged by the extreme right-wing 
Centrumpartij. Their representative in parliament, Hans Janmaat, protested 
often against the “medieval torturing practices”. But his struggle was a lonely 
one, for, according to him, “[t]he politicians lie about so-called xenophobia, 
anti-Semitism, racism and, for new voters, are willing to cry with the most medi-
eval torturers”.40 While progressive Dutch people considered ritual slaughter 
to be a crown jewel of the new multicultural society, Janmaat regarded it as a 
symbol of the decline of Dutch society. Janmaat argued that a genuinely devel-
oped, industrialized country would forbid these primitive religious practices.41
6 Ritual Slaughter and the Search for a Secular Dutch Identity
During the twentieth century criticism against ritual slaughter in the Nether-
lands had nearly always come from relatively marginal groups in society. This 
changed rapidly, however, after 2000, when Dutch society was impacted by 
‘9/11’ and the so-called Fortuyn revolt. While 9/11 placed Islam on the interna-
tional agenda, Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn connected the subject of Islam to 
social conditions in impoverished city neighborhoods. He demanded uncom-
promising integration policies and qualified multiculturalism as a total fail-
ure. After Fortuyn was murdered, in 2002, major elements of his ideas were 
integrated into the programs of the main political parties, in an effort to resume 
control of the debate. Due to this intense debate, support for ritual slaughter 
quickly waned and the practice became for the first time seriously endangered.
In Dutch society there have been two continuous opponents of the practice 
of unstunned ritual slaughter. First, the animal rights movement, which has 
since the end of the nineteenth century consistently opposed ritual slaughter. 
In 2006, the movement booked a huge success with the entry into parliament 
of their Party of the Animals. For the first time the animal rights movement 
had a direct say in parliament and could thus influence political debates. 
der Reijden (WVZ) mede namens staatssecretaris Van Zeijl (Landbouw & Visserij), 
September 15, 1983.
40   “Medewerker Janmaat zoekt steun bij leden Ekologische Beweging,” (“Parliament mem-
ber Janmaat goes for Ecological Movement members’ support”) Leeuwarder Courant, 
February 11, 1983.
41   Handelingen Tweede Kamer 1983–1984, Bijzondere Commissie voor het Minderhedenbeleid. 
Minderhedennota (February 27, 1984).
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The Party of the Animals (PvdD) was successful in making animal rights a 
political issue in The Hague and made ritual slaughter the theme of its first 
private members’ bill.42
Second, small parties on the right side of the political spectrum had also 
been critical since 1945, mainly as an explicit rejection of the ideal of multi-
culturalism. After 2000, this position was carried on by the Fortuyn party 
(LPF) and the rightist populist PVV of Geert Wilders. Both parties, however, 
were significantly larger than the smaller right-wing parties that had preceded 
them. Moreover, both parties succeeded in entering the center of power, 
either within government or associated to the government via special con-
struction. The critical stance towards ritual slaughter was no longer voiced 
only at the margins of Dutch politics, but was for the first time expressed in 
governmental circles.
The main question, however, concerns the position of the other Dutch polit- 
ical parties. What made these parties, at least in the debates in the Dutch 
Second Chamber, change their positions? Once again, the broader politi-
cal stance towards religion in society provides a central clue. The debate on 
ritual slaughter became redefined, this time along religious versus secular lines. 
Until the 1990s, ritual slaughter was primarily considered a cultural expres-
sion of ethnic minorities. In the twenty-first century, however, ritual slaugh-
ter became increasingly regarded as a religious rite, as had been the situation 
before 1970. This resulted in a regrouping of Dutch politics. The small Christian 
parties, Christian Union and SGP, together with the larger Christian democrats 
(CDA) party, now became fierce defendants of ritual slaughter. These par-
ties regarded the public and political debate over ritual slaughter to be a new 
attack by secular parties on religious practices and they feared that this would 
develop into subsequent anti-religious policies. Their position was partly insti-
gated by the fact that the Christian parties for the first time in post-war Dutch 
history held no more than 28 seats in parliament.
Progressive parties regrouped as well. After multiculturalism was aban-
doned, even by most left and liberal parties, Dutch society began to question 
itself about what Dutch identity actually meant. If newcomers needed to inte-
grate into Dutch society, what values would they have to accept? Progressive 
parties answered the question by advocating a new, secular Dutch identity, 
whose core values were achievements of the 1960s, namely, rights for women 
and homosexuals as well as animal rights. Somewhat surprisingly, perhaps, 
is that in Dutch politics a broad consensus could be recognized over this 
42   “PvdD wil af van onverdoofde slacht,” (“PvdD want to get rid of unstunned slaughter”) 
Leeuwarder Courant, March 20, 2008.
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theme – from populist PVV to socialist SP. Ritual slaughter, from this perspec-
tive, was a strange and abhorrent religious practice, which did not belong in 
Dutch society.43
The private members’ bill presented by the Party of Animals’ representative 
Marianne Thieme passed the Second Chamber of Dutch parliament with an 
overwhelming secular majority, but failed to convince the Dutch Senate (or 
First Chamber). However, in this debate it was clear that multiculturalism was 
no longer the prism through which ritual slaughter was approached; the prism 
had become the reach of religious freedom in a predominantly secular society. 
Whereas the Second Chamber deemed ritual slaughter an outdated religious 
rite that could no longer be tolerated, the Senate decided that such an infringe-
ment of religious freedom – and thus citizens’ constitutional rights – could not 
be sanctioned.
7 Conclusion
The debate surrounding ritual slaughter in Dutch society is not just about a 
certain number – some thousands per year – of slaughtered animals, but is in 
fact tightly intertwined with the political debate about the place of religion 
in society. The history of this debate over the last hundred years thus offers a 
prism through which changing convictions can be traced. Three main conclu-
sions can be drawn from this debate.
First, the debate on ritual slaughter emerged in the context of concern 
about the hygiene of consumers, but gradually shifted to a context of animal 
rights and of changing moral convictions. Whereas in the first instance the 
consumers – Jewish and non-Jewish – had been pivotal, animals now became 
the central point of the debate. The first approach made it possible, for the 
sake of consumers, to make exceptions to the relevant laws; the second one 
complicates such exceptions significantly. Indeed, as some politicians argued, 
there should no longer be discrimination of animals with respect to how they 
are slaughtered, with some receiving a more ‘humane’ slaughter than others. 
Although juridically impossible, in the public debate animals changed from 
objects into subjects of lawmaking.
Second, the two subsequent arrangements of ‘pillarization’ and multicul-
turalism enabled politicians to accommodate religious and cultural  diversity 
43   A detailed analysis of the argumentation used by proponents and opponents of the prac-
tice of ritual slaughter is given in Bart Wallet, “Ritueel slachten en godsdienstvrijheid in 
een seculiere samenleving,” Religie & Samenleving 7 (2012): 166–183.
Wallet�6�
in society. Both models considered Dutch society to be fundamentally diverse 
and to include various minority groups, which had to cooperate and recip-
rocate in order to live together. While ‘pillarization’ had a predominantly 
religious approach – replaced by a cultural approach in the model of multi-
culturalism – ritual slaughter was accepted in both models as a crucial rite for 
Jews and Muslims. This insight raises the question whether multiculturalism 
in Dutch society was effectively nothing more than a transformation of the 
‘pillarization’ model. The abandonment of multiculturalism in the twenty-first 
century left Dutch society without a new model for accommodating diversity. 
The search for a new, secular Dutch majority identity, with the explicit goal 
of integrating minority groups and assimilating them into the majority Dutch 
social group, jeopardized the status of ritual slaughter. As a religious rite it was 
opposed by most of the secular majority, and only a fundamental debate in 
the Senate on the limits and extents of the constitutional freedom of religion 
could save ritual slaughter from being banned.
Third, ritual slaughter obtained various shifting symbolic functions in the 
respective arrangements of politics and religion. During ‘pillarization’ it was 
a symbol of acceptance of the Jewish minority, even though a small group 
rejected it as a supposed threat to the Protestant nature of the Dutch State. 
During multiculturalism supporters of ritual slaughter considered tolerance 
for the ritual to be a preeminent example of the acceptance of moral diversity 
in a multi-ethnic society, whereas opponents considered ritual slaughter to be 
a telling example of the failures of multiculturalism. In their opinion, multi-
culturalism was a form of cultural relativism, and they considered “Western 
civilization” to be more highly evolved than Islamic and Jewish traditions. 
Ritual slaughter has recently become a symbol in the confrontation between 
religious and secular articulations of Dutch identity. The first considers ritual 
slaughter to be a test case for the acceptance of religious rites in a secular 
society; the latter regards it as a symbol of religious ‘medievalism’. In terms of 
Kathryn McClymond’s analysis, one could state that various interpretations 
of ritual slaughter as sacrificial rite clashed: A reductionist one, in which ritual 
slaughter is essentially considered to be killing an animal, and a polythetic 
approach that recognizes the religious meanings attributed to the various 
stages of the slaughtering ritual.44
The Netherlands have not been the only country to debate ritual slaughter. 
Similar debates have been waged in various European countries, including in 
countries that have maintained their pre-war bans on ritual slaughter, such 
44   Kathryn McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence. A Comparative Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008) esp. the second chapter.
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as Switzerland, Sweden, Norway and Liechtenstein.45 Further research should 
establish in what respects the Dutch debate has been typical of the country and 
what elements were part of wider European developments. It is  nevertheless 
clear that clashing Enlightenment conceptions – constitutional freedom of 
religion on the one hand versus qualification of religious rites as anachronistic 
on the other – have left a legacy with which European politicians and other 
community leaders are still struggling in their efforts to address the issue of 
ritual slaughter.
45   Pablo Lerner and Alfredo Mordechai Rabello, “The Prohibition of Ritual Slaughtering 
(Kosher Sheḥita and Halal) and Freedom of Religion of Minorities,” Journal of Law and 
Religion 22 (2006–2007): 1–62.
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“Is it love again?”, said Voldemort, his snake’s face jeering. “Dumbledore’s 
favourite solution, love, which he claimed conquered death, though love 
did not stop him falling from the Tower and breaking like an old waxwork. 
Love, which did not prevent me stamping out your Mudblood mother like 
a cockroach, Potter – and nobody seems to love you enough to run for-
wards this time, and take my curse”.1
In Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, sacrifice is a predominant theme. 
Although there are differences – Harry Potter is but a fictive character, his sac-
rifice functions in a mythical, but not a religious setting – Joanne Rowling’s 
story has some striking similarities to the biblical story of Abraham and Isaac, 
and the Quranic story of Ibrahim and his son. The parallels between Harry’s 
sacrifice and the Passion cannot be missed either. The sacrifice of a son even 
turns into the sacrifice by a son in many re-readings of the Abraham-story. 
All are stories about the sacrifice of a son, and thereby shaping the identity 
of a community. Harry’s sacrifice will enable us to look into this theme more 
profoundly.
The main question of this article is: Is Harry’s action to be interpreted as a 
sacrifice, a self-sacrifice or as a gift? This, however, raises new questions, for 
example about the autonomy of the one being sacrificed, the necessity of vio-
lence commonly involved in sacrificial practices, and finally questions about 
the nature of self-sacrifice in a profane context. This article is structured 
accordingly and will consider 1. Harry being sacrificed; 2. Harry’s self-sacrifice; 
and a strangely combining variant I propose, 3. Harry’s life being given. I will 
compare the above-mentioned biblical sacrifices to the one Harry makes.
The meaning of the term ‘sacrifice’ is ambiguous. Claudia Welz differen-
tiates between a religious and a secularized meaning of the word sacrifice.2 
1   Joanne K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 36.
2   Claudia Welz, “Love as Gift and Self-Sacrifice,” in Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie 
und Religionsphilosophie 50 (Bd., 2008): 238–266.
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In its religious meaning it is an act of giving to God, which is motivated by the 
anticipation of receiving in return, as a successful communication with God. 
In its secularized meaning sacrifice implies deliberate loss and destruction, the 
renouncing or giving up of something valuable for the sake of a greater good. 
I define ‘self-sacrifice’ as the practice of offering one’s life to gain something 
more valuable, e.g. an eternal life in heaven. I will argue that, although Harry 
Potter at the close of the final book is prepared to give his life for his friends, 
in the process he paradoxically receives his life as a gift. Furthermore, I claim 
this gift has nothing to do with magic, but can be regarded as old-fashioned 
religious grace. Therefore, I define ‘gift’ used in the context of ‘sacrifice’ as the 
receiving back of the life that has been offered in self-sacrifice.
In this article no specific literary method is applied. I do not search for 
causal connections or inter-textual relations. According to Paul Ricoeur nar-
ratives offer a possible world and an opportunity for identification. In the fol-
lowing, the novels on Harry Potter are placed in a context of religious studies 
on sacrifice and its meanings. The question is if, and if so, how, an analysis of 
Harry Potter’s sacrifice can contribute to a philosophical-theological reflection 
on (self)sacrifice.
From the start it is clear that Harry Potter is in a privileged position, com-
parable to Abraham, who is called out of Ur, and Jesus who was announced 
by John the Baptist as a very special person. Harry is “the Chosen One”, who 
survived an assassination attempt by the evil wizard Voldemort. Therefore, 
Harry is destined to fight Voldemort and save the Hogwarts school community. 
Throughout the seven volumes of the Potter series, however, the reader gradu-
ally becomes aware that Harry cannot defeat Voldemort without laying down 
his own life. When, in the second part of the last book, Harry discovers this 
dilemma, he feels betrayed and used by the school’s headmaster Dumbledore. 
I will argue that the free choice Harry has to make regarding his being sacri-
ficed, forms a necessary condition for all acts of self-sacrifice. Furthermore, one 
wonders how Harry’s sacrifice can be interpreted. Is Harry’s self-sacrifice an act 
of violence against self in order to prevent violence against others, as Derrida 
states? Can Harry’s self-sacrifice be interpreted as an altruistic sacrifice instead 
of an egoistic one, in line with the difference Schiller suggested? I will argue: 
Neither. Harry’s self-sacrifice does not seem to be understandable adequately in 
terms of a sacrifice. Its meaning has to be re-phrased in terms of a gift.
1.1 Summary
For those who did not read the series: The main character, Harry Potter, is an 
orphan. His parents were killed by the evil wizard Tom Riddle, whose nickname 
is Lord Voldemort. One-year-old Harry survived the attack. Harry is left to stay 
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with his only remaining family: His uncle and aunt and their spoiled son. This 
family of muggles (non-wizards) mistreats the young Harry. The series starts 
when Harry is eleven years old and is invited to enter Hogwarts School of 
Witchcraft and Wizardry, the setting for most of the books. In each volume, 
Harry is one year older and the author J. K. Rowling introduces issues consis-
tent with Harry’s age at the time. During his first trip on the train to Hogwarts, 
Harry meets Ron and Hermione. They develop a strong friendship and then 
fight Voldemort, who is a constant threat to the happy Hogwarts society, 
together. The last volume, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, is completely 
devoted to the accomplishment of Harry’s mission to conquer Voldemort, 
through his self-sacrifice. As will be argued, Harry’s self-sacrifice is not moti-
vated by fear, duty or a higher principle. Harry relinquishes his life out of love 
and with the help of the Hogwarts community.
1.2 A Life Based on Sacrifice Out of Love
Harry’s very existence is based on sacrifice, as his mother Lily was protecting 
him with her life when she was killed by the evil wizard Voldemort. Harry sur-
vived the attack. He is the “Boy who lived”, the “Chosen One”. The scar on his 
forehead, which he received the night his parents died, reminds him, and every-
one who meets him, of his destiny. That destiny is to conquer Voldemort, who 
is still after Harry and wants to conquer the wizard world, out of revenge. Not 
until the fifth volume does the reader learn what motivated Voldemort to try 
and kill Harry. It is a prophecy, which states that neither Harry nor Voldemort 
could live while the other survived:
The one with the power to vanquish the Dark Lord approaches (. . .) 
and the Dark Lord will mark him as his equal, but he will have power the 
Dark Lord knows not (. . .) and either must die at the hand of the other for 
neither can live while the other survives (. . .).3
The prophecy functions as a meta-narrative that seems to justify the violence 
against Harry. However, Nikolaus Wandinger, who compares the sacrifices of 
Harry Potter, of the school’s headmaster Dumbledore, of teacher Snape and 
of other characters in the books, has pointed out that this prophecy ironically 
3   Joanne K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the order of the Phoenix (London: Barnes & Noble, 2003), 
37, 741.
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became self-fulfilling only after Voldemort’s evil action.4 The prophecy was no 
inescapable fate. It had no power of its own.5 By acting out of fear,6 moreover, 
by transferring the ability of talking Parsletongue (snake language) and estab-
lishing a mind connection, Voldemort himself created his opponent. In the 
end his down-fall is a self-judgment.7
1.3 Horcruxes
There is yet more to the relationship between Lord Voldemort and Harry Potter. 
As the story unfolds, it becomes clear that Harry is one of seven Horcruxes cre-
ated by Lord Voldemort. Horcruxes are fragments of his soul. As is clear from 
his name, vol-de-mort (fleeing death), Voldemort’s aim is to become immortal. 
Dividing his soul among the Horcruxes is a way of spreading the risk of death. 
However, creating a Horcrux has its prize, as it requires a murder to split the 
soul, and a spell to encase it. Furthermore, the creation of a Horcrux dehuman-
izes the murderer by mutilating his soul.8
The night Harry Potter received his scar Voldemort gave Lily the choice to 
save herself, for it was the baby he wanted. She did not have to die. Yet, she 
chose to die for Harry. This sacrifice of his mother protected Harry.9 During the 
assassination assault on Harry, the deathly curse used by Voldemort, “Avada 
Kedavra!” backfired on himself, thanks to the protection formed by the love of 
Lily Potter. Consequently two things happened: Voldemort was heavily injured. 
4   Nikolaus Wandinger, “Sacrifice in the Harry Potter Series from a Girardian Perspective,” 
Contagion – Journal of Violence, Mimesis and Culture 17 (2010), 27–51. In this article I draw 
heavily from Wandinger’s work. In his article Wandinger reflects on the different kinds of 
sacrifices of the main characters in de series, in line with René Girard, who distinguishes 
between a pre-Biblical and a post-Biblical concept of sacrifice. Yet, while Wandinger’s arti-
cle focuses on the mimesis theory in comparing the sacrifices of the main characters in the 
series, this article concentrates on the question whether Harry has a free choice in sacrificing 
himself.
5   Cf. Hetty Zock, “Cultural Anxieties in Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince: Evil and the 
Magic of Human Abilities,” in At the Crossroads of Art and Religion: Imagination, Commitment, 
Transcendence, (ed. Hetty Zock; Leuven: Peeters, Paris: Walpole, 2008); Groningen Studies in 
Cultural Exchange, vol. 34, 101–115.
6   Hetty Zock, “Cultural Anxieties,” 52.
7   Cf. Nikolaus Wandinger, “Girardian Perspective,” 7.
8   Joanne K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Half-Blood Prince (London: Bloomsbury, 2005), 469.
9   Dumbledore explains to Harry: “. . . your mother died to save you. She gave you a lingering 
protection he never expected, a protection that flows in your veins to this day. I put my trust, 
therefore, in your mother’s blood (. . .) Your mother’s sacrifice made the bond of blood the 
strongest shield I could give you.” Rowling, The Order of the Phoenix, 37, 736–737.
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Having no bodily form of his own, he becomes dependant on his servant Peter 
Pettigrew and his army of Death Eaters until the end of Harry Potter and the 
Goblet of Fire, in which Pettigrew helps Voldemort to regain his body. The other 
consequence of the assassination gone wrong is that Lily’s death accidentally 
created a seventh Horcrux. A piece of Lord Voldemort’s soul lives within Harry, 
without Voldemort knowing it. It seems that, according to Rowling, good and 
evil are intrinsically connected. Good carries evil within it and evil can be 
transformed into good.
2 Harry Being Sacrificed?
At the end of Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire, Harry is in the finals of the 
Tri-Wizard Tournament, which takes place in a labyrinth. This setting provides 
an opportunity for Lord Voldemort to isolate Harry and to order his servant 
Pettigrew to take a bone from his father’s grave, give his own hand voluntarily 
and take Harry’s blood by force, to recreate a body for himself.10
After this event, through the blood-connection between Harry and 
Voldemort, Harry is able to ‘read’ Voldemort’s mind and feel his emotions via 
his scar more clearly than before. Now that he has a body again, the power of 
Lord Voldemort increases. Harry prepares the school by forming a group 
of pupils which he trains in witchcraft to be able to defend Hogwarts, in case 
the Death Eaters attack. This group is called after the school’s headmaster: 
Dumbledore’s army. When the Ministry of Magic finds out about the existence 
of Dumbledore’s army, the headmaster is fired and has to leave Hogwarts. At 
the end of volume six, however, Dumbledore confides his secret mission to 
Harry: He informs him that he is chasing the Horcruxes, although he hides the 
most important piece of information: His presumption that Harry is a Horcrux 
himself. On one of these secret missions Dumbledore gets poisoned, which 
indirectly causes his death. Only in the last volume does Harry, with the help 
10   As Wandinger points out, this scene shows a perfect primordial sacrifice, for the Death 
Eaters, summoned up by Voldemort to attend the humiliation and torture of Harry, func-
tion as a mob, encircling and threatening one lonely individual, intending to kill him. 
Even the blood is there. Nikolaus Wandinger, “Harry Potter and the Art of Theology: 
A Theological Perspective on J. K. Rowling’s novels – Part Two: Sacrifice and Mission,” 
in Milltown Studies 53 (Summer 2004), 31–153. Wandinger furthermore distinguishes 
between the sacrifice (or better: self-mutilation) of Peter Pettigrew’s hand, which is a sac-
rifice out of fear and the sacrifice of Harry, which is a sacrifice out of love.
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of his friends Ron and Hermione, try to destroy some of the Horcruxes himself. 
Considering his lack of success, the prophecy and the scar hurting Harry while 
contacting Voldemort, we get the impression that Harry has been called to a 
mission impossible.
Gradually, Harry begins to presume he cannot defeat his enemy by fighting. 
By recollecting the memories of the late Severus Snape, teacher of the dark 
arts, from the ‘Pensieve’, Harry learns the only way to conquer Voldemort is 
through his own death. Finally, the idea that he has to surrender to Voldemort 
without defending himself enters his mind.
2.1 Sacrificed
From the Pensieve,11 Harry learns that Dumbledore seemed to be willing to 
sacrifice Harry. Dumbledore himself gave up his own life deliberately in a 
calculated attempt to prevent Voldemort from laying his hands on the Elder 
Wand, which actually failed. The Elder Wand is the ‘master’ of all other wands 
and therefore the most desirable thing for Voldemort to possess. According 
to Wandinger, Dumbledore thinks along the logic of Caiaphas, who rather let 
one man, Jesus, die, than have the whole nation destroyed.12 At the end of the 
series, Severus Snape accuses Dumbledore of using Harry as a means to reach 
a higher goal: “We only kept him alive to let him die at the proper moment”.13 
Dumbledore replies, however, that keeping one’s life is not the essential value.14 
11   A Pensieve is a bowl in which one can read the thoughts of a person given voluntarily. It is 
first mentioned in Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire.
12   Wandinger, “Sacrifice in Harry Potter from a Girardian Perspective,” 35. The bible passage 
is John 11, 50.
13   When, at the end of the last volume, Harry walks into the Forbidden Forest to surren-
der himself to Lord Voldemort, his thoughts are most cynical: “Now he saw that his lifes-
pan had always been determined by how long it took to eliminate all the Horcruxes. 
Dumbledore had passed the job of destroying them to him, and obediently he had con-
tinued to chip away at the bonds tying not only Voldemort, but himself, to life! How neat, 
how elegant, not to waste any more lives, but to give the dangerous task to the boy who 
had already been marked for slaughter, and whose death would not be a calamity, but 
another blow against Voldemort.” Rowling, The Deathly Hallows, 34, 555. This reaction 
shows that Harry’s motive and goal of his love is life, not death.
14   Lord Voldemort tries to flee death because he cannot imagine anything “worse than 
death”, as Dumbledore says to him: “Your failure to understand that there are things 
much worse than death has always been your greatest weakness” Rowling, The Order of 
the Phoenix, 895. Dumbledore’s advice to Harry is: “Do not pity the dead, Harry. Pity the 
living, and above all, those who live without love”. Rowling, The Deathly Hallows, 578.
Coenradie�70
As Dumbledore says in Chamber of Secrets, death is not the worst fate that 
can befall someone. Loyalty and friendship are valued more highly than life. In 
line with this principle, Dumbledore seemed to have been prepared to sacrifice 
Harry for the sake of the Hogwarts community.
2.2 The Necessity of Choice
Yet, as Ismael in the Ibrahim-story, Harry is almost grown up.15 He has a choice 
of whether to comply. One’s autonomy, in the sense of the freedom and the 
necessity of making choices of your own, is stressed throughout the series. 
Tom Riddle (Voldemort) has a choice as well. Rowling describes the similari-
ties between the boys. Both their mothers died at a young age. Their wands 
contain the phoenix feather from Fawkes, Dumbledore’s bird. Their witchcraft 
is of the same strength.16 Like Voldemort, Harry must also come to terms with 
his disappointment in his father and the father-figures in his life. By stress-
ing the resemblance between the boys, Rowling seems to point out that the 
difference between good and evil is not absolute. It is not the circumstances 
that determine who they are. The dividing difference between Harry and Tom 
is their moral behaviour.17 Whereas Voldemort is sacrificing others to the god 
of his own self, in his striving to obtain immortality, Harry chooses differently, 
being prepared to sacrifice his life for his friends. Harry’s choices are all life-giv-
ing: Harry shows mercy to Peter Pettigrew, who betrayed his parents and saves 
the life of his opponent Draco Malfoy. He even makes an attempt to persuade 
Voldemort: “Try for some remorse, Riddle (. . .) It’s your last chance”.18
2.3 Hallows or Horcruxes?
As the number of followers of Voldemort increases rapidly, the school is not a 
safe place anymore. Harry is on the run, envy separates him from his best friend 
Ron, who temporarily breaks up with him. Harry is on the verge of despair, not 
knowing what to do or who can be trusted. In the second half of the book Harry 
must decide where his loyalty lies. Friendship is tested heavily. Basically, 
15   Over the books, each book covering a school-year and consequently a year in Harry’s exis-
tence, Harry becomes an adult.
16   Therefore, the Sorting Hat hesitates before putting Harry in Gryffindor, instead of 
Slytherin House, the house of Voldemort. Here again it is by Harry’s own choice that 
he enters Gryffindor. See Joanne K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone 
(London: Bloomsbury, 1997), 91.
17   “It is our choices, Harry, that show what we truly are, far more than our abilities”, says 
Dumbledore. Joanne K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets (London: 
Bloomsbury, 1998), 245.
18   Rowling, The Deathly Hallows, 594.
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Harry has two choices: Collecting Hallows or chasing Horcruxes. Dumbledore 
has left a testament in which he donates a copy of the old fairy tale of the three 
Deathly Hallows to Hermione. The Deathly Hallows consist of the Elder wand, 
which makes one invincible, the Resurrection Stone, which brings back the 
dead and an Invisibility Cloak that hides one even from death. Together these 
three things defy death. As events unfold, the fairy tale appears to be reality: 
The three things do exist. By collecting them, Harry would become all-mighty 
and could easily beat Voldemort. Like Jesus tempted by the devil in the desert, 
Harry is attracted to the idea of becoming popular and powerful himself for a 
good part of the book. Eventually, however, he chooses to hunt the Horcruxes. 
As a Jesus-like figure, Harry abstains from the seduction of power and chooses 
a vulnerable way of life that involves suffering and self-sacrifice, but eventually 
results in a permanent defeat of evil.
2.4 Crisis
Apart from the free choice Harry has, there is also the aspect of autonomy. For 
Harry to make his own choices, eventually even against his school headmaster, 
he has to be grown-up. Dumbledore seeming unreliable, Harry has no higher 
authority to fall back upon. At the end of the series, Harry has to make deci-
sions on his own, without any help. In the beginning of his career at Hogwarts, 
Harry has full trust in the school and its headmaster, who is like a father to 
him. That changes in the last volume. After Dumbledore’s death Harry is disap-
pointed to hear that Dumbledore did not tell the truth and withheld the essen-
tial information of Harry being a Horcrux. It was Dumbledore who told Harry 
that his ability of love and friendship could make the significant difference in 
defeating the enemy.19 However, it is the same Dumbledore, who keeps Harry 
unaware of the depth of the relationship between Harry and Voldemort and of 
the events, known or orchestrated by Dumbledore, involving the battle against 
Voldemort. As a consequence, Harry’s firm trust in a set of values like loyalty 
and friendship and love evaporates. At this point, Harry’s situation can be com-
pared to that of Isaac in Genesis 22. Both seem to have unreliable fathers. In 
various literary works about Isaac, the boy never recovers from the shock of 
his father being prepared to sacrifice him. Harry feels equally abandoned and 
at a loss. In this sense, Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows can be read as a 
metaphor about man’s struggle to have faith, while living in a de-sacralised 
world. If one cannot count on God’s fidelity, how can one count on God at all? 
Harry’s ‘god’ has fallen from his pedestal, leaving him to his own devices. This 
19   Indeed, as the story unfolds, Harry develops a strong friendship with Ron and Hermione, 
allowing them to accomplish what neither of them could have done alone.
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represents a common human experience after the ‘death’ of God: God remains 
silent and seems to be indifferent to the suffering of people.
2.5 The Death of God
Nietzsche called this experience the ‘death’ of God. People killed the gods with-
out being aware of the consequence: Their loneliness. What people find after 
this very last stage of sacrificing is not a sacred place; it is an empty place, a fall 
into an abyss. In this emptiness one can only ‘meet’ the absence of God. One 
stays behind in a de-sacralised world. In accordance with Nietzsche, Bataille 
interprets the death of God as the ultimate sacrifice modern culture can make. 
Bataille, however, goes further and considers the consequences by asking ques-
tions, e.g. which God has been sacrificed here? Is it the ‘old’ God? Is it – to be 
more specific – a certain image of God that got lost? Does one have to become 
one’s own God? Bataille starts his theory with the last question, by stating 
that one has misused God, by making Him into an object that can be appro-
priated. Instead of sacrificing to God to maintain one’s life one must sacrifice 
one’s life. In the process, one’s autonomy, in the sense of making free choices, 
was sacrificed. Therefore, Bataille’s version of the death of God is that people 
must voluntarily sacrifice themselves. However, in giving up their lives, they 
paradoxically will find they can keep their lives.
In comparison to the clerical practice, through the loss of a priest in the 
course of secularisation, one has to bring a sacrifice oneself, without the help 
of somebody who performs the act on your behalf. According to René Girard, 
in line with the Greek drama, a sacrifice can be understood as the internal 
aggression of a community directed at an innocent victim. A priest was sym-
bolically inflicting human violence of many against one to re-establish order 
and peace within the community, thus presenting and legitimizing sacrifice 
as a divine necessity in religion. However, in a post-modern world re-estab-
lishing a community’s relationship with the divine by killing or removing a 
scapegoat is problematic. Sacrificial violence commonly involves the unwill-
ing participation of the victim and a sovereign Other, who, behaving in an 
authoritarian manner, forces people to comply. Victims have to be duped or 
brainwashed to accept their place in the ritual.
Here, the difference between Voldemort forcing his servant Pettigrew to 
donate his hand and Dumbledore refraining from demanding Harry to sacri-
fice his life, is illustrative. A sacrifice out of love will not demand anything in 
return. The renunciation of a reward, in the form of gratitude, other’s approval 
and admiration, is part of the sacrifice. Besides, an authority asking some-
one to give up his of her life for a greater goal or moral principle, places an 
unacceptable claim on that person. In the case of the under-age Harry, that 
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would mean psychic violence.20 Harry can only surrender himself by free 
choice, that is as a moral agent. The term agent, however, does not accord with 
Harry’s actions, which may look like obedience, but are nevertheless done 
freely. Harry is free to follow the ethical principles of his own reasoning. The 
term autonomy, however, fails to take into account the community, while in 
Harry’s case the values of the Hogwarts community are crucial for his decision 
to surrender himself. The external values imposed on Harry by Dumbledore 
and internalized by Harry during his youth at Hogwarts, play a decisive role. 
A community can have a huge impact on shaping understandings and enact-
ments of individual morality. Therefore, Bucar introduces the term dianomy, 
which recognizes that both the individual and the community are important 
in moral decision-making.21 In relation to God, one needs to be dianomous, 
no matter how unequal the relationship is. Secularisation, therefore, is seen 
by Frits de Lange not only as a process of decreasing metaphysical religiosity, 
but as an increasing awareness of the sacrificial character of religion as well.22 
Since the death of God, through a phase of nihilism and secularisation, a new 
idea is given to us in art, film and literature. It is the idea that responsibility lies 
with each and everyone.
3 Harry’s Self-Sacrifice?
Sacrifice differs from self-sacrifice with regard to its goal. By means of sacri-
fice one tries to connect to the gods, to enter a sacred place. The secret of the 
sacrifice lies within the identification of becoming sacred. Self-sacrifice is an 
exception to this practice. By self-sacrifice the life of the sacrificer ends, and 
with it the need to sacrifice. Derrida points to this paradox of sacrifice, stating 
that religion both requires and excludes sacrifice.23 One uses violence in the 
name of non-violence to avoid violating others. Even if the use of violence is 
20   In this respect, Dumbledore is morally wrong forcing Snape to kill him, as the latter 
is well aware: “And my soul Dumbledore? Mine?” Rowling, The Deathly Hallows, 548. 
Cf. Wandinger, “Sacrifice in Harry Potter from a Girardian Perspective,” 31.
21   Cf. Elizabeth M. Bucar, “Dianomy: Understanding Religious Women’s Moral Agency 
as Creative Conformity,” in Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 78 (2010): 
662–686 (665).
22   Frits de Lange, “Kenotic Ethics,” in Letting go: Rethinking Kenosis (ed. Onno Zijlstra; Bern: 
Peter Lang, 2002), 59.
23   Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: the Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of 
Reason Alone,” in Religion (eds Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo; Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1998), 1–78 (52).
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unavoidable, in religions it is unacceptable to subject other life to this kind 
of violence. Therefore, “absolute respect” requires self-sacrifice. The ambiva-
lence of self-sacrifice, however, is that one must use violence against oneself in 
order not to subject others to violence. By self-sacrifice one extinguishes not 
only one’s life, but also the connection to the sacred. What motive is left for 
self-sacrifice?
3.1 Egoistic and Altruistic Self-Sacrifice
In his comment on Derrida, Dalferth, reflecting on a dialogue in Schiller’s 
Theosophie des Julius, introduces the difference between egoistic and altruis-
tic self-sacrifice.24 Schiller makes a distinction between egoistic self-sacrifice, 
which is carried out in hope of an eternal remuneration, and an altruistic self-
sacrifice, which is carried out for the well-being of all others. In a discussion 
between Julius and his friend Raphael in Schiller’s text, the question arises how 
one can benefit from self-sacrifice. A possible answer may be found in immor-
tality. But that would exclude the possibility of a truly altruistic self-sacrifice. 
Desire for immortality, and using self-sacrifice to reach this goal, would destroy 
the pure orientation on the other. Consequently, Dalferth states that “the deci-
sive difference is not between sacrifice and self-sacrifice, but between egoistic 
and altruistic self-sacrifice, on the one hand, and between an act of violence and 
an act of love on the other”.25 In his view, love is greater than both. Love over-
comes both sacrifice and self-sacrifice by refraining from violence even at the 
cost of losing one’s life. Therefore, loss of life out of love is not an intentional 
gift for others, whether given out of selfish or unselfish motives. Harry accepts 
the consequences of his love without awareness of the outcome. He “loves the 
others to death”.
3.2 Harry’s Voluntary Self-Sacrifice
As we have seen, Harry Potter is not aiming at immortality. Consequently, his 
self-sacrifice must be an altruistic self-sacrifice, voluntary undertaken. For 
Harry’s sacrifice to be a self-sacrifice he has to be a grown-up for the sacrifice 
to be a free choice and to have its full meaning. Like Abraham in Genesis 22, 
Harry is tested in the school-contest in volume four. What is being tested? Not 
24   Fr. Schiller, “Philosophisch-Ästhetische Schriften, Theosophie des Julius,” in Sämtliche 
Werke 5 (1975): 344–358. Cited in I. U. Dalferth, “Self-sacrifice: from the act of violence to 
the violence of love,” International journal for philosophy of religion 68 (2010), 77–94.
25   Dalferth, “Self-sacrifice,” 80.
 �75Towards a Grown-Up Faith
his witchcraft. His loyalty to the community is tested.26 In the contest Harry 
appears to be willing to share information with his opponents, helping them, 
warning others and saving others from drowning. Here Harry learns to make 
choices of his own. By not fulfilling his destiny to win the contest and conse-
quently become popular, but by refusing to fight the others, Harry will save 
lives and gain in the end.
Basically, he discovers: Destiny is not fate, identity is not destiny. One’s auton-
omous choices make the difference between good and evil. In his interpreta-
tion of the Koran’s Sura 37:100–110, (see the essay: Sacrifice and Islamic identity 
further on), Abdelilah Ljamai states that it is essential that the son volunteers 
for the sacrifice. So the true sacrifice is self-sacrifice. It is only by giving up his 
life, that one could keep it. The same goes for Harry. In contrast to the sacrifice 
of Isaac/Ismael there is no substitute. Like Jesus in the New Testament, Harry 
dies and after a kind of afterlife scene, in which he meets Dumbledore again, 
he is ‘risen’. Nevertheless, Harry, like Jesus, is in great despair at the time of his 
self-sacrifice. The former unquestioned trust has vanished after Dumbledore 
died – as if God remains silent. Doubt is fundamental. Harry wonders whether 
Dumbledore had ever cared about him.
Look what he asked from me, Hermione! Risk your life, Harry! And again! 
And again! And don’t expect me to explain everything, just trust me 
26   In this article, Dalferth states that Abraham, placed into the dilemma whether obeying 
a God, whose behavior contradicts itself, remains silent. As God has become incompre-
hensible and inaccessible as a dialogue partner, the conflict cannot be solved by rea-
soning. Therefore, Abraham is putting God to the test. He challenges God to be either 
reliable or to take leave of his people and cease to be their God. Ibid, 86 and 87, see also 
note 24. Cf. The Silence of God, in which the authors also interpret Abraham’s silence as 
Abraham testing God’s trustworthiness. Marjo Korpel and Johannes de Moor, The Silence 
of God (Leiden: Brill Academic Pub, 2011), 39. Cf. Adele Wiseman, The Sacrifice, (Toronto: 
McClelland, 1956, 2001). In this Canadian novel the main character Abraham interprets 
the moment when the biblical Abraham lifts his knife to slay Isaac, as follows: “In that 
moment lay the future of our people, and even more than that. In that moment lay the 
secrets of life and death, in that closed circle with just the three of them, with Abraham 
offering the whole of the past and the future, and Isaac lying very still, so as not to spoil 
the sacrifice (. . .). And God himself is bound at that moment, for it is the point of mutual 
surrender, the one thing He cannot resist, a faith so absolute (. . .). That was the moment 
that even God could not resist, and so He gave us the future.” (199). This novel suggests 
that God responds to absolute faith by keeping his promise.
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blindly, trust that I know what I’m doing, trust me even though I don’t 
trust you! Never the whole truth! Never!27
Self-sacrifice is not easily made, but accompanied by despair and doubt. Shall 
I be loved? Can this fundamental doubt be avoided?
As Marcel Poorthuis stresses in his article on Gertrud von le Fort further on, 
“a sacrifice brought willingly and without hesitation runs the risk of being no 
sacrifice at all”. Had Harry been certain of the outcome, known that his death 
would bring victory, his sacrifice would not truly have been a sacrifice.
We run into a paradox here. In the Potter story, self-sacrifice is a free and 
conscious decision, made by a responsible, autonomous individual. If the one 
being sacrificed has full knowledge and trust, there is no need to sacrifice in 
the first place. Then, what motivates the doubting, unaware and disappointed 
Harry to continue at the end?
3.3 Harry’s Sacrifice Forming the School-Identity
So far, we have seen that Harry’s sacrifice is not demanded by an authority, 
not the outcome of calculation, nor motivated by fear or duty or even love as 
a higher principle. It is a voluntary self-sacrifice out of love for the community 
and supported by that community. Therefore, Harry needs to come to terms 
with his beloved ones, even when they are dead, despite his anger and disap-
pointment. Before he can surrender himself to Voldemort, Harry has had to 
confront and forgive Dumbledore’s faults and selfishness. For his self-sacrifice 
it is vital that Harry understands and accepts his fallibility, and by extension 
his own. The underlying question Rowling raises, is whether Harry can pity 
Voldemort who wants to kill him in the end.
Here the role of witnesses arises: The self-sacrifice out of love must to some 
extent be deliberately and publicly undertaken. Harry cannot do this alone. He 
needs and gets all the moral and practical support at Hogwarts, because the 
community is in essence the source, as well as the aim, of his love. Rowling’s 
story shows the importance of the role of the public and the importance of the 
sacrifice being a ceremony. At the final moment, when he is about to lose con-
trol, which is a necessary part of any sacrifice, the Resurrection Stone opens. 
Walking through the Forbidden Forest, about to surrender himself, Harry is 
accompanied by the spirits of his beloved ones: His parents and his godfather 
Sirius and the mentor Lupin, all representing the community, its members 
27   Rowling, The Deathly Hallows, 295. The resemblance to the desperation of Jesus Christ 
in Gethsemane is striking. Cf. Wandinger, “Sacrifice in Harry Potter from a Girardian 
Perspective,” 47.
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willing to fight next to him. His father assures Harry they will stay with him 
“until the very end”.28 Rowling presents Harry’s sacrifice as an answer to the 
love he received, as an antidote to the selfish love of Voldemort, who only loves 
himself at the expense of his family and the Hogwarts community.
4 Harry’s Life Being Given
Seen in this light, Harry’s sacrifice is an answer to the sacrifices made by his 
mother, his stepfather Sirius, his teacher Snape and his mentor Lupin. Harry 
undertakes his sacrifice as a willed and intentional act. He can do so because 
he is grown up. The sacrifice transforms him and finally allows him to become 
a subject. Still, Harry’s sacrifice is not to be reconstructed as an experience ‘of ’ 
the subject. Without defending himself, Harry exposes himself to Voldemort, 
who does not hesitate to cast the Death Curse. Because of Harry’s blood in 
Voldemort, however, it turns out the latter’s death curse cannot be effective. 
The next moment Harry finds himself in a kind of after-life scene on a heav-
enly railway station: King’s Cross. Here Harry meets Dumbledore, who repents 
and explains his motives to Harry. Then Harry wonders whether he still has a 
choice, which Dumbledore confirms. Harry can either take a train, or return to 
finish the job.
4.1 The Voluntary Offer Refused
Harry returns. From this moment on the outcome is no surprise. In the big 
entrance hall of the school, Harry’s final victory, for all to see, will take place. 
Voldemort is trying to demoralize the school population: “Harry Potter is dead! 
Do you understand now, deluded ones? He was nothing, ever, but a boy who 
relied on others to sacrifice themselves for him!”.29 It is of note that Voldemort 
accuses Harry of what he himself has done all his life.30 However, the commu-
nity reacts furiously. In contrast to the book, the film shows us a very biblical 
reaction at this point. Neville Longbottom steps forward to oppose Voldemort. 
“Harry is dead”, he shouts for everyone to hear, “so many have died in this battle, 
but they now live in here [points], in our hearts. We will go on”. The following 
final Battle of Hogwarts is rich with examples of smaller and greater sacri-
fices, which motivate Harry to confront Voldemort. When Voldemort casts the 
28   Rowling, The Deathly Hallows, 561.
29   Rowling, The Deathly Hallows, 36; 585.
30   Cf. Wandinger, “Sacrifice in Harry Potter,” 57.
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killing curse on Harry, the Elder Wand knows its true master and it re-bounds 
the curse on Voldemort, who now is unprotected by Horcruxes.
Voluntary substitution occurs in contexts of a generous offer by someone 
to take the place of someone under threat. Biblical examples are Judah, who 
offers himself for this youngest brother, Benjamin (Gen. 44, 33). Moses, as 
intercessor on behalf of his sinful nation, is willing to have his name excised 
from God’s book if God will accept him as a substitute for the nation (Ex. 32, 
30–32) and Paul expresses a similar wish (Rom. 9,3). However, these sacrifices 
are not accepted. Neither is Harry’s. Therefore, these sacrifices out of unre-
stricted love are no sacrifices at all. In the end, these ‘prophets’ give nothing; 
on the contrary, they receive life. As Girard and Bataille state in reaction to 
Nietzsche, sacrifices relate humanity to the Divine. Sacrificing demands repeti-
tion in a ritual. Perhaps it is not a coincidence we see sacrificing elements in 
successful books and films of the last two decades, like The Matrix, The Lord of 
the Rings and The Narnia Chronicles. In the Potter series, Rowling shows a com-
munity surviving through sacrifices made by their moral leaders. In contrast 
to the ‘old’ concept of sacrifice, no violence is committed against the victims to 
force them. On the contrary: Harry happens to re-establish the Hogwarts soci-
ety by withdrawing from action, in relinquishing revenge, in laying down his 
life without defending it. His rescue is a gift. It breaks with the calculation of 
the ut des principle.31 In the very act of laying down his life, Harry remarkably 
receives his life at the same moment. In a religious perspective and compared 
to the sacrifice of Jesus: One could state that God gives, and his gift transcends 
that of the sacrificer. Likewise, God had given the ram in the story of the sacri-
fice of Isaac, He gives Himself in the sacrifice as a sacrifié. So, when Genesis 22 
is compared with the Harry Potter story, we see that in a post-religious context:
– Sacrifices are needed to restore relationships between a community and its 
tradition, the tradition in Harry’s case being a wizard world;
– one has to bring a sacrifice oneself, since a God is lacking and consequently 
no substitution is available;
– one can only sacrifice oneself voluntarily;
– one cannot sacrifice oneself without help from a community.
4.2 Final Remarks
Compared to Dalferth’s concept of self-sacrifice out of love, Harry’s self-
sacrifice has one unique feature: Harry does not die, or, if you wish, he receives 
31   This is the principle that you give a sacrifice to the gods, to receive prosperity, good health 
and a long life in return.
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his life back. During the series, Harry never kills; Voldemort is killed by his own 
rebounding curse. In this respect, Harry’s self-sacrifice differs from the sui-
cide of e.g. bombing terrorists. Both could be altruistic sacrifices, motivated 
by religious ends and love. However, the love of a self-sacrificing terrorist is 
limited to a certain group and damaging another group. In contrast, Harry’s 
love is extended to all others, even to Voldemort. By choosing not to defend 
himself, Harry submits himself to death. However, his surrender is not a death 
wish. His intention is to carry out a life-bringing mission. What is sacrificial 
about Harry’s death is not his willingness to die, but his determined com-
mitment to let others live. He voluntary relinquishes his life in accepting his 
destiny as an amor fati (Nietzsche). His offer does not cause killing, not even 
of himself. The giving rather than taking of live forms a fundamental reori-
entation. It is remarkable that the context of Harry’s self-sacrifice is a secular 
one, although Rowling has modelled Harry Potter after the example of Jesus.
4.3 The End
In line with the others volumes, Deathly Hallows ends with a Great Banquet. 
Unlike other volumes, however, in this communion there is no distinction 
between the houses, symbolizing the re-unification of the Hogwarts com-
munity: “Nobody was sitting according to house any more: All were jumbled 
together, teachers and pupils, ghosts and parents, centaurs and house-elves”.32 
Selfish love (Voldemort) victimizes others, while self-giving love (Harry) elimi-
nates boundaries.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, we can say Harry’s sacrifice is modern, after the “death of God” 
(Nietzsche). Analogous with the descriptions of the son of Abraham in the 
Jewish comments and Ismael in the Qur’an, Harry voluntarily relinquishes 
his life. He has to be an adult to be able to choose. Up to the very end, to the 
moment of sacrifice and of surrendering himself, Harry never loses dianomy. 
As in the religious stories, in the Harry Potter series love does not ‘require’ a 
sacrifice. De facto it ends up to be a self-offering out of love. While Isaac can be 
seen as pre-figuring Christ, Harry can be looked upon as post-figuring Christ. 
In line with the sacrifice of Jesus, Harry’s sacrifice brings life, not death. In this 
sense, his sacrifice can be seen as a religious sacrifice performed in a modern, 
secular context, although on a narrative level.
32   Rowling, The Deathly Hallows, 596.
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This article shows that Harry voluntarily relinquishes his life, without fight-
ing the enemy, whose history and position is very similar to Harry’s. Their 
choices make all the difference. While sacrificial violence commonly involves 
the unwilling participation of the victim, Harry is not being sacrificed, but sac-
rifices his life willingly and without violence. Help from his beloved ones, and 
above all, pity for Voldemort, enable Harry to save both his world and his life, 
which he receives back as a gift. This gift seems to lead to a surplus rather than 
a loss. As Levinas has stated, self-sacrifice is one’s being sacrificed rather 
than sacrificing oneself.33 In line with this passive attitude, in which a sacri-
fice is ‘imposed’ on a subject, who is unable to dissociate himself or herself 
from the vulnerability and suffering of another, one could argue Harry is sac-
rificed. In this sense, Harry’s sacrifice is an answer to his mother’s sacrifice.34 
Usually, the idea of love as self-sacrifice suggests self-diminishment or even 
self-destruction. Applied to Harry Potter’s sacrifice the idea of love as gift is 
more appropriate, which suggests that the self receives in giving itself. While 
giving himself, Harry is receiving a gift of selfhood. His sacrifice has to be re-
phrased as “self-giving”, in the sense of “gift of self”, for his giving away turns 
into gain. (Self)sacrifice in this sense does not require a victim, not even Harry 
having victimized himself. So, in a strict sense, ‘self-sacrifice’ in this context is 
a contradiction in terms.
33   Emmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (Autrement qu’être ou au-délà 
de l’essence, tr. by Alphonso Lingis; Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1998), 50.
34   It is of note that Levinas speaks of self-sacrifice in relation to maternity. The responsibil-
ity for the other is depicted as a kind of maternity, for one suffers like a mother who gives 
her life-blood for her child in “the complete being ‘for the other’ which characterizes it”. 
Levinas, Otherwise than Being, 108. Cf. Welz, “Love as Gift and Self-Sacrifice,” 245.
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I’d never given much thought to how I would die. But dying in the place 
of someone I love seems like a good way to go.
These sentences, pronounced by protagonist Bella Swan in the overture to 
the first Twilight film, are a forecast of things to come. Above all, they forecast 
the role Bella is going to play throughout the Twilight Saga, willingly sacrificing 
(or at least risking) her life for the ones she loves: For her mother, her beloved 
vampire fiancé Edward, and her unborn, half-vampire child. The sentences in the 
overture echo the Preface in the first Twilight novel, where the same thoughts 
are expressed in the context of a mysterious scene in which the ‘I’-figure (appear-
ing to be Bella) is being threatened by a ‘hunter’. In the prologue to the film, this 
impression of being hunted is symbolized by the accompanying imagery, show-
ing a defenceless deer chased through a dark wood.
In this chapter, I intend to analyse the sacrificial scripts that underlie 
the storyline in the Twilight Saga, an immensely popular vampire narrative 
devoured by millions of mainly female adolescents all over the world. From 
the moment I saw the first Twilight screenplay together with my daughter, 
I was struck by Bella’s unhesitating willingness to sacrifice her life, announced 
(in Bella’s voice) in the prologue. Of course my view is affected by the fact that 
I am a scholar of religion, and a gender scholar too. From that perspective, 
the gender scripts in the Twilight book series and film versions seem astonish-
ingly conventional at first sight. Bella is presented as an average, rather clumsy 
high school student, alternately submissive and self-conscious to her male 
counterparts, and eager to sacrifice herself at crucial moments in the series. By 
contrast, the main male characters are depicted as supermen, strong, fast and 
brave (in fact superhuman), and utterly in control. Nevertheless, millions of 
teen-aged girls throughout the world adore the story and its characters.
Is their adoration to be explained as a longing to return to traditional gender 
roles, as a correction to both outdated feminism and post-feminism? Does the 
Saga appeal to an everlasting desire in (young) women to be safeguarded by 
a hero against the evils that come with adulthood? Many feminist reviewers 
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criticized the romantic idealization of Bella’s awkwardness in Twilight, namely 
her constant need of male protection – protection from her own sexual desires, 
to begin with. Still, we should assume the countless fans to be modern, eman-
cipated young adults, not victims of false consciousness. So, what is it that fas-
cinates them?
2 The Twilight Phenomenon
Before I continue outlining my questions, let me briefly introduce the Twilight 
phenomenon. Speaking of ‘Twilight’ in general, I refer to the four-book series, 
the screen adaptations, and an online partial draft (see below). The first vol-
ume and film were also called Twilight. I refer to this first volume in italics. 
Twilight was published in 2005.1 Three volumes followed quickly, New Moon 
(2006), Eclipse (2007) and Breaking Dawn (2008).2 On her website, the Twilight 
creator, Stephenie Meyer, published what she called “my original character 
development exercise, Edward’s version of Bella’s [story]”3 – Twilight is written 
from Bella’s perspective.4 This version in Edward’s voice, picturing his harsh 
inner conflicts and ordeal, is titled Midnight Sun.
Up to now,5 four Twilight screen adaptations have been released, in 2008, 
2009, 2010 and 2011 respectively. These films added a lot to the world-wide 
hype; the actors cast for the main characters6 are worshipped as if they were 
the godlike creatures they play. The last novel is filmed in two parts; part II of 
this Breaking Dawn adaptations will be released on November 16, 2012.
The plot of the Twilight vampire narrative is basically romantic: A common 
high school student, Bella Swan, falls in love with a gorgeous fellow student, 
who appears to be a vampire, and a ‘good’ vampire too. He and his family (all 
1    I refer to the British Atom paperback editions. Twilight was first published in the U.S. by Little, 
Brown. In, Twilight (ed. S. Meyer; London: Atom, 2007), the page numbers differ slightly from 
the original Little, Brown edition. In the other volumes I quote, page numbers do not differ 
from the original editions.
2    Stephenie Meyer, New Moon (London: Atom, 2006; 2007); Stephenie Meyer, Eclipse (London: 
Atom, 2007; 2008); Stephenie Meyer, Breaking Dawn (London: Atom, 2008).
3    See www.stepheniemeyer.com, Midnight Sun, Partial Draft 4 (2008) and Meyer’s comments. 
She published this draft (retelling the first half of Twilight) in response to illegal distribution.
4    The Epilogue in Eclipse and the middle part in Breaking Dawn are written from the perspec-
tive of Bella’s werewolf friend Jacob.
5    November 2011.
6    Kristen Stewart (Bella Swan), Robert Pattinson (Edward Cullen) and Taylor Lautner (Jacob 
Black). The Twilight franchise successfully exploits their immense popularity.
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bitten to vampire-existence by the compassionate ‘father’, Dr Cullen, because 
they were dying of some other cause) are self-declared ‘vegetarians’ who do 
not consume human blood. They live on a diet of animal blood, gathered dur-
ing periodic hunts, although this blood tastes to them like “tofu and soy milk” 
to humans.7 Abstaining from human blood is a never-ending ordeal they suf-
fer deliberately, because they don’t want to be ‘monsters’. Their rigorous moral 
choice sets them apart from their kind by creating unique reciprocal ‘blood’ 
relations, unknown amongst cold ones, namely bonds of love. The Cullen fam-
ily is a living (or rather, undead) example of how a family should be, headed by 
a father, described by Edward as “a leader who deserved following”, a mother 
who “made that following into an act of love”, and linked together by everlast-
ing ties of love and mutual care.8
Bella and Edward meet after Bella has moved from sunny Phoenix, where 
she lived with her mother, to her father living in misty Forks in the northwest 
of Washington State. Edward and his vampire brothers and sisters attend high 
school in Forks. Bella immediately attracts Edward’s attention because he 
cannot read her mind, as he can with all other humans and vampires. Bella 
appears to have another attractive, but alarming quality: The scent of her skin, 
her blood drives Edward mad with bloodlust. Nevertheless they fall in love, 
and this causes many problems, especially for Edward; how to hide his vam-
pire state, and above all, how to control his burning bloodlust? As the plot of 
Twilight unfolds, the first problem is solved by Bella’s attentiveness. The lat-
ter problem, though, underpins the Twilight scenario till at least the end of 
the second volume. The solution to all Edward’s external problems and inner 
conflicts would be to transform Bella into a vampire, and this is what she her-
self desperately wants, from the moment she is aware of Edward’s condition. 
Edward considers it to be selfish to transform Bella, however, since he knows 
the consequences – excruciating, unendurable inner burning during the 
transformation process, and endless existence “without soul”, as a ‘monster’. 
He refuses to transform her, up to the moment Bella is dying in childbirth, in 
the last volume. By becoming a vampire, Bella changes from the clumsy girl she 
was into a creature she senses to be her true self, her true nature. She becomes 
an undead supergirl, “a carving of a goddess”,9 outdoing her new family as to 
7    Meyer, Twilight, 164.
8    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 78. Cf. Carrie A. Platt, “Cullen Family Values: Gender and Sexual Politics 
in the Twilight Series,” in Bitten by Twilight: Youth Culture, Media, & the Vampire Franchise 
(eds M. A. Click, J. Stevens Aubrey, and E. Behm-Morawitz; New York (etc.): Peter Lang, 2010), 
71–86.
9   Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 403.
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self-control. Her characteristic unselfishness, though, she takes with her into 
immortality.
3 Sacrificial Scripts, Blood Values and the Twilight Attraction
Engaging with the main questions in this book, I focus on the sacrificial scripts 
in the Twilight Saga.10 As I noted – and I am not the only critic to do so – the 
scripts in this atypical vampire narrative are highly gendered. In the following 
sections, I will display the features of these gender dynamics within the staging 
of (self-)sacrifice in Twilight. I will subsequently clarify what I mean by “blood 
values”, a notion I make use of in another sense than the usual one, applied 
in medical blood test results. I will use the term in line with Julia Kristeva’s 
psycho-semiotic analysis of the dynamics of ‘abjection’ in horror,11 Nancy 
Jay’s anthropological studies on the function of blood sacrifice as “birth done 
better”,12 and religious studies analyses of the ambivalent, gendered valuation 
of blood in ritual contexts.13
3.1 Self-Sacrifice: Bella’s Part
All feminist critics point to the worrying glorification of Bella’s selfless char-
acter in the Twilight narrative. This selflessness (also noticed by Edward, and 
fiercely admired by him14) shows in several ways. First of all, there is Bella’s 
readiness to sacrifice her life for the sake of those she loves. Her resolute but 
jeopardizing bravery determines the plot in all four volumes. The two male 
protagonists are brave too, of course; but Bella’s bravery is defined within a 
10    Meyer herself pointed out that sacrifice is a main topic in Twilight: “Unconsciously I put 
a lot of my beliefs into the story. Free agency is a big theme, as is sacrifice” (quoted in 
A. J. Grant, “Focus on the Family: Good and Evil Vampires in the Twilight Saga,” in Vader, 
Voldemort and other Villains: Essays on Evil in popular Media (ed. J. Heit; Jefferson N. C.: 
McFarland, 2011), 64–79 (67). Meyer is an active member of the Mormon Church.
11    Julia Kristeva, Powers of horror: An Essay on Abjection (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982).
12    Nancy Jay, Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion and Paternity (Chicago 
& London: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
13    See e.g. K. de Troyer, J. A. Herbert, J. A. Johnson, and A.-M. Korte, eds, Wholly Woman, Holy 
Blood: A Feminist Critique of Purity and Impurity (Harrisburg: Trinity Press International, 
2003) and bibliography therein.
14    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 92–93.
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format of female martyrdom, defenceless but unyielding, and thus powerful.15 
Aside from this outspoken disposition to actually and vicariously sacrifice her-
self, there is the day-to-day unselfishness that Edward considers to be Bella’s 
ultimate attraction, but feminist critics deplore above all. To quote just one of 
them, namely Bonnie Mann, stating in an article in which she confronts Bella’s 
character with Simone de Beauvoir’s The Second Sex:
What is disheartening about Meyer’s book is her reinstatement of this 
old promise: Assume your status as prey, as object, and you will gain 
your freedom as subject (. . .). Bella (. . .) is literally torn to shreds by the 
needs and desires of others. (. . .) But how does one open the door of 
the feminine imagination for young women so that they might trace paths 
to themselves that don’t pass through traditional feminine annihilation? 
(. . .) [I]n her insistence on resurrecting the promise that a meaningful 
life comes through self-annihilation in the interests of others, [Meyer] 
promises our daughters the same things our mothers were promised. In 
that sense, the wild success of Twilight might be cause for despair.16
This concern can be heard throughout most gender-critical reviews of the 
series. Against this emphasis on Bella’s selflessness, though, should also be 
pointed to her confidence and self-protection, which are present from the first 
pages of Twilight onwards in the form of the fictional ‘shield’ that protects her 
consciousness, not only from Edward, but from other vampire intruders too (as 
becomes apparent later on in the series). Missing this aspect in Bella’s charac-
ter results in missing her most powerful gift, the one that will bring the final 
battle to a close. I come back to Bella’s fictional “mind shield” later.
3.2 Self-Sacrifice: Edward’s Part
Self-sacrifice is not an all-female part in the Twilight drama, though. All along 
the series is being emphasized and repeated that the Cullen’s ‘vegetarian’ life-
style is a life of “sacrifice and denial”. In the most penetrating way this denial 
and its torments are depicted in Edward’s report of his first encounter with 
Bella when she unavoidably has to sit next to him in the biology classroom:
15    Cf. L. Stephanie Cobb, Dying to be men: Gender and Language in Early Christian Martyr 
Texts (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).
16    Bonnie Mann, “Vampire Love: The Second Sex negotiates the Twenty-First Century,” 
in Twilight and Philosophy: Vampires, vegetarians and the Pursuit of Immortality (eds 
R. Housel and J. J. Wisnewski; Hoboken, N. J.: John Wiley & Sons, 2009), 131–145 (143–144).
Dresen�86
Her scent hit me like [a] wrecking ball, like a battering ram. There was no 
image violent enough to encapsulate the force of what happened to me 
in that moment. In that instant, I was nothing close to the human I’d once 
been; no trace of the shreds of humanity I’d managed to cloak myself 
in remained. I was a predator. She was my prey. There was nothing else in 
the whole world but that truth. (. . .) Thirst burned through my throat like 
fire. My mouth was baked and desiccated. The fresh flow of venom did 
nothing to dispel that sensation. (. . .) The face of the monster in me – 
the face I’d beaten back with decades of effort and uncompromising 
discipline.17
The description of this inner torture continues for pages and pages, not least to 
highlight the ultimate control Edward finally manages to find, for a moment. 
Being near to Bella continues to be a temptation, but once he comes to love 
her, he accepts his being tempted as the price he must pay:
I burnt. The burning was acceptable, though. (. . .) [H]ere she was, still 
willingly at my side. I owed something in return for that. A sacrifice. 
A burnt offering.18
Throughout the series there is no doubt left as to the extreme self-control 
Edward needs to be close to Bella, let alone to touch her, or kiss her, or (decently 
married) make love to her.
The attraction of the series for teenage girls has been explained by point-
ing to this Jane Austen-like, restrained sexuality, termed as an “erotics of 
abstinence”,19 and regarded as a relief in a culture obsessed with sex. Several 
critics asserted that the way Edward manages to control his impulses (in order 
not to kill Bella, but also because he is old school, being born in 1901) makes 
room for Bella’s own dreams and desires. Within this room for Bella’s palpi-
tating desires, described in length to the readers, Twilight’s adorers may well 
enjoy theirs, without being hindered by reality.20
17    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 9–10.
18    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 194.
19    Marc E. Shaw, “For the Strength of Bella? Meyer, Vampires, and Mormonism,” in Twilight 
and Philosophy (eds R. Housel et al.), 227–236 (233). He borrows the term ‘erotics of absti-
nence’ from Lev Grossman (Time, April 24, 2008: “Stephenie Meyer, A New J. K. Rowling?”).
20    So Joyce A. Mercer, “Vampires, Desire, Girls and God: Twilight and the Spiritualities of 
Adolescent Girls,” Pastoral Psychology 60 (2011): 263–278 (272; 276).
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Occasionally Edward’s self-discipline is tested to the absolute limit. This is 
the case, for example, at the end of Twilight, when he has to suck the venom 
of an evil vampire out of Bella’s hand (venom of the ‘hunter’ from the Preface, 
who lured Bella by falsely suggesting he had got hold of her mother and trapped 
her with the intention of killing and draining her). Faced with this ordeal, 
Edward hesitates, his face “twisted into a mask of indecision and pain”.21 He 
fears that he will not be able to stop sucking Bella’s alluring blood, yet, encour-
aged by his father who is giving medical care to Bella, “the doubt was suddenly 
replaced with a blazing determination”.22 Actually Bella regrets his awesome 
self-control; she had rather had the venom spread, so she could have become 
his equal. For Edward, however, loving Bella means he cannot possibly let that 
happen. The asceticism of the Cullens might make them less monstrous, but 
that does not mean vampire existence should be thought of as good, he keeps 
stating. “We [the Cullen family] would trade anything to be human”.23
The sacrificial scenarios in the Cullen’s “life of sacrifice”,24 and particularly 
in Edward’s blazing determination, differ from the ‘feminine’, selfless, defence-
less-but-uncompromising martyrdom that characterizes those of Bella.25 One 
could say that Edward’s self-sacrificial love for Bella in a way suffers from too 
much self, too much determination, too much “mind over matter”,26 in short, 
too much control. This control is not only exerted on his own vampire urges, but 
is directed at Bella too, in the name of her alleged “devastating vulnerability”.27
Occasionally, Bella protests against this constant control, but her protest is 
far from adequate, according to most critics of the series. Several critics even 
stress that Edward’s protective, intrusive kind of love is just the kind against 
which young women should be warned.28
21    Meyer, Twilight, 397.
22    Meyer, Twilight, 397.
23    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 363.
24    Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 718.
25    Bella “wasn’t [even] the average martyr – she didn’t want an audience to her pain.” Meyer, 
Midnight Sun, 44.
26    Title of chapter 14 in Twilight (cf. 262; 263).
27    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 212 (“Silk over glass . . . frighteningly breakable”).
28    Edward’s criticized dominance shows in such sentences as, “What Bella wanted and 
what was best for Bella, were two very separate things.” Meyer, Midnight Sun, 219. Cf. 
Rebecca Housel, “The ‘Real’ Danger: Fact vs. Fiction for the Girl Audience,” in Twilight 
and Philosophy (eds R. Housel et al.), 177–190: “In any world other than the fantastical one 
created by Meyer, Edward would be jailed” (188).
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3.3 Self-Sacrifice: Christian Subtext
Both Bella’s willingness to vicariously sacrifice herself and Edward’s love-
inspired but self-punitive, ascetic determination display a Christian subtext. 
These (here gendered, but related) self-sacrificial scenarios owe their format 
to a Christian tradition in which both the expiatory and the unifying aspects 
of sacrifice, traditionally performed by offering sacrificial objects to the gods, 
have been reformed on the model of Christ’s sacrifice, that is, on the model of 
Christ offering himself vicariously for atonement. In the Christian tradition this 
format of self-sacrifice resulted in an archetype of ideal moral conduct, based 
on the idea of the imitatio Christi.
For several decades now, gender-critical scholars in religion have been dem-
onstrating how this seemingly gender-neutral model of ideal Christian con-
duct worked out to be gender specific from the early centuries onwards. The 
standards of female virtue and martyrdom did certainly have a lot in common 
with the ideal Christian virtues held out to men (in fact, philosophers such 
as Friedrich Nietzsche judge all Christian virtues to be ‘feminine’), but in fact 
ideal female virtue has been disclosed to be more submissive and, above all, 
more chaste and ‘immaculate’ than men’s.29
These gendered differences regarding the actual practice of ideal, self-
sacrificial moral conduct can also be noticed in Twilight. Edward admires 
above all his beloved’s kindness: “Bella was good. (. . .) – kind and self-effacing 
and unselfish and loving and brave – she was good through and through”.30 His 
own morality, however, is not warm-hearted but tight-lipped, resulting from 
the willpower he and his family must use to overcome their bloodlust and 
which, in Edward’s case, is being tested to the extreme because of Bella’s hyper-
attractive blood.
Two other male characters in the Twilight narrative, however, display a 
less stringent kind of self-sacrificial morality: Edward’s compassionate vam-
pire father, Carlisle Cullen, and Bella’s werewolf friend, Jacob Black. There is 
no room here to elaborate on the first character’s ‘super-compassion’,31 but 
I want to spend a few words on the latter character. Jacob Black is portrayed as 
an adolescent of the Quileute tribe, a (genuine) Native American clan living 
29    See Cobb, Dying to be men; Glenda McLeod, Catalogs of Women from Antiquity to the 
Renaissance (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1991); and bibliography in Grietje 
Dresen, Is dit mijn lichaam? Visioenen van het volmaakte lichaam in katholieke moraal en 
mystiek (Nijmegen: Valkhof Pers, 1998).
30    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 93.
31    Andrew Terjesen and Jenny Terjesen, “Carlisle: More Compassionate Than a Speeding 
Bullet?” in Twilight and Philosophy (eds R. Housel et al.), 49–60 (59).
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in a reservation near Forks, Washington. In folklore, the Quileute are said to 
be descended from wolves. This folklore tale is assimilated into the Twilight 
depiction of (part of) them as a human-werewolf shape-shifting pack, chang-
ing shape as soon as they sense menace, especially vampire menace. Jacob’s 
character develops into a rival to Edward for Bella’s love. Although throughout 
the series Bella prefers Edward, Jacob proves to be a genuine, loyal friend 
by the way he supports and empowers Bella during the numerous complica-
tions that go with human-vampire love. Actually, a “Team Jacob” has formed 
within the worldwide Twilight fandom, uniting fans that prefer Jacob’s soft 
looks and his ‘yielding’32 kind of love to Edward’s cold, ‘white’33 self-discipline. 
One could say that Jacob’s caring love (not only for Bella but, in the last vol-
ume, for her half-vampire daughter too) is characterized by a more ‘feminine’ 
format of self-sacrifice, despite his werewolf appearances.
4 “Blood Values”: On the Gendered Valuation of Sex-Specific Dealings 
with Blood
In recent decades, several gender-sensitive scholars of religion have high-
lighted the distinctive, gendered valuation of the way men and women have 
dealings with blood, especially in religious or ritualizing contexts. In these 
contexts, the intentional shedding of blood (not only in sacrifice but also, for 
instance, in defloration or blood-brother rituals, or in medical and military 
contexts) is associated with a hallowed, masculine connoted kind of power. 
The unintentional blood loss that is part of female fertility, however, is gener-
ally looked upon as impure. Both anthropological and psychoanalytical schol-
ars have sought an explanation for the common abhorrence of female blood 
and, on the other hand, for the privileged position of men in blood ritual and 
other intentional bloodshed. Because a similar, gendered way of dealing with 
blood features prominently in Twilight, I will outline here the theses of two of 
these scholars, the French philosopher and psychoanalyst, Julia Kristeva, and 
the American scholar of religion, Nancy Jay.
32    Cf. Rebecca Housel, “The Tao of Jacob,” in Twilight and Philosophy (eds R. Housel et al.), 
237–246.
33    Cf. Natalie Wilson, “Civilized Vampires Versus Savage Werewolves: Race and Ethnicity in 
the Twilight Series” in Bitten by Twilight (eds Click et al.), 55–70.
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4.1 Julia Kristeva: Abjection and the Horror of Female Blood
According to Julia Kristeva, the aversion to female blood loss might origi-
nate in the ambiguous reactions summoned by what she names the “mater-
nal body”. Sensory experiences that reactivate the sense of fusion associated 
with the maternal body tend to evoke defence, because they pose a threat to 
self-consciousness and to the capacity to distinguish oneself as a separate and 
unique individual. As such, these sensations evoke ‘abjection’, which, accord-
ing to Kristeva, is:
That state of uncertainty between subject and object that consciousness 
conceives as abject – state of uncertainty regarding the identity of the 
self and the other.34
Blood, and especially the blood women lose unintentionally, functions as 
a “matter out of place”, as interpreted by Mary Douglas, that is, as a material 
marker of disorder and lack of control. “Matter out of place” may even sym-
bolize the dangers threatening the boundaries of the social body, especially 
in times of social instability. Following on from Douglas’ hypotheses, Kristeva 
states:
Excrement and its equivalents (decay, infection, disease, corpse, etc.) 
stand for the danger to identity that comes from without: The ego 
threatened by the non-ego, society threatened by its outside, life by 
death. Menstrual blood, on the contrary, stands for the danger issuing 
from within the identity (social or sexual); it threatens the relationship 
between the sexes within a social aggregate and, through internalization, 
the identity of each sex in the face of sexual difference.35
According to Kristeva, the horror provoked by female blood is thus related to 
the abjection evoked by sensations recalling the maternal body. However, we 
may assume that the taboos surrounding menstrual blood will also be min-
gled with awe at the mysterious generative power to which women’s “bleeding 
34    Bibliographical sources and details on ‘abjection’ with respect to female blood in Grietje 
Dresen, “The Better Blood: On Sacrifice and the Churching of New Mothers in the Roman 
Catholic Tradition,” in Wholly Woman, Holy Blood (eds De Troyer et al.), 143–164 (158).
35    Kristeva, Powers of horror, 71.
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without dying” testifies.36 That at least is the hypothesis underlying the work 
of Nancy Jay.
4.2 Nancy Jay: Blood Sacrifice as “Birth Done Better”
Nancy Jay has been investigating the gendered features of blood sacrifice from 
the late 1970s until her untimely death in 1991. Her main study on the topic, 
Throughout Your Generations Forever, was published shortly after her death. 
Her initial interest in the subject started with the observation that in many 
societies blood both purifies and pollutes, and that this ambiguity seems to be 
linked to sex-specific dealings with blood. The voluntary and respected shed-
ding of blood, generally reserved to men, is set against the involuntary blood 
loss of menstruation and childbirth, which was commonly considered unclean 
and disqualified women as sacrificial performers. Jay was struck by the way 
gender had been ignored in most of the anthropological literature on blood 
sacrificial cults, which is all the more astonishing as most of these cults were 
accompanied by strict gender-related rules.
After having investigated the function of blood sacrificial rituals within sev-
eral patrilineal organized kinship structures, Jay concludes that it appears to be 
a strategy of patrilineal societies to outdo the procreative power of women by 
incorporating women’s mortal children into a spiritual and eternal community 
bound by the superior, intentional shedding of blood in sacrificial ritual: “The 
only action that is as serious as giving birth, which can act as a counterbalance 
to it, is killing”.37 To interpret and summarize the gendered, both expiatory and 
communal, transcendental function of blood sacrifice, she introduces the oft-
quoted description of blood sacrifice as “birth done better”:38
Sacrificially constituted descent, incorporating women’s mortal children 
into an ‘eternal’ (enduring through generations) kin group, in which 
membership is recognized by participation in sacrificial ritual, not merely 
by birth, enables a patrilineal descent group to transcend mortality in the 
36    Cf. Dresen, “The Better Blood” and other items in Wholly Woman, Holy Blood (eds De 
Troyer et al.).
37    Nancy Jay, “Sacrifice as Remedy for Having Been Born of Woman,” in Immaculate and 
Powerful: The Female in Sacred Image and Social Reality (eds C. W. Atkinson et al.; Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1985), 283–309.
38    Jay, “Sacrifice as Remedy for Having Been Born of Woman,” passim. Also passim in Jay, 
Throughout Your Generations.
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same process in which it transcends birth. In this sense, sacrifice is dou-
bly a remedy for having been born of woman.39
Jay’s interpretations regarding the mortality-transcending functions of blood 
sacrifice have often been modified or even criticized. She would have agreed to 
that, however, because she considered the concepts she used to be “lenses that 
will bring into focus analogous aspects of differing traditions”, and compared 
the continuing process of interpretation with women’s work, “never done but 
not consequently invalid”.40 I will make grateful use of her lenses in my analy-
sis of the “blood values” in Twilight, focusing on the protagonists’ gendered 
dealings with blood.
4.3 “It was a God Complex”: Edward’s Bloodlust as Control Over Life and 
Death
One of the first things that strikes Bella in the overall intriguing appearance 
of Edward is the colour of his eyes, changing from black to amber, and back. 
When she later learns he is a vampire, she hears the cause: Normal vampires, 
living on human blood, have fiery red eyes, but the Cullens’ eyes change to 
a warm-golden amber when they have consumed their diet of animal blood. 
Little by little this amber discolours to black again, indicating they urgently 
need a fresh input of blood. The animal blood diet does not still their thirst 
for human blood, yet it makes that thirst bearable. Throughout the series, the 
golden colour of the Cullens’ eyes is used to symbolize their unique vampire 
morality and bloodlust control; it serves as a marker, “a reflection of a mutual 
choice”.41 No doubt is left, however, about the constant threat of their razor-
sharp teeth and the venom behind. When Edward first meets Bella, in the biol-
ogy classroom, this threat is articulated, in his voice, as being one of the two 
faces in his head:
One was mine, or rather had been: The red-eyed monster that had killed so 
many people (. . .). It was a god complex, I acknowledged that – deciding 
who deserved a death sentence. (. . .) The other face was Carlisle’s. There 
was no resemblance between the two faces. They were bright day and 
blackest night.42
39    Jay, Throughout Your Generations, 40.
40    Jay, Throughout Your Generations, 13; 23.
41    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 13.
42    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 12.
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But there is no doubt left either about the face that ‘wins’: Carlisle’s face, with 
the soft golden eyes. The relationship between the protagonists changes from 
that of a ‘predator’ being attracted to his ‘prey’,43 into a mutual crush between 
‘lion’ and ‘lamb’. This still seems a threatening situation, but the thrill is will-
ingly accepted from both sides.44
The thrill of this gendered human-vampire crush is evoked again and 
again throughout the series, and highlighted in lengthy descriptions (or film 
sequences) of Edward’s lips lingering above Bella’s silky throat. Several critics 
pointed to the close connection between bloodlust, sexual desire and death in 
Twilight. Of course this connection characterizes all vampire stories (which, 
in their turn, borrow the associative causality between lust, sex and death from 
the Christian tradition), but in modern, atypical vampire narratives such as 
Twilight the principal undead figures are not the creepy, bloodsucking intrud-
ers any more. In Twilight, the vampire-classical, masculine-gendered associa-
tion between bloody violence, sexual transgression and (im)mortality has been 
stretched to make room for civilized, literally shiny45 creatures like the Cullens 
(while the antagonist vampires continue to be creeps, in varying degrees). 
Edward even manages not only to control his lust for Bella’s alluring blood but 
also to distinguish this lust from his being sexually attracted to her (“A new 
kind of desire was growing in me, working to override my self-control”)46 and 
then to control this latter temptation too. The urge of his instincts makes him 
perceive Bella as utterly fragile, “silk over glass”:
You don’t realize how incredibly breakable you are. I can never, never 
afford to lose any kind of control when I’m with you.47
However, after being married, old school Edward gives in to their sexual 
desires, and even succeeds in controlling his bloodlust through the passion of 
their first night (though leaving Bella covered with bruises).
43    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 10.
44    Meyer, Twilight, 240: “ ‘And so the lion fell in love with the lamb’ . . . he murmured. I looked 
away, hiding my eyes as I thrilled to the word. ‘What a stupid lamb’, I sighed. ‘What a 
sick, masochistic lion’.” Twilight merchandising has gratefully exploited the first sentence 
quoted.
45    The Twilight vampires tolerate sunlight, but in the sun their marble like skin sparkles as if 
it were covered with diamonds.
46    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 250.
47    Meyer, Twilight, 271 (emphasis in original).
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Over against the classical vampire as a symbol of transgression, sacrificing 
innocent life on the altar of his lust, Edward’s control over his bloodlust and 
his sexual lust symbolizes the high values that come with it. By his utter con-
trol, the sequence of lust, transgression and death (a sequence related to what 
Augustine termed original sin) is temporarily suspended. Edward may not 
have a soul, as he does not cease to emphasize, his continence is truly super-
human, or in fact heavenly, in the Augustinian sense.48 When finally he does 
have to transform Bella because she is dying in childbirth, covered in blood, 
he does so in an extremely controlled performance, both clinical and sensual, 
by first injecting his venom into her heart with a silver syringe, then carefully 
biting her all over her body, sealing the wounds with his tongue to keep the 
venom inside. By this solemn, ritual-like enactment, the transformation that 
was postponed throughout the narrative, is executed. That is to say, it is started, 
for Bella will have to burn on her ‘pyre’49 for three days, suffering unbearable 
inner pain, before the transformational process from human into vampire will 
be finished and the creation of new substance completed – comparable to the 
transformational process by burnt offering in Vedic sacrifice. The values that 
come along with Edward’s control of his bloodlust are most clearly depicted 
in the scene in which new born vampire Bella goes out for her first hunt with 
him. Bella makes a mess of herself, with animal blood all over her, but Edward 
manages to kill and drain a deer without spilling a drop of blood:
[N]ot a hair ruffled, not a spot on his white shirt. (. . .) I watched carefully 
to see how he was able to hunt so neatly.50
So Bella’s sacrificial executor is a godlike decider of life and death, a vegetarian 
ascetic inspired by humanist, not to say Christian, values, and a blinding white, 
neatly hunting bloodsucker (and a good lover, too!). His sacrificial power is 
closely connected to his planned shedding of blood, or refraining from doing 
so, in performances that display his superhuman control. As a result of this 
control, Bella can be incorporated into the loving, everlasting communion of 
the Cullens.
48    Cf. Michael Müller, Die Lehre des Hl. Augustinus von der Paradiesesehe und ihre Auswirkung 
in der Sexualethik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts bis Thomas von Aquin (Regensburg: Pustet, 
1954). Augustine’s anthropology is central to the theology of Meyer’s Mormon Church.
49    Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 389. The process of inner burning and the excruciating pain 
accompanying it is depicted from p. 375 onwards.
50    Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 424.
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4.4 Bella’s Blood: Temptation, Danger and Distress
The covers of the Twilight book series all have a simple, symbolic image in red 
and white against a black background. In the context of the respective imagery, 
the distinct red always refers to Bella’s blood and its pivotal meaning in the 
narrative, particularly to her dangerous attraction for Edward and her fragility 
both human and feminine.51 In Twilight (and especially in Edward’s version of 
the story, Midnight Sun), mention of Bella’s blood always implies lust, and thus 
danger. There is notable progress as to the acuteness of that danger, though; 
the scent of her blood first hit Edward like a “wrecking ball”, but later on he 
manages to “appreciate the bouquet”, even though he will not drink the wine52 
and calls it “exactly my brand of heroin”.53 Apart from the scent, it is the sub-
stance, “hot, wet and pulsing”,54 behind the rosiness of Bella’s skin that contin-
ues to tantalize Edward. He is not the only vampire to notice her extraordinary 
attraction, however; most of the complications in the storyline evolve, one way 
or another, out of this fictional fact. The attraction of her blood for vampires is 
a given that goes beyond Bella’s will. Within the narrative, it is associated with 
her utter fragility and vulnerability: In the first three volumes, being an attrac-
tive ‘snack’55 poses constant threats to her. Even during her visits to the well-
controlled Cullens, a paper cut in her finger or a broken glass bowl are enough 
to cause general panic.
So the key connotations of Bella’s blood in the Twilight Saga are temptation 
(from a vampire’s perspective) and thrill, danger or distress, from the reader’s 
or viewer’s perspective, which is connected to Bella’s view, as she is the main 
narrator. Sometimes it is Bella herself who mentions her own blood as a met-
aphor for desire running out of control. For example during the lovers’ first, 
tentative touch:
My blood was racing, and I wished I could slow it, sensing that this must 
make everything so much more difficult – the thudding of my pulse in 
my veins.56
51    On the cover of Twilight, a red apple evokes the symbolism of the Fall. On the New Moon 
cover, a withering white and red tulip (losing a feather-like red petal) represents ephem-
eral beauty and Bella’s mourning. On the Eclipse cover, an almost torn red ribbon symbol-
ises Bella trying to break away from her human life. On the final volume, a little red pawn, 
standing behind a tall white chess queen, represents the human shape Bella left behind.
52    Meyer, Twilight, 267.
53    Meyer, Twilight, 235.
54    Meyer, Midnight Sun, 14.
55    Meyer, Twilight, 331.
56    Meyer, Twilight, 241.
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At their first kiss, ‘racing’ even turns into ‘boiling’:
Edward hesitated to test himself (. . .), to make sure he was still in control 
of his need. And then his cold, marble lips pressed very softly against 
mine. What neither of us was prepared for was my response. Blood boiled 
under my skin, burned in my lips. (. . .) Immediately I felt him turn to 
unresponsive stone beneath my lips. (. . .) “Oops”, I breathed. “That’s an 
understatement.” His eyes were wild, his jaw clenched in acute restraint, 
yet he didn’t lapse from his perfect articulation. (. . .) “Wait for a moment, 
please.” His voice was polite, controlled.57
In contrast to Edward’s control, Bella’s racing and boiling blood emerges as a 
mark of wild, unruly desire.
As to Bella’s own intentional dealing with blood, her character shows a strik-
ing development, going from fainting in class at the mere sight of a drop of 
blood in Twilight,58 to deliberately cutting her arm in order to distract hostile 
vampires from killing Edward at the end of Eclipse, to drinking human blood 
(provided by Carlisle from his medical blood bank) to prevent her unborn half-
vampire baby from draining her from within in Breaking Dawn. The final step 
in this sequence of Bella’s dealing with blood is the aforementioned first hunt 
with Edward, during which she ruins her clothes with blood, but shows unprec-
edented self-control when they inadvertently stumble on human passers-by. 
Newborn vampires are known for not being able to resist human blood, but 
Bella just runs the other way to prevent herself from pouncing on them. This 
unseen newborn control also enables her to nurture her hybrid daughter, who 
combines a blood circulation with vampire features.
4.5 Female Sexuality and Bella’s Unintended and Intentional Dealings 
with Blood
There is another semantic field (associated with that of temptation and dan-
ger) that is attached to the mention of Bella’s blood. The passages referring to 
her racing and boiling blood also denote this field. It is the field of female sexu-
ality, here presented in terms of its traditional Christian valuation as a threat 
to male rationality – and as such paralleling the references to Edward’s ideal 
continence. Thanks to Edward’s control, Bella can unleash her desires, which 
are being depicted at length throughout the series. In the final volume, these 
desires and their consumption ‘materialize’ in Bella’s becoming pregnant with 
57    Meyer, Twilight, 247.
58    In chapter 5: “Blood type”.
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a child that threatens to kill her, because of its rapid growth. The beginning of 
this pregnancy, which is also the starting point of her transformation, is marked 
by Bella noticing that her menstruation (the ‘curse’) has stopped.59 The rapid 
growth of the foetus will eventually break her ribs and even her spine, forcing 
Edward to cut the baby out. The child is born in a fountain of blood, leaving 
Bella as a Christ taken from the cross, a “broken, bled out, mangled corpse”.60 
After being bitten into vampire existence, however, all her fatal injuries van-
ish; all her human and female weaknesses are gone. Her vampire appearances 
make her look like “a carving of a goddess”; her new, ‘bloodless’ sovereignty is 
symbolized on the cover of Breaking Dawn by the white chess queen. As a vam-
pire, Bella thus transcends the frailties, flaws and pains that come along with 
Eve’s curse. Her sex appeal is obviously not reduced, though; but both lovers 
are finally equal in beauty, strength and erotic agency.
Summarizing the values that Bella’s blood and her dealing with blood stand 
for, we must distinguish not just between the period before and that after her 
transformation, but in particular between the blood Bella involuntarily dis-
plays through her fragrance and alluring skin or loses because of her female fer-
tility, and her more or less intentional dealing with blood. The blood loss that 
is women’s part of the Fall (and that, within Bella’s part in Twilight, is enlarged 
to the ridiculous) comes to an end with her transformation. Thereafter, she is 
as strong, closed, controlled and marble-white as her new vampire family. In 
sharp contrast to this new looks, her alluring blood and unintended blood loss 
during delivery (described in details through Jacob’s eyes) evoke abjection, in 
the sense that Julia Kristeva has given to that term.
As for Bella’s intentional dealing with blood, her change is gigantic. It could 
be summed up in her own words, as in the Preface of the third book, Breaking 
Dawn): “The panic changed to bloodlust”.61 As such, her transformation 
reflects quite literally the dynamics of “rebounding violence” that the British 
scholar of ritual, Maurice Bloch, has described in his study on the function of 
blood sacrifice, Prey into hunter.62 In a similar dynamic of “prey into hunter”, 
59    Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 123.
60    Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 355.
61    Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 368.
62    Maurice Bloch, Prey into hunter: The politics of religious experience (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). Bloch uses the symbolism of prey and hunter to explain the sym-
bolic violence enacted in sacrificial ritual. By this ritually re-enacted violence (named 
as ‘rebounding violence’), the participants in sacrifice are transformed and their mortal 
transience is converted into being a participant in a transcendent entity. Clearly, this sym-
bolism and Bloch’s explanation resemble Jay’s description of blood sacrifice as ‘birth done 
better’. However, Bloch does not reflect upon the fact that the role of women in sacrifice 
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post-transformation Bella is included into the Cullens’ communion of mortal-
ity-transcending vegetarian hunters.
5 Bella’s Transformation, or: Becoming Who You Are
I return to the question in my introduction: What captivates the countless fans 
in this romantic vampire story that apparently represents such traditional val-
ues? There is no doubt that this fascination exists, first of all, in the “erotics 
of abstinence” that are expressed throughout the Twilight Saga. Nevertheless 
many critics have lamented the glorification of the female protagonist’s 
dependent character. Why are the devotees (many of whom suffer from self-
diagnosed “Obsessive Twilight Disorder”)63 not irritated by this dependency?
I suggest that the answer to this question must not only be sought in 
Edward’s (and Jacob’s) thrilling beauty, strength and composure, but also 
in characteristics of Bella with which fans can identify. Apart from the space 
for female (heterosexual) desire that is created through Edward’s continence, 
an appealing feature of Bella’s role appears to be her uniqueness, being chosen 
for eternity and, within this election, Edward’s very serious recognition of her 
vulnerability and fragility. Critics may deplore this ascription, but I think they 
must have forgotten how it feels to be a teenager. Being an adolescent (and 
a female adolescent, in particular) in a culture in which beauty and decisive 
agency are being overrated can make you feel very insecure if you do not yet 
know your own qualities. Bella is such a teenager not yet knowing her quali-
ties. She is just a plain, unselfish girl. A girl that is initially noticed by Edward 
because of her “mind shield” that prevents him from reading her thoughts. 
Despite that mind shield, he recognizes her uncertainty and ‘vulnerability’. 
I suppose that this outward recognition of Bella’s vulnerability is reassuring, 
especially for fans who sense themselves to be just as vulnerable. It makes 
Bella’s election even more special. A godlike lover that notices and respects 
your vulnerability: What teenager would not want that?
is usually strictly limited (although he mentions this fact, e.g. on p. 69: “[W]omen who 
are not virgins, especially menstruating women, are excluded from many aspects of the 
cults.”) Also he ignores the fact that in many cultures (e.g. in Christianity) women (here: 
as Eve’s daughters) are held responsible for mortal transience. An obliviousness that Jay 
showed to be common in studies on blood sacrifice.
63    Steven D. Greydanus, “Twilight Appeal: The cult of Edward Cullen and vampire love in 
Stephenie Meyer’s novels and the new film” (2008), on www.decentfilms.com/articles/
twilight (visited October 29, 2011).
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After her transformation, it is exactly her mind shield that proves to be 
Bella’s ‘gift’. Most of the vampires in Twilight have a special gift; Edward’s gift 
is his mind-reading, for example. These gifts tend to be an enlargement of 
the most characteristic quality they had when they were still human. Despite 
Bella’s apparent clumsiness as a human teenager, her mind shield appears to 
be interrelated with her capacity for self-control: “Then I realized what that 
might mean, if my ‘superpower’ was no more than exceptional self-control”.64
This capacity for self-control was being symbolized and fictionally ‘materi-
alized’ in the shield enabling Bella to protect her mind against the invasive gift 
of Edward and other vampires. She takes this protective shield with her into 
eternity. As the Saga runs toward the final battle (a battle with the reigning 
vampires, the Volturi, who want to kill her hybrid child) it turns out that Bella 
can externalize her shield and wrap it around those she loves as a protective 
cloak. So the quality Bella was unaware of when a teenager was her unusual 
capacity to protect her own mind; and she can use this same, now literally 
extended, capacity after her transformation to protect those she loves from 
unwanted intrusion. Externalizing and stretching her shield requires a lot of 
her self-control, but once she succeeds she operates on the battleground as a 
Madonna of the protective cloak.65 Or, indeed, as the cloaked chess queen on 
the final cover, being a symbol of idealized female power. Bella even succeeds 
in temporarily lifting her mind shield for Edward, which appears to be even 
harder than wrapping it around those she loves. She gives him a glimpse of her 
thoughts, lingering on their most exciting moments up till then:
I knew my shield better now. I understood the part that fought against 
separation from me, the automatic instinct to preserve self above all 
else. It still wasn’t anywhere as easy as shielding other people along with 
myself. I felt the elastic recoil again as my shield fought to protect me. 
(. . .) I concentrated even harder, dredging up the specific memories I’d 
saved for this moment.66
Many critics deplored the unrealistic romanticism of this vampire fantasy 
(“Unlike Bella, we don’t have the option of awakening to an eternal life or 
64    Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 466.
65    On Mary as a ‘bloodless’, yet empowering symbol of ideal female power (similar to Bella’s 
post-transformation figure), see Cleo McNelly Kearns, The Virgin Mary, Monotheism, and 
Sacrifice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
66    Meyer, Breaking Dawn, 752–753.
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experiencing undying romance”)67 and saw this as an escape from our human 
condition. Fans, however, are well aware that Twilight’s characters are fictional, 
as is shown by their comments and narrative revisions on fan blogs.68 Reading 
Twilight might indeed imply a temporary escape from reality, as reading fiction 
always does. Yet I trust that while enjoying this escape, fans do not appreciate 
Bella Swan as a model of second-sex compliance, but rather as an example 
of Nietzsche’s “becoming who you are” or as a duckling proving to be a swan 
(as her name already indicates). Certainly, Twilight readers cannot become 
immortals themselves, but the good news is that they know this perfectly well.
Julia Kristeva aptly described adolescence as a “syndrome of ideality” (refer-
ring to processes of idealization as understood by Melanie Klein): “The ado-
lescent believes that the Great Other exists and is pleasure itself”.69 Twilight 
undeniably reflects such Great Others. However, experiencing pleasure from 
fictional Great Others is less harmful than believing they really exist.
67    Jennifer L. McMahon, “Twilight of an Idol: Our Fatal Attraction to Vampires,” in Twilight 
and Philosophy (eds Housel et al.), 193–208 (206).
68    Cf. Bitten by Twilight (eds Click etal), Part II: “Biting into the Twilight Fandom,” 137–222 
(5 chapters).
69    Julia Kristeva, “Adolescence, a syndrome of ideality,” in Psychoanalytic Review 94 (2007): 
715–725 (719). Cf. Julia Kristeva, “The Adolescent Novel,” in Abjection, Melancholia, and 
Love: The Work of Julia Kristeva (eds J. Fletcher and A. Benjamin; London & New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 8–23.
© anne-mareike wetter, ���7 | doi ��.��63/9789004335530_0�3




“Judith . . . Isn’t she the one who cut off that general’s head?” is a common reac-
tion when the name of this intriguing woman is mentioned. In order to save 
her hometown Bethulia, Jerusalem, and ultimately Israel as a whole from the 
threat of the advancing Assyrian army, the widow Judith enters the enemy 
camp, beguiles all the men present – including the captain, Holofernes – and 
eventually decapitates the latter as he lies on his bed, completely intoxicated. 
Back in Bethulia, she orders the Israelites to rout the stunned Assyrians and 
loot their camp. The final scene depicts Judith as the leader of a triumphal 
procession towards Jerusalem, where she and the people dedicate the spoils to 
God. Judith then returns to her former life as a chaste and pious widow.
So much for the plot of this apocryphal book, which is usually dated 
to the second half of the second century BCE. Although it is presented as 
‘history’, the reader immediately notices the many anachronisms strewn 
throughout the text. These aberrations from ‘real’ history account for much 
of the book’s ironic quality. Moreover, they suggest that something other 
than historiography was the main concern of its author.
One feature that strikes even the casual reader, is the preoccupation with 
ritual in the book. Sacrificial acts seem to mark the key points of the narrative. 
Virtually every action of Judith or other Israelites is accompanied by ritual per-
formance. In addition to the conventional rites she engages in, Judith repeat-
edly takes an action out of its original context and, through verbal or other 
means, assigns it an added ritual and religious significance. It is this process of 
‘ritualization’, rather than the conventional sacrifices that gives religion in the 
Book of Judith its intriguing and versatile quality.
2 New Skins for Old Wine – Recent Advances in Sacrificial Theory
Until recently, scholars’ knowledge of ritual in general and of sacrifice in par-
ticular leaned heavily on a limited number of universal theories about these 
phenomena. All aimed at explaining ritual and sacrificial acts regardless of 
their particular geographical, religious, or social contexts. Unsurprisingly, over 
the past decades scrapes have appeared on the smooth surface of monolithic 
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theories of ritual and sacrifice. Their designers were criticized for wanting too 
much and too little at the same time – too much, because they presented their 
concepts as theoretical panacea for widely disparate phenomena, and too little, 
because their definitions of ritual and sacrifice proved too narrow to analyze 
anything that fell outside their immediate scope.1 Eventually, new paradigms 
replaced those that had thus far determined most research in these areas: 
1) universality was abandoned in favor of contextualization; 2) the assumed 
priority of myth over ritual made room for an interest in ritual on its own 
terms; 3) the notion of ritualization entered the discussion, bringing with it a 
new appreciation of the creative potential of ritual acts; and 4) definitions of 
sacrifice, which until that time had been rather static and had almost always 
included violence of some kind, made room for new, polythetic approaches 
to sacrifice.
The first point does not require much elaboration – instead of approaching 
ritual in general and sacrifice in particular as universal notions, scholars began 
to appreciate their unique quality and function in different cultural and social 
contexts.
The second and third point can both be linked to the work of Catherine Bell, 
although others certainly contributed to this paradigm shift as well. In Ritual 
Theory, Ritual Practice, Bell advocates an alternative, more action-oriented 
approach to those acts usually described as rituals. She insists that ritual not 
so much integrates separate or even opposing forces – for example, the beliefs 
held by society and the individual who has to conform to them – but rather 
creates a separation itself, namely between the sacred and the profane:
Viewed as practice, ritualization involves the very drawing, in and 
through the activity itself, of a privileged distinction between ways of 
acting, specifically between those acts being performed and those being 
contrasted, mimed, or implicated somehow. (. . .) Ritualization gives rise 
to (or creates) the sacred as such by virtue of its sheer differentiation 
from the profane.2
1    For a critical account of the development of ritual theory in general, see Catherine Bell, 
Ritual Theory, Ritual Practice (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1992). For the criticism voiced 
against at least some of the theories on sacrifice enumerated above, see David Janzen, The 
Social Meanings of Sacrifice in the Hebrew Bible. A Study of Four Writings (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
2004), 78–81.
2    Bell, Ritual Theory, 90–91.
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This focus on ritualization as a creative process, not bound to pre-defined 
rules, opens up perspectives for a much broader notion of what qualifies as 
ritual(ization). For Bell, ritual is not a specific type of activity directed towards 
what an underlying myth or belief system defines as sacred. It is the act of 
ritualization itself that creates a sacred sphere or space and, even more impor-
tantly, imbues ordinary objects and events with new meaning and significance 
when placed within a specific context. This notion seems to illuminate many 
of Judith’s actions, especially if we take some recent advances in the theory of 
sacrifice into account.
A relevant example of creative reconsideration of the nature and func-
tion of sacrifice can be found in the work of Kathryn McClymond. One of her 
contributions to the field is the insight that violence, bloodshed and actually 
killing may be significantly less central to many sacrificial practices than the 
dominant theories presuppose.
McClymond argues for the inclusion of a variety of other practices and sub-
stances, such as milk, oil anointments, and flowers. She states:
‘[S]acrifice’ as an authoritative concept is often appropriated within 
streams of religious communities to authorize practices other than tradi-
tional sacrifice. Sacrifice becomes a metaphor for other activity.3
This mechanism of ‘metaphorization’ contributes both to the “persistence of 
sacrifice as an authoritative category”4 even in the absence of the means to 
perform traditional sacrificial acts, and to the legitimation of the alternative 
practices.
Often the process at work here can be described as the “interiorization of 
ritual”, a term for which McClymond refers to the Israeli religion scientist Yael 
Bentor. Sacrifice along this line,
may pertain to a mental performance of the ritual; to the replacement 
of the ritual with a continuous process of life, such as breathing or eat-
ing; to a particular way of life, such as renunciation; to an actual perfor-
mance with an inner interpretation; to the replacement of the external 
ritual with an internal one, and so forth.5
3    Kathryn McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence. A Comparative Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins, 2008), 3.
4    McClymond, Beyond Sacred Violence, 155.
5    Yael Bentor, “Interiorized Fire Rituals in India and Tibet”, Journal of the American Oriental 
Society, 120 (2000): 594–613 (594).
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McClymond mentions prayer and asceticism as examples of practices falling 
into this category of metaphorical, or interiorized, sacrifice – two examples 
that will turn out to be highly significant for the study of Judith.
Turning to Judith, within the framework of ritualization, many actions and 
attitudes in at least three different areas can be construed as sacrificial: first of 
all, in Judith’s general lifestyle before she even comes into action on behalf 
of her community; second, in the prayers Judith offers both before and after 
the execution of her plans; and third, in the actions Judith undertakes to rescue 
the Israelites, which can be read as an appropriation of the biblical concept of 
‘War of YHWH’.
3 Sacrifice and the Character of Judith – A Matter of ‘Lifestyle’?
In the Book of Judith, the omnipresence of ritual is striking. Some of the ritual 
acts fall within the scope of conventional Temple sacrifice. Facing the threat 
of annihilation, the Israelites engage in what looks like an overkill of prayer, 
mourning rituals, and sacrifices (4:8–15), adorning even their livestock with 
sackcloth (4:10). Interestingly, the rituals in this case come after the more prac-
tical preparations against the Assyrian threat, like fortifying the border villages, 
laying up provisions and devising a defense strategy (4:4–7). God’s response is 
ambiguous – he “heard their voices and looked on their misery” (4:13), but does 
not take action. If do ut des is the rationale behind these sacrifices, something 
has clearly gone awry.
Unlike the religious rulers and the rest of the people, who plunge into official 
ritual and sacrificial acts but nonetheless seem to uphold the maxim “erst das 
Fressen, dann die Moral”,6 Judith has organized her entire life as a continuous 
sequence of ritual performances. She prefers a tent on the roof of her house to 
the comforts of the house itself; she wears her widow’s attire far beyond the 
regular period of mourning, and she fasts almost continually (8:5–6). Bentor’s 
words about the different shapes of interiorized sacrifice – especially a lifestyle 
marked by renunciation – come to mind.7
The text appears ambiguous about the rationale underlying Judith’s ascetic 
lifestyle. On the one hand, her widowhood is stressed (“Judith had been wid-
owed in her house for three years and four months”, 8:4; “she fasted all the 
days of her widowhood”, 8:5), implying that her lifestyle is an expression of 
prolonged mourning. On the other hand, verse 8 emphasizes her piety: “There 
6    German saying based on a line by Bertold Brecht’s Dreigroschenoper.
7    Bentor, Fire rituals, 594.
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was none who spoke evil of her, for she feared God greatly.” This evaluation 
suggests that Judith has devoted her life to the service of God, and that wid-
owhood has little to do with her choice of lifestyle. I suggest that the ambigu-
ity concerning Judith’s motivations serves a purpose. The text seems to imply 
that Judith presents the perfect candidate for the role she is about to take on. 
In order for her to do what she does – leave the village on her own, engage in 
close contact with male adversaries, and maintain a reputation that is above 
all reproach – she must be a widow, that is, no longer bound by the restraints 
applying to virgins or married women, yet still visibly attached to her deceased 
husband. At the same time, it has to be clear that her first priority is to serve 
God. Through her ascetic lifestyle, she removes herself from the mundane con-
cerns occupying the rest of the people, and instead maintains close contact 
with a more spiritual reality. Consequently, she can speak with authority about 
God’s purposes with Israel.
Initially, Judith seems to be so absorbed in her religious duties that the dis-
tress of her people hardly touches her. It is only when the people confront their 
leaders with an ultimatum – “if God does not deliver us within five days, we 
will submit to the Assyrians” – that she enters the narrative. Her first action 
consists of a rebuke of the elders that almost takes the shape of a sermon. 
Judith has her own ideas about how the history of Israel should be interpreted, 
and knows that the plans of the God she so “greatly fears” (8:8) cannot be fath-
omed, nor can he himself be put to the test. Intriguingly, she herself seems to 
know exactly what God is planning to do: without any hesitation, she promises 
the elders divine deliverance through her hand (8:32–34).
Once the elders have left, Judith starts to pray – not quite coincidentally, 
one may assume, at the same time as the “incense offers were being brought 
to the house of God in Jerusalem” (9:1). According to the biblical record, these 
incense offers were installed as part of the worship of Israel during its founda-
tional period as the people of God: the desert wanderings.8 Judith 9:1 suggests 
that there is a continuous line from the divine command spoken to Moses in 
Exodus to the practice in Judith’s time, interrupted only by the catastrophe of 
the Exile. The timing of Judith’s prayer thus functions to place her words in the 
context of the ritual routine of Israel. More specifically, it suggests that Judith’s 
words are not just a spontaneous expression of her own individual thoughts 
and feelings, but must be interpreted within the framework of official worship. 
What perhaps would not have counted as official worship by itself (after all, 
a prayer composed and uttered by a widow on the roof of her private home 
hardly qualifies as such), is legitimized and ritualized by means of the crucial 
8    Exod. 30:1–8; 40:26–27.
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side remark about its timing. And by extension, Judith, the ritual actor, effec-
tively joins the ranks of the priests as they address God in their daily prayers. I 
 suggest that we see at work here the mechanism McClymond describes as ‘met-
aphorization of sacrifice’. Based on the official regulations regarding incense 
offerings, Judith is the wrong person (neither a Levite nor a man) in the wrong 
place (on a roof in a border city, not in the Temple of Jerusalem). Conventional 
sacrifice, therefore, is not an option available to her. However, metaphorized 
or interiorized sacrifice is. Through this process, Judith as the sacrificial actor 
and her prayer as the object offered are legitimized, while simultaneously the 
legitimacy of the official sacrificial cult is affirmed.9
3.1 ‘Holy’ War and ‘Holy’ Warrior
Judith’s prayer is intriguing, not just as a ritual per se, but also because it con-
tains several instances of ritualization on the level of content. Initially, quite 
mundane actions and events are imbued with religious significance through 
the way in which Judith connects them with each other and with her own situ-
ation. Taking the rape of Dinah and the subsequent revenge of her brother 
Simeon on the Shechemites as a paradigm for her own planned actions, Judith 
construes both Simeon’s and her own deed as instances of ‘Wars of YHWH’, 
which are acts of aggression that God not only condones but actually insti-
gates. According to Judith, and in deviation from the genotext in Genesis 34, 
it is God who puts the sword in Simeon’s hand (Jth. 9:3; Gen. 34:25) and ulti-
mately causes the downfall of the Shechemites (Jth. 9:4; Gen. 34:26–29). 
Besides, Judith considers the threat of the Assyrians primarily a threat against 
the Temple: “They plan to disgrace the temple where you are worshiped and 
to chop off the corners of your altar with swords” (Jth. 9:8) She thereby takes a 
military invasion out of its original context (an attempt to subdue the popula-
tion of a rebellious province) and inserts it into the context of God’s struggles 
with his human challengers.
Judith has often been seen as a female warrior,10 and in some cases, a holy 
warrior as well. I will develop the characterization as holy warrior based not 
9     Interestingly, Judith is not the only one whose prayer is to be counted as incense offering. 
In a psalm attributed to David, we read: “Let my prayer be established as incense before 
you, the lifting of my hands as the evening sacrifice” (Psalm 141:2/140:2, LXX). Apparently, 
the substitution of sacrifice by prayer was no new invention – what is new in Judith, per-
haps, is the application of this concept to a woman.
10    Thus, e.g., Craghan: “The beauty process in 10:2–4 is really a disguise. Judith is actually 
the female warrior (. . .) who has mapped out her military strategy and concealed her 
weapon, viz., her beauty. Thus the female sets out to rescue the male, using the most 
 �07Sacrificing Judith
only on Judith’s actions in the Assyrian camp, but also on the prayers and prac-
tices framing them. The concept of ‘holy war’ is well-attested in other biblical 
sources, notably the beginning of the Deuteronomistic history. Perhaps a more 
appropriate and less suggestive term is ‘War of YHWH’, for God is consistently 
portrayed as the instigator of, and main actor during, these battles. Patrick 
Miller, for example, describes warfare in early Israel as a synergism of divine 
and human efforts.11 Consequently, a War of YHWH was a matter of ritual as 
well as warfare: it was preceded by oracle inquiry, conducted either by a priest 
or the military leader prior to battle in order to assess the chances of victory, 
and the ritual purification of the camp and the warriors. Miller goes on to 
claim: “Most important of all, however, was the practice of herem, the devotion 
of the spoils – both men and property – to Yahweh.”12 Israel was not to fight for 
its own economic advancement, but exclusively for the honor of God.13
All of this suggests that those participating in a War of God were expected to 
engage in their martial activities as a religious service. And perhaps the notion 
of (self-)sacrifice is not too far-fetched in this context. Susan Thistlethwaite, in 
any case, summarizes the requirements for a holy warrior as follows:
Warriors who had not a singleness of heart were sent home (Deut. 20:5–9). 
Only warriors who looked on war making as sacrifice, who ‘offered them-
selves willingly’ (Judg. 5:2), could go. The full support of the priests and 
cult was behind the war (Deut. 20:2; 1 Sam. 10:1) and the warrior became 
a kind of holy person, a priest, in the war (1 Sam. 21:14; Isa 13:3). Ritual 
taboos regarding contact with a woman prior to battle apply (1 Sam. 21:4; 
2 Sam. 11:11).14
Of course, in the original setting of pre-monarchic and monarchic Israel 
Thistlethwaite refers to, the confrontation with the enemy on the battlefield 
effective weapon – beauty.” See John F. Craghan, “Esther, Judith and Ruth: Paradigms 
for Human Liberation,” Biblical Theology Bulletin 12 (1988): 11–19. Similarly, C. A. Moore 
argues: “Just as a soldier facing battle takes much care preparing himself and his arms, 
so our Female Warrior dressed herself with much deliberateness.” See Carey A. Moore, 
Judith, The Anchor Bible, vol. 40 (New York: Garden City, 1985), 200.
11    Patrick D. Miller Jr., The Divine Warrior in Early Israel (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1973), 156.
12    Miller, Divine Warrior, 157.
13    See also N. Lohfink, “hrm”, in Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Alten Testament 
(eds G. J. Botterweck and H. Ringgren, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1982), vol. III, 192–213.
14    Susan Brooks Thistlethwaite, “You May Enjoy the Spoil of Your Enemies. Rape as a Biblical 
Metaphor for War,” Semeia 61 (1993): 67.
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would have been a male prerogative.15 Nevertheless, I suggest that Judith’s per-
formance of her rescue mission bears many resemblances to the practices and 
attitudes Miller and Thistlethwaite describe. Except from her sex, Judith quali-
fies as the ideal participant in a War of YHWH. She is not bound to her home 
by husband or children. Her sexual purity is unquestioned. She casts her own 
deeds within the framework of Israel’s cultic life, taking on the double role of 
priest and warrior. And last but not least, her actions can be interpreted as a 
sacrifice on behalf of her people: she is willing to risk the integrity of her body 
and ultimately her life for the greater good.
The preparations Judith undertakes after having finished praying underline 
the ritual character of her actions. She takes off her sackcloth, bathes, anoints 
herself with oil, and puts on jewelry and festive clothes. Of course, the most 
common-sense reasoning behind this is the wish to “beguile every man who 
sets eyes on her” (10:4) – one of the most crucial conditions for her plan to suc-
ceed. Claudia Rakel, however, sees a religious significance too:
Stärker als die Tatsache, dass Judit sich schön macht und damit in der 
Tradition vieler biblischer Frauengestalten steht, stechen die Parallelen 
zwischen ihrer Kleidung und der priesterlichen Garderobe ins Auge.16
André LaCocque, on the other hand, suggests that Judith
adorns herself as a sacrificial victim. From now on the enemy’s attention 
will be forced upon her instead of on the whole of Bethulia. She makes of 
herself a substitutive offering.17
Rakel and LaCocque obviously handle different approaches to Judith’s prepara-
tions. Rakel casts her in the role of the priest, who enjoys the special protection 
of the deity, while LaCocque perceives in her the sacrificial victim, consciously 
leaving behind any kind of protection. But these two approaches may not be 
15    The Hebrew Bible does record the deeds of some individual women who contributed 
decisively to the outcome of an armed conflict, e.g., Hagar (Josh. 6), and Deborah and Jael 
(Judg. 4).
16    Claudia Rakel, Judit – über Schönheit, Macht und Widerstand im Krieg. Eine feministisch-
intertextuelle Lektüre (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), 131. (Translation: 
“Stronger than by the fact that Judith adorns herself and doing so ranges herself into the 
tradition of many outstanding women in the Bible, we are struck by the analogy between 
her clothing and the priestly attire”).
17    André LaCocque, The Feminine Unconventional. Four Subversive Figures in Israel 
(Nottingham: Wipf & Stock, 2005), 47.
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mutually exclusive, if we read Judith’s mission as part of a War of God, and 
accept Thistlethwaite’s claim that warriors “became a kind of holy person, 
a priest”, and were simultaneously expected to “offer themselves willingly.”18
It is clear that Judith is setting the actions she is about to take apart from her 
everyday life. She changes her location and her outfit, and in the next verse pre-
pares a number of food items, which sharply contrast with her habit of fasting 
almost continually. This raises the question how the ritual-like demarcation 
between ordinary life and rescue mission can be interpreted. If ritualization is 
about the creation of a (religious) context that is set apart from more ordinary 
actions,19 then what, in this case, is the ‘religious context’, and what the ‘ordi-
nary’? What, if anything, can be read as ‘sacrifice’? Is Judith indeed engaging in 
the ritual purification required of a holy warrior before entering battle? Or do 
her preparations, quite to the contrary, signify a departure from an everyday 
life that is characterized by a rigorous ritual routine – a routine that could be 
construed as the internalization of sacrificial practice – which she is willing 
to exchange for a worldlier lifestyle for the duration of her mission? Or would 
such a strict separation between ‘ordinary’ and ‘religious’ be based on false 
assumptions in the case of Judith’s mission? Would it not be more fitting to 
speak of different, but nonetheless connected domains, in which Judith gives 
shape to her religious life with respect to the notion of sacrifice, albeit in dif-
ferent ways in both domains?
I suggest that the latter is the case. It is true that Judith’s mission into the 
Assyrian camp is a temporary departure from her customary life of austerity 
and seclusion into a world of luxury, sensuality, and violence. Judith’s life is 
acknowledged to be marked by great piety – it consists, as it were, of a con-
tinuous sequence of ritualizing, even sacrificial acts, and these acts create the 
overarching context within which all Judith’s actions must be understood. This 
includes the excursion into the enemy camp, which is neither a sharp break 
from her normal life of piety, nor a ritual act which, through its extraordinary 
quality, would somehow devalue this life as ordinary in the sense of mundane. 
It is, rather, quite literally “out of the ordinary” – exceptional, but firmly rooted 
in Judith’s daily practice of faith. Additionally, Judith’s mission bears witness 
to how she persistently gives shape to her own ritual reality, a reality that is 
embedded in the myths and rituals of Israel, but reinvented in both a creative 
and autonomous way.
18    Thistlethwaite, Enjoy, 67.
19    Bell, Ritual, e.g. 90.
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3.2 In the Enemy’s Camp
At least part of Judith’s creativity is rooted in the many double entendres that 
will characterize the narrative from now on: acts and words which are per-
fectly comprehensible on a profane level gain a different or added significance 
if placed within the ritual context Judith creates wherever she goes.
A first incident worth noting is the encounter between Judith and the town 
elders and guardsmen at the city gate of Bethulia: “When they saw her, and 
how her face was changed, and how different her clothing was, they mar-
veled greatly at her beauty . . .” (Jth. 10:7). At first sight, it is Judith’s physical 
attractiveness that is at stake here. But the change in Judith’s appearance can 
be appreciated on another level too. Several readers have noted the parallels 
between Judith and Moses.20
I suggest that Jth. 10:7 contains another subtle allusion to the famous first 
leader of the Israelites. After all, Moses’ appearance, too, was changed due 
to an encounter with God (Exod. 34:30, 35). And even though the vocabulary 
describing the reaction of the onlookers differs (thaumazō in the case of Judith, 
phobeō / eggizō in the case of Moses), I would claim that the parallel is at least 
implied: the change that has come over Judith is something more than dress 
and make-up can accomplish. As was the case with Moses, some of the glory of 
God seems to have rubbed off on her.21
Naturally, the Assyrians see only the extremely attractive woman approach-
ing them. Even though they do not strictly need her assistance to triumph over 
the Israelites – after all, Bethulia is on the verge of surrender – they are eager to 
oblige when she demands to speak to their captain. Holofernes, too, is immedi-
ately taken in by Judith’s looks and promises. And quite contrary to his scornful 
treatment of the religion of the other peoples he has subdued, he shows an 
almost touching concern for Judith’s ritual purity, wondering what she will eat 
once her own provisions have run out (12:2). Judith, however, promises him 
victory before that will be the case. On a profane level, then, the food Judith 
had brought to the Assyrian camp with her is part of her performance, under-
lining how swiftly she will lead Holofernes to victory. On another level, how-
ever, it spans a bridge between her pious life in Bethulia and her mission in 
20    Jan Willem van Henten, “Judith as a Female Moses: Judith 7–13 in the Light of Exodus 17, 
Numbers 20 and Deuteronomy 33:8–11,” in Reflections on Theology and Gender 
(eds Athalya Brenner and Fokkelien van Dijk-Hemmes, Kampen: Kok-Pharos, 1994), 33–48.
21    Of course, whereas appearance in the sense of attractiveness never seems to have played 
a role for Moses’ acceptance as divinely ordained leader, the ‘radiance’ of Judith’s looks is 
more ambiguous. She is always in the first place a beautiful woman, and only those with 
very sharp eyes will see more in her than seductive curves and appealing facial features.
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the Assyrian camp. Her dress and location may change, but no Assyrian food, 
and certainly no Assyrian man will enter her body. Judith keeps herself apart – 
sacred – from anything that could dilute the sharp border between her body 
and the bodies of the Assyrians.
Judith’s nightly excursions from the camp also serve a double purpose. On a 
practical level, they create a precedent, so that her flight with Holofernes’ head 
in her bag is not immediately noticed as such. But they also serve to underline 
the separation between Judith and the Assyrians – Judith uses her outings to 
wash herself clean from any traces of contact with the enemy – and to frame 
her actions within the ritual context that has determined her entire life up to 
this point.
Even during the fatal drinking bout, Judith sticks to her own provisions, 
underlining the boundary between her and the men surrounding her. Once 
Judith is alone with Holofernes, the most (in-)famous scene of the narrative 
unfolds. Compared to the elaborate and lengthy preparations of the circum-
stances that have led up to this event, the scene is surprisingly short. In only 
eight verses, Judith prays for strength (13:4–5), grasps Holofernes’ sword (13:6), 
prays again (13:7), severs his head (13:8), takes the head and the canopy of the 
bed to her maidservant (13:9), and, together with her maidservant, returns to 
Bethulia to announce that “with us, God, our God, has worked power again in 
Israel, and might against the enemies” (13:11). The visual arts seem to glory 
in this scene – apparently, the perceived paradox between the beautiful, pious 
widow and the truculence of Holofernes’ assassination speaks to the imagi-
nation. In some of the paintings, a sacrificial interpretation seems to suggest 
itself.22 Holofernes lies on his bed as though it were an altar, and the streams of 
blood from his neck remind one of the blood of the animal victims so central 
for Temple sacrifice. Is it possible, then, to read Judith’s murder of Holofernes 
as related to the animal sacrifices offered to God on a regular basis? Does 
Holofernes, for example, perform the function of a Girardian scapegoat, who 
has to die in order for peace to be restored? Perhaps. Nevertheless, the wording 
of the Greek text suggests otherwise. Judith 13:8 reads:
And she struck his neck twice with (all) her strength, and took his head 
from him.
The keywords in this verse – patassō (strike), trachèlon (neck), and perhaps 
also ischus (strength) are not at all reminiscent of cultic sacrifice. Rather, they 
seem to point again to the concept of the War of God and of God’s dealings 
22    See, e.g., the works by Caravaggio and Artemisia Gentileschi.
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with those who do not submit to his rule. The neck, especially when accompa-
nied by the attribute sklèros (stiff, stubborn) or the verbal form sklèrunō (make 
stubborn, harden) is the body part that symbolizes precisely this refusal to bow 
to God’s authority.23 More than once, God’s response is to strike (patassō) the 
offender (Israelite or otherwise) with hunger, disease, or just straightforward 
death.24 Of course, the one who strikes does not have to be divine; the verb 
often describes inter-human aggression as well.25 An interesting example is 
the struggle between David and Goliath, where the same word as in Judith 13:8 
is used to describe David’s attack on the giant. Last but not least, in some cases, 
God explicitly commands his people to strike, as in Deut. 7:1–2:
And the Lord your God brings you into the land, into which you go to 
possess it, and removes great nations before you [. . .], and when the Lord 
delivers them into your hands, then you must strike them; you must 
destroy them completely: you must not enter into a covenant with them 
or have compassion on them.
I would suggest that the context provided here and in similar verses offers a 
more plausible parallel for the scene in Judith 13. Holofernes is no lamb being 
led to ritual slaughter, but an enemy whom God has given into Judith’s hands. 
This is not to say that there is no ritual or even sacrificial undercurrent to this 
scene. It is the most decisive moment of Judith’s mission as God’s warrior. As 
such, it partakes in the sacrificial character of every one of God’s wars. True 
to his command in Deut. 7:2, Judith makes sure that her enemy is destroyed 
completely.
3.3 The Offering of the Cursed Thing
A final hint that it is the context of ‘Holy War’ that imparts meaning to Judith’s 
actions can be found in the concluding scenes of the narrative. Having arrived 
at Jerusalem, the first thing the people and Judith do is offer their “whole burnt 
offering, and their voluntary offerings, and their gifts” (Jth. 16:18). In addition, 
in verse 19,
Judith dedicated (anethèken) all the equipment of Holofernes, which the 
people had given her, and the canopy, which she herself had taken from 
his bed, she gave to God as a cursed thing (anathèma).
23    See, e.g., Deut. 10:16; 31:27; 2 Chron. 30:8; 36:13; Neh. 9:16–17.
24    E.g., Exod. 3:20; 9:15; Deut. 28:22, 27, 35.
25    E.g., Deut. 19:4, 6, 11; Josh. 13:12, 21; 19:47; Judg. 1:5, 8, 10, 12, 25; 1 Sam. 17:49; 18:7.
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Here, another detail that I had tentatively interpreted as hinting in the direc-
tion of a War of God, is confirmed by the text itself. In most cases, the Hebrew 
equivalent of anathèma is ḥerem (devoted thing, devotion or ban), a terminus 
technicus from the semantic field of the War of YHWH.26 The precise mean-
ing of the term is debated, ranging from violent interpretations (‘destroy com-
pletely’) to more moderate proposals (‘devote to God’, ‘separate from society’).27 
What counts here is that by using the specific term anathèma, the author 
places Judith’s actions within the context of Holy War, known to him from the 
literary conventions of other biblical sources.
If Judith’s role as holy warrior had not yet been firmly established before, 
this is established now. Moreover, her motivations for taking the canopy of 
Holofernes’ bed (Jth. 13:9) become clear. At the time, this action had seemed 
rather nonsensical – in any case, carrying a large piece of cloth would have 
increased the risk of being detected. It does, however, fit in perfectly with 
Judith’s self-understanding as a warrior of God. Killing the enemy was not 
enough – he, or some object symbolizing him, had to be devoted – → anathèma – 
to God, in order to really complete her mission.
3.4 The LORD Almighty Resisted him with Feminine Hands . . .
Of course, before Judith dedicates the spoils of her victory to God, she func-
tions as the leader of a procession towards Jerusalem. In the psalm (Jth. 16:1–17) 
she proclaims during this procession, some of the tentative interpretations 
that had only been based on implications in the text (such as the sacrificial 
nature of Judith’s prayer, or the self-identification of Judith as warrior of God) 
are now confirmed.
To greet the victorious soldiers with songs of praise had always been a tra-
ditional task for the women of Israel.28 In that sense, Judith seems to return 
here to the conventional female sphere, and to leave the role of ‘holy warrior’ 
behind. There are, however, several details that suggest otherwise: the peculiar 
identification of Judith’s own body with the land of Israel (Jth. 16:4), and her 
reference to sacrifices and burnt offerings (Jth. 16:16). The first seems to suggest 
a more literal approach to sacrifice, with Judith as both priest and sacrificial 
26    See, e.g., Lev. 27:28; Num. 21:2; Deut. 13:16–17; 20:17; Josh. 6:18, 21; Judg. 1:17; 1 Sam. 15:3, 8–9.
27    See, e.g., W. K. van der Molen, Een ban om te mijden. Bouwstenen voor een bijbels-
theologische verkenning (PhD diss, University of Groningen, 2008).
28    Examples range from Miriam (Exod. 15:20–21) to Deborah (Judg. 5) and Jephta’s daughter 
(Judg. 11:34) to the women expressing their admiration for David and contempt for Saul in 
their songs (1 Sam. 18:6–7).
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victim mediating between God and his people, while the latter advocates a 
more interiorized form of sacrifice.
Judith 16:4 reads:
He [Assur] said to light my borders on fire,
and to kill my young men with the sword,
and my nursing women he put to the ground,
and my little ones he gave up for plunder,
and my virgins he despoiled.
There is some uncertainty about the referent of the first person pronouns in 
this verse. Since Judith is the speaking subject of these words, grammatically, 
they must refer to her. However, to understand the verse in this way would 
mean to construe Judith as the ‘proprietor’ of the borders, young men, nursing 
women, little ones, and virgins mentioned here. The question then arises who 
‘owns’ all of these individuals. Whose borders are being lit on fire, whose young 
men killed with the sword? Israel’s? Judith’s? Judith-as-Israel’s? God’s? Judith-
as-God’s? The ambiguity remains unresolved. There are certainly instances 
in which Judith is identified or identifies herself with the people of Bethulia 
or even Israel as a whole. At other times, however, the text emphasizes the 
discrepancy between Judith on the one hand and the population of Israel/
Bethulia on the other. Put very briefly, the people are the passive object of 
Judith’s active salvific actions. Perhaps, then, the identification must be sought 
in a different direction. In fact, Judith seems to occasionally identify herself 
with the God of Israel, or at least to occupy a middle position between the 
people and the deity: she feels competent to speak in God’s name without hav-
ing received any explicit instructions from him (for example, Jth. 8:15–37), and 
she ascribes her actions to him, although he is not otherwise mentioned in the 
text (for example, Jth. 13:11). I would suggest that the psalm is another instance 
of Judith identifying herself, at least to some extent, with Israel’s God.
Perhaps Judith’s self-characterization through her psalm can be construed 
as an instance of ritualization in the extreme. Through the roles she takes on – 
priest, self-sacrificing holy warrior, savior of her people, and ultimately rep-
resentative of God – Judith herself gains a sacred quality. One might say that 
she is an example of what Mauss and Hubert see as the function of sacrifice in 
general: communication between the profane world of the worshipper and the 
sacred world of the divine.29 Offering her body for the sake of the community, 
29    H. Hubert and M. Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1964).
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Judith becomes this means of communication between God and his people. 
In the process, she herself is made holy – at least for as long as her sacrificial 
role lasts, and perhaps even for the rest of her life. After all, her spatial removal 
from the rest of the community (Jth. 8:5; 16:21) and her refusal to enter into a 
new marriage (16:22) underline how far removed Judith is from the mundane 
reality surrounding her.
3.5 Every Sacrifice is too Small . . .
Towards the end of the psalm, Judith makes another noteworthy remark, 
this time in the direction of a metaphorical or interiorized understanding of 
sacrifice:
For every sacrifice is (too) small for a sweet fragrance, and every bit of fat 
falls short as a burnt offering for you; but whoever fears the Lord is great 
through them all (Jth. 16:16).
What was only implied in the beginning is now put into so many words: sac-
rifice per se is legitimate, but not enough. It is all about the interiorization of 
‘fear of the Lord’ – a mind-set that Judith personifies. The reader is reminded 
of passages like 1 Sam 15:22,30 where Samuel rebukes Saul for wanting to sac-
rifice the plunder of the Amalekites instead of destroying it, or Micah 6:6–8,31 
where Micah confronts the people for their tendency to offer impressive sac-
rifices instead of obeying God. Protestant theologians have been tempted to 
read a dismissal of all cultic service in(to) these verses. However, this conclu-
sion seems unwarranted. Neither Judith nor the prophets condemn sacrifice 
as such. Rather, they insist that it must be accompanied by obedience to God.
4 Conclusions
It seems safe to say that through her prayers and the dedication of her acts 
to God, Judith consistently transfers her sometimes highly dubitable behavior 
30    Samuel inquires of Saul: “Does God delight in burnt offerings and sacrifices as much as in 
obeying God? To obey is better than sacrifice, and to heed is better than the fat of rams” 
(1 Sam. 15:22).
31    Micah wonders: “Will God be pleased with thousands of rams, with ten thousand rivers of 
olive oil? Shall I offer my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of 
my soul? He has shown you, o mortal, what is good. And what does God require of you? 
To act justly and to love mercy and to walk humbly with your God” (Micah 6:7–8).
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(risking her sexual purity, seduction, duplicity, and ultimately murder) into a 
ritual/religious context. In the Book of Judith as a whole, we find conventional 
ritual and sacrificial acts side by side with instances of ritualization and inter-
nalized or metaphorical sacrifice. The sacrificial practice at the Temple contin-
ues despite – and in part because of – the Assyrian threat, and is still observed 
at the very end of the narrative (Jth. 16:18–19). Simultaneously, Judith engages 
in, or even invents, alternative practices. Some of these, such as Judith’s asceti-
cism and prayers, could be categorized as internalizations of traditional prac-
tices appropriate for a woman who, after all, was not allowed to participate 
in traditional Temple sacrifice. In all cases of alternative sacrifice throughout 
the book, then, one deviation from conventional practice is the change of the 
person who performs the sacrifice. In addition, the nature of the object to be 
offered is altered (fasting and praying come in the place of animal or plant 
offerings) as well as the location (Judith’s roof and the enemy camp instead of 
the Temple). Perhaps the most radical change is connected with Judith’s self-
identification as ‘warrior of God’, which implies the double role of priest and 
sacrificial victim.
Considering these alterations in virtually all areas pertaining to the notion 
of sacrifice, what I have construed as sacrifice in the Book of Judith seems so 
far removed from the standard practice at the Jerusalem Temple – which was 
still fully functional at the time Judith was written – that the legitimacy of my 
reading may well be questioned. Is not the whole notion of ‘interiorization’ 
or ‘metaphorization’ of sacrifice a (post-)modern one, far removed from the 
ancient author’s intellectual horizon? Certainly, this author would not have put 
the same labels on the actions and attitudes of his protagonist. Nevertheless, 
in the absence of the Temple, rabbinic Judaism would develop a metaphorized 
approach to sacrifice, substituting it with elements like prayer, Torah study and 
fasting. Is it really so far-fetched to detect a similar tendency in the Book of 
Judith? Perhaps discontented with the standard procedure of Temple sacrifice, 
the author of Judith may have started looking for alternatives. This is not to 
imply that the Book of Judith discredits the sacrificial practice at the Temple in 
general. Throughout the book, much emphasis has been put on the centrality 
of the holy city and the sanctuary; in fact, it is the “sanctuary and the Temple 
and the altar” that Judith sets out to rescue (Jth. 8:24).
Nevertheless, there are a few indications that conventional sacrifice was 
seen as ‘necessary but insufficient condition’ for proper worship of God. In 
response to the extensive sacrifices the Israelites offer upon hearing of the 
Assyrian threat, the narrator recounts that “God heard their [the Israelites’] 
voices and looked on their misery” (Jth. 4:13). God does not, however, come into 
action at this point in the narrative – do ut des does not work in this instance, 
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perhaps due to the mind-set of the people, which Judith describes as “testing 
(or blackmailing?) God” (Jth. 11:8). Judith’s attitude and actions form a positive 
contrast: she leads a life of interiorized sacrifice, but does not expect anything 
in return. She asks God to reveal his power through her, but only in order to 
“make all your peoples and all the tribes know the knowledge that you are God, 
the God of all power and might, and that there is no other shielding the people 
of Israel but you” (Jth. 9:14).32 And last but not least, she is willing to become 
the sacrificial victim herself – an attitude which, perhaps, the author of Judith 
would find fitting for the people of Israel as a whole.
32    Perhaps it is also significant that Judith is a woman, and therefore excluded from regular 
Temple sacrifice. It would lead much too far to characterize the author of Judith as a femi-
nist avant la lettre, but he does seem to handle a rather broad definition of who and what 
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Sacrifice and Islamic Identity
Abdelilah Ljamai
1 Introduction
In recent years, representatives of the monotheistic religions in the Netherlands 
have debated the subject of sacrifice. These discussions took place against the 
background of a more general debate on religious discourse and identity. For 
Jews, Christians and Muslims the position of religion within modern society 
poses both a challenge and a problem. For Jews and Muslims, this culminated 
in the issue of ritual slaughter being branded as a primitive habit that should 
be forbidden.
Ritual slaughter constitutes an essential element of the religious identity 
of both Jews and Muslims. The story of Abraham/Ibrahim sacrificing his son 
plays an important role. Each religious group tries to interpret the story of this 
‘nearly-sacrifice’ according to its own holy book and in line with centuries of 
interpretation. From the point of view of Jewish and Christian traditions, Isaac 
was Abraham’s son intended to be sacrificed. The Muslims generally believe 
that Ismail was the son that was meant to be sacrificed, although Islamic tradi-
tion knows of other opinions too.
This article is not about the differences in views between the Muslims, Jews 
and Christians on who was the son to be sacrificed. I shall limit myself to the 
discussion of the story of this sacrifice from Islamic perspective in order to 
highlight the connection between sacrifice and religious identity. In Islamic 
tradition, this sacrifice is associated with two issues. The first issue relates to 
the qurʾanic story of Ibrahim and his son. The second concerns the Festival 
of Sacrifice (id al-adha).1 According to Sura 37, Ibrahim, known in the three 
monotheistic religions as the close friend of God (khalil al-Rahman2), receives 
in a dream the command from God to sacrifice his son. According to common 
1    This festival is considered the most important religious festival in Islam. It takes place annu-
ally on the 10th of Muharram, which is the first month of the Muslim year. See e.g. C. Snouck 
Hurgronje, Het Mekkaansche Feest (Leiden: diss. Universiteit Leiden, 1880). More information 
about the festival of sacrifice in Islam can be found in E. Gräf, Jagdbeute und Schlachttier in 
islamischen Recht (Bonn: Selbstverlag des Orientalischen Seminars, 1959).
2    In Isaiah 41:8, Ibrahim is described as a friend of God. See “Ibrahim” in Encyclopedia of Islam 
(Leiden: Brill, 1981), vol. III, 980–81.
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Islamic interpretation, this command constitutes a divine test for Ibrahim. The 
major question in this article is: What are the different views of Muslim schol-
ars regarding the story of this sacrifice and how is this discussion related to the 
question of Muslim religious identity?
Here is the story of Ibrahim’s sacrifice in Sura 37:100–113:
My Lord, grant me [a child] from among the righteous.
So We gave him good tidings of a forbearing boy.
And when he reached with him [the age of] exertion, he said, “O my son, 
indeed I have seen in a dream that I [must] sacrifice you, so see what you 
think.” He said, “O my father, do as you are commanded. You will find me, 
if Allah wills, of the steadfast.”
And when they had both submitted and he put him down upon his 
forehead,
We called to him, “O Abraham,
You have fulfilled the vision.” Indeed, We thus reward the doers of good.
Indeed, this was the clear trial.
And We ransomed him with a great sacrifice,
And We left for him [favorable mention] among later generations:
“Peace upon Abraham.”
Indeed, We thus reward the doers of good.
Indeed, he was of Our believing servants.
And We gave him good tidings of Isaac, a prophet from among the 
righteous.
And We blessed him and Isaac. But among their descendants is the doer 
of good and the clearly unjust to himself.
2 Interpretations by Muslim Scholars of the Story of the Sacrifice
In the story of the sacrifice, the question whether the son who should be sac-
rificed is identified with Ismail or Ishaq remains open.3 Because both persons, 
Ishaq and Ismail, play an important role in the interpretation of this story, it is 
relevant to pay attention to these two names in the Qurʾan. Ishaq4 is mentioned 
3    See “Ismaʿil” in Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. IV, 184.
4    About the biblical Isaac, see E. Noort and E. Tigchelaar, The Sacrifice of Isaac: The Aqedah 
(Genesis 22) and its Interpretations (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
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in sixteen passages in the Qurʾan.5 Six of these6 refer to him together with 
Ismail, while he is mentioned without Ismail in ten passages.7 Ismail8is men-
tioned in twelve passages of the Qurʾan: Six times without Ishaq,9 and the 
aforementioned six times together with him.10
It is remarkable that Ishaq is mentioned twice together with his father 
Ibrahim in the Meccan Sura 12:6 and 12:38, which reads respectively:
And thus will your Lord choose you and teach you the interpretation of 
narratives and complete His favor upon you and upon the family of Jacob, 
as He completed it upon your fathers before, Abraham and Isaac. Indeed, 
your Lord is Knowing and Wise.
And I have followed the religion of my fathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob.
The same fact is true for Ismail, who is also mentioned twice with his father. 
This was, however, in a Medinan Sura, 2:125 and 2:127:11
And We charged Abraham and Ishmael, [saying], “Purify My House for 
those who perform Tawaf12 and those who are staying [there] for wor-
ship and those who bow and prostrate [in prayer]”.
And [mention] when Abraham was raising the foundations of the 
House and [with him] Ishmael, [saying], “Our Lord, accept [this] 
from us.”
5     W. Montgomery Watt refers in his article “Ishaq” only to fifteen qurʾanic passages, see 
Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. IV, 109.
6     These are the following Suras: 2:133; 2:136; 2:140; 3:84; 4:163 and 14:39.
7     Namely 6:84; 11:71; 12:6; 12:38; 19:49; 21:72; 29:27; 37:112; 37:113 and 38:48.
8     See M. Hayek, Le Mystère d’Ismael (Paris: Mame, 1964).
9     In the Suras 2:125; 2:127; 6:86; 19:54; 21:85 and 38:48.
10    See note 6 for the Suras where Ishaq and Ismail are mentioned together.
11    The Meccan Qurʾan was revealed before the emigration of the Prophet to Medina in the 
year 622, even though its revelation did not take place in Mecca. The Medinan Qurʾan 
was revealed after the emigration of Mohammed to Medina, even though its revelation 
did not take place in Medina. Compare A. Ljamai, Introduction to the Study of the Koran: 
Legislative history and methods of the Quran exegesis (Zoetermeer: Meinema, 2005), 61–63.
12    Circumambulation of pilgrims around the Ka ʾ bah; a ritual during the pilgrimage to 
Mecca.
Ljamai��4
3 Al-Tabari on Ishaq as the Son to be Sacrificed
For a proper understanding of the subject, it is very important to notice that 
the debate among Muslim scholars about the identity of Abraham’s son is 
related to the fact that the name of the sacrificed son is not mentioned in 
Sura 37:100–110, the verses referring to Ibrahim’s intended sacrifice of his son. 
Actually, there has been a strong controversy among Muslim scholars about 
the identity of the sacrificed son.13 In classical Islam, there have been two 
opposite opinions in relation to the question which of the two sons of Ibrahim – 
Ismail or Ishaq – was to be sacrificed.
The first opinion is of the Persian founder of the Tafsir biʾl-ma ʾthur (reli-
gious exegeses), Ibn Jarir al-Tabari (who died in 923). In his qurʾanic commen-
tary Jamiʿal-bayan14 and in his book The History of al-Tabari,15 he declared that 
Ibrahim received the command from God to sacrifice his son Ishaq. To buttress 
his view, he refers to various statements by the companions of the Prophet 
and his followers. For example, in his interpretation of 37:101: “So We gave him 
the good news of a boy ready to suffer and forbear”, he emphasizes that in this 
text the Qurʾan speaks about Ishaq.16 He supports this interpretation with the 
following statement by Qatada (who died in 735): “No one is complimented 
as forbear, except Ibrahim and Ishaq.” Furthermore, al-Tabari relies on a state-
ment by Suddi that Ibrahim, when he received the good news that his wife Sara 
was going to have a baby, promised God that he would sacrifice his newborn 
child. Years after the birth of Ishaq, Ibrahim saw in his vision an angel telling 
him that he had to fulfill his promise to God, according to Sura 37:102:
Then, when (the son) reached (the age of) (serious) work with him, he 
said: “O my son! I see in vision that I offer thee in sacrifice: Now see what is 
thy view!” (The son) said: “O my father! Do as thou art commanded: Thou 
will find me, if God so wills, one practicing Patience and Constancy!”
Al-Tabari uses this story as an argument to show that the son who was obedi-
ent to his father was Ishaq.17
13    Compare Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. IV, 109.
14    See Jarir al-Tabari, Jamiʿ al-bayan fi-ta ʾ wil al-Qurʾan (Cairo: Dar al-Salam, 2009), in particu-
lar his exegesis of Suras 12:6 and 37:107, see vol. 6, 4466 and vol. 8, 6916–6920.
15    Titled Tarikh al-Tabari, Tarikh al-umam wa-ʾl-muluk (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-ʾIlmiyah, 
1991), vol. 1, 164–165.
16    Jamiʿ al-Bayan, vol. 8, 6911.
17    Jamiʿ al-Bayan, vol. 8, 6911, and Tarikh, vol. 1, 164.
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In his interpretation of this story, al-Tabari was aware of the different views 
of Muslim exegetes on the theme of the sacrificed son. But he believed, as an 
exegete and a historian, that Ishaq was the dhabih (the one who should be 
sacrificed) and not Ismail. To enforce his statement, he referred to al-ʿAbbas 
Ibn ʿAbd al-Muttaleb (died in 653), the uncle of the Prophet of Islam, who 
also declared that Ishaq is the one to be sacrificed. According to al-Tabari, this 
explanation was enforced by the interpretations of Abu Ishaq Kaʿb al-Ahbar 
(died in 653), Masruq (died in 682) and Jabir (died in 697), who said that the 
Qurʾan speaks in Sura 37:102 about Ishaq and not about Ismail.18
Al-Tabari was not the first Muslim scholar to connect the identity of the sac-
rificed son with the person of Ishaq. The famous Islamic scholar of Persian ori-
gin, Abu Muhammad Ibn Qutayba (died in 885) had already chosen for Ishaq 
as the dhabih in his book al-Maʿarif. Likewise, he referred to the statement 
of al-ʿAbbas Ibn ʿAbd al-Muttaleb that Ishaq, and not Ismail, was Abraham’s 
sacrificed son.19 Even after the period of al-Tabari, it became clear that some 
authors of the stories of the prophets (Qisas al-anbiyaʾ) also opted for this 
interpretation. For example, there is the relatively unknown author of the sto-
ries of the prophets, al-Kisaʾi (eleventh century), and the more elaborate work 
of al-Thaʿlabi (died in 1038). They both mention the two options. Al-Thaʿlabi 
eventually decides for Ismail, al-Kisaʾi seems to opt for Ishaq.20
Likewise, al-Tabari continues quoting the views of others who believe that 
in Sura 37:102 the Qurʾan speaks about Ismail. People who have opted for this 
interpretation were Ibn ʿAbbas (died in 687) and Abdullah Ibn ʿUmar (died 
in 693), companions of the Prophet. Ibn ʿAbbas said: “The one who had to be 
sacrificed was Ismail. The Jews claimed that it was Ishaq, but they lie!”21 After 
quoting both views, al-Tabari declares that the argument of those who say that 
it was Ishaq is much stronger, because the Qurʾan said: “And We ransomed him 
with a momentous sacrifice” (Sura 37:107). Ibrahim received the good news 
about Ishaq and not about Ismail, because he said in Sura 37:100: “O my Lord! 
Grant me a righteous (son)!” The son who should be sacrificed is the same as 
the one mentioned by the Qurʾan, about whom Ibrahim will receive the good 
news. This means that the son was Ishaq rather than Ismail.22
18    Jamiʿ al-Bayan, vol. 8, 6916–6918.
19    See Al-Maʿarif, edition al-ʿAmira al-Sharqiyya, 1883, vol. 1, 13. See in this framework 
I. Goldziher, Die Richtungen der islamischen Koranauslegung (Leiden: Brill, 1920), 79–81.
20    Compare. M. I. A. A. al-Kisa ʾi, Kisas al-anbiya ʾ (ed. Eisenberg; Leiden: 1922), 150–153, and 
M. al-Thaʿlabi, Kisas al-anbiya ʾ (Cairo: 1894), 40–60.
21    See Jamiʿ al-bayan, vol. 8, 6919.
22    Ibidem, 6916–6920.
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4 The Majority of Muslim Scholars Claim Ismail was the  
Sacrificed Son
In contrast to the opinion of Ibn Jarir al-Tabari, the majority of Muslim schol-
ars, including the exegetes, determine that the sacrificed son was Ismail and 
not Ishaq. The supporters of this interpretation use several arguments to but-
tress their views.
An example of this is Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya in his book Zad maʿad. He 
believes that the Jews are erroneously stating that the son was Ishaq. He refers to 
a verse from the Torah, in which God was said to have given the command 
to Ibrahim “to sacrifice his elder son”,23 that is, Ismail, while in another verse 
He said: “Your only son” (Genesis 22:2). Ibn Qayyim concludes that a consen-
sus exists among Muslims and Jews that Ismail was the elder son of Ibrahim. 
Indeed, he emphasizes that the biblical text, “Sacrifice your son Isaac”, must 
be wrong, because this text is in conflict with another verse from the Torah, 
“Slaughter your elder and only son.” Next to this exegetical argument he uses 
what he calls a “rational argument”, which goes as follows. How is it possible 
that Ibrahim and his wife Sara received from God the good news about Ishaq 
and later about Jacob, but that God nevertheless commands him to sacrifice 
his son Ishaq? Ibn Qayyim considers this a contradiction and not rationally 
possible. He bases his arguments on the Qurʾan and gives his own interpreta-
tion of Sura 37. He says the good news about Ishaq was in fact a reward for 
Ibrahim, because he had not protested against the divine test: In this context, 
the sacrifice of his elder son. Indeed, the so-called al-dhabih was in Mecca 
and that points to Ismail and his mother Hagar.24 Furthermore, the time of 
the sacrifice was also attached to the place of sacrifice which was Mecca. If the 
sacrifice would have been in Syria, the sacrifice of the Muslims now should 
take place in Syria and not in the holy house in Mecca.25 We see here how 
the issue of the sacrifice is connected to that of religious identity, in casu to the 
holy places of Islam. Religious identity is intrinsically connected to not only 
the exegesis of holy texts but also to holy places.
23    This text is not mentioned in the Bible!
24    The expulsion of Hagar and her child Ismail is described in accordance with Jewish 
tradition, based on Genesis 21. For the Islamic tradition about this expulsion compare 
R. Paret, Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. IV, 184–185. See also “Zamzam” in Encyclopedia of 
Islam vol. XI (2004), 440–42; cp. M. Poorthuis, ‘Hagar’s Wanderings: between Judaism and 
Islam’, Der Islam 90, 2 (2013), 213–237.
25    See Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah Zad al-maʿad fi hadyi khayr al-ʿibad (Beirut: Dar Ibn Rajab, 
2006), vol. 1, 49–53.
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4.1 The Connection to the Holy Places of Islam
The same argument is used by the historian and commentator Ibn Kathir (died 
in 1373), in his book Stories of the Prophets, to show that the son that had to 
be sacrificed was Ismail. His opinion is that al-Tabari used ʿIsra ʾilliyyāt, that 
is, stories of Jewish origin, in his interpretation of Sura 37 about the story of 
the sacrifice.26 These stories cannot be adopted without critical examination, 
according to Ibn Kathir.
Another argument to reinforce the view that the sacrificed person was 
Ismail and not Ishaq, is offered by the Mu‘tazilite exegete Abuʾl-Qasim 
al-Zamakhshari (died in 1143).27 In order to clarify his position, he refers to 
the words of the Prophet saying about himself: “Ana Ibn al-dhabihayn: I am the 
son of the two dhabihayn (sacrificed)”.28 This means: I am the son of the first 
dhabih, ʿAbdullah ibn ʿAbd al-Muttaleb (his father), and the son of the 
second dhabih, Ismail, the forefather of the Arabs.
Still, it is important to note here that this prophetic statement is described 
by experts of the hadith as a non-correct (that is, not very reliably transmitted) 
hadith.29 Next to the use of this prophetic tradition, al-Zamakhshari points 
out that the person described in the Qurʾan as full of constancy and patience 
(sabir) had to be Ismail, for the Qurʾan says: “And (remember) Ismail, Idris 
and dhu al-Kifl, all (men) of constancy and patience”. Ismail’s obedience to his 
father Ibrahim who wished to sacrifice him is undoubtedly a form of patience.30 
With this interpretation al-Zamakhshari tries to prove that the sacrificed son 
was Ismail and not Ishaq.
4.2 Ishaq, the Son Who Never was in Mecca
The same intention becomes clear in the way Al-Alusi (died in 1854), a sup-
porter of symbolic exegesis, wants to prove that Ismail was the sacrificed son. 
In his exegesis Ruh al-maʿani, he buttresses this opinion stating that Muslims 
and Jews agree that Ismail lived in Mecca and that Ishaq had never been there. 
26    See Ibn al Kathir, Qisas al-anbiya ʾ  (Riyadh: Dar Ibn Khuzayma, 1998), vol. 1, 261–269.
27    The Muʿtazilite school originated in the eighth century; its adherents made a plea for a 
rational interpretation of the Qurʾan. Compare A. Ljamai, “Relationship between Islam 
and humanism,” Journal of the Dutch-Flemish Levinas Society 16 (2011): 7–13.
28    See Abuʾl-Qasim al Zamakhshari, Al-Kashshaf ʿan haqa ʾiq ghawamid al-tanzil wa-ʿuyun 
al-aqawil fi-wudjuh al-ta ʾ wil. Beirut: Dar al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1995, vol. 4, 54.
29    M.A. al-Albani, Silsilat al-ahadith al-daʿifa wa-ʾl-mawduʿa wa-atharuha al-sayyiʾ fi-al-
umma. Riyadh: Maktabat al-Maʿarif, 2001, vol. 1, 500 (hadith number: 331).
30    See al-Zamakhshari, Ibid., vol. 4, 54.
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Because the sacrifice scene had taken place in Mecca, it is impossible, accord-
ing to al-Alusi, that the dhabih would be Ishaq.31
The Imam Ahmed al-Thaqafi (died in 1308) tries in his tafsir book of exege-
sis of the Qurʾan to find a link between the two verses 101 en 102 from Sura 37, 
where is spoken about “(a) boy ready to suffer and forbear” and also “one 
practicing patience and constancy!”, and verse 28 from Sura 51 where is spo-
ken about “(a) learned boy”. The first description refers to the dhabih Ismail, 
whereas the second description surely refers to Ishaq, who is known in the 
Qurʾan as “learned boy”. Al-Thaqafi elaborates his interpretation and empha-
sizes that Ibrahim has received “good news” twice: The news of his son the 
dhabih, and the news of his newborn son, described as “learned boy”. Besides, 
al-Thaqafi states, Muslim, Jewish and Christian scholars all agree that Ismail 
had been in Mecca, whereas Ishaq never was in Mecca.32
We came across this argument by al-Thaqafi in the interpretation of 
al-Zamakhshari as well. This indicates how important the location of the sac-
rifice in Mecca is for Muslim scholars who want to defend the idea that the 
sacrificed son was Ismail. We have seen that, to declare Ismail as the dhabih, 
many interpreters, like Ibn Qayyim, Ibn Kathir, al-Zamakhshari, al-Alusi and 
al-Thaqafi, use the Qurʾan, the prophetic traditions, Qurʾanic commentaries, 
and work of their predecessors, and, in addition, draw upon the so-called ratio-
nal argumentation. Without doubt, this interpretation is significant for Muslim 
scholars at a theological and polemical level, in particular when it comes to the 
dialogue between Muslims, Jews, and Christians. The Muslim scholars want 
to prove that the sacrifice concerns their own forefather Ismail, whereas Jews 
and Christians defend the idea that the sacrifice is about Isaac, since in the 
book of Genesis it is explicitly mentioned that the dhabih was Isaac. In terms 
of religious identity, the story of the sacrifice displays yet another dimension: 
Not only the relevance of sacred places but also the question which Scriptures 
are sacred and how to interpret them.
31    See Shihab al-Din al-Alusi, Ruh al-maʿani fi-tafsir al-Qurʾan al-ʿazim wa-ʾl-sabʿ al-mathani 
(Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1997), vol. 13, 196–197.
32    See A. Al Thaqafi, Milak al-ta ʾ wil al-Qatiʿ bi-dhawi al-ilhad wa-ʾl-taʿtil fi-tawdjih 
al-mutashabih al-lafzi min ay al-tanzil (Beirut: Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1983), vol. 2, 
960–961.
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5 The Importance of Ismail for Arab Identity
Apart from the theological discussion among Muslims, Jews, and Christians, 
the following question comes up: Why is it so important for these Muslim 
scholars to connect the sacrifice story to the person of Ismail? Furthermore, 
why does al-Tabari, the famous exegete and historian, have different thoughts 
on this story?
From the sources we learn that the majority of the Muslim exegetes defend 
the idea that the person that had to be sacrificed was Ismail, probably because 
Ismail was considered the forefather of the Arabs. Muslim scholars usually rely 
on the statement of the Prophet of Islam: “I am the son of the two dhabihayn”. 
Because of this genealogical connection, the story of the sacrifice is intrinsi-
cally connected to Islamic religious identity. Many Islamic scholars emphasize 
that the story concerns Ismail and not Ishaq, because this interpretation is an 
essential element of their religious identity.
At Islamic and Jewish schools, Jewish children will get more informa-
tion about Isaac, who is viewed in a positive light, whereas Muslim children 
will hear more about Ismail, likewise viewed in a positive light. It is impor-
tant, however, to keep in mind that there are also common points between 
Muslims, Jews, and Christians regarding the story of sacrifice. All three agree 
on the fact that it was a divine test for the father of monotheism, Ibrahim. 
To return once more to the difference of opinion among Muslim scholars 
on the story of sacrifice, the attitude of al-Tabari towards the story can be 
explained by the fact that in his interpretation he refers to the qurʾanic pas-
sages and statements of the companions of Mohammed. His defence of the 
idea that Ishaq was the only dhabih does not mean that Islamic identity is 
not important to him. Al-Tabari asserts, as I see it, that from Islamic per-
spective all prophets are equal. Both sons of Ibrahim can be considered as 
prophets. Hence, whether the person to be sacrificed is Ismail or Isaac is 
not relevant to al-Tabari. His concern is to transmit as many arguments and 
interpretations of the texts as possible. His religious identity allows him to 
admit a wealth of different interpretations. We may even conclude that the 
different opinions themselves are an important element of the Muslim reli-
gious identity.
To summarize, we have seen that the story of Ibrahim and his son relates 
to religious identity at several levels: The performance of the ritual of sacrifice 
as a religious obligation for Muslims today; the attachment of the story to the 
holy places of Islam; the orientation towards sacred scriptures and the accep-
tance of different opinions as a legitimate aspect of religious tradition.
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Sacrifice – Action within a Relationship:  
A Phenomenology of Sacrifice
Claudia Mariéle Wulf
1 Introduction
A young woman had become entangled in drug culture. Nothing had warned 
her about the consequences of drug abuse for the rest of her life, nor about the 
effects it was to have on her parents and younger sister. She had closed her-
self off from her family and friends, so her mother had no longer any access to 
her. Her mother prayed. This, however, was not enough. Slowly but surely, the 
mother began to change. First, she stopped eating what she most enjoyed. It 
was a silent offering for her daughter, who failed to understand. Instead, the girl 
replied: “It doesn’t affect me whether you eat what you like or not!”. Then her 
mother started copying her daughter’s way of dressing. She roamed the streets 
in old and shabby shoes, she dyed her hair black like her daughter had done, 
something which was quite alien to herself. Initially, her daughter just laughed 
at her. Then she fell silent. She knew what it meant to her mother to be a laugh-
ing stock for the people, because of her shoddy appearance. When she fully 
realized that her mother had made these sacrifices in order to show her how 
close she was to her, her mother’s love touched her and she returned home.
Is this the sort of sacrifice we are talking about here? Does sacrifice mean 
giving up yourself in order to save somebody else? Does it mean offering your-
self as a sacrifice to God? Does God want – or even ask for – such sacrifice? The 
example shows that in order to be meaningful, a sacrifice has to be related to 
someone: To God, or to another human being. It can also be related to creation, 
if creation is seen as a responsibility given to us by God. To make a sacrifice 
means giving up something important, something we like or love, in order to 
reach a higher goal.
Sacrifices abound in everyday life. We find them in ecological groups, for 
example, where members decide to save energy and consciously refrain from 
enjoying some pleasures in order to save the environment. We find another 
kind of sacrifice in a movement of young people who seriously try to postpone 
intimate relationships until they meet the right partner, someone with whom 
they want to share intimacies for the rest of their lives.1 We also find it in sport 
1    See http://www.lifeway.com/Article/true-love-waits. Consulted on October 31, 2011.
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and profession, where people give up everything in order to reach their goal. 
We often forget that parents live lives filled with sacrifice, in order to bring up 
their children in the best possible way. It is not uncommon for parents to give 
up professional advancement, if this can positively affect the development of 
their children.
1.1 Sacrifice – An All-Embracing Concept
A gift can entail sacrifice. A person can sacrifice himself or herself in freedom.2 
However, if someone is being sacrificed without consenting to it, that person 
does not act voluntarily and hence becomes a victim. If a thing (or in some cults 
an animal) is sacrificed, we call it an oblation. To sacrifice means consciously 
letting go of something that is important, valuable or pleasurable, because it 
is meaningful to do so. It is essential, therefore, that there are good reasons 
for making a sacrifice – it is a means to an end. What one gets or attains is not 
part of what one gives or gives up; it is not a sacrifice if we give up something 
or someone we wanted to get rid of anyway. It should be done for the sake of a 
higher goal, just as the mother in our example gave up food and nice clothing 
as well as her social reputation, in order to restore her daughter’s health. When 
somebody makes a sacrifice in this way, it is voluntary. Life may often require 
sacrifices from us. If we cannot accept such a sacrifice as part of our life, if we 
cannot make the sacrifice freely, we may become a victim ourselves. A sacri-
fice, in order to be a true sacrifice, has to be made in freedom.3
A sacrifice is part of an interpersonal relationship – someone sacrifices 
something for the sake of another person. This can be done, and often is done, 
without the knowledge of the person concerned. It can take place in the con-
text of reconciliation: If the guilty party is unable to make amends, someone 
else can do this on his or her behalf and thus bring about reconciliation. This 
happens in a religious, social, or political context.
The opposite attitude to the readiness to make a sacrifice is consumerism.4 
This attitude presupposes that everything has to be available here and now, 
2    In new myths, like Harry Potter (J. K. Rowlings) and Lord of the Rings (J. R. R. Tolkien), the 
protagonist offers himself as a sacrifice, but survives. See Almuth Hammer, “Dein Leben ist 
das meine wert. Erlösungsmythen in der Fantasy,” in Erlösung ohne Opfer? (ed. Werner H. 
Ritter; Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2003), 157–192. See also the contribution by Sigrid 
Coenradie on Harry Potter in this volume.
3    See Wolfgang Palaver, René Girards mimetische Theorie. Im Kontext kulturtheoretischer und 
gesellschaftspolitischer Fragen (Münster-Hamburg-London: LIT, 2004), 293.
4    See Claudia Mariéle Wulf, Der Mensch – ein Phänomen. Eine phänomenologische, theologische 
und ethische Anthropologie (Vallendar: Patris, 2011), 402.
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and preferably should cost very little. It means finding our bearings solely 
with a view to our own wishes and ideas. This is the basic attitude of many in 
our present-day society, but life is impossible without sacrifices, as we shall 
see later.
2 Part I. Four Core Values of Sacrifice as an Action within 
Relationship
Before I deal with the view of Edith Stein on sacrifice (part 2), I will offer a short 
phenomenology of sacrifice as an action within a relationship from four points 
of view.
1.  A sacrifice is a free act. This is the philosophical and psychological aspect.
2.  Sacrifice has a social function. Hence it can be seen in sociological terms. 
This aspect has been developed among others by René Girard,5 and 
has been developed further by Raymund Schwager SJ into his Dramatic 
Theology.6
3.  Sacrifice may include the dimension of creation.
4. Finally, there is a theological element to sacrifice.
2.1 Ad 1. Sacrifice from a Psychological Perspective: A Free Act
First I would like to describe some psychological aspects of sacrifice. A sac-
rifice is an action, that is, the expression of free choice. In comparison with 
other actions, it is an expression of greater freedom. In the normal course of 
events, our actions are motivated by some value we want to attain or protect. 
This value is directly connected with the action or the object of an action. 
Sacrifice is also orientated to a value, but it is not immediately contained in it, 
or attainable at the moment. Sometimes we cannot be sure that we will attain 
the object of the action. The mother in the example could not know whether 
her daughter would be brought back from the way she had chosen. The value 
that is aimed at is only indirectly related to the sacrificial action; it is often just 
5    See René Girard, Violence and the Sacred. (tr. P. Gregory; Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1977) and René Girard, Le sacrifice (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale de France, 2003).
6    See Raymund Schwager s.j. and Józef Niewiadomski, eds, “Dramatische Theologie als 
Forschungsprogramm,” in Religion erzeugt Gewalt; Einspruch! Innsbrucker Forschungsprojekt 
Religion-Gewalt-Kommunikation-Weltordnung (Beiträge zur mimetischen Theorie, Band 15; 
Münster-Hamburg-London: LIT, 2003), 39–77, 57; Raymund Schwager SJ, Jesus in the Drama 
of Salvation: Toward a Biblical Doctrine of Redemption (New York: Crossroad, 1999).
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the expression of hope. It follows that a sacrifice is a greater expression of free-
dom, because it means detaching ourselves from the good being aimed at, and 
from the possible satisfaction of what is desired. If we make the sacrifice, we 
give up something in order to attain a higher goal, although we can only hope 
that we will attain it.
In a certain sense, when we bring a sacrifice we become the victim of our 
own sacrifice. We deprive ourselves of something. This can even go so far that 
we do not just sacrifice something, but our very self. The sacrifices made by the 
mother in our opening example come close to the self-sacrifice meant here. If 
we become a victim of our own sacrifice, it means we have accepted sacrific-
ing our very self. Such a sacrifice may not be undertaken without that accep-
tance. This is because if we give up ourselves without realizing it, we abuse 
ourselves for an external goal. We may then lose ourselves, because by giving 
up ourselves and our freedom our soul is wounded. We may later feel that we 
have become ourselves the victim of the cause for which we had initially sac-
rificed ourselves. If the daughter in the example had not come home again, 
her mother could have felt she was her daughter’s victim; she could then have 
accused her daughter of ingratitude and hardness of heart. This shows clearly 
that an action, which should actually have been undertaken freely and will-
ingly, runs the risk of becoming no longer the expression of something freely 
willed; instead it is perceived as having been forced upon oneself by another 
person. Any relationship to a personal decision has then been lost.
Making a sacrifice does not guarantee that we will actually attain the higher 
goal. If we decide to make a sacrifice, to give up something, we must be aware 
of this. To sacrifice means giving up something of value, to let go of something 
one has possessed, and hence to give up the security connected with it. Since 
we can never be sure that the higher value will be achieved, sacrifice includes 
giving up a temporary, sometimes only supposed security, in order to attain a 
higher goal, a greater or even ultimate security.
If we freely and willingly make a sacrifice, we remain in relationship 
with ourselves, with our own will. However, if on the contrary a sacrifice is 
demanded of us, it can destroy our relationship to our self. The only possibility 
that remains is to agree to and accept the sacrifice afterwards, and to assimilate 
it as part of our own life. In this way the sacrifice remains part of our own free-
dom, and we remain in relationship to ourselves. This is one of the highest pos-
sibilities of human freedom. This act of freedom restores our relationship to 
ourselves in view of an action that is demanded of us. So if I feel that I am the 
victim, because a sacrifice has been demanded of me, and then decide freely 
and willingly to give, or give up what is demanded of me, I can experience that 
such a sacrifice liberates me from a situation of bondage.
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2.2 Ad 2. Sociological Aspect of Sacrifice – Our Relationship to Others
Until now sacrifice has been considered in relation to the self. Let us take a 
second step and examine it in relation to others. I will mention two forms of 
sacrifice in this regard: A synchronic sacrifice for someone who is present at 
the same time and place, and a diachronic sacrifice that benefits those who 
lived in the past, or will live in the future, and/or at another place.
2.3 A Synchronic and Local Sacrifice
Our daily sacrifices are usually synchronic with the people who live around 
us, or at least at the same time. For example, we can sacrifice something for 
someone we love.
The fundamental attitude of consumerism, which demands that everything 
is here, now, immediately and completely available, destroys human relation-
ships: The other person is not here in reality, he or she is usually somewhere 
else. This means that I have to give up my ‘here’ in order to meet the other 
person. The other person is not immediately at my disposal, he or she does 
things differently, so I have to give up my idea of ‘now’ in order to give the other 
person time and space to act. With children, for example, we have to scale back 
our own pace of doing things. The other person is not perfect, never quite in 
accord with our criteria – he or she is always different from what we expect. 
We have to give up our own picture of that person, or we will never discover 
the richness of his or her personality. In relationships nothing is free, we have 
to make some sacrifices in order to be unexpectedly enriched.
In human relationships, it is impossible to maintain the attitude of consum-
erism, which is antithetical to sacrifice – we have to give up something, even if 
we might have considered it valuable, if we really want to encounter the other 
person. We see that such a sacrifice is usually required when we encounter 
someone directly – our partner, our children, our friends, the significant peo-
ple around us. It is a sacrifice that takes place simultaneously with an encoun-
ter, and often at the same place. Its aim is the sense of well-being of the people 
in our vicinity.
2.4 A Diachronic and Global Sacrifice
However, a sacrifice can also be important with reference to other times, that 
is, diachronically. It can play an important role in historical relationships; for 
example, if we need to be reconciled with our past. It is possible today to con-
tribute through a symbolic act to a reconciliation that has not yet taken place. 
The need of reconciliation arises from a crime or misdeed in the past; how-
ever, it is ultimately directed to a reconciliation in the future, so it is directed 
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towards the future. Hans Jonas mentions the duty to live in such a way today – 
to make sacrifices today – that a future generation can exist:
Existenz der Menschheit heißt einfach: Dass Menschen leben; dass sie 
gut leben, ist das nächste Gebot. Das nackte ontische Faktum, dass es 
sie überhaupt gibt, wird für die darin vorher nicht Befragten zum ontolo-
gischen Gebot: Dass es sie weiter geben soll. Dies an sich namenlos ble-
ibende “erste Gebot” ist ungesagt in allen weiteren enthalten (wenn diese 
nicht das Nichtsein zu ihrer Sache gemacht haben).7
In this sense sacrifice is orientated to something that might not even happen, 
so it is borne from hope. The past plays no role (unless we have to work off 
inherited issues in the present, in order to make the future possible); the goal 
of sacrifice is to be found in the future.
This form of sacrifice can be global in nature. We do today, here and now, 
what could bear fruit tomorrow or somewhere else. It is possible to have the 
whole world in view, for example, if we sacrifice our freedom of movement in 
order to reduce the emission of greenhouse gas. In addition, by acting in this 
way we can offer others a good example, and thus perhaps change a situation 
for the better.
2.5 Ad 3. Sacrifice Seen Ecologically – in Relation to Creation
The example quoted above shows clearly that sacrifice is not only directed to 
people, it can also be related to creation. Let me again refer to an idea of Hans 
Jonas: The duty to make it possible for future generations to live includes the 
duty to ensure that a world exists in which people can live. We have to give up 
something that we might wish to wrest from creation – also here we have to 
give up the attitude of consumerism – so that other people who come after 
us can live. We cannot expect that the goods we require are always ‘here’ – 
they have to be transported long distances in order to be available. We need 
an ancient virtue that requires sacrifice of us: Temperance. It is impossible for 
7    See Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische 
Zivilisation (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003), 186–87: “The human existence simply 
means: that people live; that they live righteously, is a commandment which comes next. 
The pure ontological fact that they exist at all, becomes an ontological commandment for 
those who were never questioned beforehand: that they must go on existing. This, in itself 
nameless, ‘first commandment’ is silently taken up in all that follows (as long as it does not 
make non-being its aim”.
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everything to be at our disposal all the time; not every fruit grows in every sea-
son. Instead of organizing things to be conveyed around the world, so that we 
can enjoy fruits that are out of season, we should practice patience, another vir-
tue that requires sacrifice of us. It is not possible for everything to be available 
all the time – we must again become modest and frugal in our wants, which, 
again, requires sacrifice of us. Things are not always exactly the way we want 
them to be – some of our wishes have to be given up; flexibility is required. 
Finally, it is not possible for everything to be as cheap as we would wish if the 
regulations to protect the environment (and social justice) are to be observed – 
through our own diligence we have to purchase the things that do not just fall 
into our laps. The subject of sacrifice, therefore, is very topical when we look at 
the whole problem of the environment.
2.6 Philosophical Sacrifice
Does philosophy require sacrifice? It is probably a provocative idea. Philosophy 
seems to be the field in which we have full scope for our thinking without 
observing any limits. Are our thoughts not free? Yes and no! Capriciousness 
in thinking, which does not include practical consequences, is dangerous. 
(A well-known example is Peter Singer, who became famous because of his 
provocative anthropology and his ideas on animal liberation,8 in fact ignor-
ing pratical implications. Are we allowed to express such ideas and confuse 
those people who are unable to expose the philosophical lapses? Has someone 
like Singer thought about the fact that as a result of his ideas someone could 
harm another person, or that the disabled could be insulted and harmed by 
his theories – what actually happened? We have to take responsibility for our 
thoughts and ideas.)
The sacrifice of the intellectual is the sacrifice of a self-created truth. The 
intellectual or academic has to orientate his or her search to the objective truth, 
and this sometimes requires them to sacrifice their own ideas, because they are 
too far removed from the truth – no matter how evocative their ideas may be 
or how much fame they could bring. What is demanded here is the sacrifice of 
capriciousness and intellectual vanity.
In general, knowledge has always to distance itself from what could still be 
done in order to gain power, prestige and riches. The pressure exerted on sci-
ence by those providing the funding often enough counters the actual goal of 
science. Precisely in the field of science sacrifice may be totally ‘un-modern’, 
but it is sometimes necessary in order to protect the truth and the world from 
intellectual hubris and the delusion of feasibility.
8    See Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: University Press, 2011).
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In this regard, Edith Stein offers an interesting thought. She speaks about 
the “sacrifice of one’s own intellect”, which has to be made in order to under-
stand a greater truth. Her insight was that human beings can only understand 
the world and themselves to a certain degree; what transcends the human 
intellect and touches the divine can only be given to human beings as a gift.9
2.7 Sacrifice Seen Theologically – A Gift to God
The fourth and last element related to sacrifice is the theological context 
of sacrifice when it is offered to God. From a phenomenological viewpoint, 
religions see sacrifice as offering something to God. In ancient and in natu-
ral religions, it is taken for granted that the godhead demands sacrifice. In a 
magical-mystical context, a sacrifice becomes a gift that prevails upon the god-
head, even forcing that godhead to grant what the human being requires of 
it. In the monotheistic religions, sacrifice is understood as a free gift to God, 
which cannot force God to do anything, but is nevertheless an expression of an 
urgent request, or else – and this is often forgotten – an expression of gratitude 
or praise. Sacrifice should not make people enslaved to God, but no more may 
it be misinterpreted as the price by which they can extract something from 
God, or force God to do something, in the sense of a quid pro quo. God remains 
free in this regard too.
In the context of religion, sacrifice is a free gift to God and an expression of 
human self-surrender to God. In this sense sacrifice is a conscious and free gift, 
and even an expression of human freedom in relation to a transcendent power.
3 Part II. Edith Stein on Sacrifice and Mediation
The phenomenologist Edith Stein situated sacrifice within the context of medi-
ation between God and man. The Mediator, the Redeemer, stands between 
God and human beings, making himself the victim in order to redeem us. This 
sacrifice was the outflow of Jesus Christ’s free decision; he obeyed God’s will in 
freedom and as an expression of freedom.10
Stein also wanted to see her own sacrifice in the sense of mediation. She 
saw herself as a mediator between God and the Chosen People, which had 
9     See Edith Stein, Der Intellekt und die Intellektuellen. In: Bildung und Entfaltung der 
Individualität. (Edith Stein ESGA 16. Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder, 2001), 116–117, 143–156.
10    See Edith Stein, Natur, Freiheit und Gnade. Published as: “Die ontische Struktur der Person 
und ihre erkenntnistheoretische Problematik,” in Welt und Person. Beitrag zum christli-
chen Wahrheitsstreben (ESW VI; Freiburg-Basel-Wien: Herder, 1962), 137–198 (160–162).
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not yet found their Messiah.11 According to Stein’s understanding, her people 
had become partakers in the sufferings of Christ, without realizing whose 
cross they were carrying at that moment.12 They didn’t know that their suf-
fering already included their future redemption. Edith Stein stated that she 
wanted to bear the cross on behalf of her people, because, blessed by that cross 
(Benedicta a Cruce), she knew about the redemptive power of suffering and 
about the reconciliation needed.13
3.1 God’s Sacrifice
In the context of religion, it is often overlooked that God personally offers 
sacrifice.14 God is both the Sacrificer and the Sacrifice,15 a sacrifice in which 
Jesus Christ himself became the Victim as a result of his own free decision.16 
That is the unique quality of sacrifice in Christianity: God is present on both 
sides of the sacrifice. God is the redemptive Sacrifice and the One who accepts 
the sacrifice.
11    See Edith Stein, Testament (Edith Stein Archiv Köln, A55).
12    See Maria Amata Neyer and Andreas Uwe Müller, Edith Stein – das Leben einer ungewöhn-
lichen Frau (Düsseldorf: Benziger, 1998), 264–268 and 278–280, footnote 21.
13    See Waltraud Herbstrith, Edith Stein; ein neues Lebensbild in Zeugnissen und 
Selbstzeugnissen (Mainz: Topos, 1983), 153–154: “Ihr geistlicher Begleiter Johannes 
Hirschmann fragte sie: ‘Wer sühnt für das, was am jüdischen Volk im Rahmen des 
deutschen Volkes geschieht? [. . .] Wer wendet die entsetzliche Schuld zum Segen für 
beide Völker?’ Und sie antwortet damals: ‘Die, die die Wunden, die hier der Hass schlägt, 
nicht neuen Hass gebären lassen, sondern die, obwohl sie mit Opfer des Hasses sind, das 
Leid unter den Gehassten und das Leid der Hassenden auf sich nehmen’.”
14    See Wolfgang Schoberth, “Schlachtopfer gefallen dir nicht (Ps 40:7) Der Kreuzestod Jesu: 
Ein Opfer?,” in Erlösung ohne Opfer? (ed. Werner H. Ritter; Göttingen: Vandenhoek & 
Ruprecht, 2003), 83–112 (90).
15    See Joseph Ratzinger, „Einführung in das Christentum. Vorlesungen über das Apostolische 
Glaubensbekenntnis. (München: Kösel, 1968), 232: Nicht der Mensch ist es, der zu Gott geht 
und ihm eine ausgleichende Gabe bringt, sondern Gott kommt zum Menschen. (. . .) Das 
Neue Testament sagt nicht, dass die Menschen Gott versöhnen, wie wir es eigentlich erwarten 
müssten, da ja sie gefehlt haben, nicht Gott. Es sagt vielmehr, dass Gott in Christus die Welt 
mit sich versöhnt hat (2 Kor 5:19)“. See Claudia Mariéle Wulf, Begegnung, die befreit. 
Christliche Erlösung als Beziehungsgeschehen. (Vallendar: Patris, 2009), 212 and 238–240.
16    See Wolfgang Palaver, René Girards mimetische Theorie, 294. This is the difference with 
the scapegoat sacrifice on which Girard’s theory is based. Girard later changed from 
« La violence et le sacré » to « De la violence à la divinité ». René Girard, De la violence à 
la divinité (Paris: Grasset, 2007).
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Through the Incarnation and Redemption, God, in a certain sense, sacrifices 
his own Godhead – a greater abasement cannot be imagined – because he 
renounces being seen as he really is: As God.
Through his human life, God took part in the everyday sacrifices of humanity.17 
Through his death on the cross he did more than is possible for a human being: 
He took all human suffering upon himself, assimilating it into his sacrifice; He 
is the Victim that bears within himself every sacrifice throughout time and 
nails it to the cross, so that in the resurrection he could redeem everyone defin-
itively and forever from suffering. Sacrificial gifting – not sacrificial being – 
is the condition for creating an identity.
3.2 Self-Unfolding and Sacrifice
Some readers may have been taken aback by Edith Stein’s idea of sacrificing 
the intellect. Is it possible to sacrifice one’s intellect without losing oneself? 
A human being is a complex entity that is able to unfold or develop mind and 
body and emotions, both on an individual level and on a social and moral 
level (in freedom and responsibility), herewith even transcending his or her 
limitations.
Nevertheless, in actual life our humanity is limited: If one ability is devel-
oped, another has to be in abeyance. If we want to gain something, we neces-
sarily have to give up something else. This is because we cannot do everything, 
limited as we are by space and time, even if we have the mental and physical 
endowment to do so. Even in order to develop our abilities in a chosen field, 
we have to sacrifice our strength and time. Unless we make these sacrifices, we 
will not make the best use of our possibilities.
3.3 Integration of Personal Sacrifice
The second task in view of sacrifice and identity is the integration of necessary 
sacrifices into our existence. This includes not just the self-chosen sacrifices, 
but even more so the sacrifices demanded of us and that we do not really want 
to make. Allowing ourselves to become a victim can alienate us from ourselves 
and our own personality. A clear example of this is being victimized: If some-
one becomes a victim to such an extent that he or she is no longer able to 
remember being anything else, and if this person interiorizes the fundamental 
attitude of being a victim so that he or she is unable to escape powerlessness, 
such a person will lose contact with his or her true self.
17    See Reinhard Feldmeier, “Gottes Torheit? Deutungen des Todes Jesu im Neuen Testament,” 
in Erlösung ohne Opfer? (ed. Werner H. Ritter; Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 2003), 38.
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The positive integration of the status of a victim into one’s existence can 
take place by accepting the sacrifice as described above; however, this free 
acceptance does not mean that the trauma resulting from victimization is 
overcome. Trauma is an obstacle to freedom, and can only be integrated into 
the personality once freedom is restored.
3.4 No Life without Sacrifice – No Sacrifice of Life? Or Could it Be?
No one who lives can escape sacrifice – sacrifice is an everyday reality. In Jesus 
Christ we encounter the highest form of sacrifice: To sacrifice oneself in free-
dom, and to accept the sacrifice even before it happens, which may be seen as 
the ultimate act of human freedom.
Edith Stein followed Christ along this way. She mirrored her own fate in that 
of Queen Esther, who was prevailed upon by her people to sacrifice herself. She 
approached the king of Persia as representative of her people to plead for its 
freedom. Just as Esther expected to be killed by entering the presence of the 
King without being commanded, so did Edith Stein expect her own death.18 
Esther was allowed to live – Edith Stein was not. The free decision to act even 
when there is no choice has already been described as the highest form of free-
dom and sacrifice. In the face of death it is the highest and most perfect sac-
rifice we can make. By reinterpreting one’s fate of an imposed sacrifice, and 
making it into a freely willed sacrifice, we can follow Christ and make meaning-
ful what is senseless; we can experience resurrection in death. The last written 
note from Edith Stein, written on her way to Auschwitz, contains only a single 
sentence: “On the way ad orientem. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce. Edith Stein”.19
Ad orientem – to the East. This liturgical concept alludes to the resurrection, 
the coming of the Messiah. By consciously choosing this Latin formula, she 
gave a final, impressive profession of faith. It is the expression of a freely willed 
sacrifice in the face of imminent death, which helps us to intuit that the deeper 
meaning of this sacrifice is the resurrection in messianic salvation.
18    See Edith Stein, Selbstbildnis in Briefen II, 1934–1942. ESW IX (eds L. Gelber and R. Leuven; 
Druten: De Maas & Waler/Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder, 1977), letter nr. 281, 121.
19    “Unterwegs ad orientem. Teresia Benedicta a Cruce. Edith Stein.” Witness of this last 
note was Sr. Placida Laubhardt (1904–1998); I interviewed her on this subject in January 
1996. See further documentation: http://www.kloster-st-lioba.de/assets/sr-placida-
dokumation.pdf, consulted October 31, 2011.
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Self-Sacrifice between Constraint and Redemption: 
Gertrud von Le Fort’s The Song at the Scaffold
Marcel J. H. M. Poorthuis
1 Introduction
Converts to Catholicism cherish certain books in which a passionate religious 
fervor goes along with a highly individual orientation. At first glance this per-
sonal experience seems to be characterized by a thoroughly orthodox orienta-
tion, but on closer scrutiny the borders of institutionalized Catholic religion 
are often transcended from the very moment of entering into the holy Mother 
Church. Next to the Confessions of Saint Augustine, Die Letzte am Schafott 
[The song at the scaffold], by Gertrud von le Fort (1876–1971), a convert herself, 
belongs to the favorite conversion literature.
It would be easy to dismiss the theme of this book, Die Letzte am Schafott, 
as no more than an expression of a Catholic triumphant attitude. During the 
French revolution, possessions of convents were confiscated and whoever 
resisted was sentenced to death and executed under the guillotine. The French 
Revolution would be no more than a demonstration of the barbarous attitude 
of the idolatry of Reason over against the devotion to true faith. The story, how-
ever, goes far deeper than that. This becomes clear when we focus on two of 
the main characters: Two young girls, strongly differing in temperament and 
background; and two spiritual leaders in the convent diametrically opposed 
to one another. We will note that the story contains a sharp criticism of tradi-
tional Catholic ideas about self-sacrifice and martyrdom. Simultaneously, the 
story offers a passionate picture of true martyrdom, which can only be reached 
by acknowledging existential fear and a deep love of life.
1.1 Bringing a Sacrifice Willingly and without Struggle is not a Sacrifice
First I want to clarify in which way the story of the Carmelites can be con-
nected to the story of Abraham called upon to sacrifice his own son, as told 
in Qurʾan and Bible, with or without elaboration in the midrash, the Jewish 
interpretations of the Bible. The primary message of the story is that the sacri-
fice of the son is initially commanded, but should not be executed eventually. 
God demands surrender from Abraham, but not at the expense of his own son. 
Full humanity can go together with full surrender to God, as the story could be 
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summarized. Abraham’s awakening conscience during the story would convey 
precisely this insight.
It is, however, vital to realize the paradoxical character of the sacrificial 
act. Some interpretations depict Abraham as a real paragon of obedience, to 
such an extent that it almost seems as if it were his only wish to sacrifice his 
son. This would totally rob the sacrifice of its dynamism! Suppose Abraham 
was secretly thinking: “Thank heavens, I cannot wait to sacrifice my son”.1 This 
would give us a shudder of abhorrence. Apparently, a sacrifice can only retain 
its significance as sacrifice when it is actually too precious to be made. The 
willingness to sacrifice to God might nearly obscure this essential fact. Only 
when the sacrifice is as precious as one’s own life – or even more – devotion to 
God can have a meaning. This implies that no sacrifice made out of hatred of 
life and out of contempt of oneself can be regarded as a sacrifice.
Hence, the sacrifice affirms in a paradoxical way the very human desire 
to retain the sacrifice. Asceticism, fasting, and other transformations of sacri-
fice retain their significance only as affirmation of love for life, of enjoyment of 
human existence, expressed in eating and drinking and in sexuality. The rest is 
nothing but self-mutilation and a not outgrown asceticism. Even celibacy and 
sexual abstinence need to affirm bodily affections as of great value, or rather 
they would serve as a foil for the hatred of life and the body.
Let us now turn to the story of the Carmelites. Although it has a historical 
kernel, it became famous as a novel, as a film script by George Bernanos, and 
as an opera by Francis Poulenc, Dialogues des Carmélites.
2 Die Letzte am Schafott2
This is historical: Carmelite sisters resist the confiscation of their convent dur-
ing the French revolution. Sixteen sisters are condemned to death. In 1906, 
these sisters have been beatified. Gertrud von le Fort wrote her novel, Die Letzte 
1    A variety of sources such as the well-known painting by Rembrandt of Abraham sacrificing 
Isaac (in the Hermitage in St. Petersburg) as well as a Syriac dialogue poem about Genesis 22 
allude to a certain cruelty in Abraham without, however, pushing it so far as to rob the sac-
rifice of its meaning. See S. Brock, “Two Syriac Verse Homilies on the Binding of Isaac,” in 
Le Muséon 99 (1986), 61–129. A psychoanalytical interpretation of the story as the struggle 
between father and son also tends to assume a certain willingness in Abraham to sacrifice.
2    Gertrud von le Fort, Die Letzte am Schafott (München: Ehrenwirth Verlag, 1931). I use a 1953 
version. English translations are mine. See as well Gertrud von Le Fort, The Song at the 
Scaffold, translated by Olga Marx, New York 1933.
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am Schafott, in 1931 when she felt how the rise of the totalitarian regime of 
Nazism threatened human existence as well as the integrity of the Church. She 
was shocked to see the nazi pamphlets against the Jews in München, which 
gave her an inkling of impending disaster. It was Von le Fort’s conviction that 
the Church should resist.3 She was herself persecuted by the nazis. Georges 
Bernanos (1888–1948) wrote the script after the war, in a climate of existen-
tialism in which people were torn between meaning and absurdity. He grap-
pled with the question how humankind in its tragic condition could acquire 
God’s grace.4
The composer Francis Poulenc (1899–1963) was moved by a religious expe-
rience and wrote his opera based upon Bernanos’ text, but with important 
modifications.5 The music, the text and the theatrical scenery all contribute to 
make it into a work of art in its own right. Because of the multiple meanings 
the qualification ‘dialogue’ is aptly chosen. The focus of the opera is the entan-
glement of fear and religion on a neurotic and existential level, embodied in 
the different protagonists.6
I limit myself to the novel of Gertrud von le Fort, who relates the story from 
the vantage point of a contemporary witness of the events. Only here and there 
I point out differences with the other versions in so far as these differences 
shed a new light upon the meaning of sacrifice.
2.1 The Story of the Carmelite Nuns
The story tells about two girls who differ strongly in character: The lively and 
happy Constance and the aristocratic Blanche filled with fear and depression. 
Blanche’s mother was harassed by a mob when heavily pregnant. She died 
shortly after she gave birth to Blanche, because of which Blanche’s life is under 
a bad omen. Several objects in her house imbue her with fear, such as an old 
staircase. Her governess tries to combat these fears by religious education. 
Praying to the “little King with the crown”, that is, to Christ, should guarantee 
protection. Blanche wonders what would happen if the crown fell of his head. 
3    See Gail Elisabeth Lowther, A Historical, Literary, and Musical Analysis of Francis Poulenc’s 
“Dialogues des Carmélites” (PhD diss., University of Ohio, 2010), 14.
4    Georges Bernanos, « Dialogues des Carmélites, » in Oeuvres Romanesques (eds G. and 
M. Estève; Paris: Gallimard, 1961), 1567–1719.
5    Francis Poulenc, Oeuvres lyriques, EMI classics, Edition du Centénaire 1899–1963.
6    See the excellent article by Hans Alma and Hetty Zock, “The Mercy of Anxiety. A Relational-
Psychological Study of Dialogues des Carmélites,” in Mental Health, Religion & Culture 4 
(2002): 175–192. Cf. Sister Meredith Murray, La génèse du Dialogue des Carmélites (Parijs: 
Editions du Seuil, 1963).
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The governess gets confused and assures that the staircase is really safe when 
you have said your prayers. At that moment, a bar breaks in Blanche’s hands.
In marked contrast, Constance is so cheerful and merry – a genuine child of 
God – that she seems to know no fear of death at all. Sometimes she alludes to 
an early death in order to be with God sooner. It is hard to conceive of a greater 
contrast than between the characters of these two girls. Still, in a mysterious 
way their lives seem to coincide. To put it in Jungian terms, they seem to be two 
split figures of one and the same original or the polar manifestation of tensions 
existing in each individual.
Blanche’s father, who is a freethinker, does not understand his daughter’s 
choice for the convent. He regards it as merely an attempt to escape fear. In 
spite of that, he continues to support his daughter morally. Although Blanche 
indeed tries to escape her fears, it becomes clear that entering the convent is 
hardly a way to avoid anguish. She is received by the prioress who dies shortly 
afterwards suffering severe pains, a sure indication that life in the convent can-
not shut out reality and even less fear. Blanche wonders how God can allow 
such suffering and because of that her profession of faith is initially met with 
strong suspicion by the mistress of novices, Sister Mary of the Incarnation. The 
latter even tries to postpone Blanche’s profession. However, an impending new 
law prohibits the entrance into the convent for new candidates and Blanche is 
accepted very quickly. This brings great joy to the little sister Constance, who 
exclaims that the two of them might reach the age of hundred years, “even 
when it is hard to enter heaven after such a long time”. Because of the difficult 
circumstances, Blanche’s religious name will be Sister Blanche of the Agony 
of Christ.7
It is told about sister Mary of the Incarnation that after the execution of 
some of her fellow-sisters, she would be marked with a red line around her 
neck. When the narrator meets her, he notes that no such line is visible. The 
narrator inquires after Blanche and the mistress of novices mutters: “Why 
should fear and shudder be something bad? Cannot they sometimes probe far 
deeper than mere courage?”. Initially, she doubts Blanche’s aptitude to face the 
perils of religious life, but she secretly offers herself in devotion to God in order 
to strengthen Blanche.
The commissioner of the Jacobins regards the convent as a hotbed of 
exploiters and traitors. During his inspection of the convent, Blanche utters 
a desperate cry. The commissioner is convinced that Blanche would prefer to 
leave the convent. Sister Mary of the Incarnation intervenes, arguing that the 
commissioner has no authority to judge these matters. In a grim inquiry, 
7    In Bernanos and Poulenc, Blanche chooses that name herself. See Lowther, Analysis, 33.
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the commissioner expresses the hope that the heads of the sisters will one day 
be put on the stake. Instead of frightening Sister Mary with it, she feels glori-
fied. A glowing fervor burns in her veins, an indication of her longing for mar-
tyrdom. She prays for Blanche’s martyrdom as well, but without telling her, in 
order not to burden her with it. Meanwhile, she indicates unmistakably that 
martyrdom would be the highest ideal for the whole of the community.
Because of the prohibition of the eternal vow, Blanche and Constance 
are the only two novice sisters. The mistress of novices, Sister Mary, tries to 
bring the two of them to the eternal vow in secret, with martyrdom as the 
crowning event. The prioress, however, strongly objects to that idea.
There is a cherished tradition to pass the statue of the Little King along 
the cells of the sisters during Christmas. This year things will be different: The 
scepter and the crown have already been confiscated. Blanche is in the grip 
of fear so intensely that she drops the statue. The head breaks off. Upon the 
advice of the mistress of novices, the prioress intends to send Blanche away 
from the convent because of her excessive fear. In a conversation with Blanche, 
however, the prioress gets the impression that Blanche has devoted her fear of 
death to God in a religious act, mindful of her religious name: Sister Blanche 
of the Agony of Christ. The prioress decides that Blanche may stay under her 
personal supervision. This marks the beginning of a bitter antagonism between 
the prioress and the mistress of novices. The latter fears that Blanche’s weak-
ness and fear would be a good reason for the prioress to avoid martyrdom alto-
gether for all sisters.8
2.2 The Mistress of Novices
When the prioress leaves for a journey, the mistress of novices takes over the 
authority over the convent. She announces the assault of the convent. The lit-
tle Constance starts to cry. Still, she is not afraid, but she, being the youngest, 
does not want to be the last on the scaffold. Sister Mary, the mistress of the 
novices, is painfully hurt: “In the order of the convent, the eldest one will be 
the last”, she says, “and besides, you are not the youngest, but Blanche is”. She 
looks at Blanche while emphasizing that no one will be forced to martyrdom. 
“Whoever is not prepared to give her life to Christ may step aside.” She hopes 
that Blanche will understand this as a kind of invitation, but Blanche remains 
silent. Later on, Blanche is asked again to step aside and then she remarks: 
“I want to remain loyal to my fear”. During the act of consecration in the chapel, 
8    In Bernanos, Sister Constance pretends to belong to the weaker sisters, this in order to pro-
tect Blanche. “I do love life so much”, she says.
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Constance notes that Blanche kneels next to her. When she looks up again dur-
ing communion, Blanche has disappeared.
Blanche is taken prisoner by the mob, her father is killed and she is offered a 
cup of blood in a blasphemous gesture. As both an aristocratic and a religious 
person, the anger of the mob doubles against her. Market women, “mothers of 
the revolution, drag her through the streets of Paris”. Meanwhile, the prioress 
has returned from her journey and is leading a second act of devotion. This 
time, it is no longer an act for “God, king and fatherland”, as sister Mary of the 
Incarnation, herself of royal blood, had wished, but a “sacrifice without hope, 
a sacrifice for God only, a sacrifice of pure love”. Mary of the Incarnation had 
been convinced that the departure of the weak Blanche would be a blessing 
for the convent, but this idea does not play any role with the prioress. Then 
something curious happens. When both the prioress and the mistress of the 
novices are in Paris, they watch a spectacle of prisoners being carried on carts 
to the guillotine. Sister Mary exclaims: “O Jesus Christ, now I understand your 
agony”, and she disappears in the crowd. The next day we hear that sister Mary 
was under the impression that Sister Blanche had been on the cart.
Sister Mary wants to travel back to the convent in Compiègne to be together 
with the other sisters, but all the roads have been blocked. The sisters are 
taken prisoner and are deported to Paris. The crowd is searching for Sister 
Mary because of her royal descent. She, however, brings the “sacrifice of the 
sacrifice”, which means that she renounces martyrdom by hiding. The expres-
sion “the sacrifice of the sacrifice” might denote something truly spiritual and 
even heroic: By renouncing the glory of martyrdom, she would overcome the 
last traces of egoism. The writer, Gertrud von le Fort, however, appears not to 
intend this, but adds in a rather ironical vein: “Less noble people might think 
that she trembled for her life”. “The more pious people” – without stating it 
explicitly, Gertrud von le Fort considers them naïve – thought that this was 
the greatest sacrifice to renounce the crown of glorious martyrdom. There is 
a clear suggestion that Sister Mary has eventually chosen for the easiest road, 
namely, to safety.
Still, later on she is persuaded that the sisters will chant a hymn on their last 
way and she wants to join them together with the priest who was connected to 
the convent. The priest forbids this and says that she should sacrifice her voice 
as well. “Think of the loneliness of Christ in the Garden of Olives. And think 
of mother Mary’s silence.”9 The novel continues: “From that moment on, Sister 
9    In Bernanos and in the opera of Poulenc, Sister Mary says: “Their last glance will search me in 
vain!”, whereupon the priest retorts: “Think of another glance to which you may direct yours.” 
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Mary of the Incarnation remained utterly silent. Her voice was transferred to 
someone else”.
2.3 The Hymns
Indeed the sisters sing a hymn, the Salve Regina, to mother Mary. After that, 
the Veni Creator Spiritus is heard, the hymn to the creative Holy Spirit. It is as 
if the destruction and chaos caused by the machinery of the guillotine is 
checked by the creative force of the Spirit. The sound of the choir of the sis-
ters becomes thinner during the operation of the guillotine. In the end, only 
one voice remains, that of Sister Constance. When her voice is muted as well, 
another voice can be heard out of the crowd. The voice of Sister Mary has 
indeed been transferred to someone else. The voice sings without any trem-
bling and rather exultingly until the end of the last strophe:
Deo Patri sit gloria
Et Filio, qui a mortuis
Surrexit ac Paraclito
In saeculorum saecula!10
The ‘Amen’ could not be heard any more. Blanche was beaten to death 
by the raging mob.11 The narrator was a witness of this execution and relates 
the whole history in a letter to a friend. He comments that it is not the high 
value of human nature which has come to light in this story, but the decline of 
humanity giving way to chaos. Blanche was not a heroine, but demonstrates 
the fragility of our force and dignity.
2.4 The Narrative Lines in the Story
Blanche is tormented by fears. Her religious education has taught her to pray 
to Jesus, who will offer protection in exchange. However, in many smaller 
details – the broken bar of the stairs, the crown of the little King falling on 
the ground – it becomes clear that this religious bargain does not hold. Prayer 
in exchange for safety does not constitute the essence of Christian spiritual-
ity. Blanche’s way to the convent is by no means an escape from fear, but will 
  Then both leave the stage. Is a liaison between both suggested here? In that case, the 
ultimate degradation of Sister Mary would be complete!
10    Glory be to God the Father,/ And to the Son, who has risen from the dead,/ And to the 
Spirit who consoles,/ For ever and ever!
11    Bernanos describes how Blanche is pushed to the scaffold among a group of women, after 
which her voice remains silent. Poulenc, however, describes how she climbs the scaffold.
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rather intensify fear. This becomes clear when the old prioress is not spared 
pains by God. The religious name of Blanche of the agony of Christ, indicates 
that Blanche, with all her excruciating fears, is closer to Christ than the self-
assured Sister Mary of the Incarnation.12 Sister Mary has no sympathy at all 
for Blanche – she can hardly be called a “mother Mary” – and she accuses her 
of having small faith. Her own steadfastness, however, is ‘cheap’, because it 
lacks a basis in a genuine experience of anxiety as will become clear in the 
sequel of the story.
When the commissioner threatens the sisters with death, Sister Mary glows 
with an inner desire for martyrdom. Blanche remains loyal to her own anxi-
ety and does not opt for the heroism of martyrdom. Sister Mary’s longing for 
heroism is mingled with pride of her royal descent and her affiliation with the 
royal house of France, which renders her willingness somewhat insincere. She 
attempts to remove Blanche from the community as a weak element which 
eventually undermines her own willingness to sacrifice. Sister Mary is unable 
to identify with her community of sisters, but her pursuit is a private glory and 
salvation. In this respect, she is diametrically opposed to the new prioress who 
rejects the imposed act of devotion to martyrdom and takes Blanche under her 
personal protection.
It is highly symbolic that Blanche admires the statue of the little King of 
Glory because of its smallness and fragility, whereas Sister Mary reproaches her 
for not calling the little King powerful. Blanche rejects this ‘correct’ Christian 
qualification and says: “The little King is dead. What remains is the Lamb of 
God”. She may refer to a victory over death, but only through fragility, suffering 
and death. Blanche’s fellow sisters have to appear in the revolutionary court 
because they “do not recognize” the authority of the law. Blanche is absent. 
However, Sister Mary is nowhere to be found either. The sisters are condemned 
to the guillotine because of “counterrevolutionary statements that constitute 
a danger to the state”. When the verdict is executed, the sisters start to sing. At 
the moment it would have been Sister Mary’s turn, suddenly Blanche’s voice 
is heard in the crowd. In spite of her anxieties, Blanche raises her voice in the 
midst of the crowd and is killed.
12    In Bernanos and Poulenc, there is an elaborate debate about how it could be that Christ 
felt a profound fear of death, while many saints faced death without any fear.
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3 Perspectives on Self-Sacrifice
The story contains quite a few antagonistic movements, which can all be 
explained as ways to clarify the essence of self-sacrifice. Sister Mary is utterly 
convinced of the importance of self-sacrifice and wants to promote that among 
the sisters as their vocation. Self-sacrifice appears not as a personal choice in 
life, but as a collective ideology imposed “from the outside” by Sister Mary with 
considerable constraint. Sister Mary does not feel any motherly love, in spite of 
her name, but demands self-sacrifice of her ‘children’, in marked contrast with 
the prioress who rejects the collective act of devotion to martyrdom and would 
rather save her ‘children’. According to the prioress, martyrdom is a gift from 
God, not something that can be achieved by humans out of free will if there 
are other options as well.13 Blanche cannot surmount her fear and disappears. 
Her disappearance marks the beginning of her Via Dolorosa. Eventually sister 
Mary also discovers what anxiety really is and then it is her turn to disappear. 
Her later attempt to join the other sisters does not succeed either. In Bernanos 
and Poulenc, Sister Mary and the aforementioned priest disappear simultane-
ously, so that a connection – or rather a liaison – between them is suggested. 
This would mean a total desertion. Sister Mary’s initial willingness to sacrifice 
herself cannot be explained as a victory over her fears, but constitutes their 
denial. Hence this sacrifice is not a genuine sacrifice, but arises out of lack of 
love of life. Her refusal to bring the sacrifice constitutes a first positive discov-
ery of that love of life, after which she recoils from the genuine sacrifice which 
presupposes it. Sister Mary betrays her own ideology, in spite of the fact that 
she constantly reproached Blanche for not embracing martyrdom.
No doubt this denouement constitutes a sharp criticism of martyrdom as 
a collective Catholic ideology, imposed as it were “from the outside” instead 
of being a free choice “from the inside”.14 Gertrud von le Fort does not shrink 
back from a highly critical stand on outward morality and a legalistic sense of 
duty, in which personal feelings of individuals do not count. The novel is by no 
means a paean of traditional Catholic triumphant devotion.
Religious substitution interpreted as the responsibility of each individual for 
the whole of humankind is an essential theme in the literary works of Gertrud 
von le Fort. Sacrificial death is regarded as participation in the redemption 
13    Poulenc emphasizes this element.
14    This seems to me a striking parallel with Levinas’ philosophy, which does not offer a 
perspective of sacrifice and martyrdom as generally valid, but radically rejects any mar-
tyrdom in so far it is preached to someone else. See E. Levinas, Humanism of the other 
(Chicago: Urbana, 2003), 31.
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by Christ. Although Protestantism emphasizes that humankind cannot add 
anything to Christ’s redemptive suffering, Catholic theologians such as Erich 
Przywara (1889–1972) have emphasized the significance of vicarious suffering 
for all believers “in Christ”.15 In French literature around 1900, there is a remark-
able flood of Catholic literature on vicarious suffering, which has sometimes 
been branded as a “reactionary revolution”.16
Gertrud von le Fort can be interpreted as both a continuation and a critical 
reassessment of this theological tradition. In her works, the danger of a ste-
reotypical view of woman as particularly called to vicarious sacrifice is never 
far off. Nevertheless the strong differences between the female characters in 
Die Letzte am Schafott prevent an essentialist approach and do not allow for 
an easy feminist disqualification. The chasm between an essentialist label-
ing “from the outside” leading to oppression, and a genuine discovery of one’s 
vocation “from the inside” leading to redemption forms a crucial theme in her 
writings.
4 Christian Conceptions of Martyrdom
The theme of martyrdom as formulated in Die Letzte am Schafott is quite 
untraditional and even exceptional in comparison with the most important 
Christian documents from the formative period of Christianity. In a passion-
ate discourse, Ad martyres (198 CE), Tertullian exhorts the Christians who have 
been taken prisoner to face martyrdom without fear and with total equanim-
ity. Fleeing is no option for Tertullian and feigning obedience to the emperor 
he rejects full of contempt. Tertullian admires the Stoic ideal of equanimity 
and a dispassionate attitude, even with pagan heroes such as Lucretia, Mucius 
Scaevola and Empedocles, and demands no less from his fellow Christians.
The Christian writer Origen, who lived somewhat later than Tertullian, had 
to be prevented from martyrdom as a child, when his father had been taken 
prisoner and he himself wanted to achieve the crown of martyrdom. In his 
Exhortation to Martyrdom (235 CE), he also sketches equanimity as the highest 
ideal, embodied in the Jewish seven Maccabaean martyrs. Remarkably, Origen 
discusses the problem that Christ might have felt a strong fear of death, as the 
15    Helena Saward, “A Literature of Substitution: Vicarious Sacrifice in the Writing of Gertrud 
von le Fort,” German Life and Letters 53:2 (2000): 178–200. Incidentally, both Przywara and 
Gertrud von le Fort were in contact with Edith Stein.
16    Richard Griffiths, The Reactionary Revolution. The Catholic Revival in French Literature 
1870–1014 (London: Constable 1966), esp. 149–222.
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prayer testifies: “Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me” (Matt. 26:39). 
It is telling that Origen tries to explain this away (§29). We have to wait 
until Cyprian (200–258 CE) for the argument that martyrdom, although the 
highest good, should not be searched, but – if possible without denying 
the Christian faith – should be avoided. This was to become the guiding prin-
ciple for the Church afterwards. Incidentally, Cyprian died as a martyr.
4.1 Rejection of a Stoic Attitude
Die Letzte am Schafott can be read as a consistent major critique upon the Stoic 
ideal of equanimity towards martyrdom. Christ’s fear of death is not a reason 
for embarrassment to the writer of the novel, as it was for Origen, but points 
the way to a genuine experience of one’s own fear of death that has to be lived 
through. The prioress alludes to martyrdom not as an achievement but as a gift 
from God; this against Sister Mary who deliberately wants to search martyr-
dom, hereby suppressing her own fears.
In contrast, Blanche chooses for her own feelings and for her love of life, 
which she feels in spite of (or thanks to) her fears. Her continuous fear of death 
coincides with a strong desire to live. Again we see in the story an antagonistic 
movement. The first movement was that of Sister Mary towards heroic mar-
tyrdom, combated by the prioress, while the second is that of Blanche herself, 
fleeing for martyrdom, but nonetheless gently connected to Sister Constance. 
The anxious Blanche will eventually choose martyrdom out of her own free will 
and without anybody counting upon it – except Sister Constance. Blanche’s 
choice is not motivated by a morbid love of death – she has proven that by her 
flight – but out of loyalty to her vocation to be a nun and a bride of Christ. She 
does not want to abjure her habit and her community of fellow sisters. In that 
respect, her deed might be comparable to that of the other sisters, but in the 
novel we do not get more information about their motives.17
As modern human beings, we might shiver by this story of martyrdom of 
the sisters, convinced as we are that religious choices must be reduced to social 
pressures, gender differences, unconscious motives due to childhood experi-
ences, hatred of life or a secret ambition to heroism. That this martyrdom 
could be understood out of genuine love of life and as a testimony to Christian 
faith is hard for us to accept. We might even propose a religious frenzy in order 
to rob this religious gesture of its authenticity. Blanche’s history seems to fore-
stall all this by anticipating these objections. In first instance, as we all would 
do spontaneously, she avoids her fate. The childhood experiences, the social 
17    Bernanos introduces extensively other sisters with name and background, who all have 
their own perspectives upon the events.
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pressure and even the unconscious craving for glory are all given their due. 
This confers to Blanche’s deed precisely that hallmark of authenticity: A per-
sonal wrestling with her vocation, the loving embrace of life itself which makes 
her surrender of her life to God the most precious gift.
Her anxieties and fears, which initially seemed a weakness and a hereditary 
curse, turn out to be so essential to her choice that without them her choice 
would lack humane traits. Hence, the self-sacrifice in martyrdom is no longer 
an automatic step, but a long way of growth and defeat of one’s own fears. 
Existential fear and the search for identity are closely intertwined here. Not 
by neglecting fear, but by integrating it into the love of life as a gift from God, 
Blanche affirms her own identity and honors her own name Blanche – in refer-
ence to her white habit. Her deed turns out be pure freedom and pure devotion 
to God, a combination rarely achieved. This is her great strength, referred to in 
her name as well: Blanche de la Force, simultaneously reference to the author’s 
name, Von le Fort. The irony of the story is that all ideals of Sister Mary of 
the Incarnation were based upon her own strength, whereas Blanche realizes 
these ideals based upon God’s grace. This is symbolized by the voice of Sister 
Mary being taken over by Blanche.
Next to Sister Mary, Blanche and the prioress, there is the young and cheerful 
Sister Constance. It is as if she is not antagonistic to any person and manages to 
live without conflict. Her entrance into the convent is motivated by love of God 
and humankind, whereas Blanche is motivated by fear of life. Together they 
form a mysterious couple. Both are novices, both wonder whether they will be 
the last ones on the scaffold.18 Constance is convinced that Blanche will return 
in one way or another, although she puts no pressure at all upon Blanche as 
Sister Mary did. We noted earlier that a dream had told Constance that the 
two of them would die together. With an inner joy Constance enters the scaf-
fold, without being forced by an ideology imposed upon her by a tradition or 
a superior. Pure love of God and humankind motivates her behavior. Her face 
radiates joy. It is that joy which Blanche has to conquer, but which will eventu-
ally be her share as well.19 Constance has always encouraged Blanche, stating 
that she would be able to overcome her fears. In the end the two of them are 
together, united in death before God.
18    Poulenc intensifies the intertwined fates of Blanche and Constance by introducing 
Constance relating laughingly a dream in which Blanche and herself will die together.
19    Poulenc describes how Constance and Blanche exchange a last eye contact before 
Constance’s execution.
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5 The Complex Relation Between Sacrifice and Freedom of Will
We might wonder what prompted Blanche to raise her voice in the midst of 
the crowd. At first glance death could have been avoided, in contrast to the 
fate of the other sisters. It is significant that Blanche does not decide to choose 
martyrdom before she sees her fellow sisters, but precisely at that moment. This 
may indicate that she felt her personal vocation to be intrinsically connected 
with them. At the moment she sees the other sisters being carried off to the 
scaffold, she realizes that she is on the brink of deserting her vocation. Her 
choice is free but not individualistic: Her identity is intrinsically connected to 
the community, yet this does not imply that she is consciously pressed by that 
community. Here we might adduce the philosophy of René Girard, who points 
out that our desires have an element of imitation.20 We desire when and what 
we see others desire. Blanche has probably no desire of martyrdom, until she 
sees her fellow sisters on the way to the guillotine. Then she manages to over-
come her fear of death.
Should we conclude that her martyrdom is after all not a free decision but 
rather a form of mimesis, of imitation of what others do in order to acquire the 
same status? It is important to look once more at her situation.
She does not distance herself explicitly and visibly from the vocation of her 
fellow sisters. At that moment she is hidden in the crowd, be it in the hands of 
a revolutionary mob.21 In whatever way, she is now invisible to the eyes of the 
other sisters. Neither the crowd nor her fellow sisters did have occasion to put 
any pressure upon her final choice. Therefore her release from the crowd by 
following her vocation should be understood as an act of pure freedom, “from 
the inside”. It is a self-sacrifice without being sacrificed. As the example of her 
fellow sisters has brought her to this step, it is preferable to speak about fol-
lowing in their footsteps rather than copying their fate. Even if it is the fate of 
the others that induces her to take up martyrdom, she is not forced by the con-
scious will of the others. Hence it is neither slavish mimesis nor imposed force 
or collective obligation, but a choice for martyrdom which she – and she only – 
recognizes in her fellow sisters and which ultimately only she can choose for 
herself. Seen in this perspective, she realizes the highest freedom and the 
deepest identity by choosing self-sacrifice, after having lived through all 
the fears and sufferings as well as the feelings of attachment to life. We may 
regard her self-sacrifice as a genuine sacrifice, in the sense of sacrifice with 
20    See Saskia van Goelst Meijer’s contribution in this volume.
21    In Gertrud von le Fort’s novel. Bernanos and Poulenc put a stronger emphasis upon 
Blanche’s freedom by introducing the mob only after her singing.
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which this chapter opened: Self-sacrifice presupposes love of life, or else it is 
no sacrifice. Fear does not appear as a disturbance of psychic life that should 
be removed. Fear leads Blanche to the deepest kernel of her life and to the 
highest consciousness of her vocation.22
And yet, we have to leave the paradox unresolved that Blanche’s attitude 
cannot be turned into a general ideal to be recommended to all mankind. 
Expecting the self-sacrifice from others amounts to immorality.23 Blanche’s 
resistance to such a generalized ideal, embodied in Sister Mary of the 
Incarnation, remains valid until the very end. Even the notion of divine reward 
for martyrdom should be challenged, to avoid the reduction of an unselfish act 
into an ‘economic’ choice for what would be most beneficial.24
Poulenc ends his opera with a female choir that is considered the most heart-
rending music ever written. The music, a Latin hymn sung by the women and 
accompanied by the orchestra is repeatedly interrupted by the brutal thwack 
of the guillotine, after which the choir has one voice less. At the end we only 
hear the voice of Constance, who ends up being murdered as well. Then there 
is Blanche’s solo voice, singing the final lines of the hymn Veni Creator Spiritus 
while entering the scaffold.25 She does not sing the final word ‘Amen’, however. 
At that moment the guillotine falls down on her too.
22    Cf. the existential meaning of fear in Kierkegaard and Heidegger. See J. Calsius, Ruimte 
voor angst. Het vermogen tot existentiële bewustwording doorheen angst in relatie tot 
lichaam en authenticiteit (Room for Fear. The Ability to Existential Consciousness through 
Fear in Relation to the Body and to Authenticity), (PhD diss., University of Utrecht, 2011).
23    In that respect, the philosophy of Levinas does not contain a general sacrificial philoso-
phy, but rather stresses the impossibility to expect self-sacrifice from someone else but 
me. A different position in: Peter Jonkers, “Justifying Sacrifice,” Neue Zeitschrift für system-
atische Theologie und Religions-philosophie, 50 (2008): 313–329.
24    This does not imply an atheistic stand as the only morally possible position, as John 
Milbank seems to believe. (“The Midwinter Sacrifice: a Sequel to Can Morality be 
Christian?” Angelaki 6, 2 (2001): 49–65. Those who act unselfishly without the motivation 
of heavenly reward are the most deserving that reward. This seems to be the lesson of the 
question of the righteous to the heavenly Son of Man (Matt 25:37).
25    In the novel Blanche is killed by a furious mob, by which her fate and her mother’s fate 
coincide. Bernanos, and even more Poulenc, have chosen to establish a stronger connec-
tion between Blanche’s fate and that of her fellow sisters.
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Religion, Suffering and Female Heroism: 




We are an international movement and community of women of different 
cultures, social backgrounds and generations. We trust in the Spirit of God, 
Mystery and Source of Life. We are called to create a sustainable world, trans-
forming our planet into a place of peace and justice. We acknowledge that we 
are part of the whole of creation, striving to live simply and to nurture a culture 
of care for all the earth. We are determined to look for signs of hope in a com-
plex world. We are strengthened by the compassionate energy and creative 
action of women.1
Anyone visiting the website of the International Grail comes across these 
words encapsulating the current vision of this women’s movement. The Grail 
is a spiritual, social and cultural movement “grounded in Christian faith” that 
through working in different cultures seeks to work for justice and peace 
and to enable women to develop their full potential. It is active in eighteen 
countries and is recognized by the United Nations as a Non-Governmental 
Organization with a special consultative status in relation to women within 
the UN Economic and Social Council. The Dutch branch – the movement’s first 
one, established in 1921 – explicitly states that its common ground is:
[T]o find meaningful ways of expressing our spirituality in action. The 
Grail movement in the Netherlands has grown into a community where 
a lively and exciting exploration is taking place in feminist theology, 
Christianity and Zen Buddhism.2
1   “The vision of the Grail,” see www.thegrail.org. The women’s movement of the Grail should 
be distinguished from another movement of the same name. The latter is a so-called new 
religious movement that originated in Germany in the late 1940s and is inspired by the work 
of Oskar Ernst Bernhardt (see www.grailmessage.com).
2   www.degraalbeweging.nl.
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The Grail websites present an international movement of modern women 
who, inspired by a range of both religious and secular thinkers, want to play 
an active role in today’s world. If anything, the visual culture of the Grail is 
dominated by words and images that, in addition to female bonding, reflect 
self-awareness, confidence and autonomy. Nothing could be further removed 
from concepts of sacrifice and suffering.
Nevertheless, a sacrificial culture originally lay at the core of the movement 
and for decades was fundamental to its spirituality. This fact has been erased 
from memory and, consequently, from history. Instead of regarding this as 
a mere historical error, I argue that it is rather an indication of the basically 
historical nature of the concept of sacrifice. By this I mean that its societal, 
cultural and spiritual-theological qualifications are related to specific histori-
cal contexts. The meaning and the assessment of the concepts of sacrifice 
and, consequently, of personal suffering change throughout history and are 
therefore variable concepts. While certain sacrificial acts were highly valued 
in a specific time and age, the same acts could be perceived as degrading in 
another. Whereas different cultural understandings of sacrifice are usually 
taken into account, historical ones often are not. Consequently, it remains 
unacknowledged that what once was regarded as an outstanding virtue could 
later become an unwanted – and eventually even purposely forgotten or 
denounced – heritage. So, instead of looking at sacrifice from an anthropologi-
cal or psychological perspective, I perceive sacrifice as an object of cultural his-
tory and try to grasp its meaning in a specific historical context.3
Furthermore, I take gender into account. My analysis starts from the assump-
tion that, culturally and socially, different sacrificial roles are attached to, and 
expected from, men and women. This versatile attitude towards sacrifice 
seems particularly present when women are concerned, because concepts of 
both gender and sacrifice appear to have changed considerably over time. It is 
vital to acknowledge the complex historical importance of sacrifice for women 
in the religious realm, because it is here that both the attractive and repressive 
sides of religious movements align. This means that in order to understand the 
current emphasis on female autonomy mentioned above, we have to look at 
the enforced, yet willing submission of these women in the past.
3   For another historical, yet essentially psychological approach of the meaning of sacri-
fice in a Catholic context see Emke Bosgraaf, Gebroken wil, verstorven vlees. Een historisch-
psychologische studie over versterving in het Nederlandse kloosterleven,1950–1970 (Groningen: 
Facilitair Bedrijf/Grafimedia, 2009).
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This article elaborates on the rise of the Grail’s sacrificial culture in the 
pre-war period and its gradual disappearance from the 1960s onwards. Firstly, 
the rise of the Women of Nazareth will be typified: A group of intellectual lay 
women that became the leadership of the Grail movement. An ambiguous sac-
rificial culture was essential for this movement: Although it was intended as a 
means of individual submission and of shaping a community with a collec-
tive purpose, sacrifice actually functioned as an instrument creating individ-
ual excellence and non-vocalized group hierarchy. Self-imposed penances and 
acts of mortification were not only identity markers, but through these prac-
tices the women aimed at becoming co-saviors, contributing to diminishing 
the sins of the world. Their being co-saviors was meaningful on an individual 
as well as a collective level.
And last but not least, these practices served on various levels as a disci-
plinary instrument. They enabled the Jesuit leader to keep control over the 
women, allowed individual women mastery of themselves, and they installed 
hierarchical cliques within the group. Yet it was only through excellence in sac-
rifice that women could engage in religious heroism. Thus, sacrifice became a 
source of repression and of mutual competition. All this should be understood 
against the historical background of the aftermath of World War I in general, 
and the position of women in the religious realm in particular. The second part 
of the article focuses on the process within which this heritage has been erased 
from the collective memory of the Grail since the 1960s.
2 “Woman’s Natural Capacity for Sacrifice and Suffering.” The Origins 
of the Grail Movement
The aftermath of World War I initiated moral concern amongst an internation-
ally oriented group of Catholic intellectuals, writers and artists in the trans-
atlantic area. Among those were a considerable number of converts, such as 
the French thinkers Léon Bloy, Jacques Maritain and his wife Raïssa, and the 
English writer G. K. Chesterton. They evaluated the cultural and moral disman-
tling of the western world as basically a religious problem caused by moder-
nity, and aimed at a Catholic revival by placing the Mother Church once again 
at the centre of western intellectual life.4 Inspiration was sought and found not 
4   Paul Luykx, “Daar is nog, poëzie, nog kleur, nog warmte.” Katholieke bekeerlingen en modernit-
eit in Nederland, 1880–1960 (Hilversum: Verloren, 2007); Patrick Allitt, Catholic converts. British 
and American intellectuals turn to Rome (Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press, 1997).
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only in the writings of another famous convert, namely the English Cardinal 
John Henry Newman, but also in Catholic tradition. Although a diverse group 
of cultural critics, many of these intellectuals idealized the vigor of early 
Christianity and the mysticism of the Middle Ages. They were especially fas-
cinated by monastic traditions of asceticism and physical penances. Because 
of the allure that suffering had for them, they often cultivated such practices 
themselves, regarding them as the articulation of a counter-pressure against 
secularization and a way of participating in the suffering of Jesus.5
2.1 Victim Spirituality
In fact, the whole period of the interwar years showed a remarkable rise in 
the popularity of a phenomenon that had made a first re-appearance in nine-
teenth-century France: The so-called ‘victim-souls’. These were people who, in 
their own perception or that of others, were specially chosen by God to suffer 
more than most people during their lifetime. They generously and willingly 
accepted the suffering because it signified a union with their Savior: Their 
actions were inspired by Christ’s own Passion and death. Behind this willful 
embrace of sacrifice and suffering lay a desire to make reparation for the sins of 
mankind. Being deprived of other social, cultural or religious means to partici-
pate in the history of salvation – since this was the exclusive prerogative of the 
ordained priesthood – women particularly identified with these practices of 
spiritual repair. These practices provided the desired participation in salvation, 
albeit in a complex manner, in which submission and feelings of exclusivism 
became intertwined.6 “A self-appointed religious elite”, the historian Richard 
Burton has aptly typified them.7 This elite felt re-enforced and approved by 
Church politics of canonization, since both Jeanne d’Arc and Anna Maria Taigi 
were canonized in 1920. The former was a symbol of female pious persistency 
5   For the French susceptibility to this cultural and religious climate see Brenna Moore, Sacred 
Dread: Raïssa Maritain, the Allure of Suffering, and the French Catholic Revival (1905–1945) 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2013); Stephen Schloesser, Jazz-Age Catholicism. 
Mystic Modernism in Post-war Paris, 1919–1933 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005).
6   Nancy Jay, “Sacrifice as Remedy for Having Been Born of Woman,” in The Female in Sacred 
Image and Social Reality (ed. Clarissa Atkinson; Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 283–309 
(297–304).
7   Richard Burton, Holy Tears, Holy Blood. Women, Catholicism and the Culture of Suffering in 
France, 1840–1970 (London: Cornell University Press, 2004). Also: Moore, Sacred Dread; Paula 
M. Kane, “She offered herself up. The Victim Soul and Victim Spirituality in Catholicism,” 
Church History 71:1 (2002): 80–119; Steffen Lösel, “Prayer, Pain, and Priestly Privilege: Claude 
Langlois’ New Perspective on Thérèse of Lisieux,” in Journal of Religion 88, 3 (2008): 273–306; 
Ida Magli, Women and Self-Sacrifice in the Christian Church. A Cultural History from the First 
tot the Nineteenth Century (Jefferson, London: MacFarland & Company, 2003).
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through trials and tribulations, while the latter, a nineteenth-century Italian 
housewife and mother, was known to have been “a true victim-soul” by leading 
a life full of prayer, mortification and self-denial.8 The canonization of another 
female apostle of suffering in union with Christ, Gemma Galgani, followed 
in 1940.9
Against this historical background, a Dutch Jesuit, the internationally 
renowned linguist Jacques van Ginneken, came to develop his own ideal of 
a profound, vigorous and mythical Catholicism and saw an all-embracing 
conversion as a countermovement against the growing secularization. In line 
with other radical Catholics, with whom he held close contact, Van Ginneken 
constructed his view upon an idealization of early Christianity, the era of the 
martyrs. He thought that practice of the faith should be passionate and mili-
tant. The ascetic movements of the Middle Ages also inspired him because 
they displayed devotion and suffering for a religious cause. Contrary to his 
contemporaries, Van Ginneken believed that women, as both militant com-
batants and devoted sufferers, were most suited for such a new golden age of 
Catholicism. Women would be ‘naturally’ enabled to give themselves totally 
to a higher ideal, and in addition possessed a superior capacity to engage in 
a “spirituality of the Cross”, in which sacrifice and suffering held a special 
place. He underlined this theory by pointing to several strong women from the 
history of Christianity, notably in early Christianity and the Middle Ages. By 
constructing a female genealogy, Van Ginneken provided the means of identi-
fication and legitimization for the women that he wanted to gather to save the 
world. Furthermore, it was not women religious but lay women who should 
take up this role, because the strict rules and regulations that the Church laid 
upon convents prevented nuns from carrying out a militant task in the world.10
2.2 Militant Sacrificers: The Women of Nazareth
To support his cause, the visionary Van Ginneken established two associations 
of Catholic laywomen: The Ladies of Bethany and the Women of Nazareth. 
Ahead of what later would become widely known as Catholic Action, they 
were to become a “quasi-religious nucleus of the lay apostolate”. Both groups 
aimed to convert on a global scale. From a social perspective, the members 
8    Nieuwe Tilburgsche Courant, 27-04-1920.
9    Lucietta Scaraffía, “Christianity has liberated her and placed her alongside man in the 
family: from 1850 to 1988,” in Women and Faith: Catholic Religious Life in Italy from Late 
Antiquity to the Present (eds Lucietta Scaraffía and Gabriella Zarri; Cambridge MA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999), 249–280.
10   The following paragraph is based on Marjet Derks, Heilig moeten. Radicaal-katholiek en 
retro-modern in de jaren twintig en dertig (Hilversum: Verloren, 2007), 188–324.
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were representative of a first generation of highly educated Catholic women 
who had no desire to take on the accepted ideals of either motherhood or con-
vent life. However, they were very willing to follow a social and religious calling 
and Van Ginneken’s lay associations held a strong appeal.
The Women of Nazareth’s goal was the conversion of adolescent city girls, as 
a starting point for the conversion of this target group in other countries too. 
After a few years, however, the bishop of the Haarlem diocese, where the group 
was centered, demanded that they take up responsibility for the ailing Catholic 
girls’ movement. After rigorous deliberation, Van Ginneken and the women 
decided to comply, making this “sacrifice of obedience”, as they referred to it 
amongst each other. In 1928, they started the so-called Grail movement, and 
due to its modern approach and appropriation of methods from the youth 
movement this soon became the largest and most successful youth movement 
in the Netherlands. Tens of thousands of girls joined, engaging in outdoor 
activities, taking part in gatherings in special clubhouses, marching the streets 
in colorful uniforms and performing large scale theatrical religious plays in sta-
diums. From 1932 onward, the movement began to spread to other countries, 
first in Western Europe (Germany, England, Scotland and Ireland) and after a 
while to Australia and the United States.
The movement seemed modern, straightforward and very artistic. The 
internal dynamics, however, resembled an inverted family-like group, with fea-
tures of what sociologist Erving Goffman has described as a “total institution”.11 
Becoming a genuine member, and thus justifying the choice of this way of liv-
ing, involved a process of “mortification of the self”, the sacrifice of one’s own 
personality. Grail women remained lay women. Therefore, while working “in 
the world” they would have to be immune to worldly temptations. This called 
for subjection to degrading and humiliating treatment, both self-inflicted and 
imposed by Van Ginneken. In addition, he demanded a regular and detailed 
update of what had been practiced. To get this, he kept in close contact 
with the women who led the movement. Without any supervision or control 
from the outside, these practices were more far-reaching than the penances 
and acts of mortification that were being practiced in religious orders. In fact, 
the daily life of the Women of Nazareth was dominated by a much cultivated – 
yet hidden – sacrificial culture of severe physical and mental penances: 
Practices of joyous suffering within the group. A true member would excel at 
sacrifice. These practices also served the movement’s aim: By becoming a holo-
caustum (which means “fire sacrifice” and was the term Van Ginneken used), 
11   Erving Goffman, Asylums. Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and other 
Inmates (New York: Doubleday, 1961).
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the women would stand out as purifiers. They would repair the world’s wrong-
doings and encourage conversion. Through the sacralization of sacrifice, suf-
fering and loss were turned into a source of spiritual power.
3 Reinventing the Grail in the 1960s
After World War II, things changed on a large scale and at a fast pace. The 
war years had left the Grail shattered, its houses confiscated by the German 
occupying force, the girls’ movement forbidden, and the leadership dispersed. 
Contact had been difficult during the war, especially with those Women of 
Nazareth who lived and worked outside the Netherlands. Lacking in financial 
means, many Women of Nazareth were forced to take up jobs in totally dif-
ferent fields from the ones they were used to. A relatively large group became 
nurses, while others found employment in offices or schools. Communal 
meetings and spiritual retreats became rare, although Van Ginneken, who was 
forced to go into hiding, did manage to meet with a small group of Grail leaders 
once in a while. On those occasions, he kept accentuating the importance of 
the sacrificial spirituality and the cause of world conversion. But by then it had 
become clear that the type of girls’ movement that belonged to the interwar 
years had outlived its appeal and would not easily be restored after the war. 
When, in 1946, Van Ginneken died of a brain hemorrhage, the Grail seemed to 
be finished.
3.1 Renewal of Christian Culture
Nevertheless, the so-called Nucleus (central group) of the Women of Nazareth, 
who after the war had continued under the name of the Grail, did eventually 
manage to work out a new orientation. The concept of conversion underwent 
major changes in this new orientation. Engaging itself with the world crisis 
that now manifested itself, the Grail reappeared with a vision of a renewed 
Christian culture. A universal perspective and a missionary spirit became key 
concepts, yet still closely linked to the all-embracing nature of Catholicism. 
The movement set out to develop a kaleidoscopic range of apostolic endeav-
ors to advance what was now called “spiritual conversion”, ranging from work 
among poor neighborhoods and students in the US to the development of a 
world-wide missionary movement.12
12   Alden V. Brown, “The Grail Movement to 1962: Laywomen and a New Christendom,” U.S. 
Catholic Historian 3, 3 (1983): 149–166.
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Primarily, the new Grail became an international movement that aimed at 
training young women to work as lay missionaries in education and health 
care and to catechize all over the world. Already in 1947, the Tiltenberg, the 
movement’s mother-house, had become a mission school attended by dozens 
of young women who were eager to work as missionaries but felt no attraction 
whatsoever to becoming nuns. None other than the Dutch Prime Minister Beel 
opened the school and applauded its existence. A year later, the school moved 
to a reconstructed house in Ubbergen (near Nijmegen).13 The successful reori-
entation of the Grail attracted hundreds of young women who spread the orga-
nization’s work in an increasing number of countries. It made the Grail even 
more of an international movement than it had been before the war. Although 
there were some generational differences within the movement, its success 
seemed to compensate for that.
3.2 In Search of New Concepts of Identity
Success and growth seemed to imply that the Grail’s approach to Christian 
cultural renewal was seen as valid, but this was only partly true. The new-
style Grail had to deal with a world that was rapidly changing, politically as 
well as socially, economically, and technologically. This affected its religious 
setting to a great extent. While the number of people leaving organized reli-
gion was growing, the Catholic Church experienced an increasing influence 
of modern theologians. Throughout the 1950s, these theologians began to 
turn away from the neo-Thomism and anti-modernism that had been domi-
nant since the nineteenth century and began to address relations between 
the Church and the modern world. They pleaded for the integration of mod-
ern human experience with the principles of a Church based on Jesus Christ, 
and for re-engagement with the Scripture and with the Church Fathers as a 
basis for renewal. It was these reflections and deliberations that led to the 
Second Vatican Council (1962–1965), in which various Grail women were 
actively involved, both as translators, hostesses and auditors.14 Although the 
Grail unambiguously supported the Council’s conceptualization of aggiorna-
mento, they did not immediately grasp the consequences it would have for 
them. The conciliar call for a new orientation on both the present and the 
past had an enormous impact on the Grail movement, which had just been 
theologically retuned.
13   Limburgs Dagblad (November 8, 1947 and April 22, 1948).
14   Marjet Derks, “Changing Lanes: Dutch Women Witnessing the Second Vatican Council,” 
Trajecta. Religion, Culture and Society in the Low Countries 22, 1 (2013): 81–102.
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As far as the present was concerned, the Grail felt forced to discuss the lay 
status that had been the core of its identity since the creation of the Women 
of Nazareth. The Decree Perfectae Caritatis, on the adaptation and renewal of 
religious life, stated that all members of religious orders were in fact lay people 
and should be regarded as such. In this way, nuns became competitors to the 
Grail women who had always cherished their lay status and wanted fervently 
to distinguish themselves from women religious. Despite the renewal that was 
going on in the religious orders, the Grail women felt that nuns would never 
understand the world in the way that they did. A member of the Nucleus wrote 
in 1963:
[W]e need an approach to our world that has much more real contact 
with the kind of world in which we are living. The nuns do not have this 
and I doubt, even with many changes, if they can achieve it.15
Consequently, the Grail women felt the need to re-conceptualize their identity 
as well as rethink the needs of modern life to which they should adapt. In other 
words, once again, the Grail needed to reinvent itself. In several national and 
international conferences, the movement opted to open itself to women from 
all kinds of spiritual backgrounds, and began to focus more strongly on social, 
political and economic justice. This was reflected in a changing vocabulary, 
from which phrases such as “integral Catholicism” or “new Christendom” dis-
appeared altogether.16
4 Evaluating the Sacrificial Past
Much more difficult, and according to historian Alden Brown even ‘agonizing’, 
was the long process of self-criticism in which the past was re-examined. The 
Grail felt that it, too, was addressed by the Council’s urging religious orders to 
engage in a program of ressourcement in order to determine what needed to be 
changed so that they could better accord with the spirit of their founders. The 
Nucleus set out the results of a thorough research of Van Ginneken’s original 
aim and spiritual assumptions. This included his perception of the spiritual-
ity of the Cross, which had held such a central place in the militant Catholic 
15   Archives of the International Grail, nr. 53: letter of Mary Imelda Buckley to Dolores Brien 
(July 1963).
16   Brown, “The Grail Movement,” 164–165.
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interwar years but now seemed hardly compatible with Vatican and theologi-
cal renewal.
4.1 Personal Images of the Cross
In 1964, the Nucleus of the Grail decided it was time for a written consultation 
with all its members. This consisted of 33 questions that were divided into sev-
eral sub questions. A total of 148 Grail women (77 individuals and 71 group par-
ticipants) sent in their answers.17 One of the key questions of the consultation 
addressed the theme of the spirituality of the Cross, referring to the spirituality 
of suffering and sacrifice on which Van Ginneken had continually placed so 
much emphasis. “How do you see the place of the Cross in your life?”, was the 
first sub question, to which some women filled in more than one answer.
The answers were quite revealing. A substantial group of respondents 
attached positive meanings to the Cross. Fourteen respondents, in particu-
lar older members, stated that it was central in their lives. “To my generation 
(25 years ago) it was very involving to accept and propagate the Cross in a femi-
nine way”, one member wrote. Ten women answered that, for them, it repre-
sented a participation in redemption.
For 26 women, the Cross did not refer to a ‘thing’, but rather was an atti-
tude and a day-to-day reality which came from God. As one of them stated: 
“[I]t is a training to live in the spirit of the Gospel and to keep being directed 
towards God”.
Five respondents said it meant the joyful acceptance of daily difficulties and 
disappointments; eight members saw it as union with Christ and one even as 
the climax of Incarnation. Fourteen said that it was a source of life and even 
consolation to them, eleven that it represented the obedience of surrender to 
God, and six that it held purifying qualities.
For a much larger group, however, the Cross held merely negative connota-
tions. Three respondents stated that it caused tensions about what they were 
and should do; sixteen women said that their temperament hindered the 
demands of sacrifice; two explicitly said that it made them lonely; two that it 
added to their sense of aging.
One Grail woman stated that she felt the culture of sacrifice had brought her 
into confrontation with the unpredictable whims of her flesh and emotions, 
while another said she felt exposed to her state of being unredeemed.
A large group of Grail women responded that they experienced the Cross 
mostly in relationships with other Grail members (community life), or people 
17   The following is based upon Archives of the Grail International, nr. 70: Consultation (1964).
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they had to work with, or in having to confront a changing world or their own 
aging process. They did not need any additional suffering, as coping with all 
this was difficult enough:
As I grow older, I have come to realize that the cross exists in the accep-
tance of everything that life holds in store: Old age, sickness, and every-
thing that accompanies those processes.
One of the former leading Women of Nazareth was of the same opinion. She 
believed that in the past, the Cross had been “looked for”:
I believe that spiritual growth will, as a rule, be promoted rather through 
the circumstances of life itself than through things of our own finding.
One Grail woman wrote as a comment:
I have never been inspired by the idea of looking for the Cross, not because 
this is difficult and painful, but because I believe that we should be humble 
and ready to accept what He sends us, we must leave it to Him whether to 
send us comfort or pain, and we must trust that He will help us.
The responses made it clear that the spirituality of suffering and sacrifice no 
longer held the place it used to. The answers were quite diverse and did not 
unequivocally point in the same direction. For some respondents the cross 
held a very positive quality, while others referred to it as a source of loneliness, 
cutting them off from the community. Some seemed to give it a very central 
position, while others wanted to minimize it.
4.2 Personal Images of Mortification
The second part of the question was even more revealing. It addressed the 
theme of personal mortification: “How do you understand the relation of 
mortification and penance as we have practiced them to your present circum-
stances?”. It was answered by 56 individual Grail members and 74 participants 
in groups. The way the question was formulated led some women to give their 
evaluation of the “old forms” of penance. Again, sometimes more than one 
answer was given.
Eighteen respondents stated that the past forms of penance and mortifica-
tion had been helpful and meaningful. For two of them, they had given a cer-
tain discipline and helped to free them up for higher goals:
Derks�66
I understand the relation of mortification and penance as follows: 
Mortification is the giving up of egoism and turning towards Christ, pen-
ance is for me the reparation of my personal sins and the sins of others. 
The relation is the complete trust in God’s mercy.
Two women said that it had helped them to surrender to God or to feel one 
with the Church or the group. One of them did add, however, that she no longer 
performed any penances like the ones she used to “because I am just not strong 
enough for that (physically!)”, thus implying how hard these practices had in 
fact been. Two others stated explicitly that they loved what they described as 
“these symbols of religious extremism”. They expressed their desire that corpo-
ral penances would remain, albeit as a matter of personal choice.
Several explicitly named fasting and waking as ‘authentic’ and therefore 
desirable forms of penance – provided they could be done voluntarily, not on 
demand – while at the same time rejecting other forms that had prevailed in 
the past.
On the other hand, 41 women said that none of the penances and acts of 
mortification had been helpful or meaningful at all. Three said that they had 
hindered their growth to maturity, and that they certainly had not helped 
them to acquire any sense of responsibility. For two, they were not at the heart 
of Christian living and charity did not grow because of it.
Thirteen women stated that the mortification had been artificial, too 
extreme, isolated acts and separate from real life. Three said that the acts of 
mortification had made one concentrate too much on oneself and had been 
a hindrance to contact with others, thus blocking rather than stimulating any 
sense of community.
Three respondents even said that the acts of mortifications had intensified 
conflicts and pressures, while for two women they had been unhealthy and 
caused nervous breakdowns. One respondent made it clear that the mortifica-
tion held the danger of conformity, while another woman said that they had an 
ambiguous flavor of pain-seeking. Four respondents explicitly stated that the 
penances had been merely a means of personal achievement, done in order to 
be perfect or to be in control of oneself.
Several women explicitly warned that mortification and penances had even 
been a source of wanting to perform and excel: “The danger of wanting to excel 
was very great”, one woman stated, and another said:
I, personally, find this a dangerous method because it easily degener-
ates into a desire for achievements. It also creates unnecessary tensions 
in our life which already has more than enough tensions without these 
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additional ones. In relation to my present circumstances these practices 
appear rather childish.
5 A “Proto-Feminist Movement”
From this period onward the sacrificial culture became a matter of personal 
choice, a practice mainly for the older generation, which was tolerated, but 
not applauded. The Grail’s self-perception gradually aligned with the femi-
nism of the feminist theological tradition. Books written by Grail women 
about the movement’s past stressed that it had originated as a women’s and 
a lay movement, and, moreover, as an ecumenical movement.18 In 1985, it was 
even claimed that as far back as the 1920s their predecessors had been driven 
through and through by a feminist approach. By now, even older members, 
such as Lydwine van Kersbergen, who had been one of the Grail leaders in the 
interwar period, one of Van Ginneken’s most intimate confidants and a fierce 
defender of the sacrificial culture, declared that the Women of Nazareth had 
been the beginning of women’s liberation: “No authority from outside”.19
The process of feminizing the Grail’s history came to a height in the volume 
Dangerously modern, published in 2001, where it says that Grail women had 
been the prototypes of the proverbial “strong woman”: Emancipated, renew-
ing and autonomous.20 The word ‘sacrifice’ did not come up once in any of 
these histories. In fact, when a television documentary on the Grail was made 
in 1982, in which a former member did refer to the penances and acts of morti-
fication, even adding that this had been her reason for leaving, the leadership 
either toned it down or denied it altogether. By then, talking about sacrifice 
and “sought suffering” had already become so alien, awkward and uncomfort-
able that it had been erased from history.21
18   Gertie Lauscher, De graankorrel in de aarde (not published, 1970); 50 jaar Graal, 1921–1971. 
Verleden, heden, toekomst (not published, 1971).
19   Lydwine van Kersbergen, “De Graal: een katholieke jonge-vrouwenbeweging,” Het 
Binnenhof (14 mei 1991).
20   Ine van Emmerik, ed., Gevaarlijk modern. Levende geschiedenissen van vrouwen in de 
Graalbeweging (not published, 2001).
21   Hilde van Oostrum, Documentary in two parts. Part 1: K(l)eurig, kwiek en katholiek; 
part 2: Hé, is dat mijn moeder? (1982). See http://www.filmfestival.nl/industry/films/
kleurig-kwiek-en-katholiek-de-graal.
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5.1 Welcome and Unwelcome Heritages
The meaning and valuation of the concepts of sacrifice and, consequently, of 
personal suffering varies throughout history. Sacrifice and suffering are also 
highly gendered notions. This becomes apparent when we look at two distinct 
periods in Dutch modern history (the interwar era and the post-Vatican era) in 
which the Grail evolved from a Catholic conversion movement into a feminist 
theological religious group.
In the 1920s and 1930s, the ritual and personal meaning of sacrifice and of 
both personal and communal suffering was vital for the self-understanding 
of the Grail members. They were influenced by converts like Jacques and 
Raïssa Maritain and their entourage, and by a widespread revival in the west-
ern world of ‘victim-souls’, people who indulged in physical and mental suf-
fering in the imitation of Christ. Incited and controlled by their founder and 
spiritual leader, Father Jacques van Ginneken SJ, the intellectual women of 
the Grail movement cultivated personal and communal sacrifice, both within 
their own ranks and in the thousands of young girls that they gathered and 
guided in a girls’ movement. They saw the capacity for suffering, in particular 
suffering for religious reasons, as the most outstanding female quality. In this 
way, Catholic femininity was heroically and romantically equated with conver-
sion and sacrifice.
This specific historical example sheds light on the confusing character that 
religious sacrifice held for women. While its overall spirituality referred to the 
suffering of Christ, and offered women a way to become co-saviors, in prac-
tice it did much more than that. It ambiguously spelled both the shaping of a 
collective purpose and the creation of hierarchy. While being directed at sub-
mission to the will of God, it also provided means for individual human excel-
lence. Last but not least, these practices served as a disciplinary instrument on 
various levels, thus pointing at sacrifice as a source of repression.
That the meaning of sacrifice is basically historical became obvious through 
the transformation of the culture of sacrifice from the 1960s onwards, when, 
under the influence of both the Second Vatican Council and the feminist 
movement, it became a contested concept. A new generation of Grail mem-
bers sought female heroism in personal spiritual transformation, while both 
sacrifice and conversion were first frowned upon and later disappeared alto-
gether from their vocabulary. While trying to reinvent their past and their tra-
dition, they radically erased all notions of sacrifice and suffering from their 
collective memory, replacing them with feminist concepts of assertiveness. To 
a large extent, the same process took shape in many female religious orders – 
the same from which the Grail movement so explicitly wanted to differ. In the 
aftermath of Vatican II they, too, distanced themselves from sacrifice and suf-
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fering and from other aspects of their history.22 The idea of the proud suffering 
Catholic woman, as well as that of the strict male leader that supported her, 
had become unwelcome heritages that disappeared from memory and there-
fore from history.
22   This process has been eloquently described in Annelies van Heijst, Models of Charitable 
Care. Catholic Nuns and Children in their Care in Amsterdam, 1852–2002 (Leiden: Brill, 
2008), 301–350.
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Self-Sacrifice and Care Ethics
Inge van Nistelrooij
1 Introduction
What if your close friend of many years asks if she can stay with you for a cou-
ple of weeks? What if she is suffering from cancer and her stay with you will be 
for a treatment in your town? I do not think many people would hesitate for a 
moment. At least Helen does not, when her friend Nicola turns to her in Helen 
Garner’s novel The Spare Room.1 Nicola is not only suffering from bowel cancer, 
she is dying of it. But instead of facing what lies ahead, she flees from it into a 
ridiculous alternative therapy, forcing Helen (and others who compassionately 
surround her) to emotionally come to grips with her impending death while 
she herself denies it.
This story is about friendship and farewell, hope and denial, companion-
ship and support, being alive and dying. But it is also a story about a caregiving 
friend, suffering from her friend’s suffering and – although full of doubt as to 
whether she is entitled to rob her of her hope – seeking courage to confront her 
friend in her self-deception at the cost of truth, love and other people.
A touching story. I take it, however, as a starting point for thinking about 
those things that are the ‘natural’ setting of the story, that is, the sacrifices that 
Helen makes. The story of Abraham and Isaac teaches us that being prepared to 
making sacrifices may imply other sacrifices. No doubt Abraham is asked 
to sacrifice what is dearest to him, but implicitly Isaac is supposed to sacrifice 
his life without even being asked. It seems to me that this sacrificial entangle-
ment sheds light upon the story of Helen and Nicola as well. Helen is willing to 
sacrifice time and energy, but how about the sacrifices her family has to bring?
First of all, Nicola requires much more care than expected. She is seriously 
ill and suffering day and night, with only an exceptional good hour or good 
day. Helen sacrifices her own physical well-being from the minute they meet 
at the airport. Within a few days she is exhausted. Washing and cleaning, day 
and night, cooking, driving, worrying, spending hours in waiting rooms and 
supporting her suffering friend, while suffering herself from what she sees as a 
1   Helen Garner, The Spare Room (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2008). Helen is the novel’s main char-
acter, and although there are similarities between her fictional life and Helen Garner’s real 
life, the story is fiction.
 �7�Self-Sacrifice and Care Ethics
hopeless situation getting worse. Helen also sacrifices her family, being forced 
to suspend every contact with her daughter’s family living next door, as they 
have caught a severe cold which is a major threat to Nicola’s complete lack of 
resistance.
Helen puts her own life plans on hold, as caring for Nicola requires every 
bit of her energy; and Helen must also repress her own beliefs, as Nicola asks 
her to support her choice in favor of an alternative therapy and not to rob her 
of her last hope. Friendship in the end demands honesty, but when the air is 
cleared and the therapy is canceled, Helen still finds herself conforming to the 
wishes of Nicola in her final months. Caregiving entails accepting that in 
the end Nicola decides about the final stage of her life and affectionately sub-
mitting to her demands. In short, Helen’s caregiving requires a great deal of 
sacrifice, almost to the point of sacrificing herself.
2 Responsibilities in Caregiving
This chapter examines self-sacrificial caregiving. Caregivers care for others, 
instead of sacrificing them. Abraham, being his son’s caregiver, might have 
considered giving priority to his responsibility in that role and offered to sac-
rifice himself instead of his son. From the viewpoint of care ethics he should 
have. My point of departure is this emphasis of care ethics on the responsibili-
ties in caregiving. I will focus on the self-sacrifice of the caregiver within the 
caring relation, as care ethics has a problem with engaging with the experi-
ence of caregivers sacrificing themselves. Although there are good reasons for 
being critical about self-sacrificial caregiving, I will argue that thinking about 
caregiving can be enriched by including thinking about self-sacrifice. In order 
to do so, we must reflect on the ambiguity of self-sacrificial caregiving: It is 
neither mere stupidity nor mere heroism. Therefore, I will take the experience 
of Helen in The Spare Room as one that raises questions about the relation 
between caregiving and self-sacrifice, specifically with regard to the distinct 
meanings and interpretations of sacrifice and self-sacrifice. I do not claim to 
interpret the book, nor do I use it as an illustration for a line of argumenta-
tion. Rather, I consider Helen’s experience as one that challenges certain ideas 
about caregiving and reveals a more complex and ambiguous reality, which 
surfaces when we look at the sacrifices she makes.
This is not only Helen’s experience, but can also be found in other literary 
works. I am thinking of the experience of the servant Gerasim, comforting his 
dying master by supporting his agonizing legs for hours night and day, in Leo 
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Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich; or John Bailey’s experiences of the increas-
ingly demanding care he gives to his wife, Iris Murdoch, as related in his books 
Iris: A Memoir of Iris Murdoch and Elegy for Iris: A Memoir. These books relate 
stories about the demanding care which the caregiver feels obliged to give out 
of compassion or love for the one needing care. These books, and many others 
like them, depict caregiving that requires a lot more than expected. Caregiving 
entails giving time, energy, sleep, health, well-being, and one’s own relations. 
In doing so, the caregiver not only makes sacrifices, but also appreciates the 
essence of care. Strange as it may seem, these caregivers risk (at least) their 
health and happiness while simultaneously affirming themselves and realiz-
ing their own goals. In this article, I want to look at sacrificial caregiving on an 
everyday level in everyday circumstances.
2.1 Aspects of Self-Sacrifice in Care
Accepting the responsibility to care for another human being without consid-
ering the possible personal consequences – or maybe better, without having 
been able to consider them all beforehand – is an experience, I would like to 
defend, all-too familiar to caregivers. This experience gives rise to the thought 
that caregiving often takes place in an unavoidable tension between involve-
ment and care for others, on the one hand, and self-care or self-preservation, 
on the other. This is well-acknowledged in care ethics but needs further 
exploration.
I take the term ‘self-sacrifice’ as a heuristic device for this exploration, as 
I think it illuminates exactly the point where the dynamics of care itself leads 
to giving up parts of ourselves, possibly even up to the point of sacrificing the 
self. Firstly, I will delineate how care ethics think about the costs of caregiving 
on the part of the caregiver, in order to further explore the difficulties of the 
tension. Then I will turn to theology, in which I offer a survey of the various 
meanings of self-sacrifice arranged in a taxonomy; I will also explore a distinc-
tion between what is and is not self-sacrifice. In a third part, I will return to the 
story of Helen. I will argue that care ethical thought is enriched by incorporat-
ing self-sacrifice in its various meanings.
The story, however, shows that there are three additional points. First, 
the suggested taxonomy needs to be extended, in order to include what was 
excluded, building on concepts of self-sacrifice from the spiritual and mystical 
traditions. Moreover, I will put the taxonomy of self-sacrifice itself into two 
dialectic tensions, each as a way of further deepening our understanding of 
care and sacrifice. In my conclusion, I will offer a definition of self-sacrifice in 
caregiving.
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3 Self-Sacrifice from a Care Ethical Point of View
The epistemological starting point of an ethics of care can be traced to the pub-
lication of In a Different Voice by psychologist Carol Gilligan in 1982. Gilligan, 
a student of Lawrence Kohlberg, proposes an ethics that takes into account 
the concrete responsibilities for concrete others, rather than an ethics formu-
lated from an abstract and disconnected “point of view”.2 A morality of care 
focuses on ‘relationality’ and the mature handling of responsibility claims.3 
Gilligan speaks of the need to compromise that is felt by caregivers when fac-
ing conflicts between interests of the self and interests of the other. Only when 
a connection between integrity and care is discovered is one capable of mature 
care. Moreover, the identity of caregivers is defined by their relationships, 
responsibilities and care, rather than by their autonomy from others.4
From the start most care ethicists have been aware of the tensions involved 
in care and have discussed the question of asymmetry and equality. Those 
interested in Gilligan’s findings take two opposing positions. On the one hand, 
researchers embrace her elaboration of a “feminine ethics”. They ignore the 
aspect of power connected to care and gender roles, emphasizing the natural 
symbiosis of the caregiver (mother) and the care receiver (child), while mak-
ing care a dyadic practice. A major representative of this essentialist view is 
Nel Noddings, who was one of the first to develop an ethics of care.5 She dis-
tinguishes between a natural moment and an ethical moment. The first is the 
natural feeling of ‘engrossment’, of being seized by the other person’s need. 
This first moment may yield the ethical moment, when the caregiver actively 
accepts her responsibility for taking care. On the other hand, feminists advo-
cate a disconnection of femininity and care, either by rejecting care ethics as 
an ethical perspective altogether, or by connecting care ethics to a power anal-
ysis and political ethics.
A major representative of this latter view is Joan Tronto, who defines care as:
[A] species activity that includes everything that we do to maintain, con-
tinue, and repair our ‘world’ so that we can live in it as well as possible. 
2   Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (London: Harvard University Press, 1982).
3   Inge van Nistelrooij, Martha en Maria revisited. Zorg als ethisch perspectief (Tilburg: Tilburg 
University Press, 1996).
4   Gilligan, Different Voice, 156–160.
5   Nel Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1984). Noddings does not use the term caregiver but ‘one-caring’.
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That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our environment, all of 
which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web.6
Her moral and political view of care involves an elaborate analysis of power 
inequalities in relations of care, on the levels of personal relationships, insti-
tutions, and the wider society. She considers care as a practice that not only 
builds relations but also builds society and orders relations in a political and 
institutional context. She concludes that, in many respects, taking responsi-
bility for caregiving tasks involves assuming a subordinate, marginalized and 
powerless position, whereas pursuing power often involves the transfer of 
caregiving responsibilities to others. Tronto’s plea is for a reallocation of the 
boundaries between a political and a moral view so that arguments from a care 
perspective can gain political impact.
3.1 Responsibility and Power
How do these lines of thought relate to self-sacrifice? Thinking of self-sacrifice 
in relation to care is difficult for various reasons. First, self-sacrifice in care is 
paradoxical. How could care entail self-sacrifice, as care aims at support, con-
tinuation, repair and maintenance? Would sacrificing the self not be the exact 
opposite of, and therefore incompatible with, the goals of care? Further, if one 
wants to take care of another person, the loss of self in sacrifice would simulta-
neously be the destruction of care and the end of the caring activity. Still, care 
involves commitment to the other who needs or deserves care because of his 
or her vulnerability or needs, or simply because he or she is loved.
Noddings and Tronto both consider the risk of sacrifice. Noddings under-
stands the care relationship as a dyad, making the caregiver the sole source of 
care, and therefore can only see the risk of destruction of the caregiver, which 
she fiercely rejects. In order for care to be given as long as necessary, the care-
giver must also take care of herself, upholding “the strength and beauty of her 
ideal (of being one-caring).”7 Her argument starts from the idea of caregiving 
itself, in which two persons want and need the caregiving to be continued. 
Obviously the one in need of care wants this, but the caregiver does so too, 
according to Noddings, for in caregiving the caregiver acts according to her 
moral conviction and accomplishes her moral ideal. In order to protect caregiv-
ers from self-sacrifice and exhaustion, there are instances in which they must 
‘quantitatively’ reduce their ideal by excluding particular persons or groups in 
order “to maintain the quality of the ideal for remaining cared-fors.”8 Tronto 
6   Joan C. Tronto, Moral Boundaries (London: Routledge, 1993), 103.
7   Noddings, Caring, 105.
8   Noddings, Caring, 114–115.
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frames care in a much broader constellation of social relations, institutions 
and politics, and rejects Noddings’ dyadic structure; she thus acknowledges 
that care is other-directed and involves sacrifices.
However, there is power involved here too, and its distribution is inversely 
related to caregiving responsibilities. Those with power often are less inclined 
to make sacrifices, whereas those with little power often are inclined to give 
care, to give in, and to sacrifice even more.
Some people make greater sacrifices of themselves than do other peo-
ple; some will even sacrifice too much. Part of this moral problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that those who are most likely to be too self-
sacrificing are likely to be the relatively powerless in society.9
Hence, care ethicists have strong arguments against caregivers making sacri-
fices, most certainly against sacrificing themselves. Still, they acknowledge the 
tension within caregiving, when caregivers are engrossed by the other, experi-
ence compassion and love, and are more than willing to stand by the other and 
not abandon the one in need. Noddings’ warning that an exhausted caregiver 
risks terminating care, and Tronto’s warning that sacrificing entails a further 
marginalization and a relinquishing of the possibility of gaining power, make 
clear that sacrifices and self-sacrifice play a role in caregiving. It is paradoxical: 
Caregiving cannot do without sacrifices, even of the self, but it also should not 
be so. In order to gain clarity regarding this paradox, it seems helpful to make 
a semantic analysis.
4 Self-Sacrifice from a Theological Point of View
I now turn to theology, which not only has reflected on self-sacrifice for centu-
ries, but can also help us with a clarification of terminology. What exactly do 
we mean by the ambiguous term self-sacrifice?10
Ruth E. Groenhout gives an extensive answer to this question in her analysis 
of kenosis, which is the Greek term for the self-emptying of God by becom-
ing man in Jesus Christ.11 She understands kenosis as self-emptying, self-giving, 
9    Tronto, Moral Boundaries, 141.
10   This question is asked by John Lippitt, “True Self-love and True Self-sacrifice,” International 
Journal of Philosophy of Religion 66 (2009), 125–138.
11   Ruth Groenhout, “Kenosis and Feminist Theory,” in Exploring Kenotic Christology: the Self-
emptying of God, (ed. Stephen C. Evans; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 291–312.
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self-sacrifice.12 God in kenosis, however, did not stop being God. This is the 
leading idea in her analysis of self-sacrifice, which she opposes to self-destruc-
tion. She unfolds a taxonomy that is a sliding scale of distinct meanings of 
self-sacrifice:
Firstly, Groenhout explains the stages of self-sacrifice. Self-limitation is impos-
ing limits on the self while also retaining “some sense of robust identity”.13 Self-
limitations that are imposed in the interest of others or of a higher good are 
close to kenosis.
The next stage is the giving up of prerogatives, when “a sense of a core self or 
identity is retained, but what is owed to that self is temporarily set aside”.14 (It 
hardly needs to be said that this is often the case in caregiving, as in the story 
of Helen.) Self-giving is next, which “implies some measure of giving up self-
determination”.15 Giving, in Groenhout’s view, presupposes a recipient, and 
hence self-giving is other-directed, as the only possibility of giving the self to 
the other.16 The very next stage is self-sacrifice, which she describes as:
[T]he strongest term because it implies that in some significant way 
the self is actually lost. At a minimum it involves some sort of denial 
of the self, though this can be the denial of one part of the self for the 
sake of another part. At the maximum it involves what the phrase liter-
ally means – the sacrifice of the self, or of life. Further, in order for this to 
be a sacrifice (rather than, say, mere destruction) it also must involve giv-
ing up the self for some other person, or some other good. Self-sacrifice 
is the term I have focused on in this chapter [on kenosis] because it has 
connotations of giving more than just some aspect of the self – it suggests 
a giving up of the self itself, of giving up parts of one’s identity. When the 
12   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 291.
13   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 297.
14   Ibidem.
15   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 298.
16   Ibidem. I will refute this view later.
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parts of one’s identity given up are central to one’s sense of self, it may 
involve a loss of identity at some level.17
Secondly, Groenhout scrutinizes the distinction between self-sacrifice and 
mere self-destruction or self-annihilation.18 The distinction is in the telos 
(goal) of the action or practice: When one gives up “the self, or life itself, alto-
gether, for some other person(s) or good”, this is self-sacrifice. Self-annihilation 
and self-contempt fail the test. For self-sacrifice is the paradox of a self that 
not only sacrifices the self but also remains a self in this action of sacrificing. 
Therefore, according to Groenhout, a proper sense of self is fundamental for a 
proper understanding of self-sacrifice. This sense of self contains:
[A] sense that one is loved for one’s own sake, that one’s existence is a 
good thing, and that one can properly love the fact that one is alive and 
able to do things that are worth doing.19
These beliefs should be neither too strong nor altogether absent. Groenhout’s 
conclusions are twofold. First, the self that is sacrificed must be recognized 
as a self with intrinsic value. Only a valued self that is emptied can be con-
sidered a sacrifice.20 Second, following from the first, a proper self-sacrifice is 
oriented towards the good, rather than a sacrifice of the self for its own sake. 
The latter is mere self-destruction.21
4.1 Kenosis, Caregiving, and Feminism
Two more things need to be said about Groenhout’s thoughts on self-sacrifice. 
First, she confronts kenotic thought of self-sacrifice with feminist theory. She 
is well aware of the extensive and valuable feminist critique of self-sacrifice, as 
for instance in Valerie Saiving’s classic article The Human Situation: A Feminine 
View22 However, she opposes the idea that feminism should reject the worth of 
sacrifice, for feminism has always been a movement fighting for a just cause, 
asking and inspiring women to sacrifice for this cause. And many women did 
sacrifice their happiness, according to Groenhout, fighting for this just cause.23
17   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 298.
18   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 298–307.
19   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 303.
20   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 302.
21   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 304 and 307–310.
22   Valerie Saiving, “The Human Situation: A Feminine View,” Journal of Religion 40 (1960): 
100–112.
23   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 308.
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Feminist thought therefore can contribute to theological thinking by unveil-
ing the harmful effects of the theological rhetoric of self-sacrifice, especially 
for women, and the ways in which Christians have misused sacrificial lan-
guage in order to ask women to sacrifice themselves for inappropriate ends.24 
However, when feminist theory concludes that self-sacrifice cannot be appro-
priate for women, it not only denies the feminist movement’s history, in which 
self-sacrifice did take place, it also denies that women can be called upon to 
sacrifice themselves. This would be inappropriate for feminist thought itself, 
since it would be based on the assumption that women are weaker and less 
capable moral agents than men.25
Hence, the notion of self-sacrifice should not be rejected but must include 
an awareness of men and women sacrificing themselves for proper causes, on 
the one hand, and an awareness of the abusive and oppressive social systems 
(and, I might add, cultural expectations) that impede proper self-sacrifice, on 
the other.26
Put more strongly, unless one thinks that women’s choices to sacrifice 
themselves for something appropriately important are justified, one runs 
the risk of denying women their own moral agency.27
A second addition to Groenhout’s views comes from the English ethicist and 
philosopher of religion, John Lippitt, who has appropriated Groenhout’s analy-
sis as part of his study on “true self-love and true self-sacrifice”. To the notion 
that self-sacrifice is based upon a sense of self-worth he adds the surprising 
suggestion that pride can be a virtue in self-sacrifice, despite the Christian and 
non-Christian rejection of pride. In his view, pride is not vanity but rather the 
same as self-respect. It is “a positive view of oneself [that] is necessary to live” 
and to be able to continue doing ethical work.28 It is a vital aspect of true self-
love, which Lippitt considers crucial for other-relatedness. He refers to Paul 
Ricoeur who argued: “Must one not, in order to make oneself open, available, 
belong to oneself in a certain sense?”29 A sense of the self as worthy of love and 
respect is essential for understanding proper self-sacrifice.30
24   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 308.
25   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 309–310.
26   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 310–311.
27   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 311.
28   Lippitt, “Self-love and self-sacrifice,” 135.
29   Lippitt, “Self-love and self-sacrifice,” 136.
30   Lippitt, “Self-love and self-sacrifice,” 136–137.
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5 A Further Analysis of Self-Sacrifice in Caregiving
Groenhout’s taxonomy, considered in the previous section, offers us insight into 
the distinct meanings of self-sacrifice. We recognize them all in Helen’s story, 
to which I now return. Helen indeed limited herself, gave up her prerogatives, 
gave herself, and sacrificed herself. At the same time, she valued herself, consid-
ered herself worthy of respect, when she defended herself and her beliefs against 
Nicola. She did not aim at destroying herself; rather she aimed at what she 
believed in, at what was of value: Their friendship and intimacy, especially dur-
ing her friend’s last months. Groenhout’s sliding scale offers clear and plausible 
distinctions, not only between the possible gradations of self-sacrifice that deter-
mine the self’s identity, but also between good and bad instances of self-sacrifice.
These clear distinctions, however, are challenged when we look a bit deeper 
at everyday experience. The ethical distinctions between right and wrong and 
between good and evil, both in literature and in life, often appear as simplify-
ing reductions of reality. So, too, in Helen’s story: While Groenhout’s taxonomy 
is clarifying, it can also be shown to be insufficient.
In the next three parts, I will first propose to draw Groenhout’s sliding 
scale differently and to extend it with a certain form of both self-loss and self-
destruction. In both the second and third parts, I will disclose a complexity 
of the scale as a whole, as it contains two tensions within itself. In the second 
part I will elaborate on the tension between violence and pride, and in the 
third part I will describe the tension between giving and receiving. These com-
plicating additions to Groenhout’s taxonomy have surfaced both from a con-
sideration of Helen Garner’s book and from my own research on self-sacrifice 
in caregiving.
5.1 Extending Groenhout’s Taxonomy to Self-Destruction
Helen’s story shows an expansion of demanding caregiving, starting with the 
offer of simple everyday help to a good friend in need and eventually leading to 
demanding caregiving and even self-sacrifice. Her care can be well character-
ized by Groenhout’s taxonomy of self-sacrifice. Her telos is not self-destruction, 
as she values herself and the care she is providing. Throughout the story she 
learns to handle Nicola’s demands, seeing them not as opposed to her own 
interest, but rather as a way of leading a different, giving life. The story portrays 
a formation process, a positive unfolding of a new (but perhaps also familiar) 
way of life, in which the self becomes more and more self-giving and self-emp-
tying, while remaining a self.
At the same time, however, the story challenges this idea. Although we 
see how Helen tries to remain a self, giving expression to her exhaustion, 
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defending her own needs and advocating her beliefs, there is also her commit-
ment to Nicola and to caring for her. The situation is one she cannot control, as 
Nicola’s need for care continuously pushes her to provide more and more care, 
beyond her limits. Helen’s goal is to care for her dying friend, no matter what 
sacrifices this entails and despite the risk of losing the self, annihilating the 
self. Her commitment to Nicola, to their friendship, to care, is simultaneously a 
risk to herself. Only afterwards are we able to conclude that Helen, fortunately, 
remained a self. The goal of caring for Nicola could have led her to disregard 
her other telos, namely remaining a self, valuing the self. In fact, at times this 
is what caregivers do.
The question then is whether there can be a positive evaluation of self-loss, 
of selflessness, of self-effacing caregiving that is in line with self-sacrifice rather 
than opposed to it. Groenhout’s sliding scale has a sharp-edged end, where 
self-sacrifice stops and is contrasted with the other practice, in which both the 
self of the caregiver was not valued and the practice was one of self-destruc-
tion. In view of the more complex reality in which aiming at a good might 
involve self-destruction and the forgetting of one’s own value, I propose to re-
draw the sliding scale, based upon a tradition that Groenhout does not take 
into consideration. Mystical and spiritual traditions have displayed a different 
idea of identity, in which the self does not need to be preserved at all costs. 
Mystics have expressed a “highly dramatic” form of self-sacrifice, one that, in a 
certain sense, assigns positive value to self-destruction and the unworthiness 
of the self.
Starting from the everyday level, our sliding scale has the following stages: 
Self-limitation – giving of the self – self-abandonment (abandon) – self-
destruction (anéantissement).
‘Self-limitation’ takes place on an everyday, mundane level, involving minor 
sacrifices made in giving care. Caring for others requires the acceptance of less 
time for the self, of a limitation on one’s autonomy. A tension begins to emerge 
between care for the self and self-loss, that is, the experience of limiting 
the self ’s activities, giving up hobbies, habits, needs. This is self-sacrifice on the 
most ordinary, daily level.
The next stage is the “giving of the self” to others or to an ideal in dedication, 
obliteration, abnegation or effacement of the self. Here persons come to mind 
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who care for someone or something with a strong sense of belonging, of loy-
alty and commitment, or of truthfulness, such as persons inspired by political, 
religious, social, juridical, scientific, or even sporting ideals.
The next two terms on the sliding scale are ‘self-abandonment’ (aban-
don) and ‘self-destruction’ (anéantissement). Both terms are defined in the 
Dictionnaire de spiritualité ascétique et mystique, which is my source here.31 
‘Abandon’ is a spiritual term for a state in which the soul either actively relies 
on (s’abandonner à) God or is passively abandoned by (être abandonnée par) 
God. In the active sense, the soul conforms itself to the will of God. The idea of 
abandon stems from the view that our spiritual life is the work of two: God and 
us. When we submit or conform to God’s will, this is obedience, which is the 
normal means of reaching perfection.
However, this is not yet ‘abandon’, which requires an even more generous 
giving of the self, a form of conformity to the divine will proceeding from love. 
‘Abandon’ is a total conformity, a complete renunciation of one’s own will in 
order to embrace God’s will. The source of the virtue of ‘abandon’ can be found 
in the Scriptures, in the teachings and examples of Jesus, culminating in the 
moments of his passion when he prays in the garden, “Father, if you are will-
ing, remove this cup from me: Nevertheless not my will, but yours be done” 
(Luke 22:42) and when he falls beneath the Cross and prays, “Not as I will, but 
as you will” (Matt. 26:39).
Anéantissement is an expressive hyperbole that characterizes certain acts 
or states of the spiritual life. The term, however, should never be taken in an 
absolute sense. It expresses the supreme moral effort to diminish or eliminate 
the human self insofar as it opposes God, in all of its elements that block per-
fection. In worshipping God, the self expresses its unworthiness as a creature, 
symbolically obliterating the self and sacrificing it to God in a religious act of 
adoration. More perfect still is the passive form of anéantissement, in which 
the soul feels profoundly emptied and totally liberated by a powerful outward 
force. This mystical experience is described by Saint John of the Cross as a 
“dark night of the soul”. It becomes a more or less permanent state, a path or 
special vocation, in which one’s own will is given up while being mystically 
united with God. This experience of selflessness has also been expressed by the 
former UN Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjöld (1905–1961): “I am the vessel. 
The drink is God’s. And God is the thirsty one”.32
31   Marcel Viller SJ, Ferdinand Cavallera and André Derville, Dictionnaire de spiritu-
alité et mystique: doctrine et histoire (Paris: Beauchesne, 1932–1995); “Abandon,” 1–49; 
“Anéantissement,” 560–565.
32   Dag Hammarskjöld, Markings (New York: Ballantine Books, 1982), 76.
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In searching for a sliding scale of self-sacrifice, for obvious reasons we are 
anxious to avoid the extremely violent and destructive forms. Mystical tradi-
tions, however, shed new (yet old) light on extreme forms of loss of self that do 
not oppose self-realization, but rather are a passive realization of the self, in a 
non-autonomous, radically dependent way. The value of the self is not denied 
but related to something or Someone greater than the self.
5.2 The Tension of Violence and Pride
Helen’s story also gives rise to thought about the dimensions of violence, on 
the one hand, and pride, on the other. The scale of self-sacrifice itself exhibits a 
constant tension between pride and violence. Both are involved in caregiving, 
as shown in Helen’s experience. One can rightfully say that Helen fulfills her 
gendered role as a mother and female caregiver submitting to cultural expecta-
tions of women that are oppressive and violent toward women, as they under-
mine their own life in the process. Yet there is also something else. During an 
exhausting night of endlessly remaking Nicola’s bed (she is perspiring from 
pain, soaking the bed), Helen recalls her mother, who did the same for her 
when she was a child wetting her bed. She remembers her mother being able 
to remain patient, warm and loving, and she is very glad that she is able to 
care that way too. She feels that she is good at it. Lippitt’s idea of pride as part 
of self-sacrifice can be recognized here. We must acknowledge, then, that vio-
lence (the harm to Helen’s health), care (the alleviation of Nicola’s distress), 
and pride (in Helen’s performance) go together in Helen’s experience.
Hence self-sacrifice stands in a tension. On the one hand, there is the inevi-
tability of violence when living with and caring for others, requiring us to act 
on the other’s behalf. On the other hand, there is the necessary affirmation of a 
self that is capable of doing good things, which is indispensable for any ethics.
As we have seen in Helen’s story, caregiving is not all pleasure but also takes 
its toll. For instance, when Helen confronts Nicola with her honest concern 
that she is putting false hope in a dubious therapy, Helen is both violent, by 
destroying Nicola’s hope against her explicit wish not to do so, and proud to 
have found the courage to end their dishonest concealment of reality, making 
a new intimacy possible in which they can face together what lies ahead.
Caregiving is a mixed experience, which cannot easily be divided into right 
and wrong. Both pride and violence are inevitable in real life, including in 
practices and relationships of caregiving. Caregivers are not always faithful to 
their ideal of caring, as described by Noddings. And when they give care they 
do not straightforwardly realize their ideal but also have to abandon other ide-
als, giving up wishes and needs, giving in and limiting their other plans. Giving 
care can be harmful to all involved; moreover, along with realizing goods, 
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there often is unavoidable damage too. Things of value are cared for, nurtured 
and accomplished, but simultaneously other things of value are oppressed, 
neglected or rejected.
5.3 The Trap of “Easy Heroism”
In short, giving care is not unambiguous, and it cannot be reduced to “real-
izing a good”. On the other hand, in giving care one does aim at a good, or 
rather one good among other goods. And when this good is realized, one can 
be proud of one’s (part in the) accomplishment. This is everyday, small hero-
ism in care. However, at this point Groenhout warns us against “easy heroism”. 
She criticizes forms of idolatry in the case of caring for one’s children.33 Many 
women, she argues, are lauded for devoting their lives to their children, and 
although she does not deny that this may be a high calling, she points out 
that it may also be a “spineless submission to whatever anyone else requests 
or demands of the agent”.34 Feminist thinkers have rightly alerted us to this 
form of submission. The call to self-sacrifice may in fact be used as an excuse 
for failing to become capable of doing great things, and this evasion of higher 
activities often is made easier for women by societal expectations, according 
to Groenhout.35
Along with this undue making of heroes out of everyday, unexceptional care-
givers, we should also acknowledge that violent self-sacrifice is often socially 
and culturally expected and excused. Taking seriously the cultural expecta-
tions felt by women, we should think of self-sacrifice as social aggression as 
33   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 310–311.
34   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 311.
35   Ibidem.











well. Caregivers who provide demanding care do feel bound by expectations 
of what mothers, nurses, partners, friends, family, and neighbors (and among 
these especially women) do and should do. We should not discount the power 
of ideologies that have historically deprived women of their dignity, idealizing 
their physical suffering and self-abnegating behavior in favor of others (most 
often men) and religion. It is an image not only of self-abnegation, but also of 
social destruction through oppression, subordination, deprivation, and sexism.
5.4 Self-Sacrifice in the Tension of Giving and Receiving
Taking a final look at the story of Helen’s care for Nicola, we want to add one 
more dimension to the sliding scale of self-sacrifice, namely that of giving and 
receiving. Groenhout has connected giving and receiving in self-sacrifice, argu-
ing that in giving a recipient is presupposed. Again, reality is more complex. 
First of all, self-sacrifice is indeed giving, but giving has many meanings. And 
second, in many cases it may be that there is no receiving. At least we can 
say that in self-sacrifice and in care receiving is not guaranteed, neither as the 
receiving-care of the one needing care, nor as the receiving-back of the care-
giver. And yet self-sacrifice and giving may have taken place.
Helen’s story tells us about giving. She gives her home, her time and her 
energy to Nicola. She gives in, gives up, gives away and gives way to Nicola. She 
forgives her, and gives back to her what used to be and should continue to be 
valuable in their friendship. This does not mean that she does not receive. But 
first of all she gives, because that is both what Nicola needs and what Helen 
herself feels urged to do. She is not motivated by any prospective reward or 
return gift from Nicola. The care that Nicola has asked of Helen (and which 
turns out to be much more demanding than expected) is readily given, because 
Helen wants and is able to do so. Giving stands central, not an exchange or 
expected gifts in return.
This is an experience of caregiving. Someone or something needs care. 
Caregiving requires involvement and openness to the other, in order to see 
what constitutes care. Constitutive elements of care are not only needs but 
also what lends value to the friendship or relationship. One gives away what 
is of value to the self. What is not constitutive of care is what may be received-
in-return. There is no do ut des, not “I only give X when you give Y back to me”. 
Receiving is not anticipated. It is not a condition for giving care; it is not con-
stitutive of care itself.
Moreover, there may be a gift (of care) without it being actually received, 
and still there was a gift (of care). Helen, like other caregivers, sometimes expe-
riences her care as given but not received. For example, she spends her time 
and money on special meals for Nicola, which turn out to be given in vain 
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when Nicola is too ill to eat. This, however, does not erase the gift. The giving 
was in the meal, in the care devoted to preparing it, so that Nicola could have 
eaten, if she had wanted to. Hence a gift may be given without there being a 
recipient. We see that, for instance, when we give money to charity or when 
we save money for the future studies of our children or for our pensions. The 
recipient is distant, either in space or in time, and may or may not be a recipi-
ent in the end. This does not mean that nothing is given: There was a gift, or 
even a sacrifice. And in this sacrifice something of value was given, or given up, 
for something which the giver or the one sacrificing holds to be sacred, some-
times even without taking into account whether or not it is received.
An example may be helpful here, of one sacrificing himself for a good with-
out it being received. This example is Father Maximilian Kolbe, who volun-
teered to die in place of somebody else in Auschwitz.36 He must have seen 
the ambiguity of his deed. He was not rescuing anybody, as everybody in the 
concentration camp would eventually be killed anyway, and he was not chang-
ing any system for the better. Nazism would not change because of his choice, 
nor would there be political implications. And yet, he realized a good by giving 
his life. There was no receiving of this gift; the man whose place he took did not 
receive his life, but only a bit more time. Still, Kolbe gave his life. Was it in vain? 
Practically speaking: Yes. We can sense the value of his action nonetheless.
This does not mean, however, that there cannot be receiving in care. There 
certainly can be, including in the story of Helen and Nicola. When giving care, 
one unexpectedly may receive the other, or one’s (better) self, or contact, com-
munity, grace, love . . . As a nurse in a home for the elderly once expressed 
her definition of care: “Giving care is sharing intimacy”, while another nurse 
said: “Giving care is being there for the resident without him needing to be 
grateful”.37 These remarks show the fragility of the relationship, which may, but 
also may not, be one of giving and receiving.
We may conclude, therefore, that self-sacrifice is pure giving. If a return 
is required, then the character of sacrifice is erased. A return, if there is one, 
can only be gratuitous. This is what is rightly expressed by the term ‘sacrifice’, 
in which something of value to the self, or even the self itself, is given, given 
up, given away. Therefore, in our figure, receiving care is not part of the fig-
ure of self-sacrifice. It is not a required element, but rather an unexpected, 
hoped-for grace.
36   See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maximilian_Kolbe.
37   Inge van Nistelrooij, Zorgen doe je samen (Heeswijk: Uitgeverij Abdij van Berne, 2009), 
12 and 17.
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6 Conclusion: Thinking of Care from a View of Self-Sacrifice
In the light of the semantic analysis we may define self-sacrifice in caregiving 
as follows. Self-sacrificial care is care that the self is determined to give because 
of the good realized in this specific act of caring, despite the acknowledgment 
by the self that one will not realize other goods (for instance, care for the self), 
and despite the acknowledgment that the good of this caring is not unambigu-
ous or indisputable. In the latter case, for instance, the one cared-for may not 
be very much loved, or may not be indubitably deserving care; or the caring 
activity may be the caregiver’s pitfall; or the caregiver may be exhausted.
When thinking about self-sacrifice in care, we must always be aware of the 
proper and improper forms of self-sacrifice. The caregiver’s dignity is at stake, 
both when the caregiver does not aim “high enough”, evading his or her capa-
bilities and responsibilities, and when a caregiver seeks submission or self-
destruction. This is not merely a personal decision but is always mixed with 
cultural, societal and religious systems as well as images and language that 
reflect social distribution of power and positions.
Throughout the present analysis we have gained a view of the self as fun-
damentally permeable, not self-determining, but affirming itself (sometimes 
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with pride!) while receiving all that is given in his or her existence as well as 
existence itself. As in the experience of Helen, the self cannot be understood 
as living and shaping its life by itself alone but only as living a life given by 
grace, that is, as a gift and a task that one may fulfill with pride. Helen would 
not be Helen, would not be realizing herself, if she did not respond to Nicola’s 
needs. But she did respond, even before she could decide to do so or could 
determine the amount of time and energy she would spend. Self-sacrifice 
serves as an adequate heuristic device to show the contingency and “tragic 
edge”38 that should always be incorporated in our understanding of care.
38   Groenhout, “Kenosis,” 305.
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Animal Substitution as a Reversed Sacrifice: An 
Intertextual Reading of Genesis 22 and the Animal 
Stories of Shūsaku Endō
Sigrid Coenradie
1 Introduction
In Genesis 22, God provides an animal substitute for a human sacrifice. It is 
of note that God was also the intended receiver of the sacrifice, as Abraham 
was required to sacrifice his son to God. Therefore, I will call these animals 
‘reversed’ substitute sacrifices, which emphasizes the idea of sacrifice as a 
gift. I will start with a reflection on the critique of Levinas on Kierkegaard’s 
interpretation of Genesis 22, and read the result against the various stories on 
‘reversed’ sacrificial substitution in the oeuvre of the Japanese Catholic author 
Shūsaku Endō (1923–1996), in which a bird or a dog are substituted for dying 
humans. Next, I will stress two major differences between the biblical story 
and Endō’s stories of animal substitutes:
1. In the story of Abraham and Isaac, it is God who gives the ram to prevent 
Abraham from sacrificing his youngest son. In contrast to the biblical story, the 
‘giver’ in Endō’s narratives of sacrificial substitution is anonymous. This differ-
ence is significant in relation to the second difference, the role of the females 
in the stories.
2. In the story of Abraham and Isaac, the relationship between Abraham and 
God seems to take priority over the human relationships of Abraham and his 
wife Sarah, his son Isaac and his servant / friend Eliezer, whereas the relation-
ship of the main character in Endō’s stories to the unknown giver of the animal 
substitute seems to improve the relationship to his family. This difference is, as 
I will argue, significant for approaching substitution as a gift instead of a sacri-
fice. I will elaborate on both differences, in order to contribute to reflection on 
the concept of sacrificial substitution.
Drawing on philosophical theories on giving and receiving, I will analyse 
and compare the nature of sacrificial substitution in Genesis 22 and in several 
of Shūsaku Endō’s stories. Sacrifice is, next to a religious theme, an event, and 
in most cases a drama. For understanding the concept, it is necessary to study 
it in praxis. Fiction can be regarded as solidified experience, and hence have 
an eye-opening quality. Literature is “an exploration of the abyss: The author’s 
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and our own”.1 Thus, literature can stimulate religious awareness and contrib-
ute to theological reflection. Applying this to Genesis 22, I will use Endō’s nar-
ratives on sacrificial substitution to criticize Abraham’s morality. Furthermore, 
this intertextual reading of Endō’s ‘animal’ stories will give rise to a different 
interpretation of the sacrifice in the biblical story.
2 The Given Animal in Genesis 22
Animal sacrifice is the practice or an act of ritually slaughtering an animal 
as an offering to a god or gods.2 It is found in many religions as a means of 
appeasing a god or gods, or to change the course of nature. The identity 
of someone performing the sacrifice is symbolically transferred to the sacrifi-
cial animal, which suffers death on his or her behalf. Animal sacrifices are well-
known in the Hebrew Bible. In Genesis 22, Abraham is willing to sacrifice his 
son. He is, however, stopped by the provision of a ram that could be sacrificed 
instead. This chapter will focus on the animals involved. The substitute of the 
ram caught in a thicket which is sacrificed in place of Isaac is a special case. 
After God has saved Abraham’s first-born son Ishmael and his mother Hagar 
in the wilderness of Beersheba, He orders Abraham to offer Isaac. Abraham 
does not protest, and follows the way God has told him to go. He even refrains 
from informing his family, including his son, about the intent of the journey. 
On their way to the mountain Moriah, Abraham stops to worship. Then he 
loads firewood onto Isaac.3 “Where is the lamb for a burnt offering?” Isaac asks 
his father. “God will provide himself the lamb for a burnt offering, my son,” 
Abraham answers. At the supreme moment, when Abraham lifts his knife, he 
hears an angel’s voice which stops him and a substitute ram appears. The ani-
mal replaces the son.
In this special case it is the receiver, God, who seems to provide the sacrifi-
cial creature. Instead of the son, an animal given by the recipient is sacrificed. 
Human sacrifice is replaced by animal sacrifice, human death by human life, 
thus re-establishing the covenant between God and Abraham.
1   A. Blanchet, La Littérature et le Spirituel. La Mêlée Littéraire (Paris: Aubier, 1959), 11.
2   Oxford English Dictionary.
3   On this point the story can has been interpreted as foreshadowing the willingness of God to 
sacrifice his Son Jesus; just as Isaac carried the wood for his sacrifice up to Mount Moriah, 
Jesus carried the wood of his sacrifice up to Golgotha.
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3 Alternative Interpretations
Genesis 22 is a complicated story, and its ‘inhumane’ theme of a father sacrific-
ing his own son calls for interpretations. An important theme seems to be the 
replacement of child sacrifice with animal sacrifice. It is God who provides for 
the ram, thereby stressing the difference between the God of Israel and other 
gods, such as Baal.
In The Binding of Isaac, Religious Murders & Kabbalah, Lippman Bodoff 
argues that Abraham never intended to actually sacrifice his son, and that he 
trusted that God had no intention that he would do so. According to Bodoff, 
God required that Abraham would persist with what Abraham understood 
was asked of him, “with faith that the just and righteous God would answer 
his prayer”.4 Abraham’s prayer during the stop on their way to the mountain 
was intended to persuade God to intervene, to prevent a terrible injustice from 
occurring.
Others, such as Dalferth, suggest that Abraham’s apparent complicity in 
the sacrifice was actually his way of testing God. Abraham had previously, 
in Genesis 18, pleaded with God to save lives in Sodom and Gomorrah. By 
silently complying with God’s instructions to sacrifice Isaac, Abraham was 
putting pressure on God to act in a moral way to preserve life.5 Another indi-
cation that Abraham might have thought that he would not actually sacrifice 
Isaac comes from Genesis 22:5, where Abraham said to his servants, “You stay 
here with the ass. The boy and I will go up there; we will worship and we will 
return to you”. The use of the word we (as opposed to I) reveals his expectance 
that both he and Isaac would return. Apparently, he did not believe that Isaac 
would actually be sacrificed. Likewise, Endō’s Numada, by insisting on a “fifty-
fifty gamble” operation, is anticipating a good outcome, although in his case it 
is not clear who the addressee of his challenge is. As I aim to show, comparing 
Abraham in Genesis 22 to Numada in Deep River brings an alternative interpre-
tation of the former to the fore.
4   Lippman Bodoff, The Binding of Isaac. Religious Murders, and Kabbalah: Seeds of Jewish 
Extremism and Alienation? (Jerusalem/New York: Devora Publishing Company, 2005), 28.
5   I. U. Dalferth, “Self-sacrifice: From the act of violence to the passion of love,” in International 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (2010): 77–94 (87).
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4 The Case of Numada: Faces of Jesus in a Japanese Setting6
Substitution is a dominant theme in the literary work of Shūsaku Endō, one 
of the outstanding East-Asian authors of the twentieth century. Between 1955 
and 1993 he published around 200 titles, including short stories, plays, essays, 
critical biographies, diaries, and novels. After the publication of Silence (1966), 
he became famous. Due to his parents’ divorce the young Shūsaku moved from 
Dalian in Manchuria to Japan. He lived in the house of his mother’s older sister 
in Kobe, who was a Catholic. At twelve he was baptized. Endō experienced 
the “foreign religion” in a country with less than two percent Christians as an 
“unfitting western suit”.7 In his literature the struggle with faith is a recurrent 
theme. Three dissertations highlight the theological themes in Endō’s literary 
work Endō Shūsaku: A Literature of Reconciliation (1999) by Mark B. Williams; 
Christ in Japanese Culture: Theological Themes in Shusaku Endo’s Literary Works 
(2008) by Emi Mase-Hasegawa; and Transcultural Theodicy in the Fiction of 
Shūsaku Endō (2009) by Adelino Ascenso. The last study offers a renewed 
image of Jesus Christ through an analysis of Endō’s narratives.8
Shūsaku Endō’s novel Deep River (1993) is composed around a journey of 
Japanese tourists to the holy Buddhist places in India. In this novel, the last 
Shūsaku Endō wrote, each protagonist has his or her own chapter. All protago-
nists are motivated by a personal desire to undertake the journey, each striving 
to accomplish a private goal. The theme of animal sacrifice plays a role in two 
chapters of Deep River. In chapter five, the main characters are Kiguchi and 
Tsukada. They recollect their past as Japanese soldiers at the end of the Burma 
campaign. Exhaustion and hunger had driven them to desparation. Kiguchi’s 
friend Tsukada purchased some “lizard meat,” which he devoured, whereas 
Kiguchi was too sick to eat. Not much later the “lizard meat” turned out to 
be human flesh, the remains of a dead soldier they both knew. In the story of 
Kiguchi, the ‘animal’ is believed to have saved the living soldiers’ life.9 In chap-
ter four, the reader is introduced to Numada, a writer of children’s books. He 
6   “The Case of Numada” is the title of chapter four in: Shūsaku Endō, Deep River (London: Peter 
Owen, 1994), 69–83.
7   Shūsaku Endō, “The Anguish of the Alien,” The Japanese Christian Quarterly 6/4 (1974): 
179–180.
8   Adelino Ascenso, Transcultural Theodicy in the Fiction of Shūsaku Endō (Roma: Editrice 
Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 2009), 11.
9   The similarity between “The Case of Numada” and “The Case of Kiguchi” is elaborated on by 
Zhange Ni in “Japan’s Orient and Animal Theology in Endō Shūsaku’s Deep River,” Journal of 
the American Academy of Religion 81 (2013 No. 3): 669–697.
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uses dogs and birds as main characters in his books, since his first dog Blackie 
had taught him “that animals can converse with humans” and “he had also 
learned they can be companions who understand your sorrows”.10 During his 
youth, one day Numada took home a stray dog, named Kuro (Blackie).11 The 
filthy dog followed him when he went to school and when he returned in 
the afternoon. The relationship between Numada’s parents was problematic. 
Often his father came home drunk and his mother was depressed. The young 
Numada confessed his sorrows to Blackie.
If I live with Dad, that would hurt Mother, and if I live with Mother, that 
would be a bad thing to do to Dad (. . .). Blackie had been the one who 
understood his sorrow in those days, the only living creature who would 
listen to his complaints: His companion.12
When his parents finally got divorced, the boy went with his mother from 
Manchuria to Japan to live with an aunt in Kobe. The dog had to stay behind. 
As an adult, Numada was never able to forget the eyes of Blackie, who chased 
after their carriage as it drove away. The grown-up Numada has a hornbill in his 
room, called Pierrot, after Rouault’s paintings of clowns who symbolize Jesus.13 
The bird was forced upon the writer by an old man at the local department 
store, who ran the pet department.
One day he popped up on Numada’s doorstep, accompanied by a young 
man in working clothes, carrying a large furoshiki-wrapped parcel. This 
fellow’s a friend of mine. He has a shop at Shibuya where he sells little birds 
and animals. He’s just recently got his hands on a hornbill. And here’s what 
I said to him: I know a man like Mr. Numada would want a bird like this.14
To his wife’s distress, Numada lets the hornbill have free run of his study. When 
Numada appears to have tuberculosis and is hospitalized, the bird has to be 
10   Endō, Deep River, 74.
11   The story in Deep River is highly autobiographical. Like Endō, the protagonist Numada is 
a writer. Like Endō, Numada was raised in Dalian, Manchuria, which at the time had been 
occupied by the Japanese.
12   Endō, Deep River, 73.
13   Georges Rouault (1871–1958) was a French Catholic expressionist painter and printmaker. 
From 1917, he specialized in religious themes. The clown-like faces of Jesus and the cries of 
the women at the feet of the cross in Rouault’s work are symbols of the pain of the world.
14   Endō, Deep River, 75.
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returned to the pet shop. During his two years’ stay in hospital, Numada had 
two unsuccessful operations. Now he has pleaded with the physicians to have 
a third operation, for “it was distasteful to consider staying alive another ten or 
fifteen years bereft of the ability to do anything”.15 While the doctors deliber-
ate, Numada is longing for an animal to share his anguish and doubts, as he 
does not want to cause distress to his wife by confessing his despondency to 
her. “But if he told all to a bird (. . .) it would silently take it all in”.16
One day his wife buys Numada a myna bird. “Its eyes were just like those of 
the hornbill”. The author shares his hesitation about the dangerous operation 
with the bird. He has the impression his bird is laughing at him in response. 
“The laugh seemed at once to mock his cowardice and to offer encouragement”.17 
Like the hornbill, the myna bird is regarded by Numada as a companion. During 
his third operation his wife is so full of anxiety, she leaves the myna bird on the 
roof of the hospital and forgets all about it.
I wonder if it died in place of me?, wonders Numada afterwards. A feeling 
very close to certainty boiled up like hot water from his lacerated chest. 
(. . .) Numada’s recovery after surgery, the source of such profound con-
cern to his doctors, was nearly miraculous. (. . .) The myna bird died, as 
though in his stead.18
In later years, Numada joins the journey to India to visit a bird sanctuary, pur-
chase a myna bird and release it to thank for his miraculous rescue.
5 Comparing and Confronting the Stories
Several questions arise when the stories are compared: Who is demanding the 
sacrifice? Who is giving the substitute animal? Who is sacrificing? Who suffers 
from the sacrifice? Who benefits from the sacrifice?
In the Genesis 22 story, the ram is recognized as a substitute for the son. 
Likewise, in Shūsaku Endō’s “The Case of Numada,” the bird is believed to be a 
substitute for Numada as well as a reference to Jesus, who, according to Endō, 
is believed to be a representative for humanity.19 Endō introduces the aspect of 
15   Endō, Deep River, 79.
16   Endō, Deep River, 80.
17   Endō, Deep River, 81.
18   Endō, Deep River, 82.
19   Endō, A life of Jesus, 178.
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substitution through animals, specially birds and dogs, referring to the signifi-
cance of the eyes and the juxtaposition of the eyes of the bird and the dog with 
the compassionate eyes of the Jesus engraved on the fumie.20 In an attempt 
to bridge the communication gap between his non-Christian readers and the 
theme of his stories, Endō did not write about “the eye of Christ” until he wrote 
Silence. “Instead I tried to refer to it through different forms, such as the eye of 
a bird that dies”.21 A fumie is a wooden or metal image of Jesus or Mary. It was 
used by the authorities during the persecutions of Christians in the Tokugawa 
Period (1600–1868). In this ritual, people had to trample on the image as a proof 
that they did not belong to the Christian religion or as a sign of abandonment 
of the Christian faith. In Shūsaku Endō’s Silence, the main character, the priest 
Rodrigues, apostatizes by stepping on the fumie. When he raises his foot, the
Christ in bronze speaks to the priest: Trample! Trample! I more than any-
one know of the pain in your foot. Trample! It was to be trampled on by men 
that I was born into this world. It was to share men’s pain that I carried my 
cross.22
According to Endō, Jesus becomes the substitute for the one who suffers. His 
redemptive suffering is a suffering of the substitute: He takes the pain of the 
ones who are suffering on his shoulders to the point of death. In Deep River, 
Endō compares the main character Ōtsu, who is a Jesus-like substitute, to the 
Suffering Servant in Isaiah 53. Two chapter titles in Deep River concerning Ōtsu 
explicitly point to the bible passage; chapter eleven is called “Surely He Hath 
Borne Our Griefs” and chapter thirteen “He Hath No Form Nor Comeliness”. In 
chapter two, Mitsuko, another central character, enters a chapel and reads a 
few sentences from the Isaiah 53 passage.23
Jacques Derrida, relating to Kierkegaard’s epilogue of Fear and Trembling 
(written under the pseudonym of Johannes de Silentio) sees a connection of 
Genesis 22 and the Christian Passion story. To Derrida, there is an obvious anal-
ogy between the story of the sacrifice of a son by the father, and that of the son 
sacrificed by men and saved by a God who seemed to have abandoned him 
20   Cf. Ascenso, Transcultural Theodicy in the Fiction of Shūsaku Endō, 248, and Mark Williams, 
Endō Shūsaku: A Literature of Reconciliation (London/New York: Routledge, 1999), 77.
21   Endō, “The Anguish of an Alien,” 185.
22   Endō, Silence, 171.
23   Endō, Deep River, 44–45.
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or put him to the test.24 In this way, he states, Jesus’ death has been seen as a 
substitute sacrifice, comparable to and associated with the near-sacrifice of 
Isaac.25 In the light of the compassionate eyes of the bird in Endō’s narrative, 
which could stand for Jesus’ compassion with the suffering main character, it 
is astonishing that Abraham ignores the eyes of Isaac when he raises the knife. 
An angel is needed to withhold Abraham.
A theme in both Genesis 22 and Endō’s narrative concerns relinquish-
ing one’s life and surrendering one’s future in an uncertain situation. Both 
Abraham and Numada are on the brink of risking death. On his way to respond 
to the voice that commanded him to sacrifice Isaac, Abraham is about to kill 
his only remaining son, thereby ending his own future as well. In Numada’s 
case, his life is at stake as a consequence of his own wish for the lung operation 
despite the risks. In both stories, the substitute by the animal brings life.
Whereas Abraham remains silent, Numada expresses his doubts and 
anguish towards the bird.26 In response, the myna laughs at him, thereby 
acknowledging the paradoxical nature of the situation. At the same time, the 
bird’s laughter breaks the tension and encourages Numada. In contrast, noth-
ing seems to ease the loneliness of Abraham’s dilemma.
5.1 Two Differences
Next I will elaborate on the two main differences between the Genesis 22 
story and Endō’s stories of animal substitutions: The (unknown) giver and the 
absent female. Furthermore, I will argue that these differences are related to 
each other. I start by reflecting on Levinas’ critique of Kierkegaard’s interpreta-
tion of Genesis 22 to enlighten the story’s ethical element.
Levinas’ ethic is based on the responsibility of the self for the other. The ‘self ’ 
is not well-grounded, autonomous and in control; rather, it is naked, open. The 
responsibility for the other is expressed in terms referring to the condition of 
hostage and the call to substitute, which relieves the ‘I’ of the concern with his 
or her own being (and his or her own death). According to Levinas, the relation 
24   Jacques Derrida, The Gift of Death & Literature in Secret (Chicago/London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1999; 2008), 81.
25   Hereby suggesting that Isaac is an Old Testament ‘type’ of Jesus.
26   Abraham’s silence has puzzled Kierkegaard. Kierkegaard recalls Abraham’s strange 
answer to Isaac (that God will provide an animal) by stating that Abraham speaks but 
keeps his secret at the same time. Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Problem III, 
(tr. Walter Lowrie, New York: Doubleday, 1954, reprint 1941), 123–124. On the one hand, 
God has promised Abraham (who symbolizes Israel) a land, a people and a future in the 
form of a son. On the other hand, God is demanding the life of Abraham’s son. This ten-
sion between the promise and its impossibility leads to a crisis that silences Abraham.
Coenradie�96
between other and self (the ethical) is prior to the relation between God and 
self (the religious). From this perspective, Levinas criticizes Kierkegaard’s 
interpretation of Abraham’s absolute obedience to God, which distinguishes 
the God-human relationship from human relationships. Abraham seems to 
place unconditional obedience to God above the suffering of Isaac and Sarah, 
which renders Abraham’s action, as interpreted by Kierkegaard, “violent” in 
the view of Levinas.27 According to Levinas, responsibility for the other human 
puts the ‘I’ in question. However, in Kierkegaard’s Abraham, there is no trace of 
doubt. In his essay “On the Suspension of the Ethical,” Martin Buber wonders 
why Kierkegaard takes for granted that it is God who summons Abraham to 
sacrifice Isaac, for it might have been Moloch, imitating the voice of God. The 
identity of the giver is important.
In the Deep River story, however, the substitute animal is given by an anony-
mous giver. It remains unclear whether the substitute bird, which stands for 
Jesus, who died for humanity, is given by God or by life itself. In Endō’s stories 
on substitute animals, the relationship between the giver of the substitute ani-
mal and the ‘I’ is closely connected to the human relationships. The partici-
pation of Numada’s wife is no denial of the divine. She may here serve as an 
instrument of the divine. The “love your neighbour” in Endō’s stories seems to 
be equal to “love your God”.
6 The Giver
The substitute sacrifice in the story of Abraham and Isaac is thought to be 
given by an identified authority – God. As Nico Schreurs argues, one could 
read this form of reversed substitution as an equivalent of God giving up Egypt 
and the surrounding peoples to save the life of Israel (Isaiah 43:3–4).28 Biblical 
scholars of the School of Tübingen, who studied substitution and atonement, 
like Hartmut Gese, Bernd Janowski and others, stress the Hebrew Bible’s term 
kpr, pointing to the relationship between God and sinful humanity, which does 
not keep the law. God is prepared to accept a ransom instead of human life.29 
The kofer takes the place of the sinner, whose life, by his evil deeds, is forfeited. 
27   Emmanuel Levinas, Proper names (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 76.
28   Nico F. M. Schreurs, “Substitution and Salvation: An Example of Systematic Theology in 
Dialogue with Exegesis,” in Theology between Church, University and Society, Studies in 
Theology and Religion (STAR), vol. 6 (eds M. E. Brinkman et al.; Leiden: Brill, 2003).
29   H. Gese, “Die Sühne,” in Zur biblischen Theologie: Alttestamentliche Vorträge (München: 
BEvTh, 1977), 85–106.
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Remarkable in texts such as Isaiah 43:3–4 and Exodus 21:28–32 is that God, the 
offended party, is the one who provides the ransom in the form of an animal in 
exchange for the life of the sinner. This seems to be a reversal of the sacrificial 
substitute required.30
In the story of Numada, the sacrifice is only a sacrifice because it is inter-
preted as such, in hindsight. The question who has given the bird remains 
unanswered. After an excursus on philosophical thoughts on giving and receiv-
ing, helping me to elucidate the concept of sacrificial substitution in the narra-
tives, I will return to this theme of the anonymity of the giver.
6.1 Between Giving and Receiving
In both stories, the animals are received as a gift. Abraham recognizes the ram 
as the expected provision. Numada accepts the hornbill which is offered to 
him on his doorstep and he is touched by his wife’s present of the myna bird.
In this section, I will interpret the sacrificial substitution in the narratives 
from the perspective of the gift. As the Dutch philosopher Van Velthoven has 
pointed out, a gift can only be a gift if there is someone who actively and con-
sciously receives.31 The gift must be recognized as such. At first sight it may 
seem that the giver is the active one whereas the receiver remains passive. 
However, the receiver has a truly active part in the act of receiving. People can be 
willing to give, and act accordingly, but have to wait and see if their gift will 
be received. A gift implies the reception of the gift, and yet it is only the 
receiver who can accept it. This diminishes the difference between the giver 
and the receiver, for the acceptance is in itself a gift, intended and hoped for by 
the giver. By acting as though the gift will be accepted, the giver is expressing his/
her hope for future intersubjectivity. The act of giving and receiving assumes 
a bond between the one who gives and the one who receives. Katherine Rupp 
shows how in the Japanese context a gift can be experienced as an offense 
to a receiver. In Japan, gift-giving functions as a major means of social mobil-
ity. The giving of gifts is extremely important in patronage. Summer gifts and 
winter gifts are given to bosses, doctors, and teachers of one’s children. On a 
macroeconomic level, politicians receive donations from industry and they, 
in their turn, intercede with bureaucracy on the latter’s behalf. The gift-giving 
of humans to deities reflects the gift-giving among humans. The making of 
30   Schreurs, “Substitution and Salvation,” 129.
31   Theo van Veldhoven, Ontvangen als intersubjectieve act: Rede uitgesproken bij de 
aanvaarding van het ambt van bijzonder hoogleraar vanwege de Radboudstichting in de 
betrekkingen tussen christendom en wijsbegeerte aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam, 
September 29, 1980.
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offerings is thought to reinforce the cosmological hierarchy between humans 
and deities.32
The Japanese context emphasizes the economy of exchange that is part of 
giving and receiving. However, as Derrida has shown, the gift functioning in 
such a system of calculated exchange is no longer a gift in the strict meaning 
of the word. As soon as we give something to someone to receive something 
in return, we put that person in our debt, thus taking, not giving. The gift has 
become a measure to reach another aim, a form of calculation. By such a sys-
tem the gift is destroyed as a gift. Derrida argues that the true gift is extrav-
agant, exceeding what is strictly required, expecting no reciprocity. In this 
respect, gifts resemble sacrifices. Abraham had to sacrifice his youngest son, to 
give Isaac to God, without expecting anything in return. “The gift of death (. . .) 
has been accomplished without any hope of exchange, reward, circulation or 
communication”.33
Furthermore, Derrida argues that for a gift to be a gift not only must the 
donor or recipient not perceive or receive the gift as such, that is, have no 
consciousness of it, but they must also forget it right away.34 A true gift forgets 
itself as a gift that has been given. All one could know of the gift would be 
the trace of its having already passed. The gift can only be known by way of a 
trace. The true gift cannot take place between subjects. Then who could meet 
the conditions of giving a gift? In Rethinking God as Gift, Robyn Horner sug-
gests that Derrida’s interpretation of the pure gift “precludes any possibility of 
belief that God is giver”.35 One can conclude that only God or an anonymous 
giver is able to give a “pure gift”, which is precisely the case in both stories.
6.2 The (Unknown) Giver
Jean-Luc Marion aims at transgressing the economic system of giving and 
receiving by reducing the gift to what he calls ‘givenness’.36 Instead of the 
object, Marion stresses the process that precedes the act of giving. Marion’s 
thoughts can be applied to the narratives in this chapter, because no object 
32   Katherine Rupp, Gift-giving in Japan: Cash, connections, cosmologies (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2003).
33   Derrida, The Gift of Death, 81.
34   Jacques Derrida, Given Time: 1. Counterfeit Money (Chicago/London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1992), 16.
35   Robyn Horner, Rethinking God as Gift: Marion, Derrida, and the Limits of Phenomenology 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 197.
36   Jean-Luc Marion, Being Given: Towards a Phenomenology of Givenness (tr. Jeffrey L. Kosky; 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002).
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is involved in the reversed sacrificial animal cases. In contrast to a given 
object, the life of the animals is given without a possibility of being repaid. 
Time, love, power and life are ‘things’ that can never be returned to the giver. 
Instead, Numada’s freeing of the myna in India can be seen as accepting the 
gift of the animal by transmitting it. The anonymity of the giver prevents him 
from returning the gift, however, while at the same time it emphasizes the gift 
itself. The anonymity of the giver gives Numada, the ‘givee’, freedom to react. 
Numada finds himself “paying back” by writing children’s books in which birds 
and dogs are main characters.
In his analysis of Abraham’s sacrifice in terms of giving and receiving, 
Derrida values Abraham’s gift as a “pure gift” that is, strictly speaking, “not 
of this world”.37 According to Derrida, Abraham’s gift avoids the manipula-
tive do ut des principle. In this sense, Abraham’s gift of his son is the sacrifice 
of the economy of sacrifice itself, because, according to Derrida, it is impos-
sible Abraham could have benefited from this sacrifice, since his own future 
would be at stake in sharp contrast to God’s promise to multiply Abraham’s 
descendants. However, one could argue against Derrida that if Abraham had 
not been stopped, he would probably have murdered Isaac. In his critique of 
Kierkegaard, Levinas emphasizes not Abraham’s response to the first voice, 
asking him to sacrifice Isaac, but his response to the second voice, asking him 
not to “lay his hand upon the lad”.38 The second voice brings Abraham back 
from the religious reign into the ethical reign. Levinas’ interpretation gives rea-
son to doubt whether the test is about Abraham’s obedience to God. Abraham’s 
loyalty to Isaac, Sarah and Eliezer might have been tested too. I will argue that 
for this last test Abraham seems to fail. To illustrate my point, I will turn to the 
second significant difference between Genesis 22 and “The Case of Numada” in 
Deep River: The role of the female in both narratives.
7 The Absent Female
Abraham’s wife Sarah is strikingly absent in Genesis 22. Abraham does not 
communicate with her, nor with his son Isaac or his friend Eliezer. Numada’s 
wife, by contrast, plays an important part. She is the one who gives the bird 
to Numada as a present and neglects the bird in the hectic time around her 
37   Jacques Derrida, from “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-
Luc Marion,” in God, The Gift and Postmodernism (eds J. D. Caputo and M. J. Scanlon; 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 59.
38   Genesis 22, 12 (King James Version).
Coenradie300
husband’s surgery, which indirectly causes its substitute death. One could state 
that she unconsciously sacrifices the bird in Numada’s stead, recognizing the 
sacrifice only after the bird’s death. Various comments on the Genesis 22 story 
suggest that Isaac and Sarah suffered from the near-sacrifice. In Deep River, 
Numada and his wife benefit from the substitute death of the myna bird.
Derrida has observed the absence of “anything feminine whatsoever” in the 
Genesis 22 story.39 Sarah Coakley also points to this lacuna.40 The absence of 
Sarah in Genesis 22 might affirm that the necessary violence in such a cultic 
act of sacrifice is “condoning, justifying and even glorifying the abuse of the 
powerless (including, of course, children and women)”. Coakley wonders if 
the “unthinking male obedience even unto death” is typical for the establish-
ment of “patriarchal religion”.41 She protests against the tendency to distinguish 
between sacrifice and gift in the postmodern discourse,42 for which she intro-
duces an alternative. Searching for the lacking female participation in the story, 
Coakley turns to Isaac, inspired by Rembrandt’s etching of Abraham’s sacrifice 
(1655), which shows a nearly grown, rather feminine picture of Isaac. Referring 
to plural rabbinical midrash on the story, she suggests to see in Isaac an “hon-
orable woman”. As a grown-up, Isaac was not an unwilling victim, but cooper-
ated in his sacrifice. Isaac, in the story depicted as a powerless boy, according 
to Coakley, is utterly transformed by the event. The divine interruption by the 
angel disrupts the negative father/son relationship, which was inclined toward 
violence. The angelic third lifts the spell of the patriarchal duality. The purifica-
tion enhanced by the near-sacrifice ended a false sacrificial logic and a falsely 
idolatrous desire. In Coakley’s view, the divine gift inevitably invites human 
sacrifice “if it is to draw us more deeply into participation in that gift”.43
This thought is consonant with the conception of evil in the literary work 
of Shūsaku Endō. According to Endō’s main character in Deep River, Ōtsu, 
good and evil are not separate and mutually incompatible. “God makes 
39   Derrida, The Gift of Death, 76.
40   See also e.g. Nancy Jay, Throughout Your Generations Forever: Sacrifice, Religion, and 
Paternity, (Chicago/London: The University of Chicago, 1992). Jay states that when 
Abraham was stopped and he offered a ram in place of Isaac, the latter received his 
life from the hand of his father. Jay sees the nearly sacrifice of Isaac as a spiritual ‘birth’ 
accomplished without female assistance.
41   Sarah Coakley, “In Defense of Sacrifice: Gender, Selfhood, and the Binding of Isaac,” 
in Feminism, Sexuality, and the Return of Religion (eds L. M. Alcoff and J. D. Caputo; 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 17–38.
42   See e.g. Derrida, “On the Gift: A Discussion between Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc 
Marion,” 59.
43   Coakley, “In Defense of Sacrifice: Gender, Selfhood, and the Binding of Isaac,” 23.
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use not only of our good acts, but even of our sins in order to save us”. This 
thought is familiar to the Buddhist conception of good-evil and its principle 
of “dependent origination” with good and evil being “completely dependent 
on one another”.44 Sin, in Endō’s view, is a state of infidelity in a relationship.45 
Therefore, restoration of that relationship cannot occur without participation 
of the parties involved. Seen from the perspective of Endō’s story, in which 
the woman participates by providing a substitute animal, I wonder if the lack-
ing female element in Genesis 22 could account for the tragedy in Abraham’s 
family relationships since the event. According to diverse rabbinical com-
ments, the relationships of both Abraham and Sarah and Abraham and Isaac 
were frustrated by Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his son. Some comments 
have interpreted Sarah’s sudden death in Genesis 23 as the result of maternal 
shock and grief over her husband’s willingness to sacrifice their son.46 To dem-
onstrate the significance and consequences of this difference in female par-
ticipation, I will turn to several of Shūsaku Endō’s stories on animal sacrificial 
substitution.
7.1 Endō’s Tales of a Substitute Death
What is the function of the substitute sacrifice in Endō’s stories? The death of 
the bird serves to reframe Numada’s recovery in terms of a sacrifice. In a lecture 
at the University of Utrecht, Kathryn McClymond stated that “sacrifice is about 
storytelling”.47 McClymond analyzed the execution of Saddam Hussein, on 
December 30, 2006, in terms of sacrifice. In the eyes of his followers, Saddam 
Hussein’s death must have looked like a sacrifice for his people, as the date of 
the execution coincided with the Feast of the Sacrifice in Islam. This connec-
tion was partly due to Saddam Hussein’s own efforts to present his death as a 
sacrifice in the media.
Likewise, the death – due to neglect – of the animal in “The Case of Numada” 
is rephrased as a sacrifice, a life-giving substitute death. Shūsaku Endō’s 
44   See e.g. Masao Abe, “The problem of evil,” in Buddhist-Christian Dialogue: Mutual Renewal 
and Transformation (eds P. O. Ingram and F. J. Streng; Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 
1986), 146.
45   Ascenso, Transcultural Theodicy in the Fiction of Shūsaku Endō, 234.
46   Stephen Stern interprets Sarah’s death in Kiriath-Arba, a foreign land, as an indication 
that she left Abraham due to his role in the near-sacrifice of her son. Cf. Stephen Stern, 
“The Unbinding of Isaac,” in Sacrifice, Scripture, and Substitution: Readings in Ancient 
Judaism and Christianity (eds A. W. Astell and S. Goodhart; Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 2011), 277.
47   Kathryn McClymond, Ritual gone wrong, a lecture held on September 22, 2010 at Utrecht 
University.
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short stories “A Forty-year-old Man” (1964) and “A Fifty-year-old Man” (1973) 
will enlighten this point.48 These short stories were sketches for the story of 
Numada in Deep River. Hence, the degree of repetition occurring in these short 
stories is considerable. Combining the various forms in which Endō attends 
to the theme of an animal substitute for a dying person creates an interesting 
picture that can contribute to the understanding of the stories written by Endō 
as well as to a deeper understanding of Genesis 22.
7.2 “A Forty-Year-Old Man”
In “A Forty-year-old Man,” the main character is Suguro. A few days before his 
third operation, Suguro is visited by a priest who tells him that Jesus died for 
the sins of us all. Suguro’s sins are clear. However, he does not confess them 
to the priest, but to his myna bird. Soon after, Suguro is visited by Yasuko, his 
wife’s cousin with whom he had a secret sexual relationship. This happened 
several years previously, during the two weeks Suguro’s wife Yoshiko was in the 
maternity ward of the hospital before delivering their baby. Yasuko became 
pregnant, and had an abortion. Although they never discussed the event, 
Suguro has the strong impression that his wife knows everything. The conver-
sation at the hospital bed, during a visit of Yasuko and her husband to Suguro 
and his wife, conceals the past, although Yasuko’s husband is the only one 
who is unaware of what has happened. “They all behaved as though nothing 
had happened,” although “there were thorns and private meanings concealed 
beneath each of their remarks”.49 “Everyone is covering up for everyone else”.50
This conversation between family members mirrors the conversation 
between Abraham and his son. The painful issue is avoided.51 On the day of 
the surgery, Suguro asks to say goodbye to the bird.
You’re the only one who knows what I could not tell the old priest in the 
confessional. You listened to me, without even knowing what any of it 
meant.52
48   Shūsaku Endō, “A Forty-year-old Man,” in Stained Glass Elegies (Suffolk: Penguin Books, 
1986), 11–27. In Japan, it is regarded as one of the most admired and most frequently 
anthologized of Endō’s stories. And “A Fifty-year-old Man,” in The Final Martyrs (New 
York: New Directions, 1994; 2009), 58–73.
49   Endō, “A Forty-year-old Man,” 21.
50   Endō, “A Forty-year-old Man,” 22.
51   Cf. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (tr. Willard 
R. Trask; Princeton University Press, 1953), 11.
52   Endō, “A Forty-year-old Man,” 26.
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The operation succeeds. When Suguro asks about the bird, Yoshiko tells him 
how it died.
The nurses didn’t have time to look after it. Neither did I. We fed it, but 
one really cold night we forgot to bring it back into the room. We shouldn’t 
have left it out on the veranda all night. Suguro remains silent. “I’m sorry,” 
continues Yoshiko, “but I feel as though it took your place (. . .) I buried it 
at home in the garden”.53
In this story, Yoshiko is the one drawing the conclusion that the bird died in 
place of her husband. She is also, as in “The Case of Numada,” the one who 
leaves the bird on the roof or veranda. It is as if she unwittingly sacrifices the 
bird, so that her husband will live. Consequently, Endō’s stories on substitute 
animal sacrifices seem not only to restore the relationship between the protag-
onist and God, but also between husband and wife. The bird’s death functions 
as a catalyst in the family’s relationships.
7.3 “A Fifty-Year-Old Man”
Nearly ten years after, Endō revisited this theme once again. In “A Fifty-year-old 
Man,” however, the relationship between the giving and receiving parties is not 
so clear. In this short story, the animal is a dog named Whitey (instead of the 
former Blackie), the main character is Chiba, and the dying person is the pro-
tagonist’s brother. The dog is an old mongrel, whose eyes remind Chiba of a dog 
which stared at him in Dalian many years ago, when he was forced to leave that 
dog behind. As his brother is in hospital in a critical situation, the condition of 
the dog deteriorates. The main character is troubled by dividing his attention 
between his brother and his dog. He cannot be with both of them at the same 
time. Chiba stays in the hospital, watching over his brother, who undergoes 
a successful operation. The next morning he returns home just in time to be 
beside his dying dog. The ‘crime’ in this story are the dancing classes that Chiba 
attends. The participants of the classes are in their twenties, whereas Chiba is 
over fifty.54 When he dances with a young partner, he imagines having sexual 
53   Endō, “A Forty-year-old Man,” 27.
54   This theme occurs once more in Shūsaku Endō’s “A Sixty-year-old Man”. The main char-
acter of this story is a writer, who is working on the draft of a book called Life of Jesus, 
a rewrite of A Life of Jesus, which he wrote fifteen years earlier. He frequents a coffee shop 
on Sundays, where he secretly meets a high-school girl named Namiko. The author feels 
guilty and shameful about stealing glances at the young woman. Shūsaku Endō, “A Sixty-
year-old Man,” in The Final Martyrs, 128–146.
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intercourse with her as he secretly inhales her sweat undiluted by perfume. 
The story suggests a vague relationship between the behavior of Chiba and the 
death of Whitey. Again, it is the wife of the protagonist who concludes: “He 
died in place of your brother”.55
7.4 Substitute for Trespassing or a “Pure Gift”?
In contrast to Abraham, the main characters in Endō’s stories reflect on their 
past misbehaviour towards both God and their wives. Endō’s three different 
stories indicate that the protagonists somehow deserve to be punished for 
their secret misconduct.56 When the Genesis 22 story is regarded in the light 
of these stories, the suggestion is that Abraham is ‘paying’ for previous misbe-
haviour. Some Jewish comments interpret the sacrifice of Isaac as a punish-
ment for Abraham’s earlier mistreatment of Ishmael, his elder son, whom he 
expelled from his household at the request of his wife Sarah. According to this 
55   Endō, “A Fifty-year old Man,” 73. The self-reflection in the three stories on substitute 
animal sacrifice by Endō is typical for the literary genre of his writing. Shishōsetsu is a 
Japanese literary genre in which transparency, sincerity, subjectivity, and autobiographi-
cal character result in a kind of confession. Shishōsetsu is based on the assumption that 
realism in the novel can only be founded on authenticated personal experience. Fiction 
and autobiography thus overlap when the author concentrates on narrating his or her 
own life and feelings. For detailed information on shishōsetsu, see e.g. The Rhetoric 
of Confession: Shishōsetsu in Early Twentieth-Century Japanese Fiction (ed. E. Fowler; 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988). According to Mark Williams, Shūsaku 
Endō belongs to the third generation of shishōsetsu writers, who attempted to expose the 
conflicts within the Self. This Self is in constant confrontation with an ‘other’ – within 
or without itself – urging the protagonist(s) to seek reconciliation. Cf. Williams, Endō 
Shūsaku: A Literature of Reconciliation.
56   This relationship can also be found in a combination of the story of “The Case of Numada” 
and “Life,” another story with autobiographical elements by Shūsaku Endō in The Final 
Martyrs, 114–127. In the district Hokkaidō where the young Endō/Numada lives, Chinese, 
who had lived there for a long time, were regarded second rate. His mother hires Li, one 
of the Chinese children, as a houseboy. One day Numada picks up a stray dog. His parents 
are not pleased with the filthy Manchurian dog and order Numada to get rid of it. Li, 
however, washes Blackie and secretly hides the dog in the coal shed near the house. After 
a couple of days Numada’s parents agree to the dog’s staying. A month later Li is fired. The 
padlock to the coal shed had been opened and half of the supply of coal had disappeared. 
Although he denies it, Li is accused of the theft. He is been fired and sent away. In “Life,” 
however, the reader learns about another reason for Li being fired. In this autobiographi-
cal story, the main character is an eleven-year-old boy, who is so bored by his depressed 
mother, who is grieving about the bad relationship with the boy’s father, that he steals her 
ring and sells it. Li, the houseboy, is accused instead and sent away.
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view, Abraham failed to show compassion for this oldest son, so God punished 
him by ostensibly failing to show compassion for Abraham’s youngest son.
In line with the two differences between Genesis 22 and Endō’s narratives, 
the reactions of the protagonists show a third difference: Their reaction to the 
animal’s substitute death. One of the untold elements in the Genesis 22 story 
is Abraham’s reaction to the gift. While Numada expresses his gratitude for 
receiving a substitute, it remains unclear whether Abraham thanks God explic-
itly. One could argue that the reverse occurs: God thanks Abraham for his obe-
dient attitude of absolute loyalty (Gen. 22:15–19).
In contrast to Abraham, Numada makes great efforts to give form to his 
gratitude. The reason for Numada to subscribe to the tour to India lies in 
his desire to visit a bird sanctuary, where he can set a bird free, as a sign of 
recognition of the myna bird which had died in his place. “Do you remember 
those nights?” he asked the captured myna he eventually buys, just before he 
lets it go. Numada tells this new bird about those nights when he confessed 
his anxiety and loneliness to a similar bird. A bird that died “as though in his 
stead”. Then he opens the cage and frees the bird.
Watching its laughable movements from behind, Numada felt as though 
the heavy burden he had carried on his back for many years had been 
removed.
After releasing the bird, he realizes that animals are ‘reborn’ in his children’s 
stories.
From this perspective, the substitution can be regarded as a subtle form 
of reincarnation.57 Analogue to Endō’s description of Jesus who continued to 
live in the hearts of his disciples, the birds are restored to live in Numada’s 
children’s books. From the stories preceding “The Case of Numada” as well as 
“The Case of Numada” itself, it becomes clear that the relationship between 
the man and woman benefits from the sacrifice of the substitute animal. 
In the airplane to India, Numada buys perfume to thank his wife. “A Forty-year-
old Man” ends with Yoshiko saying that “everything will be all right now”. And 
despite her distaste for Whitney, in “A Fifty-year-old Man,” the wife of Chiba 
“plucked several cosmos flowers” to lay on the dead dog’s head. In contrast, as 
57   Ascenso points to other characters in Deep River, in whom the Buddhist concept of rein-
carnation might be recognized: the dying wife of Isobe and her ‘rebirth’ in her husband; 
the volunteer Gaston as the Jesus figure who is ‘reborn’ in Kiguchi’s dying friend and, 
finally, the dying Ōtsu and his ‘resurrection’ within Mitsuko. Cf. Ascenso, Transcultural 
Theodicy in the Fiction of Shūsaku Endō, 269.
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Heleen Zorgdrager states, Sarah, who is excluded from information and par-
ticipation, is – symbolically speaking – the one who is sacrificed, namely as the 
mother of her child.58 In my view, the difference between the supposed lack 
of gratitude of Abraham and the abundant gratitude of Numada is in line with 
the differences in their relationship to their nearest and dearest.
8 Conclusion
From comparing and confronting the stories of ‘reversed’ sacrifice in Genesis 22 
and “The Case of Numada” (and its previous sketches), the following charac-
teristics have emerged. God or a divine power provides the sacrificial animal 
(hence: Reversed, for God or a divine power also receives the sacrifice). The 
animal sacrifice serves as a substitute. By the substitute death of the animals 
the incomprehensibility of God/the paradoxical situation is broken and the 
protagonists’ lives are saved. In the case of Numada, the substitute animal 
has an additional function as a silent witness to Numada’s confession. In the 
Japanese stories, the sacrifice is performed without witnesses or priests, with-
out a ritual and without the protagonists knowing. The substitution is recog-
nized as a gift only in hindsight. The animal dies in loneliness, at the moment 
that the protagonist should have died. Characteristic of the animal substitutes 
is their clumsiness; they are laughable figures. However, their vulnerability, 
relativism and availability seem to encourage the main characters to surrender 
themselves to the unknown.
Compared to Numada, Abraham seems to be a violent figure. In his obe-
dience to God he is willing to suspend the ethical. He is not even moved by 
the other right beside him, who is his own son. Therefore he ceases to com-
municate. Abraham uses Isaac as a means to receive an absolute relation to 
the absolute, the price of which seems to be radical solitude and consequent 
disturbance of his family relationships. Unlike Sarah in Genesis 22, the wives 
in Endō’s stories are playing an active and decisive role, which gives the reader 
hope for an interpersonal reconciliation. In the Japanese story, the substitute 
is experienced as a dōhansha, a motherly constant companion who remains 
58   Heleen Zorgdrager, “The sacrifice of Abraham as a (temporary) resolution of a descent 
conflict? A gender-motivated reading of Gen. 22,” in The Sacrifice of Isaac: The Aqedah 
(Genesis 22) and its Interpretations (eds E. Noort and E. Tigchelaar, Leiden/Boston/Köln: 
Brill, 2002), 182–197 (196).
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loyal up to the end.59 The substitute animal sacrifice enables a new future for 
the protagonists and hence provokes gratitude.
59   See e.g. Ascenso, Transcultural Theodicy in the Fiction of Shūsaku Endō and Williams, 
Endō Shūsaku: A Literature of Reconciliation for a discussion of the concept of dōhansha 
in Endō’s literary work.
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The Fruits of Dissent and the Operationalization of 
Faith: A Midrashic Reading of the Akedah
Elliot Lyons
1 Introduction
The Bible is a text fraught with ‘gaps’ – narrative silences, inconsistencies, and 
places where questions arise – and as such yearns to be interpreted. Genesis 22, 
Abraham’s intended sacrifice of Isaac, the Akedah (‘binding’) as it is known 
in Judaism, is nothing but exemplary in this regard. The biblical text main-
tains two ‘gaps’1 where Midrash – biblical interpretation in the Jewish tradi-
tion which juxtaposes biblical passages – places Satan into the narrative in a 
manner that emphasizes the fortification of faith through interrogating its very 
premises.2 The more questions put to Abraham, in other words, the deeper his 
faith becomes.
Accordingly, this chapter will begin by locating the two main ‘gaps’ in the 
text: Genesis 22:1, where Abraham was tested “after these things/ words”, and 
the narratological gap between verses three and four. In presenting the textual 
gaps, I will use traditional historical-critical exegesis in order to juxtapose the 
radical potential and imagination present in Midrash to a method of interpre-
tation that either entirely fails to answer the gaps, or only glimpses the tip of 
the theological iceberg that is the Akedah. Next I will discuss three Midrashim, 
from Genesis Rabbah (GR), from Midrash Tanhumah Yelammedenu (TY), and 
from the Babylonian Talmud (BT), which reconsider the gaps from the first 
half of the chapter in light of Satan questioning the ethics of a sacrifice-forged 
faith, and God pressing the grim task of filicide.
1   There is another ‘gap’ between the end of chapter 22 and the beginning of chapter 23, where 
Abraham returns and finds Sarah dead. This issue will not be dealt with here due to space 
restrictions and thematic inconsistency.
2   I am heavily indebted to Daniel Boyarin, who is also responsible for the notion of ‘gaps’, and 
Gary Porton for this rendering of Midrash. Cf. Daniel Boyarin, Intertextuality and the Reading 
of Midrash (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994); Gary G. Porton, Understanding 
Rabbinic Midrash (Hoboken: KTAV Publishing House, 1985). My article is an elaboration of 
my master thesis written under the aegis of prof. dr. Marcel Poorthuis (University of Tilburg).
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Here is the biblical text of Genesis 22:1–5:
Some time afterward, God put Abraham to the test.
He said to him, ‘Abraham,’ and he answered, “Here I am.”
And He said, ‘Take your son, your favoured one, Isaac, whom you love, 
and go to the land of Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt offering on 
one of the heights that I will point out to you.”
So early next morning, Abraham saddled his ass and took with him two 
of his servants and his son Isaac. He split the wood for the burnt offering, 
and he set out for the place of which God had told him. On the third day 
Abraham looked up and saw the place from afar.
2 The Gaps and their Defining Questions
2.1 Gap 1: After these Things. Language and the Problem of Reference
Genesis 22 begins easily enough with, “Some time afterward, God put Abraham 
to the test.”3 Here, the issue is the interpretation of the Hebrew text:
ויהי אחר הדברים האלה והאלהים נסה את אברהם
(wajehi achar haddevarim ha’ele wehaElohim nissah et Avraham).
And specifically the terms, ‘דברים’, (devarim) ‘speeches’, ‘occurrences’, ‘things’, 
 haElohim) or ‘the) ,’האלהים‘ nissah, < nasah) to ‘try’, ‘test’, or ‘prove’, and) ,’נסה‘
God’. For example, דברים (devarim) is not translated in the Jewish Publication 
Society ( JPS) translation and in the Dutch translation Nieuwe Bijbel Vertaling, 
while the New Revised Standard Version translates the term as ‘things’, along 
with the King James Version. The main question or gap here is what preceded 
Genesis 22:1, because the sentence suggests that what came before is intimately 
related to the opening text. Traditional historical-critical commentary will be 
applied to this question below.
2.1.1 Gordon J. Wenham’s Misdirection
Traditional biblical commentaries furnish us with answers to the literary 
function of the phrase and the impossibility of identifying the precise events 
preceding Genesis 22:1. Gordon J. Wenham assesses the opening statement as 
being a:
3   The Jewish Publication Society (JPS). All biblical translation will come from this source, 
unless otherwise noted.
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[G]reat moment, both from a dramatic and a theological perspective. It 
serves to cushion the listener from the full impact of the horrific com-
mand to Abraham, and it diverts attention from the question whether 
Isaac will be sacrificed to whether Abraham will stand up to the test.4
While admitting the theological import of the phrase, he fails to identify the 
events that underscore said import. However, he does touch upon the poten-
tial (mis)direction of attention from Isaac to Abraham in order to make the 
death sentence seem less horrific. Wenham believes listeners are spared the 
full impact of the command because Genesis 22:1 shifts emphasis from the con-
tent of the command – Isaac being sacrificed – to its form: That a command 
was given by God, and as such should be obeyed.
However, this interpretation itself is misleading because questioning 
whether Abraham will carry out the command cannot be seen as separate 
from the content – sacrificing Isaac – owing to the relationship between 
Abraham and Isaac. Hence shifting attention from Isaac to Abraham only 
leads back to Isaac, underscoring the horrific consequences of the command. 
Still, (mis)direction remains a key element of the narrative, as will be seen in 
the Midrashim, where Satan’s (mis)direction pierces the heart of Abraham’s 
dilemma.
2.1.2 Victor P. Hamilton’s ‘Lad’
Victor P. Hamilton gives another interpretation of the verse when he claims 
that it is impossible to know the identity of the preceding events referred to 
in verse one, concluding that the timespan is most likely years because Isaac 
does not seem to be a newborn. Abraham refers to Isaac as a ‘lad’ or naʿar in 
verse five, a term which would suggest that Isaac is not a fully-grown man.5 It 
almost seems as if Hamilton dismisses the preceding events – marking them 
as insignificant – because they cannot be known in any concrete manner; it is 
precisely this dismissal that is concretized in Midrash.
2.1.3 Hamilton and Wenham: God tested Abraham
A curious use of language in Genesis 22:1 is the formulation of ‘the God’ (האלהים) 
in relation to ‘test’ (נסה), which has implications on how the gap in the text 
posed by “after these things” is read. This is a strange formulation due to the 
4   Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis 16–50, Word Biblical Commentary Vol. 2 (Dallas: Word Books, 
1994), 103.
5   Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18–50, The New International Commentary of 
the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 100.
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‘the’ before God, as if the text is trying to distinguish God in some manner 
regarding the testing. Both Hamilton and Wenham note the bizarre inclusion 
of ‘the’ before Elohim, with Hamilton remarking ‘the’ ensures that the order 
is coming from none other than God himself.6 Furthermore, he goes to great 
lengths proving it is God who is appropriately testing Abraham, by comparing 
the verse to Exodus 15:25, the next instance where God appears as the subject, 
and Exodus 20:20.7
Hamilton’s analysis deals with the tension in the text – why God would 
assign such a horrible task – and does away with it through a normative 
understanding of faith: God could not possibly do anything inappropriate or 
uncalled for, and therefore, by virtue of the command being given, it must be 
just, and even good. However, if God’s test is to be appropriate, then what did 
Abraham do to deserve such a fate? How is ordering the slaying of an inno-
cent son by a righteous father in any way ethical? Can blind obedience be the 
answer? This piece of exegesis also brings to the surface concerns about how 
to categorize ‘good’, and whether or not these categories can apply to God at 
all. It is clear in Hamilton’s analysis that the text – “the God tested” – has the 
mark of Satan all over it, for Satan is normally associated with such cruel acts. 
Yet it is the God who tests. Where Hamilton falters by explaining away the 
tension, Midrash makes its stand in this very tension by inserting Satan who 
prompts God to test Abraham, engaging the thoughts that arise when God 
does the inexplicably cruel.
Wenham provides another viewpoint by characterizing the Elohim as the 
persona God assumes when He desired to distance himself from his actions.8 
Through the juxtaposition of names, Wenham voices, just as Hamilton, nearly 
inescapable thoughts and feelings in the contradiction between perceptions of 
God’s justice and his present actions – cruel and confounding. However, just as 
quickly as he begins to unravel the thread of meaning, similarly to Hamilton, 
he cuts the thread by not seeking out what constitutes the individual threads 
that compose the string. God may be acting remotely, and this just may be 
marked by the use of Elohim, but why would God choose to act in this man-
ner? What would He be attempting to prove? Wenham remarks נסה – ‘test’, 
6   Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 100.
7   For Hamilton, the two instances are similar because God is doing the testing. When a human 
being is the subject of the verb, or testing, and God is the object, Hamilton categorizes the 
testing as negative, being “uncalled for, and out of place.” In Exodus 20:20, God is doing the 
testing and some form of nasa (to test) is being used for evidencing fear of God. Hamilton, 
The Book of Genesis, 101.
8   Wenham, Genesis 16–50, 103.
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‘prove’, ‘tempt’ or ‘try’ – is used to show a person’s true character, generally in 
the face of hardship,9 but what purpose does such a test have in Genesis 22? 
What does it prove, and to whom? Moreover, what was the temptation? Was it 
Abraham’s love of Isaac, and to overcome this love in the face of divine com-
mandment? Or was it to test whether Abraham would follow such a cruel and 
senseless order just because God commanded it?
The gaps in the text are already numerous in the opening words of 
Genesis 22, being present in the language – ‘test’ and the God – and the lan-
guage which narrates absence, as in the case with claiming that the command 
came “after these things”. The biblical commentaries are useful in so far as they 
begin to unearth kernels of information that send our minds spiralling down 
a path towards an answer, but they fail to supply that level of imagination that 
will push the limits of what can be said theologically about faith, due to being 
bound by the conventional exegetical method.
Yet, “after these things/words”, whatever they were, Abraham is asked by 
God to take his son and offer him up as a burnt offering at a place that God 
will show him.10 Responding to the call, Abraham rises early the next morning, 
enlisting two of his servants as well as his donkey to accompany him and Isaac. 
He also splits wood for the fire, and with this last preparation, he sets their 
feet to the road, and so ends verse three. Verse four begins two days after the 
beginning of the journey, “On the third day.” This is where the next gap comes 
into sight.
2.2 Gap 2: Three Days of Silence
The biblical text gives no hint about what occurred during the walk that has 
lasted almost three days. However, it does identify that Abraham and his reti-
nue are at a place where they can see the mountain on which he is to offer up 
Isaac. Needless to say, curiosity is piqued by this omission of details: If they had 
been travelling for two days, why were they still so far away on the third day? 
Did something impede their progress? What did they talk about? Or were they, 
as the text and also Hamilton in his commentary on the gap suggest,11 silent 
and speechless?
Hamilton and Wenham give similar answers to the gap between verses 22:3 
and 22:4. Hamilton notes that the expression “on the third day” is the Hebrew 
equivalent of “at the eleventh hour”.12 Wenham remarks that three days is 
9   Wenham, Genesis 16–50, 104.
10   Genesis 22:2.
11   Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 107.
12   Hamilton, The Book of Genesis, 107.
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a typical period of preparation for something important, also noting that 
Abraham was most likely filled with anxiety and dread.13 Although Wenham 
puts into words what is undoubtedly on the minds of readers – Abraham being 
anxious at the prospect of having to sacrifice his son – he leaves no further 
comment on this most interesting issue of Abraham’s feelings. The Midrash, on 
the other hand, gives us a situation where Abraham’s anxieties are manifestly 
present before him in the form of Satan, leaving him to confront his fears and 
anxieties about having to sacrifice his beloved son.
After the events on the mountain – the building of the altar, the binding, the 
retaining of Abraham’s hand by the angel because he had not withheld Isaac 
from the Lord, the blessing given to Abraham – and his journey to Beersheba, 
the chapter comes to a close.
3 Satan’s Akedah and the Process of Faith
The foregoing concentration on the gaps in the text acts as a beginning point 
in both the interpretation of the biblical text and the concurrent process of 
Abraham’s journey towards faith, a process which is brought out in the Midrash. 
The three Midrashim presented below – from the Babylonian Talmud14 (BT), 
from Genesis Rabbah15 (GR), and from Midrash Tanhuma Yelammedenu16 (TY) – 
deepen the biblical text through inserting Satan into the narrative gaps, in a 
13   Wenham, Genesis 16–50, 106–07.
14   The word Talmud is derived from lamad, ‘to study’. This text was still being developed 
throughout the fifth century of the Common Era. Cf. Moses Mielziner, Introduction to the 
Talmud (New York: Bloch Publishing Company, 1968).
15   The Genesis Rabbah, or Bereshit Rabbah, achieved its final form circa 450 CE, being a 
Midrash collection composed of a verse-by-verse analysis of the book of Genesis. Cf. 
Jacob Neusner, “Genesis in the Genesis Rabbah,” in The Encyclopedia of Midrash: Biblical 
Interpretation in Formative Judaism Vol. I (eds Jacob Neusner and Alan J. Avery Peck; 
Leiden: Brill, 2005).
16   This Midrash collection derives its title from the opening formula that precedes the main 
text: “Thus began R. Tanhuma bar Abba.” However, R. Tanhuma did not author these texts. 
Rather it is thought that he may have laid the groundwork in the latter half of the fifth 
century CE for the text that would later bear his name. A definitive dating of the text, 
or any of the Tanhuma homilies for that matter, is not possible, while the place of ori-
gin is not certain either. “Introduction,” in Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu: An English 
Translation of Genesis and Exodus from the Printed Version of Tanhuma-Yelammedenu with 
an Introduction, Notes, and Indexes, trans. Samuel A. Berman (Hoboken: KTAV Publishing, 
1996). Cf. Myron B. Lerner, “The Works of Aggadic Midrash and the Esther Midrashim,” in 
The Literature of the Sages Vol. II (ed. Shmuel Safrai; Assen: Von Gorcum), 169–70.
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way that questions the nature of the relationship between God, Satan, faith, 
and Abraham, and the normative conceptions of each. In other words, the 
process of faith is its interrogation, asking the difficult questions. Through the 
texts, we will find the truth in lies and the ugliness of truth, and we will notice 
that sacrifice may be but a canvas on which these concepts are painted, con-
struing spirituality as a process in which Satan plays a positive role. The texts 
will be treated synchronically because Satan’s character remains the same 
throughout – knowledgeable, sensible, surly – which makes them effective for 
discerning a general rabbinic opinion on Satan’s character. By treating the texts 
synchronically, each Midrash is a revision of the biblical text, and when read 
together they create a new narrative.
We will start at the beginning of the tale and work our way through the 
two gaps, mirroring the structure of the previous section. The first gap – “after 
these things” – will be analyzed using the BT and GR, which prepares the criti-
cal theological questions regarding God’s truth and justice Abraham must 
deal with in the second gap – three days of silence – where Satan comes to 
Abraham and Isaac, forcing them to confront the implications of these theo-
logical issues.
3.1 Gap 1: The Midrash on “After these Things”
The Babylonian Talmud furnishes us with a conversation where God bets with 
Satan that should he require Isaac, Abraham would not withhold him, thus 
filling in the gap in Genesis 22:1 with a wager. ‘After these things’ is here inter-
preted as ‘after these words’. Which words? The conversation between God 
and Satan. The conversation begins with Satan flattering God, conveniently 
contrasting God’s graciousness at giving Abraham a child at the age of one 
hundred to Abraham’s ungratefulness at failing to provide a sacrifice at Isaac’s 
weaning:
Sovereign of the Universe! To this man didst Thou graciously vouchsafe 
the fruit of the womb at the age of a hundred, yet of all that banquet 
which he prepared, he did not give one turtle-dove or pigeon to sacrifice 
before thee.17
God replies that should he require Isaac, Abraham would obey.
Satan gives the Sovereign of the universe due recognition, contrasting the 
gift – a miracle – that he gave Abraham and Sarah to Abraham’s failure to offer 
17   BT Sanhedrin 89b, translation in The Babylonian Talmud (ed. Rabbi Dr. I. Epstein; London: 
Soncino Press, 1935), 595.
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the paltriest of offerings at Isaac’s weaning – a turtledove and pigeon, which 
would have had no intrinsic value to Abraham, unlike Isaac who is the earthly 
manifestation of Abraham’s pact with God and God’s faithfulness to Abraham.18 
Accordingly, Satan recognizes that one can only sacrifice what one esteems, 
and what would be more highly esteemed than Isaac, a miracle? Yet, at the 
same time, Satan could be chastising Abraham for forgetting an offering as 
meagre as a turtledove and pigeon, underscoring the importance of the offer, 
even if it is not equal to what was given. Hence Satan’s emphasis is on the sac-
rifice, which contrasts to Wenham’s earlier remarks where the purpose of the 
first verse was to direct the listeners’ attention away from the sacrifice.
God, on the other hand, confidently and seemingly plays into Satan’s hands 
through placing the wager. If God knows Abraham is faithful, it would indeed 
be cruel to give such a test, particularly to bolster his ego and show off his 
star pupil. Moreover, even if God was punishing Abraham for a failed sacrifice, 
the punishment given rather befits a tyrant than a just, merciful and forgiving 
God. This incongruity leads us to pose the same question again, this time with 
the new information provided by the BT: Why would God place such a bet? 
Seeking to understand the text, this Midrash asks questions of the biblical text 
in order to foster understanding through the mouth of Satan. Hence, although 
the gap is ‘filled’ by a specific answer, “a wager”, the overall theological question 
still needs refinement. Next, we move to GR where a reason is given for the test: 
“So that the world may know the truth.”
3.1.1 Genesis Rabbah: Abraham as God’s Banner of Faith
The following passage uses the term נסה (nasa) which, as stated earlier, is not 
only a test but also an event that proves the mettle of the individual being 
tested. Here Abraham stands as an example for truth, something which proves 
to be as enigmatic as faith:
And it came to pass after these things, that God did prove (‘nissa’) Abraham 
(Gen. 22:1). It is written, Thou hast given a banner (‘nes’) to them that fear 
thee, that it may be displayed (‘le-hithnoses’) because of the truth. Selah 
(Ps. LX, 6): This means, trial upon trial, greatness after greatness, in order 
to try them in the world and exalt them in the world like a ship’s ensign 
[flying aloft]. And what is its purpose? Because of the truth. Selah: In 
order that the equity of God’s justice may be verified in the world. Thus, 
if one says, “Whom He wishes to enrich, He enriches; to impoverish, He 
impoverishes; whom he desires, He makes king; when he wished, He 
18   Genesis 17:16.
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made Abraham wealthy, and when He wished He made him a king”, then 
you can answer him and say, “Can you do what Abraham did?” Abraham 
was a hundred years old when his son Isaac was born unto him (Gen 22:5); 
yet after all this pain it was said to him, take now thy son, thine only son 
(Gen 22:2), yet he did not refuse. Hence, Thou hast given a banner to them 
that they fear thee, that it may be displayed; so it is written, that God did 
prove Abraham.19
Abraham endured even the annihilation of a miracle because he feared God, 
knowing that the truth is this very fear, or an awe that reveres and listens, echo-
ing Psalm 60:6 – “Give those who fear You because of Your truth a banner for 
rallying”.20 The banner is itself the fear of God.
Similarly to the BT, God is cloaked in a cruel mysteriousness on account 
of his incomprehensible stance on justice. If God does what he wills, giving 
this name to justice and truth, then how can it be just to ask a largely inno-
cent Abraham to commit filicide, going directly against God-given command-
ments? Is this his truth? Or is facing the death of Abraham’s son, who was given 
to him at one hundred years old,21 by his own hands22 the price of faith? Could 
you do any of these things after being similarly blessed? And so the test began 
after these things;23 after having a son and the accompanying joy swept away. 
Hence, in GR, Hamilton and Wenham’s issue of whether the command origi-
nates from God is not of central importance, but rather what the command 
says about how we think about God.
If the remarks from the BT are considered as an answer to GR – why would 
God place such a horrible wager? – then it seems God needs Satan in order 
to uplift Abraham to greatness, using him as an example for the world to see. 
Put simply, God is omnipotent, thus he could have acted alone, which leads to 
the question why Satan has a role in this. Wenham remarked “the Elohim” was 
used to distance God from the act, and here God is distant in that Satan spurs 
the test, and in doing so, bridges the gap between God and the command in a 
seamless manner. Yet at the same time God is still intimately involved in the 
events. Satan could possibly be one half of the same force, with the other half 
being occupied by God.
19   Genesis Rabbah 55:1, in Midrash Rabbah Vol. I, trans. Rabbi Dr. H. Freedman and Maurice 
Simon (London: Soncino Press, 1951), 482.
20   JPS. Note that the Midrash contains a wordplay: nissah (‘prove’), nes (‘banner’, ‘miracle’).
21   Genesis 21:5.
22   Genesis 22:2.
23   Genesis 22:1.
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Considering the Midrashim surveyed so far and looking ahead to the pro-
ceeding texts, it could also matter not so much which ‘side’ – light or dark, 
good or bad and evil – that either of them occupies as the opposition existing 
in the first place. Stuck in the middle of this continuum is Abraham, who must 
navigate it in order to understand faith through confronting it, and question-
ing it, as will been seen in the Midrashim from the TY and GR regarding the 
second gap where both Abraham and Isaac are confronted by Satan on the 
way to Moriah.
3.1.2 Satan and the Road to Moriah
We will deal with the unintended consequence of the faithful: Satan confront-
ing Abraham in the Midrash Tanhuma Yelammedenu and Genesis Rabbah. GR 
will not be given a separate subheading because it reiterates the same senti-
ment found in the TY – that Abraham will be labelled a murderer if he com-
mits filicide – save that in the former text, Abraham, when pressed by Samael,24 
confesses his intent to kill Isaac. In both texts, Abraham remains stalwart and 
faithful in having the consequences of his actions put plainly before him in a 
straightforward, confrontational manner.
Satan appears to Abraham as an old man in the TY, inquiring about 
Abraham’s destination. Abraham is going to pray, and Satan smugly retorts – 
“[D]oes one carry fire and a knife in his hands, and wood on his shoulders?”.25 
Abraham needs the knife and wood to prepare food, but Satan cuts in, reveal-
ing his presence when God gave the command, and Abraham would be foolish 
to relinquish such a blessing:
Have you not heard of the parable of the man who destroyed his own pos-
sessions and then was forced to beg from others? If you believe that you 
will have another son, you are listening to the words of a seducer . . . And 
if you destroy a soul, you will be legally accountable for it.26
24   Louis Ginzberg gives this as an alternative name for Satan; Freedman, in his translation 
of Genesis Rabbah, marks Samael as a wicked angel, with the Dictionary of Deities and 
Demons giving Samael as a name given in the intertestamental period for the devil, who, 
among other things, is leader of the hosts of evil and persecutes the righteous. Louis 
Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews, trans. Henrietta Szold (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society of America, 1937), 175; B. Becking, P. van der Horst, K. van der Toorn, eds, 
The Dictionary of Deities and Demons [DDD] (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 468; Cf. E. E. Urbach, The 
Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs Vol. I, trans. Israel Abrahams (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 
1975), 161–169.
25   Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu Wayera 30a, 144.
26   Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu 30a, 144.
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Satan unearths the legal ramifications of Abraham’s actions through speaking 
common sense. Ironically, he warns Abraham for the seducer (Satan). He pre-
pares Abraham for the idea that God may be fooling him, as if to ask, utilizing 
the themes from GR above, yet refined, what type of truth involves contradict-
ing the law? Abraham will be not only breaking the general prohibition against 
killing but also the law prohibiting child sacrifice in Leviticus 20:2:
Moreover, thou shalt say to the children of Israel: Whosoever be of the 
children of Israel, or of the strangers that sojourn in Israel, that giveth his 
seed unto Molech; he shall be surely put to death; the people of the land 
shall stone him with stones.27
Legally, according to Satan, Abraham will be held accountable, and this will 
most likely be through paying with his life; thus, although Satan does not refer 
to Leviticus 20:2, he certainly implies as much in his speech. Accordingly, lis-
tening to a voice that told Abraham otherwise would be foolish – seduction to 
a fault – and how can one possibly represent God’s truth through filicide result-
ing in death? This would indeed be a grim fate.
In GR, Samael also confronts Abraham, pointedly asking, “What means this, 
old man! Hast thou lost thy wits? Thou goest to slay a son granted to thee at 
the age of a hundred!”.28 Abraham cannot, in Kierkegaardian terms, be both in 
adherence and in violation with the law at the same time. Moreover, Samael 
averts, “To-morrow He will say to thee, Thou art a murderer, and art guilty”.29 
Satan further presses Abraham, asking him if he could withstand an even 
greater test, following this question with a quote from Job’s friend, Eliphaz, 
“If a thing be put to thee as a trial, wilt thou be wearied?”.30 This last ques-
tion functions to precipitate further reflection on Abraham’s behalf because it 
seeks after his motivations, which in turn asks after his values – is filicide a fair 
price for anything? Especially for something unknown? These questions could 
very well prove too heavy a burden; hence in GR and the TY, we find the weight 
of the questions becoming stronger as Satan himself speaks to Abraham.
27   JPS. The term ‘Molech’ has been argued to be a divine name as well as a technical term 
used in the cultic sacrifice of children. The Old Testament view on this cult of child 
sacrifice is that ‘Molech’ was predominantly a Canaanite practice, as is demonstrated 
in Deuteronomy 12:31 and 2 Kings 17:17, although it was practiced in Jerusalem. DDD, 
1090–1097.
28   Genesis Rabbah 56:4.
29   Genesis Rabbah 56:4.
30   Job 4:2.
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The two Midrashim underscore and deepen the questions raised in the first 
‘gap’ as to the nature of God, Satan, good, bad and evil. Satan argues the moral 
point of acting in accordance with the law, while God, in a Job-like distance, 
allows Satan to approach Abraham, and counter His orders – yet Abraham 
remains steadfast, rebuffing Satan. The key question here is the purpose of 
Satan, and the answer may be that Satan will aid Abraham in understanding 
why he believes and adheres, that is, the content of his faith, and not only the 
fact that he adheres unquestionably.
This is, of course, in spite of the fact that the rabbis did not view knowledge 
of the reasons for the commandments as necessary for following them; thus 
the commandments have merit apart from the motivations behind them.31 Yet, 
part of the purpose of the commandments is to benefit and keep people away 
from the evil inclination through testing, which makes one mindful of one’s 
mistakes.32 However, in the end, none of this reasoning is needed to carry out 
a command. Thus, to use the language of Plato’s Eutyphro, commandments 
are pious both because they are God-given and because of their intrinsic 
value. At every turn of thought we find a ‘but’, and we know from the GR that 
Abraham is an exception, and the rule, who would obey because it is required. 
He must face Satan and his fear of failure without having the belief filicide will 
be recalled, believing with understanding through considering the contrary – 
Satan’s words, which very competently ask: What kind of God would require 
filicide? However, in all the texts surveyed, no hint of Abraham’s inner process 
has been given, and he has faced Satan coolly, confidently.
3.1.3 A Mother’s Love: Satan, Sarah, Isaac and Abraham in the Midrash 
Tanhuma Yelammedenu and Genesis Rabbah
The TY and GR will be discussed together because both are built upon Satan 
noting Sarah’s disgust at Abraham’s actions, if only she knew, and Satan com-
ing to Isaac to tempt him, disguised as a young man. In the latter text, Satan 
also mentions Ishmael, and Isaac breaks down in the face of Satan’s word, 
causing Abraham to comfort him by telling him that if God does not provide 
an offering, Isaac will be the offering. These Midrashim add to the depth of 
the trial because both Abraham and Isaac admit and accept the truth that the 
former will sacrifice and the latter will be sacrificed.
In the TY, Satan questions Isaac in the same manner as Abraham, with Isaac 
releasing that he is journeying to study law. “Alive or dead?” Satan inquires.33 
31   Urbach, Sages, 368.
32   Urbach, Sages, 367.
33   Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu 30a, 144.
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Isaac responds by asking how one could possibly study law while dead, resist-
ing Satan’s attempt to tempt him away from his father’s trust. Lastly, Satan 
relays that Sarah would be beside herself if she knew to what grim task 
this ‘demented’ man set himself, as if to say that death is a perverse tool for 
instruction.34 Like his father, Isaac accepts his fate by avowing fealty to his 
heavenly and earthly fathers.
Isaac, here, is faced with the reality of death. The TY also reveals that 
Abraham, to explain their departure, told Sarah he was to provide Isaac with 
critical instruction.35 Hence Satan confronts Isaac with the lies of Abraham, 
giving Isaac all the information he needs to make an informed decision him-
self, just as he did with reminding Abraham that he would be breaking the law. 
Similarly, in GR Samael calls on Isaac as the “son of an unhappy mother”, tell-
ing him Abraham will kill him, and then asking him whether his inheritance 
would go to Ishmael, “the hated of her [Sarah’s] house”.36 Isaac cries out to 
Abraham, causing Abraham to shun Sammael and offer the strange comfort 
of telling Isaac that if God fails to provide an offering, Isaac will be the burnt 
offering – “so they went both of them together – one to slaughter and the other 
to be slaughtered”.37
In the text from GR, Samael forces Abraham to tell Isaac the truth, which 
is a bizarre comfort, in fact being the same comfort afforded Abraham in his 
relation to God: Both must have faith in their fathers as their only solace. With 
the same processes being mirrored between father-son and God-Abraham, 
a queer bond is made between all parties based in faith, and a new under-
standing of the role love plays in faith. Love requires sacrifice, which in turn 
requires sacrificing parts of the self. Consequently, this may be the ‘instruc-
tion’ Abraham told Sarah he would give Isaac in the TY, and the truth Abraham 
uttered along with this lie – for how can one be instructed and study law while 
dead? Moreover, faith could be rendered here as Abraham and Isaac submit-
ting to the reality of having to sacrifice and be sacrificed after a thorough 
questioning, with the guiding issue of Abraham speaking the grim reality into 
existence. In the TY below, Abraham continues this thread by fully admitting 
the truth of Satan’s lies.
34   Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu 30a, 144.
35   Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu 30a, 143.
36   Genesis Rabbah 56:4.
37   Genesis Rabbah 56:4.
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3.1.4 The River in the Road: Satan’s Role in the Tested Faith in the TY
On the third day, when Abraham lifted his head and saw the place from afar, 
the TY notes the incongruent amount of time for the short distance travelled, 
accounting for the lack of progress, by explaining that Satan, perturbed by 
being ignored, placed a river in Abraham’s path. Abraham and retinue wade 
out up to their necks; Abraham cries out to God to spare him so he can do as 
he was commanded.38 God removes the river. Undeterred, Satan again uses the 
words of Eliphaz from the book of Job (4:12):
Now a word was secretly brought to me (Job 4:12); that is, I have heard from 
behind the heavenly curtain that a lamb shall be sacrificed as a burnt 
offering instead of Isaac.39
Abraham, stalwart yet revealing as ever, tells Satan that it is a liar’s penalty that 
even when he speaks truth, no one will believe him.
The process of faith is at play here, its contents in the willingness to ful-
fil commandments in the face of not only a physical obstacle, but the truth. 
Abraham beseeches the heavens, evoking the banner motif from GR in ask-
ing God who will fulfil his commandments if either he or his son dies. This 
idea of sight aligns with the language of Genesis 22, where the term ‘to see’ 
 ra ʾah) appears in various forms multiple times.40 Abraham cannot be the ,ראה)
example of how God sees to or provides for those who heed his words if he is 
dead, which, curiously enough, are congruent with the implications of Satan’s 
earlier remark to Isaac in the TY on the impossibility of studying law while 
dead: How is one to learn how to carry out the law when one’s instruction is in 
breaking the law? To reformulate the question, how is the truth built upon a 
lie, and how can a lie be the truth?
Satan’s river challenges Abraham, testing his resolution in order to dis-
cern his mettle, as if to suggest faith would be useless without these things – 
obstacles, doubts and having one’s own fears externalized, in this case mani-
fest in an inquisitive, plainly speaking Satan. Satan’s challenge is utterly 
indistinct from God’s – for did not God agree to the wager? After and in these 
things, seeing events as good, bad, or evil is of no use because truth has many 
facets – it is relative – and not all of them are normative. Abraham conjures 
38   Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu 30b, 144.
39   Midrash Tanhuma-Yelammedenu 30b, 145.
40   For example, in the noun Moriah, which is used throughout the verse, and also in the 
famously enigmatic verse 14, where Abraham names the location of the sacrifice, יהוה 
.”or something “the Lord will see” or “the Lord will provide ,יראה
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images of deceit and misdirection, but his character here and in the other 
Midrashim directs him to consider what faith means, and whether it includes 
sacrifice. Notice that in the first ‘gap’ the analysis concerned the nature of God, 
while presently it centers around Abraham taking on the burden that he has 
accepted, and doing so by calling upon God to dry up the waters when death 
would have been an easy way to avoid filicide. Thus, it seems the more Satan 
pushes and questions, the stronger Abraham’s resolve becomes.
Satan offers that a lamb will replace Isaac, which is the truth in the end. Yet 
this truth is most likely contingent upon Abraham being deterred or not. That 
is to say, if he quit, God would probably not have taken Isaac, while Abraham 
would still have maintained a place among the holy because he followed the 
law. However, to be able to offer the lamb in place of Isaac – even if it also 
served as a belated offering for the forgotten ritual at Isaac’s weaning (GR) – 
would surely be the greatest achievement, because in this case God is trusted 
to see to the situation. Although Abraham may be uncertain about the out-
come, he is certain God will provide a solution, and this is a truth set against 
the truth that there may be honour in turning back when faced with death. 
Thus, just as this and the other Midrashim have brought out and fortified the 
‘gaps’ in the biblical text, Satan within this form brings out and fortifies 
the ‘gaps’ in Abraham’s spirituality.
4 Conclusion: The New Akedah
This chapter began by briefly detailing how traditional biblical commentar-
ies treated the ‘gaps’ in the biblical text by hinting at the theological depth 
plumbed in Midrash. The strength of Midrash lies in its creative use of the text 
by inserting Satan into the narrative, causing one to rethink conceptions of 
faith. The Midrashic texts surveyed here in no small part call for a re-evaluation 
of the way we speak about sacrifice, and specifically how we view sacrifice 
through the lens of faith. The form of Midrash was a narrative that questioned 
the biblical text in order to explicate the minutia, and in this case, the devil 
was literally in the details. Relentlessly pursuing Abraham and Isaac, Satan 
opposed God, beseeching Abraham to uphold God’s law, challenging Abraham 
to find and ground his faith through placing what were undoubtedly his own 
apprehensions right at his doorstep.
The power of the Midrashim is in their treatment of faith as dynamic pro-
cess that resists being diluted into formulas and rudiments, seeing faith as a 
truth among truths. It asks one to doubt to believe, with doubt pointing at 
what one finds difficult, what one cherishes. Wenham gave the opening words 
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of Genesis 22 a dampening function – they direct attention away from the 
intended sacrifice, focusing on whether Abraham will sacrifice. Abraham’s trial 
is precisely not forgetting the importance of Isaac, and Satan potently reminds 
him in the Midrashim of his folly. Although Abraham confidently rebuffs 
Satan, his soul must have yearned and uttered a soft ‘I know’, for there would 
be no trial without recognition of the love he had for Isaac.
Satan, as he did throughout the Midrashim by opposing God, interrogates 
the value of the truth regarding faith. In GR, God’s truth would be known 
through Abraham, but Satan inquires what type of truth is known through the 
sacrifice of innocents. Yet, just as Midrash asks the difficult questions, it draws 
back, giving no answers to the problem of Abraham’s faith, for remaining 
steadfast – or faithful – is not an answer to the problem, but a tautology that 
can only be managed by Abraham. Consequently, perhaps the truth is in not 
believing the lie of fixed solutions, in removing the veil presented by the holy 
and admitting the gritty yet intoxicating allure of having one’s eyes opened to 
the possibility of faith being a violent movement of the soul, in the suspension 
of belief and judgment.
It is recognized that the above reading is in many ways a radical reading of 
the Midrashim, but it is grounded in the view that Midrash itself is a radical 
manner of biblical interpretation, sacrificing certainty for the pursuit of what 
cannot be grasped. Endless discussion and interpretation of the Midrashim 
continually make Abraham’s tale anew, and it is this remaking of tradition and 
viewing ancient texts through new eyes which keeps religion vibrant and rel-
evant. Thus, the true import of the Akedah may be in the process, and in find-
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Fascination of Sacrifice
Kathryn McClymond
We are at a critical juncture in the study of sacrifice. In a world troubled by war, 
economic crisis, and deprivation, the language of sacrifice is used frequently to 
rally men and women to extend themselves on behalf of others. Sacrificial rhet-
oric is used to justify and give meaning and honor to this extra effort, and it is 
embraced as language rooted in the world’s great religious traditions and high-
est philosophical ideals. At the same time, the resources for scholarship have 
never been richer in terms of the data and methodologies available. Scholars 
can draw on ancient texts, archaeological evidence, contemporary philosophy, 
classical theology, literary works, and popular culture to find examples of sac-
rifice and to inform their thinking. By contrast, however, theorizing regarding 
sacrifice in modern Western academia suffers greatly. I would argue that this is 
largely because sacrificial theorizing continues to be driven by a narrow range 
of examples and framed largely by Protestant Christian models, in which 1) the 
sacrificial offering substances are assumed to be animal or human; 2) the pur-
pose of the sacrifice is substitutionary atonement via violent destruction; and 
3) the nature of the sacrifice is monothetic, with a single aspect of sacrifice 
presented as its defining and essential element. I have argued elsewhere that 
this approach to sacrifice cripples our appreciation for this rich phenomenon.1 
We have been seduced by the drama evoked by bloody and violent elements of 
some forms of sacrifice, and thus distracted from the subtleties and complexi-
ties that exist more broadly. As a result, current scholarship is relatively “one 
note”, lacking in sophistication.
The essays in this volume are prompted, at least in part, by a recognition of 
the current state of sacrificial studies, both its strengths and its weaknesses. 
The authors represented here take up the rich data and methodological 
resources available and present a dazzling range of case studies in sacrifice, 
case studies that lay bare the complex nature of sacrifice. In addition, these 
essays implicitly challenge the narrow models that dominate sacrificial studies 
conversations by presenting example after example of sacrifices that cannot 
be satisfactorily explained by these approaches.
1   An extended presentation of this argument can be found in Kathryn McClymond, Beyond 
Sacred Violence: A Comparative Study of Sacrifice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2008).
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Without ever explicitly saying so, this volume also asserts the value of the 
comparative study of sacrifice. While our work continues to benefit from in-
depth descriptions and analyses of individual sacrificial systems, the theoriz-
ing of sacrifice requires a broad approach, brings multiple sacrificial traditions 
into conversation with one another. Historically, comparative work has received 
harsh criticism, largely because early attempts generated ahistorical descrip-
tions of sacrifice that ignored context and glossed over differences between 
traditions. This reductionist approach led to unwarranted claims about far-
reaching similarities between traditions. Attempts to address this problem 
led to an over-correction in which comparison was discounted entirely. Area 
studies were praised while comparative work was shunned out of fear of over-
reaching. However, responsible comparison recognizes its limitations, taking 
on research problems that suit comparison. In addition, responsible compari-
son is modest in its conclusions. Comparative studies of sacrifice make sense, 
given the prevalence of sacrifice around the world. In addition, a compara-
tive approach to sacrifice offers a corrective for models that claim universality. 
The present volume presents a series of case studies of sacrifice, clustered into 
three sections. Each case study speaks for itself while being framed in conver-
sation with other related essays, giving the reader a sense of the breadth and 
depth of the issues to be tackled. Ultimately, this approach invites each reader 
to come to his/her own conclusions about the broader nature of sacrifice.
The study of sacrifice goes back at least as far as the study of religion. In the 
following few pages, I highlight the prevailing views of sacrifice that this col-
lection implicitly engages. I will briefly describe the approaches that currently 
dominate the field and then note some of the ways in which these approaches 
fall short. In so doing, I hope to set the stage for the case studies that follow.
I. While theoretical approaches to sacrifice span a wide spectrum, contempo-
rary theorizing tends to be dominated by three different approaches. Probably 
the most well-known is that of René Girard, who argues that sacrifice is the 
unconscious redirected aggression of a society:
[Sacrifice] is a substitute for all the members of the community, offered 
up by the members themselves. The sacrifice serves to protect the entire 
community from its own violence; it prompts the entire community to 
choose victims outside itself.2
2   René Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1977), 8.
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For Girard, scapegoating is at the heart of ritual, religion, even culture as a 
whole. In his work Girard builds on a Christian notion of vicarious atonement 
via an innocent victim. He argues: “society is seeking to deflect upon a rela-
tively indifferent victim, a ‘sacrificeable’ victim, the violence that would other-
wise be vented upon its own members, the people it most desires to protect”.3 
While it is clear that many sacrificial systems include substitutionary atone-
ment, this motif alone is woefully inadequate as a singular, definitive charac-
terization of all sacrifice.
Others have characterized sacrifice as some form of cuisine. W. Robertson 
Smith’s classic work, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, focused on sac-
rifice as a communal meal, in which worshipers reestablish a broken connec-
tion with their god, in addition to forging communal ties.4 Marcel Détienne 
and Pierre Vernant, in their work on ancient Greek sacrifice, argue that sacri-
fice is a kind of political cuisine: “Political power cannot be exercised without 
sacrificial practice”, noting “the political and alimentary vocation inherent 
in sacrificial practices”.5 Finally, Charles Malamoud, commenting specifically 
on Vedic sacrifice, argues, “it is essentially a matter of cooking: It is the prepa-
ration, sometimes through the combination, but always through the cooking, 
of edible substances”.6 While these approaches differ significantly from one 
another in their understandings of the nature and purpose of the sacrificial 
meal, they all attempt to argue that the ‘meal’ or ‘cuisine’ metaphor captures 
the thrust of sacrifice.
Finally, scholars have consistently characterized sacrifice as part of a broader 
system of social exchange. In his classic work The Gift, Marcel Mauss invokes 
this image, underscoring the fact that no gift is free gift; rather, gift-giving sys-
tems depend upon ongoing reciprocity, either between individuals and com-
munities or with the divine: “One of the first groups of beings with which men 
had to enter into contract, and who, by definition, were there to make a con-
tract with them, were above all the spirits of both the dead and of the gods. 
Indeed, it is they who are the true owners of the things and possessions of this 
3   Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 1.
4   W. Robertson Smith, Lectures on the Religion of the Semites (New York: Meridian Books, 1957 
[Orig. 1889]).
5   Marcel Détienne and Pierre Vernant, The Cuisine of Sacrifice among the Greeks, trans. Paula 
Wissing (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 5.
6   Charles Malamoud, Cooking the World: Ritual and Thought in Ancient India, trans. David 
Gordon White (New York, Oxford University Press), 34.
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world”.7 More recently, Gregory Alles has continued imagining sacrifice as a 
kind of exchange, asserting:
Exchange did provide one of the oldest theoretical models for under-
standing the widespread ritual of sacrifice: The notion that sacrifices 
are gifts given to the gods or ancestors in the hope of receiving a gift in 
return. This perspective is summed up in three Latin words do et des, “ 
I give [to you], to that you will give [to me]”.8
The phrase do et des is commonplace in sacrificial studies, emphasizing the 
dynamic that is created between the giver and the recipient in a sacrificial 
exchange on multiple levels. Again, however, characterizing sacrifice simply 
as a form of exchange fails to capture other activities and dynamics at play in 
sacrificial events.
Each of these models offers valuable insights into some sacrificial phenom-
ena, but none of them adequately explores all the sacrificial phenomena avail-
able to us, and each of them emphasizes one element of sacrificial practice to 
the detriment of other elements. We turn now to an explanation of the funda-
mental problems with these approaches and one possible solution.
II. Common thinking about sacrifice makes several faulty assumptions. First, 
sacrifice is commonly associated with animal and human victims, but the 
world’s religions include a much wider range of sacrificial offerings. Around 
the globe we find liquid offerings such as wine and ghee; vegetal offerings such 
as gourds, grains, and fruit; and material offerings such as fabric. However, the-
orists have largely ignored or dismissed this fact. Hubert and Mauss acknowl-
edge the existence of vegetal offerings:
It may cause surprise that in this scheme we have not mentioned those 
cases where the victim is not an animal. We might indeed have done so 
(. . .) The preparation of the [grain] cakes, the way in which they were 
anointed with oil or butter, etc., corresponds to the preparation of the 
[animal] victim.9
7   Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Arabic Societies, trans. Ian 
Cunnison (New York: Norton, 1967 [Orig. 1925]), 16.
8   Gregory Alles, “Exchange,” in Willi Braun and Russell T. McCutcheon, eds, Guide to the Study 
of Religion (New York: Cassell, 2000).
9   Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Functions, trans. W. D. Halls 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964 [Orig. 1898]), 137 n291.
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Vast numbers of sacrificial offerings – and the procedures applied to these 
offerings – have been largely ignored in sacrificial theorizing to date. I suspect 
that this is because pouring ghee and pounding grain cakes is not nearly as dra-
matic as the death of an animal, and the dramatic activities have captured our 
scholarly attention. However, this narrow focus on animal and human offer-
ings has crippled our understanding.
Related to the focus on the substance of sacrifice is the problem of its pur-
pose. Sacrifice is commonly assumed to be destructive, usually in a violent way. 
Hubert and Mauss, long viewed as the ‘grandfathers’ of modern sacrificial stud-
ies, state this boldly:
[W]e must designate as sacrifice any oblation, even of vegetable matter, 
whenever the offering or part of it is destroyed.10
The procedures that receive attention in sacrificial studies are those that dis-
member animal victims, and these activities are fundamentally viewed as 
destructive. However, reviews of the world’s sacrificial systems reveal that sac-
rifice is often a constructive activity. Unique elements are constituted over the 
course of a sacrifice, and even when a substance is taken apart, this is often 
best understood as the generation of multiple new, discreet offerings out of 
a single ‘unformed’ substance. In addition, the sacrificial ritual itself is often 
performed in order to stave off destruction, disintegration or chaos. Rather, 
sacrifices often maintain or reestablish the stability of the cosmos, including 
the social and political worlds as well as the natural world. In these examples, 
sacrifice is best understood not as destructive or violent, but as a generative, 
constructive activity.
Finally, sacrifice has been misrepresented in terms of its nature. Sacrifice is 
largely characterized as monothetic. That is to say, one element of sacrificial 
activity – usually consumption or killing – is emphasized as the sole defining 
element sacrifice. A cursory study of sacrifice, however, reveals that sacrificial 
events are far more complex. I have argued elsewhere that sacrifice is better 
understood as a polythetic phenomenon, in which multiple activities com-
bine in countless ways, and none of which is essential or definitive. Sacrificial 
events include many activities, including the selection of an appropriate sacri-
ficial offering; the association of the offering with a particular deity or deities; 
the identification of that offering with the sacrificer(s); the killing of some (but 
not all) offering substances; the apportionment of unformed substances into 
10   Hubert and Mauss, Sacrifice, 12. Note that despite this quick reference to vegetal offerings, 
Hubert and Mauss consciously bracket out vegetal offerings from their theorizing.
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multiple, discrete sacrificial offerings that are distributed to different partici-
pants; the heating of offering portions, either by fire or other means; and the 
consumption of certain portions. Each unique sacrificial event involves combi-
nation of these basic “building block” activities, combining in distinctive ways 
and in specific relationship with one another.
The complexity of sacrificial activity requires us to resist the temptation to 
reduce sacrifice to a single defining motif – destruction, cuisine, etc. Instead, 
we are invited to appreciate its multi-faceted, dynamic nature. Sacrifice is an 
organic phenomenon. It evolves constantly, generating various forms, some of 
which involve material substances, some of which are internalized processes 
within the body (e.g., tapas-generating yogic activities), and others of which 
are metaphoric (e.g., Jewish prayer, reading of the Bhagavad Gita in certain 
strains of Hinduism). In its different incarnations sacrifice addresses multiple 
concerns simultaneously: Individual and communal, as well as spiritual, social, 
economic, political, and cultural. In addition sacrifice manifests itself in mul-
tiple realms of human activity: The natural world, the socio-political arena, 
and countless cultural forms (including visual art, literature, and song). As a 
result we have an embarrassment of riches upon which to draw, a veritable 
playground for the scholarly imagination. Our task at this moment in sacrifi-
cial scholarship is to reject reductionism and let the full spectrum of sacrificial 
substances and activities speak to its theorizing.
III. The essays in this volume take up the challenge of reimagining sacrifice 
with these points in mind. First, they take on sacrifice in relationship with 
three key constituents: Community, ritual, and identity. In section one, the 
essays remind us that communities offer the opportunity to offer ourselves in 
sacrifice – or they demand it. Whatever the dynamic, sacrificial events forge 
connections between individuals and construct communities as a result. 
Section two examines sacrificial ritual in a host of religious traditions. We are 
reminded of the wide range of sacrificial rituals performed in religious and 
cultural traditions, but more importantly of the variations that occur within 
specific traditions, depending on time, place, and historical factors. Rituals are 
sensitive phenomena, and they reflect and respond to their specific contexts. 
Finally, section three explores the relationship between sacrifice and various 
identities we craft as individuals. The essays present exercises in the discovery 
of individual identity, implying that individual identity is always developed 
in response to other beings and to specific challenges. In clustering the 
essays in this way the editors underscore the fact that sacrifice never occurs 
in isolation – it is always constructed, deployed, and negotiated in rich social 
circumstances.
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The case studies in this volume also display the broad range of data avail-
able to scholars of sacrifice. Most obviously, these essays discuss a wide vari-
ety of religious sacrificial traditions, including Vedic-Hinduism (Nugteren), 
early Christianity (Rouwhorst), Catholicism (Poorthuis), Judaism (Lyons, 
Wallet, Wetter), Islam (Wallet, Ljamai) and that of the Kapsiki/Higi in North 
Cameroon (Van Beek). In addition, the authors vary widely in the types of data 
they address. Certain authors draw on historical texts, such as Poorthuis’s dis-
cussion of Gertrud von le Fort’s account of the execution of Carmelite nuns 
during the French Revolution. Others join in contemporary philosophical 
and theological debates (Nistelrooy, Wulf). Certain authors draw on creative 
works. Prevoo examines Friedrich Hölderlin’s eighteenth century tragedy Der 
Tod des Empedocles, while Coenradie explores Harry Potter and the Deathly 
Hallows and several novels by Shūsako Endō. Two essays focus on modern 
films: DePoortere addresses Andrei Tarkovsky’s 1986 film The Sacrifice. Dresen 
explores contemporary popular culture in her study of the Twilight vampire 
saga. Finally, some authors address issues of contemporary concern. Gender is 
a key issue in Derks’s study of the Grail movement, while De Wit explores rheto-
ric used in justifying self-sacrifice on behalf of one’s country. Van Goelst Meijer 
examines sacrifice in the context of conversations regarding nonviolence.
The breadth of data presented here invites us to reimagine the substance, 
the nature, and the purpose of sacrifice in its countless manifestations. In so 
doing, the essays in this volume challenge us to infuse our theorizing about 
sacrifice with the same richness and complexity we find in sacrifice itself. We 
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